

# CARIBBEAN PATHS IN THE DARK

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- PEACE, DEVELOPMENT, AND SECURITY IN THE CARIBBEAN.* Edited by Anthony T. Bryan, J. Edward Greene, and Timothy M. Shaw. (New York: St. Martin's, 1990. Pp. 332. \$55.00.)
- GUYANA.* Volume 96, World Bibliographical Series. By Frances Chambers. (Oxford: Clio, 1989. Pp. 206. \$36.00.)
- GRENADA: REVOLUTION IN REVERSE.* By James Ferguson. (London: Latin American Bureau, 1990. Pp. 138. \$8.00.)
- THE TROUBLED AND THE TROUBLING CARIBBEAN.* Edited by Roy Glasgow and Winston Langley. (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1989. Pp. 347. \$59.95.)
- A REVOLUTION ABORTED: THE LESSONS OF GRENADA.* Edited by Jorge Heine. (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990. Pp. 351. \$34.95.)
- ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN.* By Kempe Ronald Hope. (New York: Praeger, 1986. Pp. 215. \$39.95.)
- URBAN POVERTY IN THE CARIBBEAN.* By Michel S. Laguerre. (New York: St. Martin's, 1990. Pp. 181. \$45.00.)
- MICHAEL MANLEY: THE MAKING OF A LEADER.* By Darrell E. Levi. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990. Pp. 349. \$29.95.)
- CARIBBEAN PERSPECTIVES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF A REGION.* Volume 1. Edited by Joseph Lisowski. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1991. Pp. 214. \$19.95.)
- ETNICIDAD, CLASES Y NACION EN LA CULTURA POLITICA DEL CARIBE DE HABLA INGLESA.* By Andrés Serbín. (Caracas: Biblioteca de la Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1977. Pp. 477.)
- GUYANA: POLITICS IN A PLANTATION SOCIETY.* By Chaitram Singh. (New York: Praeger, 1988. Pp. 160. \$37.95.)

The paths to social and economic development in the Caribbean are poorly lit and not very promising. One path appears well lit and productive, but once taken, the lights go out and one can find no way back. A second path, although dark and full of brambles, reveals some light in the distance producing shiny reflections—but does the light recede when one moves toward it? A third path proves to be not a path at all but a clearing. There, blinded in each other's glare, travelers seem locked in perennial

struggle. The fourth path offers little in material terms except adversity, although it does so equitably and with some illumination. Many travelers leave it altogether to seek brighter and more comfortable futures elsewhere. From “elsewhere” (part of which is found in the Caribbean), one studies the problem of the paths in relative comfort and under the artificial light of a different history.

The presence or promise of bounty along the Caribbean paths varies, but not by much. The heyday of plantation agriculture and lucrative production of bauxite and other raw materials has been replaced by the more uncertain day of tourism and labor-intensive “production-sharing” in the region’s new free-trade zones. But the terms of trade—whether in single-crop or twin-plant economies—have always been unkind to local development.

If economic dilemmas in the Caribbean are fairly uniform, problems of national identity are not. The light of national identity either glows from within or is reflected from without or flickers in the geopolitical winds. In relation to the resource base and the path chosen for development, it would seem that “light” would be generated by any successful local utilization of resources that substantially benefits the population at large. How does the “light” on path number one suddenly “go out”? How does the “light” on path number two recede? How do the “blinding” and “artificial lights” affect development potential? A current batch of books on the Caribbean offers some suggestions.

The titles range widely. At one extreme are a micro-level analysis of two slums in Fort-de-France, Martinique, and a random collection of policy studies in the U.S. and British Virgin Islands. The batch also includes more systematic national-development histories of Guyana, Jamaica, and Grenada. Finally, there are studies and collections on the English-speaking Caribbean (on ethnic politics and development strategies) and on the Caribbean as a whole (viewed in terms of regional security and global geopolitics).

