TOPICAL REVIEW

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN THE STUDY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN LATIN AMERICA

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THE STUDY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS IMPORTANT FOR AN UNDERSTANDING of any society. Political leaders participate in, or influence the making of, decisions that allocate resources within and among social units. These acts of choice constitute the major component of the governing process. It seems obvious, then, that an understanding of any social order rests fundamentally on a systematic grasp of the background attributes, careers, value and issue orientations, behaviors and environmental context of political leaders.

In studying Latin American politics, the importance of the leadership strata seems especially clear. It is not uncommon to find the major features of politics in Latin America described almost entirely in terms of factors directly associated with the nature of political leadership. Typical is Needler's position, which emphasizes "the central role of the military, the prevalence of violence, the ascendancy of dominant personalities . . . the widespread graft and nepotism."[1] The point is made even more directly by Anderson, who contends that "the characteristic political process of Latin America" is one of "manipulation and negotiation among power contenders with reciprocally recognized power capabilities."[2] Clearly, the study of political leadership must be a central part of the study of Latin American politics.

At the same time, it is worth emphasizing that no society can be adequately understood by examining *only* its political leaders and their behavior. Generally, students of Latin American politics have recognized this. Yet it is perplexing and frustrating that the few researchers who have gathered reasonably hard data on political leaders have almost totally ignored the importance of viewing these leaders in their environmental context. To be sure, there has been concern for looking at leader-follower relations, and for typing political

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leaders on that basis.[3] Relatedly, there is interest in the presumed relationships between levels and rates of economic development and the nature of political leadership.[4] Unfortunately, however, the linkages tend to be asserted or presumed, rather than documented.

The failure to examine leadership systematically in its social contexts is all the more unfortunate in light of recent trends in model-building in comparative politics.[5] One of the principal characteristics of the middle-range models developed in comparative politics in recent years has been the tendency to acknowledge that politics must be studied explicitly in its environmental context. The formulations of Apter,[6] Easton,[7] Deutsch,[8] and Spiro,[9] to cite only four examples, emphasize the importance of the non-political context of political activity. In Easton's model of the political system, demands from the essentially non-political environment are seen as major inputs into the political process. And Apter's model focuses on the concept of social stratification, contending that the basic motivation for political activism is the desire for social and economic mobility. One can, of course, argue with the substance of Apter's premise. But the methodological message is clear, and should be heeded: political activity is substantially conditioned by economic, social and cultural factors, and must be studied in that context.

The literature on political leadership can be broadly divided into intensive and extensive studies. Intensive studies attempt to probe, albeit unsystematically, the motivations, personality characteristics, inter-personal styles, and behaviors of a handful of top "elites"—or, perhaps, even a single dominant leader. These intensive studies may provide insight into idiosyncratic contributions to leadership roles. They are more likely than are extensive studies to highlight "unique" situational factors that may strongly influence the parameters or even the substance of the decision process. The extensive studies of political leaders, on the other hand, are based on aggregated biographic data on a large number of leaders. These studies may be more useful in identifying trends in elite recruitment. They may also provide a more systematic basis for relating changes in the composition of leadership groups to indicators of social and economic development, or to changes in other political system variables, such as intraparty conflict.

In general, it can be said that extensive studies lend themselves more readily to the use of scientifically acceptable procedures of data analysis. It is thus unfortunate that the majority of political leadership studies which have been done on Latin American systems have been intensive studies.

More broadly, it is staggering that there has been so little systematic research *of any kind* on political leadership in Latin America. A cursory examination of the issues of two of the major area journals for the years 1960–68 documents well the lack of research on one of the most important facets of Latin American political life. Of more than 180 articles published in the

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journal *Inter-American Economic Affairs* between 1960 and the end of 1968, only a single article presented hard data on the backgrounds, careers, or perspectives of political leaders in Latin America. This articles was J. D. Cochrane's "Mexico's New Científicos: The Díaz Ordaz Cabinet,"[10] published in 1968. Even counting the published studies which discussed political leadership tangentially, or which reported no specific data whatever, there were a mere half-dozen additional articles, including works by Christopher Mitchell on "The Role of Technocrats in Latin American Integration,"[11] by Fredrick B. Pike on the APRA in Peru,[12] by John D. Martz on the Venezuelan labor movement,[13] and by Edwin Lieuwen on "Neo-Militarism in Latin America."[14] In short, less than 4 per cent of the articles in *Inter-American Economic Affairs* since 1960 have dealt even incidentally with political leadership.

