Contents

Acknowledgements			
	Introdu	ction	I
	0.1	Game Plan	2
PA	RT I TH	E EPISTEMOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF RESIST.	ANCE
ТО	EVIDEN	ICE	
I	Resistan	ice to Evidence: Triggers and Epistemic Status	9
	1.1	Resistance to Evidence	9
	1.2	The Social Psychology of Evidence Resistance	ΙI
	1.3	Rejecting Evidence: A Taxonomy	16
	1.4	Conclusion	22
2	Evidenc	e One Has and the Impermissibility of Resistance	23
		Evidence Internalism	23
	2.2	E = K	25
	2.3	Reliable Indicators	28
	2.4	Virtuous Reasons	31
	2.5	Conclusion	34
3	Evidenc	e You Should Have Had and Resistance	36
	3.1	The Social 'Should'	36
	3.2	Worries for Social Epistemic Normativity	39
	3.3	D 11 C 1 M 1(01 11)	45
	3.4	Conclusion	46
4	Permiss	ible Suspension and Evidence Resistance	48
'	4.I	Proper Suspension: The Simple Knowledge-Based View	48
	4.2	Sosa on Virtue, Telic Normativity, and Suspension	51
	4.3	The Respect-Based View of Permissible Suspension	59
	4.4		62
	4.5	Conclusion	66

x Contents

5	Resistance to Evidence, Epistemic Responsibility, and		
	Epistemic Vice		
	5.1 Responsible Inquiry and Epistemic	Character Traits	68
	5.2 Content-Individuating Responsibil	ist Virtues and Vices	72
	5.3 Psychological Vice Individuation		77
	5.4 Value-Based Vice Individuation		83
	5.5 Conclusion		91
	ART II RESISTANCE TO EVIDENCE AI	ND EPISTEMIC	
PR	ROPER FUNCTION		
6	Resistance to Evidence as Epistemic M	Malfunction	95
	6.1 Epistemic Oughts		95
	6.2 Functions and Norms		99
	6.3 Resistance to Evidence as Epistemi	c Malfunction	109
	6.4 Conclusion		110
7	Evidence as Knowledge Indicators		111
	7.1 Knowledge Indicators		111
	7.2 Evidence and the Impermissibility		116
	7.3 Infallibilism: Evidence and Knowle	edge	I 20
	7.4 Conclusion		123
8	Defeaters as Ignorance Indicators		I 24
	8.1 The Nature and Theoretical Impor	rtance of Defeat	I 24
	8.2 Defeaters as Ignorance Indicators		130
	8.3 External Defeat and Norms of Evid	dence Gathering	I 32
	8.4 Conclusion		137
9	Inquiry and Permissible Suspension		138
	9.1 Suspension and the Knowledge Fu	nction	138
	9.2 Justified Suspension		139
	9.3 Suspension and the Normativity of	f Inquiry	142
	9.4 Conclusion		147
PΑ	ART III THEORETICAL UPSHOTS		
		.1	
10			151
	10.1 Obligations to Believe and Epist	temic Dilemmas	151
	10.2 What Dilemmas Are Not		152
	10.3 Epistemic Non-dilemmas		155
	10.4 Conclusion		162
ΙI	1	2	165
	11.1 Two Neo-Mooreanisms		169

Contents	xi
11.2 Against Concessive Neo-Mooreanism	167
11.3 A New Radical Neo-Mooreanism	173
11.4 Conclusion	177
12 Knowledge and Disinformation	178
12.1 Information and Disinformation	178
12.2 Against Disinformation Orthodoxy	180
12.3 A Knowledge-First Account of Disinformation	184
12.4 Conclusion	190
Concluding Remarks: The Way Forward in Policy	
and Practice	192
Evidence Resistance	192
Disinformation	195
Bibliography	197
Index	215

215