The most scholarly and informative of the group is the volume edited by Jorge Heine, of the Centro Latinoamericano de Economía y Política Internacional in Santiago, Chile, and the University of Puerto Rico. Quite remarkably, Heine and his collaborators have added a very useful book to the already crowded shelf of studies on the Grenadian Revolution and its destruction.<sup>1</sup> Earlier versions of these essays were presented in

1. Earlier volumes include Hugh O’Shaughnessy, *Grenada: Revolution, Invasion, and Aftermath* (London: Sphere, 1984); Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton, and Tony Thorndike, *Grenada: Revolution and Invasion* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1984); Paul Seaburg and Walter A. McDougall, *The Grenada Papers* (San Francisco, Calif.: Institute of Contemporary Studies Press, 1984); Tony Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics, and Society* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1985); Kai P. Schoenhals and Richard A. Melanson, *Revolution and Intervention in Grenada: The New Jewel Movement, the United States, and the Caribbean* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985);

1985 at the Inter-American University in Puerto Rico. Among the more innovative studies is Arend Lijphart's examination of the stultifying effects of the Westminster parliamentary system on developmental efforts in small societies and his suggestions on how to adopt more appropriate electoral systems.

Heine urges reconsideration of the objectives and options chosen in the Grenadian Revolution. The country's "non-capitalist path to development," he argues, involved "removing as much as possible imperialist influence and control over the economy, the raising of the standard of living of the mass of the population, an increased participation of the people in political and economic decision-making, and an ambitious program of the people, which will also heighten their socialist consciousness" (p. 6). In discussing Maurice Bishop's approach in terms of a "much more incrementalist and cautious path" to socialism, Heine sets for his authors the task of appraising the Grenadian achievements and interrupted prospects in terms that are more congenial to contemporary development debates and theory.

Tony Thorndike leads off by summarizing the background of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) before it overthrew the government of Eric Gairy. The strategy of "cooperative self-reliance" had already been elaborated by the NJM in 1973, inspired by Julius Nyerere's "Ujamaa" (community socialism) in Tanzania. In Guyana and Jamaica, too, explorations of cooperative development and national economic assertion were attracting widespread support. The sense of relative deprivation throughout the Caribbean was undeniable in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Tapped by systematic "groundings with the brothers," as Walter Rodney demonstrated in the late 1960s in Kingston, Jamaica,<sup>2</sup> this feeling might be harnessed for more ambitious national development strategies than the prevalent "industrialization by invitation" (to foreign investors). But mobilization clearly came first. As Thorndike describes the situation, "The national democratic bourgeoisie had to lead the struggle for socialism within a multiclass alliance. Through mobilization, education, and emulation, progressive elements in other strata, notably the peasantry and the nascent proletariat, would join them. As the economy and society became more socialistic, these formerly disadvantaged strata would gradually assume dominance and, ultimately, dictatorship" (p. 36). Once in power, the regime tried to institutionalize "groundings" with the grass roots. But according to Thorndike, this effort, the decision to delay elections and the drafting of

Jay Mandle, *Big Revolution, Small Country* (Lanham, Md.: North-South Publishing, 1985); Gordon K. Lewis, *Grenada: The Jewel Despoiled* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); and *The Caribbean after Grenada: Revolution, Conflict, and Democracy*, edited by Scott B. MacDonald et al. (New York: Praeger, 1988).

2. See Walter Rodney, *The Groundings with My Brothers* (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture, 1969).

a constitution, and the NJM's selectivity of membership all manifested a Leninist impulse. Ironically, "if an election had been held, especially in the first four months of the regime," he says, "the NJM would have won a very handsome victory" (p. 45).

Political tactics aside, what was the transformational mission of the NJM? The cultural goal, Paget Henry explains, involved "the determined effort to end bourgeois domination of the cultural system and to make the culture of the masses more central to the system" (p. 51). He reports some measurable success in reducing stratification and the attitudes that maintain it. But the contradiction between state power and popular power, Henry suggests, would ultimately have grown and occasioned crisis.

