

Despite such notable omissions as an index and a bibliography, the book reflects a laborious compilation of data on a subject which has been virtually ignored. For this and for the overall merit of their work, the authors are to be commended.

DAVID FUNDERBURK
Hardin-Simmons University

BULGARIA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By *Marshall Lee Miller*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975. xiv, 290 pp. \$10.95.

Miller, a Washington, D.C. attorney and a former associate deputy attorney general of the United States, pursues his side interest of Bulgarian history in a highly professional manner. This book—which draws upon an impressive array of sources in an impressive array of languages—is the fruit of that interest. The author investigates the political history of Bulgaria during its involvement in the Second World War, skillfully interweaving threads of domestic and foreign politics. He pays relatively little attention to the purely military history of Bulgaria's participation in the war. Miller's study is skewed slightly toward the history of the Bulgarian Communist Party during that period, because of the nature of the published and unpublished sources with which he worked, but the author is aware of this imbalance and keeps it within bounds.

Any book dealing with the complexities of political history is bound to contain controversial interpretations. In this case, the "Historical Introduction," summarizing the course of Bulgarian history from 1878 to the eve of World War II in nine pages, leaves much to be desired. But a survey of this type is exceedingly difficult to write, and when Miller embarks upon his direct investigation, the interpretations are always judicious and at least supportable, if not entirely acceptable. His book, in short, is a solid discussion of an interesting period in Bulgarian history.

After reading this work, one is astonished that Nazi Germany exercised so little control over the policies of its satellite. Miller writes, for example, that after King Boris visited Hitler in March of 1942, "Hitler came away . . . convinced that Bulgaria was not a country on which Germany could completely rely." Hitler constantly pressured Boris for concessions and for further assistance in the war effort, but with only limited success. Moreover, Germany was often ill-informed about internal Bulgarian developments and very poor at predicting their course, much less capable of directing that course. The relatively humane treatment of the Bulgarian Jews provides a good illustration of this point.

Bulgaria's central problem during the war years was that of leadership. King Boris dominated the country's political life. He reduced the parliament to subservience and made the major decisions of state himself. Prime ministers and ministers served at his pleasure. At the same time, however, Boris never managed to elaborate an ideology capable of buttressing his regime intellectually. In 1942, Prime Minister Bogdan Filov made an abortive attempt to breathe life into Boris's established political approach: the notion that Bulgaria should develop a social order "in which individuals rather than parties would play the leading role in the service of the nation." This philosophy never really took hold, although it could have been described as working so long as the king was at the center of things.

In August of 1943 that center disappeared with Boris's sudden death (Miller agrees with Frederick Chary that he died of natural causes), and the leadership vacuum became acute. The sole source of recognized authority became the three regents, for Boris's son Simeon was still a child. After Stalingrad, it was obvious to most government officials that Hitler would eventually lose the war, and if Bulgaria were to salvage anything from the wreckage she would have to take decisive action. But the new prime minister was Dobri Bozhilov—Miller rightly characterizes him as “not qualified for higher office”—who installed a “colorless” cabinet which proved quite incapable, during 1944, of taking the initiatives necessary to end Bulgaria's participation in the war. As the situation worsened, Bozhilov yielded place to Ivan Bagrianov, who likewise proved unable to lead the country out of its impasse. Finally, the last cabinet to hold power—for only a few desperate days before the coup of September 9, 1944—was headed by three “Vrabcha 1” Agrarians, of whom the least competent, Konstantin Muraviev, became prime minister. In any case, by then it was too late. The failure of leadership at the top had been decisive.

Miller frequently speaks of such “opposition leaders” as Nikola Mushanov and Dimitur Gichev, head of the Vrabcha 1 Agrarians. But these men were “opposition leaders” only in a very restricted sense: they did not derive their authority from the people through the parliament (indeed Gichev had failed of election to parliament in 1940), but rather anticipated coming to power by the authority of the king, or, later, by authority of the regents. Mushanov and Gichev accepted the established source of authority, even if they opposed some of its policies. The genuine and fundamental opposition to King Boris came from the “Pladne” Agrarians, under the leadership of Dr. G. M. Dimitrov, who fled the country in early 1941, and Nikola Petkov. The open opposition of the Pladne Agrarians to the king's pro-German policies substantially antedated that of the Bulgarian Communist Party, which went into open opposition only after the German attack on the Soviet Union. In July 1944, the Pladne Agrarians summoned Bulgaria to declare war on Germany as the only conceivable means of saving the situation. But the Pladne Agrarian leadership could not prevail over the inertia of the Bulgarian government until the upheaval of September 9 swept away all the established leaders, both “government” and “opposition.” Miller pays insufficient attention to this aspect of the political struggle in Bulgaria over the war years.

On the whole, however, *Bulgaria During the Second World War* is a very worthwhile contribution to American scholarship on Bulgaria.

CHARLES A. MOSER
George Washington University

POVIJEST KATOLIČKE CRKVE MEĐU HRVATIMA. By *Josip Buturac* and *Antun Ivandića*. Zagreb: Hrvatsko književno društvo sv. Ćirila i Metoda, 1973. 372 pp. Illus. Maps.

Church history is one of the more neglected fields of modern Yugoslav historiography. While several recent studies have appeared on the history of the Serbian Orthodox church (see the review by Wayne Vucinich in *Slavic Review*, 34, no. 1 [March 1975]), a comprehensive history of the Catholic church in the Yugoslav lands is still lacking. This book provides a succinct but reliable survey of the