

also expresses the view that "Stalin provoked the aggression" (p. 456) against Russia by his own designs on Finland and Bulgaria, but this assumption appears inconsistent with Fischer's finding that Hitler had already decided on the last day of July 1940 that "Russia must be disposed of. Spring 1941" (p. 427). Some of his conclusions come more from intuitive judgment than from a thorough examination of documents, and one wishes that he had relied on original archives of the German Foreign Office rather than their selective translations published by the Department of State.

Fischer is at his best in the analysis of Soviet foreign policy in the period he witnessed in Russia in the 1920s when he had access to documents that probably no other Western author was permitted to see and also to such key statesmen as Chicherin. His vignette profiles of leading figures in the global political struggle between the USSR and the "imperialist" world make most refreshing reading. His interviews with principal actors in the drama add to the authenticity of his writing, and his style is, as one would expect, superb. The book may be controversial in some aspects, but it is that quality, combined with a sense of objectivity, that makes it thought-provoking and exciting reading for persons who are already well advanced in their knowledge of the complex story of Soviet foreign policy.

JOSEF KORBEL  
*University of Denver*

SOVIET-AMERICAN RIVALRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by J. C. Hurewitz. New York, Washington, and London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. vi, 250 pp. \$7.00.

The dramatic events that occurred in the Middle East in May and June 1967 have been received in the West with mixed emotions. Although encouraged by the reluctance of the superpowers to pursue an open collision course, observers found little to reassure them in the inability of the United States and the Soviet Union to influence the actions of their respective clients. Even more disquieting has been Moscow's subsequent determination to back the intransigence of its radical friends in Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad.

This volume is based on sixteen papers by prominent specialists in Soviet and Middle Eastern affairs which were presented at a conference held at Columbia University in December 1968. Organized by Professor J. C. Hurewitz (under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science), the conference proposed "to outline the scope of Soviet-American rivalry in the Middle East, to set forth the problems the two nations face in their rivalry, to measure its impact upon the region, and to assess the results of alternative policies that these two powers may pursue in the decade ahead" (p. v). The book is divided into four parts dealing with the topics "Struggle for Military Supremacy," "Economic Competition in the 1970s," "Cultural Contest," and "Quest for Stability."

Space limitations make it impossible to analyze the various papers. Suffice it to say that most contributions are lucidly written and display penetrating insights into the topics discussed. By way of a general observation, it might be noted that the problem of United States and Soviet interests in the Middle East (i.e., what they really are as contrasted to what the superpowers perceive them to be) should have been examined in the light of the benefits that Washington and Moscow are actually deriving from their involvement in the area. This approach is sometimes dismissed as indulgence in a purely academic exercise. But to argue in this vein is to miss

an important point. As noted by John C. Campbell, a general détente in the Middle East might be brought into the realm of the possible if the Soviet leaders (and their U.S. counterparts) came to the conclusion that the region was not crucial to their vital national interests (p. 215).

In any event, most contributors take a pessimistic view of the possibility of a superpower détente in the Middle East and, by implication, in the rest of the world as well. This is the more distressing in that recent revolutionary developments in arms technology, coupled with the rapidly growing problems of population, food scarcity, and the preservation of the environment (to name but a few), make Soviet-American cooperation desirable, if not absolutely vital. All in all, the volume is an important and valuable contribution to a better understanding of the Middle East in the coming decade.

O. M. SMOLANSKY  
*Lehigh University*

CASTRO, THE KREMLIN, AND COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA. By  
*D. Bruce Jackson*. Studies in International Affairs, no. 9. Baltimore: Johns  
Hopkins Press, 1969. viii, 163 pp. \$6.50, cloth. \$2.45, paper.

This book is a useful study of what the author, a United States Foreign Service officer, calls the "coming of age of 'Fidelismo' in the world communist movement" (p. 1) between 1964 and early 1967. It deals primarily with the November 1964 Conference of Latin American Communist Parties held in Havana, at which Fidel Castro committed himself to working with the pro-Soviet parties in Latin America; the January 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Havana, which the author feels marked the emergence of an independent Cuban policy toward Latin American revolutionaries; and the scathing denunciations of many pro-Soviet parties in late 1966 and early 1967 by Castro and his semiofficial spokesman of that period, Régis Debray. Two chapters are devoted to the Communist Party of Venezuela and its turn during these years from armed to peaceful struggle, the dissension this shift caused among Venezuelan Communists and leftists generally, and the important role this "tactical retreat" played in the development of Soviet-Cuban-Latin American Communist relations.

Yet this book is not all that its title and some portions of the text claim, namely, a general study of Castro, the Soviet Union, and communism in Latin America. It falls short of being an adequate general study on several counts. It fails to give an accurate picture of Soviet-Cuban relations during most of the decade because of its concentration on precisely that period when tensions were unusually great. Furthermore, it does not give a clear overview of Soviet and Cuban relations with Latin American Communists even during the 1964-67 period, since it zeroes in too much on the Venezuelan experience. Equally serious, if not lengthy, consideration of Soviet and Cuban policies toward Communists and guerrilla groups in such countries as Chile, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Uruguay would have strengthened many of the generalizations drawn from the Venezuelan dispute, and it would also have demonstrated a complexity and flexibility, especially in the policies of the Soviet Union, that is lost in the present work. Finally, a general study would have required a more careful evaluation of the influence of Communist China, as well as of pro-Chinese and even Trotskyist groups in Latin America, on Soviet and Cuban policies.

This book has no index and a bibliography that is too short to be of much use. Although some good references are found in the footnotes at the end of the book,