The situation has been much the same with the *Journal of Inter-American Studies*. A total of 359 articles and research notes was published in this journal in the years 1960–68. Only four of these (1 per cent) dealt directly with the nature of political leadership. These were R. A. Gomez's often-cited "Latin American Executives: Essence and Variations,"[15] Peter Ranis' "Peronismo without Perón, Ten Years after the Fall (1955–65),"[16] Harold T. Edwards' "Power Structure and its Communication Behavior in San José, Costa Rica,"[17] and Paul H. Lewis's' "Leadership and Conflict within the Febrerista Party of Paraguay."[18] There were 22 additional articles of marginal relevance to the study of political leadership.[19] Thus, the articles on political leadership in the *Journal of Inter-American Studies* for the period 1960–68 amounted at best to about 7 per cent of the studies published. Given the broadly assumed importance of political leadership for explaining societal change in Latin America, this level of neglect seems unfortunate.

The extent to which this neglect is a function of the uncertain disciplinary grounding of Latin American studies is difficult to ascertain. It is clear that students of Latin American politics traditionally have not been well-trained in the discipline of political science. Methodologically speaking, area studies in general have lagged far behind the disciplines with which they are associated. It has been often lamented—but bears repeating—that Latin Americanists exhibit staggering indifference to questions of epistemology and theory-building, and to the use of modern techniques of data collection and analysis.[20] At least in part, the lag may result from the fact that graduate students in Latin American studies have not been required to pursue methodologically rigorous programs of study. In this connection, it is worth mentioning that the major university centers of Latin American studies generally are not located at institutions whose political science departments have offered intensive methodological training. Indeed, only recently have some of the major graduate departments of political science had Latin American specialists on their staffs.

A related source of difficulty has been the normative, policy-oriented basis

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for much of the research on Latin American politics. Until very recently, much of what was written about Latin American politics showed overt normative or policy antecedents. Often, such attitudes reflected the writer's manifest desire to see "democracy" implanted in the Latin American soul, and his lament at the apparent failure of efforts to accomplish that goal. Such a concern has led some students of Latin American affairs to posit "democracy" as the (perhaps inevitable) end-state of the process of "modernization," or socio-economic development, and thus to "blame" those who apparently impeded "modernization" for the failure of "democratization." Or, analysts of Latin American politics have sometimes proceeded from an avowed desire to influence public policy (in the United States and/or in Latin America), and have been willing to justify methodological insensitivities on the ground that it was important to get on with the practical business of policy-making. Even the best (from a methodological point of view) research done on political leadership in Latin America suffers from the liabilities of a policy orientation. Thus, Bonilla and Silva Michelena describe the VENELITE project by saying that "these Venezuelan studies seriously seek to respond to policy needs,"[21] and note that their research is "strongly committed to guiding policy."[22] This policy orientation *per se* might not be a serious drawback; unfortunately, Bonilla *et al.,* make clear that their concern with influencing policy has affected both the structuring of their research and the ways in which the analyses are presented. Thus, Bonilla notes in passing that the sampling procedures used to obtain elite respondents were scientifically inadequate, and that there was a substantial lack of uniformity, and thus of comparability, between interviews with the respondents.[23] And one of the major hypotheses around which analysis was to proceed was that "it is the second-level elites . . . whose judgments on the state of a society are most *efficient*."[24] Precisely what is meant by "efficient" is not made clear, but the policy-orientation of this hypothesis seems obvious.

