

troublesome here to see a series of propositions made by authors who seem to be certain that they have all the answers: if any of them harbors any doubts, this never becomes apparent. Seeing the world in Manichean terms, with the world of goodness pitted against that of evil, they monochromatically tend to ignore such questions as what may legitimately bother "the other side" about the United States and its allies; whether the record of Soviet failures and "muddling through" does not belie the assumptions of diabolical purposefulness; and what the assumption of a worst-case scenario may do about conjuring up self-fulfilling prophecies.

More specifically, with regard to Soviet reality, there is a consistent failure throughout this volume to recognize any diversity of Soviet perceptions and operational objectives, any evolution or conflicts, any Soviet mind sets or arguments which—however widely held—cannot be publicly spelled out in Moscow because they imply a clash with the "classics" of Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet learning process and emancipation from "ideological blinders" have been gradual and uneven, but they have been real. To say that nothing essential has changed since the Cold War (let alone the "Mongol yoke") is both to misread the present and to prejudice the future.

The world, as it emerges from these pages, is a simple one; the theme is given by the title and subtitle of the book: the need for "defending America" in a post-détente world. Hence, we are told more about one strand of current American perceptions than about the real world.

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THE TROUBLED DÉTENTE. By *Albert L. Weeks*. Introduction by *Gene Sosin*. New York: New York University Press, 1976. xxiv, 190 pp.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND DÉTENTE. Foreword by *General Andrew J. Goodpaster*. With contributions by faculty members of the U.S. Army War College. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1976. xxiv, 360 pp. \$10.00, cloth. \$6.95, paper.

Books and articles dealing with definitions, history, complexities, and prospects of "détente" continue to flow off the presses. The term "détente," at one time fairly precise in its meaning in international diplomacy—a reduction or relaxation in tensions between nations—has come to be used to encompass almost all aspects of contemporary international politics. It has little descriptive or analytical utility left, but remains convenient as shorthand in the discussion of the ramifications of East-West relations. Writers of the most diverse qualifications and from many academic disciplines participate in the discussion, with specialists in Soviet affairs perhaps the least numerous among them. The two volumes under review are examples of the many studies currently available.

Albert L. Weeks approaches the subject from the perspective of a Soviet specialist. He traces largely familiar aspects of Soviet doctrine on relations with capitalist countries from Lenin to the mid-1970s. His emphasis is on continuing, underlying elements, though he notes fluctuations in operational Soviet policies over the decades. One of his theses, that substantial shifts in Soviet policy toward the West were evident at the time of Stalin's death twenty-five years ago, has been previously explored in greater detail by other scholars, notably by Marshall Shulman. Nevertheless, Weeks's book provides a useful if selective updating through the Twenty-fifth Party Congress. It suffers somewhat from its concentration on the Soviet view and from a lack of judgment concerning the success or failure of Soviet purposes. The discussion of American policy choices, found toward the end of the book, is relatively

cursorily and frequently hortatory. Unfortunately, there are also signs of hurried editing: errors in dates of major events, such as the Glassboro meeting between President Johnson and Chairman Kosygin in 1967 and the conclusion of the quadripartite agreement on Berlin in 1971; and other factual slips (the Twenty-fifth Party Congress was the third, not the second, CPSU congress held after the fall of Khrushchev in 1964). And while the book contains a brief bibliography, the frequent quotations from Soviet materials are often inadequately referenced. These technical flaws apart, the book presents some able argumentation for a skeptical view of the prospects for enduring cooperative relations between East and West.

National Security and Détente, in addition to General Goodpaster's thoughtful essay on the ambiguities of the American-Soviet relationship, contains seventeen separate contributions by members of the faculty of the Army War College and its subordinate departments. They range widely over geographical and functional aspects of contemporary international politics. Perhaps it is paradoxical that a book originating at a military institution should contain only one technical chapter—General Atkeson's discussion of the potential of precision-guided munitions for Western defense. Unfortunately, for a reader in 1978, this competent assessment antedates the controversy over cruise missiles which has complicated the SALT negotiations since 1975, and the controversy over possible deployment of the neutron bomb. As of early 1975, General Atkeson seemed to see some merit in notions of denuclearizing central Europe because of the enhanced feasibility of conventional defense; it would be interesting to see an updated judgment of this possibility.

The volume contains a brief but instructive historical review of phases of détente in Great-Power relationships during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Most of the phases turned out to be relatively short-lived, but this was not necessarily disadvantageous for the parties concerned. The three authors of this contribution wisely warn against drawing oversimplified conclusions from the past, and their own final caution—that in any détente process adaptable policies are constantly called for—is a sensible one.

For the Soviet specialist, the Army War College volume contains few new insights into Soviet policies and motivations, but it provides a stimulating cross-fertilization with other specialties and disciplines. It brings home the fact that the study of U.S.-Soviet relations in our time must be interdisciplinary, historical as well as forward-looking, concerned not only with the objectives of the actors but with the results of actions and interactions, and conscious that the purposes of the superpowers are increasingly subject to influences beyond their control.

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MOSKAU UND DIE EUROPÄISCHE INTEGRATION. By *Eberhard Schulz*.

Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft, vol. 38. Munich and Vienna: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1975. 267 pp. DM 59.

The establishment of a European Community in postwar Western Europe, and its subsequent sporadic but consequential development, has been followed with watchful concern in the Soviet Union. It is likely that the precipitant formation of a political union or of an integrated defense community possessing independent nuclear capability would have provoked a stern Soviet response. Instead, with gradual neofunctionalist integration in the economic sector, Moscow has learned to coexist peacefully and even to entertain notions of collaboration.