The NJM's economic performance is carefully assessed and compared with other members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) by Wallace Joefield-Napier. Agricultural production in Grenada rose steadily from 1980 to 1983, primarily due to diversification away from the traditional crops (bananas, cocoa, nutmeg, and mace). Construction increased dramatically, largely due to the controversial airport project. Manufacturing and government services remained about where they had been under Eric Gairy. Much of the developmental bottleneck confronting the revolutionaries derived from manpower limitations and from civil-service resistance to politicization. Distribution of aggregate income showed "a definite, though mild trend of improvement . . . associated with higher levels of employment in the public sector, including the military" (p. 100). A measure of price inflation is also noted—almost twice that of the preceding Gairy regime—partly due to measures taken to regulate imports.

In comparison with other OECS states, Grenada's performance in these brief years was not that remarkable. Its growth rate in gross domestic product per year between 1980 and 1983 was 2.4 percent, the same as St. Kitts, better than St. Lucia and Antigua, but lower than that of Dominica and St. Vincent. This finding does not render the Grenadian model less attractive, however. Completion of the Point Salines Airport and subsequent expansion of tourism would have rewarded the diversification of agricultural and other production by substantially enlarging the domestic market.

Although James Ferguson's goal in *Grenada: Revolution in Reverse* is to document the economic malaise that has followed the collapse of the New Jewel Movement, this study also provides useful data on the regime's land reform, cooperative and food-processing activities, and cooperation with Indonesia to cartelize the production and sale of nutmeg. Ferguson cites a 1982 World Bank memorandum that credits the NJM with taking "a deteriorating economy" and "addressing the task of rehabilitation and of laying better foundations for growth within the framework of a mixed economy . . ." (cited on p. 74).

Heine admits in his introduction that "the richness of the Grena-

dian Revolution . . . defies easy categorization." He draws sharp contrasts between the openness of the regime (whatever its alleged intentions) and the Communist standard and between the regime's low-budget expenditures (29 percent of GDP) and "the welfare states of northern Europe" (p. 23). Heine suggests that "the noncapitalist path provided the revolutionary leadership with a most appropriate theoretical tool kit to chart the course of the revolution" (p. 24).

Why, then, did the New Jewel regime collapse? Heine answers this question in terms of "the compulsive behavior of Bernard Coard [Bishop's principal lieutenant] and the inadequacy of Maurice Bishop's response to it," which Heine terms "a failure of political leadership of the highest order" (p. 24). In another essay, Heine ascribes Bishop's downfall to his lieutenants' sense that charisma and "one-manism" could not reliably guide and buttress the reforms being sought. His aides preferred to institutionalize the revolution in a "faceless apparat" of collective leadership. The attitude of some of Bishop's inner circle must have indeed been doctrinaire. But although Bishop may have tried his best to be accommodating, he was also believed to be about to change course procedurally, to draft a constitution and hold elections. The apparat's fear that such changes would dilute its control ultimately led to Bishop's arrest and death.

Transcripts of NJM meetings on the eve of this showdown confirm the extent of this tension. But what was also at work, and what Heine neglects to mention or appraise, was the influence of the United States in trying to strangle the regime through manipulating loans, spreading political propaganda, putting pressure on Grenada's Eastern Caribbean neighbors, and conducting military exercises nearby (which were suggestively code-named "Amber and the Amberdines"). The lack of speculation about the U.S. role in an otherwise rich body of speculative analysis results in undue emphasis on idiosyncratic rather than political, economic, and geopolitical factors. It is said that some people have reason to be paranoid. The tragedy for Grenada is that both the New Jewel Movement and its leaders became dysfunctionally paranoid as the pressure grew.