That which has been written on Latin American political leadership commonly suffers from a host of serious methodological shortcomings. For this reason, these studies (at least in the eyes of empirically-oriented scholars in comparative politics) have contributed little to a systematic understanding of Latin American political processes. To be sure, there have been exceptions to the general rule that leadership studies are methodologically unsophisticated and thus substantively inconclusive. The work of Bonilla and his associates,[25] for example, promises to represent a genuine break-through in research on Latin America, provided empirical concerns in research can be kept distinct from concern for influencing policy. And there have been isolated articles and monographs reflecting at least a modicum of methodological sophistication and concern. These include principally Edwards' community power study of San José, Costa Rica,[26] Ranis' article on Peronismo,[27] James L. Payne's monograph on political leadership and conflict in Colombia,[28] Peter G. Snow's article on

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Argentine political leaders,[29] and Richard R. Strout's monograph on the recruitment of party candidates for regional legislative posts in Argentina.[30] But these happy exceptions contrast sharply with the unhappy rule.

For convenience, we may divide the methodological shortcomings of research on Latin American political leadership into three general categories: 1) problems in the *structuring of research* (including conceptualization and theory-building); 2) problems in *data collection* (including problems of data availability and access, the organization of data, and problems of cross-national comparability); and 3) problems in *data analysis* (including the intrusion of inexplicit and problematic assumptions, and the limitations of highly traditional modes and techniques of analysis). Such a division of major methodological problems is merely convenient; there clearly are alternative ways of approaching a methodological overview of the literature on political leadership in Latin America.

It should be by now clear, but bears emphasizing, that this paper accepts scientific *desiderata* as criteria for the evaluation of research. Readers should judge the appropriateness of the present comments in that light.

THE STRUCTURING OF RESEARCH

1. *Theory-building.* Students of Latin American politics have exhibited a remarkable isolation from the recent theoretical ferment in comparative politics. Despite the continuing dominance of inelegant research and writing in comparative politics, the field has experienced important advances. This writer elsewhere has summarized these signposts of a better research tomorrow as:

a) a recognition of the often-dominant significance of informal political processes, as opposed to formal political structures;

b) a blending of institutional studies with functional approaches;

c) more systematic utilization of existing historical studies, particularly by conceptually relating discrete case studies through the drawing of analogies at higher levels of generalization;

d) identification of political concepts with significance in all political systems;

e) more vigorous concern with the process of change, as opposed to purely static description; and

f) great and growing interest in quantification and/or mathematization designed to facilitate the comparability of comparative studies.[31]

It is distressing that, of these six positive tendencies in comparative politics in general, only the first can be firmly identified in research on Latin American political leadership. This area is broadly characterized by an unconcern for theoretical issues. Five particulars of this lack of theoretical concern may be mentioned here.

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First, students of political leadership in Latin America have failed to integrate their research into extant schemes for the study of political leadership. Thus, there is not a single example in the literature of an application to the Latin American area of the Lasswell, Lerner, and Rothwell framework,[32] or of the Beck and Malloy scheme for studying political elites,[33] although references to these conceptual schemes occasionally find their way into footnotes. Further, the framework employed by Bonilla and his collaborators[34] appears to be the only explicit and comprehensive analytical scheme developed by scholars working primarily on Latin America.

Second, and relatedly, no direct use has been made of the middle-range (or for that matter, any other) models developed in comparative politics in the last decade. Despite the fact that several of these models (e.g., the work of Apter, Deutsch, Easton, and Spiro) have several basic features in common, and despite the importance accorded leadership in these models, Latin Americanists have not seen fit to use the models as bases for placing political leadership in its social context. The commonalities of these models,[35] in that they 1) focus on the environmental context of political activity; 2) use action- and change-oriented concepts; 3) conceptualize political activity in a systemic way; 4) specify criteria for the effective operation of a political system; and 5) emphasize the importance of groups (formal and informal) in the political process, could provide a point of departure for the development of middle-range models of relevance to the study of Latin American politics.

