

political realism—"A political realist wants to make history." He condemns any excesses of nationalism, and supports Dobrovský against Jungmann and others, who tried to label Dobrovský as a traitor to the Czech nation, just as Masaryk himself was later considered a traitor during the Manuscripts controversy. Masaryk's struggle, however, is not only political: "Our real task is to overcome Rome within ourselves, to bring about our moral rebirth."

This book will be most helpful to all historians of Central Europe who are interested in both the "meaning" and the "spirit" of Czech history.

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REFORM AND CHANGE IN THE CZECHOSLOVAK POLITICAL SYSTEM: JANUARY–AUGUST 1968. By *Alex Pravda*. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1975. 96 pp. £1.30. \$3.00, paper.

Alex Pravda's monograph on the interaction of reform and change in Czechoslovakia in 1968 is concise and useful. For the most part, the author succeeds in his attempt both to synthesize the reform proposals and to examine how extensively they translated into political change. He does pinpoint the gap between theory and reality, but it is somewhat ambitious, almost smug, to then judge in what measure discrepancies can be divided between problems of implementation and weaknesses of reform concepts. Eight months is an agonizingly short time for policy-makers to get their heads straight about the direction of change, come to even a tentative consensus with other political elites, and begin to restructure political relations. There is also a lack of sensitivity to problems inherent to the different ordering of reform priorities among Czechs, who put democratization first, and Slovaks, who consider equality within a genuinely federal system a prerequisite for even talking about meaningful democracy.

Nonetheless, the author has filled an important gap in the already substantial literature devoted to the Czechoslovak experiment with reform communism during those exciting, euphoric months known as the Prague Spring. He has summarized the core of that experiment, placed it within a theoretical framework, and dealt with some of the toughest problems involved in moving from a closed authoritarian system toward democratic socialism. He does all of this in just under 100 pages, in a clear understandable writing style—a considerable service to both students and professors struggling with a dilemma of outrageously expensive hardbacks, out-of-print paperbacks, and an enormous amount of reading.

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ÖSTERREICH-UNGARN UND DER FRANZÖSISCH-PREUSSISCHE KRIEG, 1870–1871. By *István Diószegi*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1974. viii, 311 pp. \$15.00.

Students of nineteenth-century foreign policy have every reason to welcome this translation of István Diószegi's book, published in Hungarian in 1965. Based upon extensive research in the Haus-, Hof-, and Staatsarchiv in Vienna, the Saxon Landeshauptarchiv in Dresden, and the Deutsche Zentralarchiv in Potsdam

and Merseburg, it is the first thorough study of the Dual Monarchy's preparations to intervene in the Franco-Prussian War, its attempts to work in the French interest when such intervention became inadvisable, its efforts to block South German adhesion to a new German imperial structure, its unsuccessful diplomacy during the crisis caused by Russia's abrogation of the Black Sea Clauses of the treaty of 1856, and the cumulative effect of these events upon the direction of Austro-Hungarian policy after the spring of 1871.

The key figure in this story is Franz Ferdinand Graf Beust, who was a minister in Saxony from 1849 to 1866, and Emperor Franz Joseph's foreign minister from 1867 until his retirement from politics in 1871. Metternich once called Beust a political tightrope walker, and Mr. Diószegi confirms the aptness of this description by recounting the way Beust pursued his hazardous course above the heads of the contentious political factions of his country. Although the factions had sharply divergent views on foreign affairs, Beust assured himself of their joint support at the beginning of his Austrian service by following a firmly anti-Prussian policy, which appealed to the resentment of the Court party over the defeat at Königgrätz, the anti-Bismarck prejudice of the Austrian liberals, and the fears of Prussian expansion that were rife among the Hungarian followers of Deák and Andrassy. But support for this line was not always reliable (the Deák party was more afraid of Russia than of Prussia, and the liberals were susceptible to the appeals of German nationalism), and external circumstances made it, in the long run, unsupportable. Prussia's defeat of France altered the European balance so completely that the Austro-Hungarian government felt compelled, by May 1871, to seek an accommodation with Prussia and, subsequently, with Russia. The government also began to think in terms of finding compensation, at Turkey's expense, in southeastern Europe.

This shift could hardly have been a happy experience for Beust. His dislike of the Prussians was deep-rooted, and the most fascinating aspect of this study is the author's description of the stubbornness with which Beust held to the anti-Prussian line and the extent to which it influenced his behavior even during the crisis caused by the Gorchakov note of October 31, 1870. Beust was a persistent man of many expedients, but unlike his colleague, War Minister Kuhn, who went on planning and urging a war against Prussia long after there was any likelihood that it would have the slightest chance of success, he was not the victim of illusions. Beust, whom Schwarzenberg once called his "best lieutenant," inherited something of his master's cold realism. Mr. Diószegi shows that Beust, by January 1871, had recognized that a revolution in power relationships had taken place in Europe and that Austria would have to accommodate its policy to the new situation. Consequently, and without vain regrets, he changed course and inaugurated the policy that led to the formation of the Three Emperors' League.

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PAL TELEKI (1879–1941): A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. By *L. Tilkovszky*.
Studia Historica, Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 86. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1974. 70 pp. \$4.50.

Three aspects of Teleki's life are considered in this book: the sensation caused by his suicide when the German Panzer divisions rumbled across Hungary toward Yugoslavia in 1941; his philosophy and policies as chief theoretician of Hun-