Robert Pastor's "The United States and Grenada: Who Pushed First and Why?" ticks off some of the first moves by the NJM and the Jimmy Carter administration (in which Pastor served as Latin American specialist on the U.S. National Security Council). Bishop and Coard, like most other politically active West Indian leaders, had been schooled well in Caribbean-centered history. They understood the risk of holding elections too soon in the wake of a takeover (whatever the accuracy of Thorn-dike's postprediction), especially in such close proximity to a wealthy and unsympathetic superpower. Bishop and Coard also feared the prospect of filibustering expeditions from (or funded by) the United States on behalf of ousted leader Eric Gairy. Shocked by the first unconstitutional change of government in the area, leaders of the Eastern Caribbean states met in

Barbados a week after the coup to coordinate policies. The United States followed their cautious extension of recognition with U.S. recognition, but as Pastor observes, the “embrace” was virtually “empty” on both sides (p. 187).

At the same time, an embrace by Cuban technical and military advisors in Jamaica made the Carter and Reagan administrations see “red.” Pastor alludes to the “Amber and Amberdines” exercises as “the largest NATO military maneuvers in the Caribbean ever” and to the Reagan administration’s threat to stop funding the Caribbean Development Bank if it made loans to Grenada (p. 209), but he is unwilling to credit these actions with the subsequent destabilization of the NJM. Carl Stone (in the collection edited by Roy Glasgow and Winston Langley) puts the matter more bluntly: “Open hostility by the United States pushed Grenada into a search for close Eastern European ties, which had the self-fulfilling effect of intensifying U.S. aggression” (p. 133). But no one contemplates the toll that such a confrontational atmosphere might have taken on the Grenadian principals themselves. One can only wonder what a “warmer embrace” by the United States of a government on a noncapitalist path might have produced.

Glasgow and Langley’s *The Troubled and the Troubling Caribbean* is a more random collection of essays examining policy alternatives in the Caribbean. Some, like the Stone article cited above, manifest consideration and cautious approval of the noncapitalist path. Others are more oblique. For example, after examining the interlocking of economic development and gender issues in the Caribbean, George Pottinger concludes, “there is no liberation without development, and no development without liberation” (p. 20). Lancelles Anderson and Trevor Turner, in a critique of Jamaican schools, point out that “education is more a dependent variable of the economic system than a cause of economic growth.” They argue instead for a “correspondence approach” in which “the education system’s social relations and those of the production system are brought into accord with one another” (pp. 36–37). The model for this approach, they suggest, was the first Manley government in Jamaica (1972–1980), another regime that experimented with taking a noncapitalist path.

Stone’s reflections on Jamaican, Grenadian, and Guyanese socialism point out that traditional Marxist thought has little relevance to the development problems of small dependent societies. Because “colonialism, dependence, and imperialism have left a legacy of an undeveloped productive capacity,” they can either take a “no-frills” approach, avoiding excesses of materialism to maximize autonomy and organize production for the basic needs of the majority classes, or work within the capitalist market economy while maintaining high levels of state regulation or ownership or both (p. 129). Grenada seemed headed in the first direction, and Stone places Manley’s Jamaica and Guyana in the second. But because of

the “geopolitical hazards” demonstrated in the “no-frills” approach, Stone concludes that “without an Eastern bloc connection, there is little prospect of developing a basic-needs economy and surviving a scaling down of Western capitalist trade or financial and technological dependence . . .” (p. 141).

What will happen to this proposition now? With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the Eastern bloc, the United States may be capable of giving alternative development models a fairer hearing. Although small states like those in the Caribbean can never hope to develop autonomously of the world economic system, Stone contends that they can—and must—exert stronger internal management:

The ability to diversify exports, the quality of labor and management to compete in international markets or to produce food and basic goods import-substitutes, the ability to retain hard currency earned, the capacity to adapt technology to break into capital goods production and light industry, the commitment of capitalists to plough back profits into production rather than siphon it into Miami banks or luxury living are just some of the factors that will more greatly influence development and survival prospects in the Caribbean than the factor of ideology (socialist or capitalist). (P. 144)