To cite only one example of how these models might be used in structuring research on political leadership in Latin America, we might examine their usefulness in categorizing and hypothesizing about the issue orientations of political leaders. One might use Spiro's model and look at issue orientations in terms of their relation to the four systemic goals of stability, flexibility, efficiency, and effectiveness. Or the preferences of political leaders might be categorized in terms of the output functions suggested by Almond and Powell,[36] or by Easton.[37]

A third aspect of the lack of theory concerns the absence of systematic hypothesizing in studies of political leadership in Latin America. Rarely does it occur to Latin Americanists to specify independent, intervening, and dependent variables. It is often unclear what is allegedly being explained, and with reference to what variables the explanation is to proceed. In the absence of such sensitivities, hypotheses are usually not presented as such. Somehow the resulting "relaxed" approach to interrelating pieces of information seems to permit some Latin Americanists to "test" hypotheses without resorting to hard data, or at least without presenting more than a hint of what the data look like, if indeed there are data. Thus, John J. Johnson (who properly enjoys a distinguished reputation in the field of Latin American studies) could relate

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the issue orientations of military leaders (apparently the dependent variable) to "institutionalization," "professionalization," and the "social-regional backgrounds" of these leaders, without ever offering specific conceptual or operational definitions of these "variables," and without presenting any specific evidence, or citing any specific sources.[38] Johnson addresses one of the most important tasks in research on political leadership (interrelating background attributes, career attributes, and issue orientations) but does so in an unsystematic way.

The lack of rigorous hypothesizing leads to another theoretically-relevant liability, which is the absence of even the beginnings of an "intellectual inventory" of research on political leadership in Latin America. Nowhere is there a published effort asking such basic questions as 1) What is it that we are trying to explain about political leadership in Latin America? 2) What kinds of data are necessary to permit us to make these kinds of explanations? 3) How much usable research has been done so far? i.e., what do we really know about political leadership in Latin America? Such inventorying questions must necessarily precede meaningful theoretical developments.

A fourth difficulty related to theory-building rests in the frequency of normative overtones in the literature on Latin American politics. We have already mentioned the abiding concern held by many students of Latin American politics for the development of democratic political practices in that part of the world. It should be emphasized that this problem would be merely distracting if these normative concerns did not affect the structuring and conduct of research itself. Unfortunately, ideology seems generally to influence epistemology. Thus, Vekemans and Segundo, in their socio-economic typology of Latin American countries,[39] equate indices of democratization with political "development" and political "maturity." The argument seems to be that social and economic modernization will beget political modernization, which "ought" to be represented by democratic political practices. Silvert (who, in 1966, called the Vekemans-Segundo typology the "most sophisticated" typology of Latin American countries[40]) seems guilty of imposing democratic norms upon Latin American systems when he writes that the power of political leaders "is generated by consensus and legitimacy."[41]

Sometimes the willingness of students of Latin American politics to engage in normative discussions leads them to make harsh evaluative statements of no scholarly relevance about particular regimes, political groups, or individuals. Thus, in 1966 Bourricaud could describe the Peruvian political "oligarchy" as "non-productive . . . greedy and gluttonous . . . [and] sterile."[42] John D. Martz found it worthwhile to criticize the "irresponsible terrorism" of the PCV and the MIR in the Venezuelan elections of 1963, and to conclude that the governmental ban on their electoral activity was "justifiable."[43] Martz

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also has labeled Gustavo Rojas Pinilla a dictator "of uncommon ineptitude."[44] And Rollie E. Poppino characterized certain Latin American Communist parties as "ridiculous," and asserted that their claims regarding "proletarian" origins constituted "self-deception."[45] Aside from seeming difficult to support empirically, such assertions add nothing to our understanding of political leadership in Latin America.

A fifth theoretically-relevant problem is the dominance of a country-by-country approach in Latin American studies, and the resulting proliferation of highly specific case studies with little relevance, even conceptual, to one another. A glance at 42 items (articles, chapters, and monographs) published in the last decade and dealing even marginally with political leadership in Latin America reveals that 32, or more than 75 per cent, were studies of a single country (or, in a few cases, a region or community). Of the ten which discussed more than one country, none reported specific data of any kind. Four of these dealt with the most popular subject for area-wide generalization, the role of the military in Latin American politics. It is worth noting that none of the ten broader contributions limited its comments to any specified sub-set of Latin American systems; that is, the generalizations apparently applied to Latin America across the board. The tendency to support the notion that the political patterns of some Latin American countries are unique somehow exists side-by-side with an apparently contradictory inclination to make sweeping generalizations about Latin American politics, thereby implicitly treating the area as an essentially homogeneous collectivity of nations.

