

2. Bliss Cua Lim, *Translating Time: Cinema, the Fantastic, and Temporal Critique* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 12–13.
3. See, for instance, Elizabeth Freeman's *Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010) which connects the “stubborn lingering of pastness” to queer affect, 8.
4. See Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Context* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 40; and Jay Clayton, *Charles Dickens in Cyberspace: The Afterlife of the Nineteenth Century in Postmodern Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 113–15.
5. Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 8.
6. Lee Edelman, *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 53–54.
7. “An Anachronism; or, Missing One’s Coach,” *Dublin University Magazine* 11, no. 66 (June 1838), 701–12, 705.
8. “An Anachronism,” 707.
9. “An Anachronism,” 709.
10. “An Anachronism,” 705.
11. “An Anachronism,” 702.



Animal

IVAN KREILKAMP

HOW did the Victorians define and conceptualize the “animal”? The term allowed—as it still does today—a strictly scientific definition, along with a more loosely colloquial one. Richards Owens wrote in 1860 that “When an organism receives nutritive matter by a mouth, inhales oxygen and exhales carbonic acid, and developes [*sic*] tissues, the proximate principles of which are quaternary compounds of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, it is called an ‘animal.’” But in his 1873 *Talk of Animals and Their Masters*, Cambridge Apostle Arthur Helps specified, “When I use the word ‘animals’ I mean all living creatures except men and women.”¹

More than a simple slippage between scientific precision and idiomatic flexibility, though, this difference points to a fundamental instability and multifariousness in the term. “Animal” is at once a biological category that

includes the human, and an ethico-political category that not only excludes the human, but that *defines* the human through that exclusion. Jacques Derrida argues that that the very term “animal” is at once a conceptual error, in its excessive generality—“They have given themselves the word in order to corral a large number of living beings within a single concept: ‘the Animal,’ they say”—but which is also foundational to the human: “Power over the animal is the essence of the ‘I’ or the ‘person,’ the essence of the human.”² Beyond its strictly biological/scientific meaning, the term “animal” performs at least two different notable rhetorical acts, arguably violent ones: it groups together *all creatures* that are not “human” into one single category; and it defines the human by virtue of its own exclusion from a category that otherwise would seem to have to include it. To be human, then, is to claim for oneself both the power to remove oneself from biological reality—to *not* be an animal, even when one actually is one—and the power to rule over and to oversee the realm of the non-human.

The domestication, care, and breeding of animals thus become charged with a special power—as practices that define and prove humanness by asserting control over animals. As Charles Darwin writes in *The Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication*, “[I]t is not surprising that . . . our highly-bred pigeons have undergone an astonishing amount of change; for in regard to them there is no defined limit to the wish of the fancier, and there is no known limit to the variability of their characters. What is there to stop the fancier desiring to give to his Carrier a longer and longer beak, or to his Tumbler a shorter and shorter beak?”³ Darwin compares animal domestication to high fashion in its tendency to operate as a zone for unlimited “extremes” of creative whim. In breeding and domestication, man shapes nature with all the unnatural artifice of a clothes designer:

It is an important principle that in the process of selection man almost invariably wishes to go to an extreme point. Thus, there is no limit to his desire to breed certain kinds of horses and dogs as fleet as possible, and others as strong as possible; certain kinds of sheep for extreme fineness, and others for extreme length of wool; and he wishes to produce fruit, grain, tubers, and other useful parts of plants, as large and excellent as possible. With animals bred for amusement, the same principle is even more powerful; for fashion, as we see in our dress, always runs to extremes.⁴

The pigeon fancier will always have an urge to give his birds longer or shorter beaks—in part simply because in doing so, he proves that he himself is “human,” non-animal, the animal who defies the category, inhabiting and controlling a zone of the non-natural “artificial”.

But when thinking about the Victorians and animals, questions of control and domination are only part of the story. Victorian personhood also relies importantly on care and *love* for the animal—or for some animals. Deidre Lynch argues that in the late eighteenth century, literature, “something to be taken personally by definition,” began to “deman[d] love,” that a newly “subjectivity-saturated language of involvement and affection” began to inflect readers’ relationship to literature.⁵ I suggest that the love of literature and the love of pet animals become mutually defining in this period. Victorian persons, and Victorian protagonists, must prove their ability to sort out animals properly: to cast out most living creatures as mere animals, as undeserving of any special care or notice, as available for consumption as meat, hide, or other products; but also to select certain special animals as “pets,” as animals who are to be brought close to the human. Such favored animals gain some of the perquisites of personhood: a given name; love; access to domestic space, and to novelistic “character-space”;⁶ some limited hold on our memories.

In Emily Brontë’s *Wuthering Heights*, one of Heathcliff’s first utterances is to advise a visitor to his home, Lockwood, to take care: “You’d better let the dog alone . . . She’s not accustomed to be spoiled—not kept for a pet.”⁷ *Wuthering Heights* is, in a manner that is characteristically Victorian, preoccupied with the dividing of creatures into animal and non-animal, pet and non-pet. When Heathcliff’s visitor Lockwood, attempting to flirt with Cathy Linton, points to “an obscure cushion full of something like cats” and asks if “your favorites are among these?”⁸ he seems to be posing a reasonable question: every proper Victorian home has its “favorite” animals, those “pets” granted love and care and even a degree of partial personhood. But he makes an unpleasant and embarrassing discovery: what he thought was a pile of living cats was in fact “a heap of dead rabbits.”⁹ Brontë makes a mordant joke here, suggesting that the Victorian love or care for animals is only slightly removed from violence towards them; that to select a “favorite” animal is always also implicitly to designate an indefinite larger category (here a “heap”) of those considered utterly disposable.¹⁰

NOTES

1. “animal,” OED Online, Oxford University Press, <http://www.oed.com>, (accessed October 9, 2017).
2. Jacques Derrida, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet, trans. David Wills (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 32, 93.

3. Charles Darwin, *The Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication*, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, 1875), 233, <http://darwin-online.org.uk>.
4. Darwin, *Variation*, 226.
5. Deidre Shauna Lynch, *Loving Literature: A Cultural History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 8, 10.
6. Alex Woloch, *The One Vs. the Many: Minor Characters and the Space of the Protagonist in the Novel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 24.
7. Emily Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, ed. Ian Jack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 5.
8. Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, 135, 8.
9. Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, 9.
10. This essay draws on arguments I make at greater length in the introduction to my book, *Minor Creatures: Persons, Animals, and the Victorian Novel* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018).



Anthropocene

JESSE OAK TAYLOR

TO describe the Anthropocene is to deploy a Victorian lexicon. This is perhaps most obvious in relation to the epoch's titular agent: the *Anthropos*. No aspect of the Anthropocene debate has been more provocative, or controversial, than the effort to align the differential histories of capitalism, empire, and industrial modernity with planetary time and the evolutionary history of the human species. In attempting to date the Anthropocene, stratigraphers are looking for the "signature" of human action, the mark of a single species operating as an agent at the level of planetary systems. In that endeavor, "human action" serves as a distinguishing marker from other forms of causality, whether atmospheric, lithic, or biological. However, humanists and social scientists have been quick to point out that human action is not uniform. There are vast disparities between humans in terms of both ecological impacts and vulnerability to the Anthropocene's manifold catastrophes, from rising sea levels to antibiotic resistant diseases. Those most at risk from ecological