According to Darrell Levi, Jamaican voters are highly rational in perceiving economic problems yet are prone to create an irrational hero-Messiah complex around their leaders. Levi’s richly informed biography of Michael Manley demonstrates the tension between these two forces: the one, a clear understanding of Jamaica’s legacy of dependent plantation development; the other a reflection of near hopelessness in overcoming it. Coming to power in 1972, Manley’s “populist” program emphasized equality, social justice, self-reliance, and discipline (p. 133). Moves in the name of “democratic socialism”—such as taxing agricultural lands not in full production, extending secondary education opportunities to the poor, making an international cartel of bauxite, instituting the National Youth Service, and other measures—may have been attempts to give Jamaicans a heroic self-image. That goal was assisted, at least initially, by the tremendous opposition that Manley’s reforms encountered among local and foreign elites. His allies in the People’s National Party did not always agree on priorities, especially after his reinvoking the party’s early Fabian goal of “democratic socialism,” his leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement’s proposal for a New International Economic Order, and his frequent attacks on international capitalism (p. 176). Violent efforts to influence the 1976 elections (possibly orchestrated from Washington) backfired, but the strains within the PNP only worsened, foreshadowing a similar reaction to outside pressures in Grenada.

Levi writes that Manley’s legacy in this period “contained substantial achievements that critics often minimize or ignore” and that “the [economic] reform effort was soon swamped by a long list of circumstances

beyond his government's control" (pp. 261–62). Social reform "was heroic in its pursuit of social justice, but necessarily constrained by economic and political realities" (p. 263). Manley's return to power in 1989 did not result from an ideologically charged campaign. He could let the worsening of conditions under his conservative rival, Edward Seaga, speak for themselves. But Manley's caution in the campaign, and in his second government thus far, suggests great reluctance to embark again on a nationalist, noncapitalist path.

In contrast to Grenada and Jamaica, the English-speaking Caribbean's other "socialist" experience occurred in name only. Carl Stone (in the Glasgow-Langley volume) says of the People's National Congress in Guyana, "No matching advances in social policy accompanied the socialist thrust in Guyana, thereby supporting the view that the PNC's leadership was merely using the socialist ideology as a cover to legitimizing state capitalism and self-enrichment by corrupt party leaders" (p. 140). In *Guyana: Politics in a Plantation Society*, Chaitram Singh methodically retraces the country's history, terrain that many other writers have traversed as well.<sup>3</sup> Singh observes that the adoption of a program of "cooperative socialism," suggested by PNC activist Eusi Kwayana as a way of getting the Afro-Guyanese back to the land, was attractive to PNC leader Forbes Burnham as "an innocuous form of socialism" that could lure voters away from his more Marxist East Indian rival, Cheddi Jagan (p. 48). Nationalizations of mining and agricultural enterprises merely increased the PNC's partisan ability to reward its followers. Disgusted with PNC corruption and Jagan's apparent willingness to resign himself to a politics of ethnicity, Kwayana later joined with Walter Rodney and others in the multi-ethnic Working People's Alliance. Dictatorial manipulations of communications, assemblies, and elections rendered all contestation ineffective, while economic stagnation worsened conditions for the poor. IMF pressures and labor agitation permitted Burnham to punish the workers and be rewarded at the same time—when in 1983 he reduced the work force by about one-third (p. 110). Given Burnham's periodic overtures to Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China, one wonders why U.S.

3. See, for example, Edward Greene, *Race versus Politics in Guyana* (Mona, Jamaica: University of the West Indies, 1974); Robert H. Manley, *Guyana Emergent: The Post-Independence Struggle for Non-Dependent Development* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1982); Henry B. Jeffrey and Colin Baber, *Guyana: Politics, Economics, and Society: Beyond the Burnham Era* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1986); Thomas J. Spinner, Jr., *A Political and Social History of Guyana, 1945–1983* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984); Leo A. Despres, *Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guyana* (Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally, 1967); Percy C. Hintzen, *The Costs of Regime Survival: Racial Mobilization, Elite Domination, and Control of the State in Guyana and Trinidad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Andrés Serbín, *Nacionalismo, etnicidad y política en la República Cooperativa de Guyana* (Caracas: Bruguera, 1981); Rita Giacalone de Romero, *Estudio histórico de la Guyana Británica* (Mérida, Venezuela: Corpoandes, 1982); and *Guyana Hoy*, edited by Giacalone de Romero (Mérida: Corpoandes, 1982).



destabilization efforts (once deemed so essential to get rid of Jagan) were not directed against Burnham. Or was Burnham's radicalism simply an act? Cooperative socialism certainly was.