One recognizes, of course, that the contrast between the flavor of case studies and the thrust of area-wide assertions derives in part from the fact that social scientists understandably make statements at different levels of generality, and that both induction and deduction are crucial components of theory-building. The "area focus," though now less accepted than was the case ten years ago, has had numerous very respected adherents. And middle-range models (often construed to mean conceptual schemes designed to look at particular geographic areas) offer considerable promise of methodological improvement in comparative politics. Thus, there is no reason to criticize the juxtaposition of broad generalizations and highly specific case descriptions, of itself, *assuming there is continual and systematic interplay between the two.* Unfortunately, there has been little effort to link these two diverse perspectives in studies of Latin American political leadership. Judging from the lack of specific evidence to the contrary, it appears that generalizations about Latin American politics have not been arrived at by systematic induction from data-supported case studies. Nor have there been serious attempts to explain the distinguishing characteristics of specific cases with reference to any kind of theoretically-relevant (or even broadly applicable) model of politics. The un-

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ambiguous but frustrating fact is that the few studies of Latin American political leadership which present data are highly specific case studies.

The lack of theoretical underpinnings in the literature on political leadership in Latin America in turn implies three central characteristics of that literature: 1) it is highly descriptive; 2) it is excessively concerned with taxonomical questions; 3) it has a high degree of obsolescence. These three characteristics derive from, and reinforce, the lack of theoretical concern. The tendency to accumulate impressions (rather than to gather data) and to use them descriptively (rather than in an explanatory fashion) is commonly traced to the traditional pre-eminence of historians in Latin American studies. This facile explanation is less applicable to studies of political leadership, since these generally have been done by political scientists, although one of the most methodologically sensitive leadership studies on Latin America was done as a Master's thesis by a professor of English at the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences in Turrialba, Costa Rica! The highly descriptive flavor of this literature leads to the third characteristic, its high degree of obsolescence. Because of the volatile nature of politics in Latin America, descriptive essays are often rendered useless shortly after (and sometimes before) they appear in print. The concern with taxonomical issues, e.g., with devising typologies of leadership styles,[46] or of patterns of socio-economic development,[47] is distracting, but it may prove to be a positive sign of better things to come. That is, it is not unusual in the history of scientific disciplines for scholars to be occupied at an early stage of development with taxonomic questions. Biology, for example, was preoccupied with taxonomic issues for centuries. More recently, the theory of games (a branch of mathematical economics) has been largely concerned with taxonomic questions.[48] The crucial question concerns whether or not meaningful use will be made of the typologies now being devised. Typologies, after all, provide the basis for an elementary form of quasi-experimental control in cross-national studies. For example, they offer us the basis for determining what relationships, if any, exist between different leadership styles and different patterns of socio-economic development. Hopefully, such use will be made of the typologies now being constructed.

2. *Conceptualization*. The literature on Latin American political leadership has not been immune to the slipshod conceptualization which has typified comparative political studies in general. The problem has been especially acute in the initial definition and identification of the subjects which are to be the foci of the research, that is, political leaders. Three such problems may be identified. First, students of political leadership in Latin America frequently fail to offer any explicit definitions (conceptual or operational) of their central concepts. Second, there is an implicit tendency to attribute functional political "eliteness" extra-empirically to formal positions in government or political party hierar-

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chies. Third, the literature collectively exhibits a methodological insensitivity to the distinctions between studies of *political elites* and studies of *political leadership*. Each of these problems bears elaboration.

The absence of explicit definitions of the concepts "elite" or "leadership" is nearly universal. The nature of the concept generally must be inferred from implicit operational definitions, and even the latter sometimes are missing. Where conceptual definitions do appear, they usually emerge as items in a typology of "elite types," or "leadership styles." The typologies offered by Silvert,[49] Anderson,[50] and Bourricaud[51] are serviceable examples. For instance, in elaborating his seven types of political leadership in Latin America (caudillo, oligarch, middle class professional, ad hoc military amateur, populist conservative or Falangist, totalitarian of the left, totalitarian of the right), Silvert provides a sufficiently detailed description of the characteristics of most of these types to enable us to infer reasonably coherent conceptual definitions. Naturally, it would be preferable if we did not have to infer the precise conceptual definition, since in the process of inference we may confuse *defining characteristics* (necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the concept's empirical referent) and *accompanying characteristics* (additional conditions which the concept's empirical referent commonly seems to meet).[52] The point is more than merely an issue in the literature on the philosophy of inquiry: since operational definitions supposedly are based on prior conceptual definitions, it is crucial to know precisely what conditions must be met before an "elite" is an "elite," or a "leader" is a "leader," for the purpose of a given research undertaking.