Frances Chambers's bibliography *Guyana* will be useful in getting the reader started on the subject. Some major sources are surprisingly absent, however, including Gordon Lewis's pathbreaking survey of the West Indies<sup>4</sup> and the works of David Lowenthal and Lambros Comitas.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, Chambers cites only current newspaper titles. For research purposes, some of the older publications (such as the *Guyana Graphic* and the *Daily Argosy*) should be mentioned, even if they have since closed (or been closed). Perhaps most significantly, reference should have been made to *Caribbean Contact*, the voice of the Caribbean Council of Churches and the single best source of continuing information on Guyana outside the country.

Among the more general studies under review here are examinations of economic development, security issues, and ethnic relations. Kempe Ronald Hope's *Economic Development in the Caribbean* compares economic development strategies and outcomes in Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Decrying "the extent to which Caribbean politicians and their advisors understate or ignore the real costs of using a purely ideological framework to achieve developmental goals," Hope nevertheless advocates a "basic needs" criterion by which an integrated strategy might be constructed (p. vii). But his analysis here focuses more on recent rather than future performance and seldom proceeds beyond restating the statistical data that fill every other page. Political contexts and anecdotal or investigative description of the developmental decisions are unfortunately missing.

Hope nevertheless provides a useful analysis of the costly illusion of industrial growth inherent in the import-substitution strategy (especially for small countries like these) as well as a sobering reflection on CARICOM's limited stimulus to interregional trade. He is not pleased at the prospect of steadily rising short-term "international debt peonage": the portion of external debt falling due in five years or less soared to some 50 percent in 1980 and is undoubtedly higher still today (p. 176). Hope notes in his conclusion that the NJM approach, by "involving the wider mobilization of the people within country councils and village assemblies," succeeded in "restoring order to the country's finances and econ-

4. Gordon Lewis, *The Growth of the Modern West Indies* (New York: Monthly Review, 1968).

5. David Lowenthal's *West Indian Societies* provides contextual data on the West Indies, and Guyana in particular, combined with a rich bibliography. See Lowenthal, *West Indian Societies* (New York: Oxford, 1972). A number of pieces on Guyana can also be found in Lowenthal and Lambros Comitas's three-volume reader, *West Indian Perspectives* (New York: Doubleday, 1973).

omy by eliminating corruption and waste and by establishing effective control of recurrent expenditure" (p. 199). The danger of a large bureaucracy degenerating into a party patronage machine, as demonstrated in Singh's study, can only be checked by some kind of devolution of power to the grass roots.

The volume entitled *Peace, Development, and Security in the Caribbean*, edited by Anthony Bryan, Edward Greene, and Timothy Shaw, aspires to draw a bead on the future in terms of geopolitics, development problems, and adjustment strategies of small states. As with the Heine volume, the list of contributors is impressive. Yet the fading of the bipolar system may render the book's geopolitical and security-oriented focus somewhat moot, while the development essays consist of strained paradigms (possibly appropriate for the classroom) or superficial warnings against radicalism combined with pious assertions of the need for mutual respect, multilateral solidarity, and "comparative study of foreign policy-making."