Silvert's leadership typology provides examples of the difficulties created by the failure to separate defining and accompanying characteristics. His description of the caudillo, while manifestly imprecise, at least seems to offer a basis for separating the defining characteristics. Although "historically the caudillo was usually a self-proclaimed military officer . . . [and was] supported by irregular or otherwise nonprofessional armies," Silvert suggests that the foregoing are *not* defining characteristics. For, he elaborates: "the *only common denominator* of the caudillo is that he is personalistic and rules over a situation which is truly primitive, or one which he and his constituency *see* as primitive and simple."[53] It must be emphasized that this conceptual definition would be difficult to make operational, since the notions of "personalistic" (elsewhere equated by Silvert with charismatic"[54]) and "primitive" are not explicated. At a minimum, however, the defining characteristics of the caudillo are separated from the usual accompanying characteristics. Silvert's handling of another leadership type, the oligarch, is less systematic, however. Indeed, nowhere are the characteristics of an "oligarch," as such, presented. Instead, Silvert offers *opinions* as to what *oligarchies* as *forms of government* in Latin

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America *usually* look like. Thus we are told that "Latin Americans popularly refer to class-bound governments identified with upper groups alone as 'oligarchies;'" that oligarchies are found "only in the less developed countries"; that oligarchies may be "Liberal" or "Conservative;" and that "most" oligarchs have been civilians.[55] An "oligarch," we must presume, is a political leader operating near the top (precisely where is not indicated) of the political hierarchy in an "oligarchy." And what *defines* an oligarchy, as opposed to what characteristics it *often exhibits,* is left most unclear.

Studies of political leadership in Latin America share a more general tendency with other leadership research in their attempt to attribute functional significance extra-empirically to formal positions in government or political party hierarchies. In much of the literature on political leadership in other parts of the world, however, there is at least implicit acceptance of the Beck and Malloy formulation that, conceptually, political leaders can be identified through their involvement in the set of *functional* relationships formed around the value-allocating process for a social unit.[56] It would be stretching the point to suggest that there is even implicit consensus on this position in studies of Latin American political leadership. It is not that students of Latin American politics believe that only formal governmental structures are important in the political process; to the contrary.[57] But despite the recognition of the importance of non-governmental and non-party groups in Latin American politics, there has been virtually no concern for formulating functional definitions of eliteness or leadership which would take these informal processes into account. Further, even those Latin Americanists who recognize the narrowness of a focus on formal governmental elites excuse such a focus on the grounds that 1) it is convenient, and 2) there is little reason to suppose that the leaders being thereby omitted are substantially dissimilar from their governmental counterparts. This kind of explicitly non-scientific posture is typified by Silvert's comments on his research on political leadership in Argentina:

The task of determining who are the political leaders in Argentina is not a subtle process . . . [we are speaking here only of] *manifest* political leadership. . . . This study does not concern itself with the "power elite" as a whole but only with that part of it which acts in formal governmental positions. As will be seen from an examination of some of the most obvious characteristics of these persons, there is little reason to suppose that their extra-political colleagues are substantially dissimilar.[58]

Aside from the fact that this statement reflects criteria of convenience rather more than criteria of methodological adequacy, three serious objections must be raised. First, it seems unreasonable to suggest that the only "manifest" political leadership in Argentina is found in a limited number (in this case, an average of 42 over time) of formal governmental posts. Second, it seems

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equally questionable to refer to anyone not occupying one of these 42 positions as "extra-political." Third, it is difficult to understand how we can draw any conclusions about similarities or dissimilarities between governmental and other political leaders by looking only at the characteristics of governmental leaders. Further, in order to justify generalizing findings on governmental leaders to the broader political leadership strata we would need more than just empirical evidence suggesting that the personal backgrounds of governmental leaders and other leaders were similar. Also required would be evidence that these background characteristics were linked with career patterns, value and issue orientations, and behaviors in similar ways in both groups.