There are exceptions. Anthony Maingot recounts how a group of West Indian leaders confronted President Ronald Reagan while he was vacationing in Barbados to reject his warning talk about Grenadian radicalism. This kind of solidarity, also demonstrated in the energetic use by Eastern Caribbean leaders of the regional security arrangements later urged on them by Washington, may manage "to reduce some of the more deleterious effects of the asymmetry of [geopolitical] power" (p. 79). Venezuelan, Mexican, Cuban, Canadian, and European interests in the Caribbean are discussed in separate articles, but even when added together, they offer no substantial counterpoise to U.S. influence (or even to the massed voice of the mini-states themselves).

Andrés Serbín's extensive study, *Etnicidad, clases y nación en la cultura política del Caribe de habla inglesa*, reviews much of the literature on cultural pluralism and its application to ethnic and class relations in the building of West Indian societies. Basically an analytical history, this work follows the development of racism as ideology in the plantation society through the social transformations that followed emancipation and decolonization. A patriotic light was generated among Jamaicans by Marcus Garvey and even by the Rastafarians with their message of initiative, self-affirmation, and self-reliance. Reflected light glistened in Barbados where the identity of "Little England" gave Bajans a feeling of superiority over their Caribbean neighbors. "Apanjaat" politics (advocating support for "your own kind") was an ugly consequence of the deliberate assembly of these artificial societies by the colonial powers. Overcoming or perhaps broadening apanjaat to the level of the nation has not been helped in Trinidad or Guyana by Westminster rules of political contestation, and the U.S.-preferred development policy of "industrialization by invitation" merely reproduced the colonial hierarchies within independent states.

Serbín closes with his own review of the Grenadian case: whatever the causes of the New Jewel Movement's failure, the evolution of the NJM from a movement inspired by Black Power to a more class-conscious organization illustrates the capacity for ideological growth in populist movements. Serbín laments, however, the NJM's persecution of local Grenadian Rastas as if they were somehow an eyesore on the noncapitalist path (p. 397).

Seldom-heard voices from the Virgin Islands (both U.S. and British) are assembled in a magazine-like volume under the editorship of Joseph Lisowski. The topics in *Caribbean Perspectives: The Social Structure of a Region* range from health and educational programs to linguistics and politics. For purposes of this review, the most interesting pieces deal with attitudes toward dialect use and public opinion on the status options of the U.S. Virgin Islands (U.S.V.I.). Vincent Cooper and Ben Kowing surveyed attitudes there toward various Caribbean dialects and "versions of standard English," finding that dialect use is believed to convey lower levels of education, ambition, honesty, and even friendliness. The stereotypes of the plural society are clearly still alive. Frank Mills's political research found almost universal public confusion about the U.S.V.I.'s present status as "unincorporated territory," and "not sure" was by far the leading response regarding status options.

The U.S.V.I., Puerto Rico, the Netherlands Antilles, the French Overseas Departments, the British Virgin Islands, and other dependencies all enjoy the highest per capita levels of gross domestic product and standards of living in the region. Yet the distribution of income is often as skewed and unsettling as in the independent states. On Martinique, Michel Laguerre examined the living conditions and social networks in two slums in the capital, Fort-de-France. He concludes, "The reproduction of inequality is part of a larger process, that of the reproduction of the state" (p. 160). Laguerre considers various paths out of poverty: "basic needs" programs, industrialization by invitation, money transfers, specific remedial intervention (especially featuring new housing initiatives and demolition of slums), and urban deconcentration (creating new towns in rural areas to retard urban migration). The last possibility, he cautiously suggests, might do the most to help. As an example, Laguerre points to the reorientation of social development in Cuba away from Havana to the countryside.

Government decision making regarding a country's development requires much more than the choice of an appropriate path to take. It must respond both to basic needs and to capacities. It must achieve a perceived balance between sovereign independence and fruitful interdependence. Decisions also have to be explained (and sold) intelligently at home and abroad. And decision making must be micro-managed with honesty, skill, and imagination. It is probably a fate as eternal as the gospels to

expect abiding poverty in the golden lands of the Caribbean. But when the poor are flooding around decision makers, resignation must give way to action. There is no shortage of ideas on how to generate development in the Caribbean. But the conditions for such development are daunting.