The tendency to focus on formal governmental leadership carries with it an additional liability. It significantly reduces the likelihood of identifying emerging trends in the composition, career patterns, orientations, and behaviors of political leadership groups. If it is true, as is often contended, that many of the societies of Latin America are in the midst or on the threshold of significant social change, it seems folly to exclude the possibility that changes in the nature of political leadership may be forthcoming. It seems clear that the economically more developed states of Latin America have experienced a broadening and strengthening of the political party and interest group systems. These developments, in turn, have created a substantial new recruitment pool of nonactive and potential elites,[59] from which subsequent political leadership groups will be at least in part constituted. Again, using a broader, functionally-based definition of political leadership and political "eliteness" might well serve to identify these emerging patterns in leadership recruitment.

Students of Latin American politics have used both the term "elite" and the term "leadership" in discussing those who participate centrally in governing society. While one senses from a reading of the literature that the choice of one concept or the other may sometimes be conscious, the rationale is rarely detailed. Relatedly, the terms are not used consistently, nor are the implicit distinctions between the two terms in any sense patterned. Sometimes the two concepts are used interchangeably. This is methodologically unfortunate and substantively consequential. While there certainly is no single, widely-accepted conceptual definition of elite,[60] it is fair to say that elite studies have generally focused on a limited number of personal background characteristics and career attributes of a relatively small number of persons holding high governmental or political party office. Thus the concept "elite" seems in practice to have led to an emphasis on who the most powerful or influential persons are, what personal characteristics they have, and perhaps why they emerged as political elites. The concept of leadership generally has implied rather more. Leadership has tended to be used as a relational concept, implying the need to examine patterns of interactions between elites, between elites and non-elites, and

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between elites and potential or nonactive elites. It thus emphasizes the study of behaviors, as well as the processes by which political elites define their relationships with their environment, and through which they seek to perform the functions which have been allocated to them, or which they have appropriated.

The failure to use these two concepts consistently has rendered the literature on elites and leadership in Latin America of little cumulative value. While it is not our purpose to single out the work of Kalman Silvert for examination, he serves again in this context as an excellent example of how potentially meaningful research can be compromised by careless conceptualizing. Witness the fact that in the same year (1966) Silvert published two essays on "political leadership" in Latin America which seem to rest on two quite distinct notions of what leadership is. In his article "Leadership Formation and Modernization in Latin America,"[61] Silvert takes the position that leadership is a relational concept. Thus leadership types must be based on the kinds of relationships which exist between leaders and followers. But in *The Conflict Society*, discussing "Political Leadership and Institutional Weakness in Argentina,"[62] Silvert characterizes leadership in terms of the background characteristics of a limited number of government officials. Thus it is not possible to tie together Silvert's comments on "leadership" in the two essays. Further, it is not clear at all how this seminal thinker actually views the concept of leadership.

The handling of the concepts "elite" and "leadership" is by no means the only area of conceptual carelessness in the literature on political leadership in Latin America. A second tendency also exists to use artificially dichotomous conceptualizations rather than more appropriate continua or dimensions. Two examples are particularly noteworthy: 1) the tendency to dichotomize social and economic development into traditional and modern extremes, and 2) the tendency to dichotomize the value orientations of political leaders, again usually in terms of a traditionalist-modernist contrast.

Wilbert E. Moore has cogently argued that the major theoretical and substantive works dealing with socio-economic development "are replete with the exposition of a fundamental dualism in social organization," a dualism we commonly refer to in terms of traditional and modern patterns.[63] The fact that theories of socio-economic change usually rest on a dichotomous base is seen as unfortunate by Moore, for five reasons:[64]

a) "All dichotomies are in some measure false."
b) Dichotomization is "an extremely primitive form of classification," and distracts attention from the complex and continuous nature of development.
c) "The similarities of concrete societies at both ends of the scale may be exaggerated," while societies with "deviant" characteristics are clustered together under a catch-all rubric such as "transitional."

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d) Such a dichotomous conceptualization "relies primarily on comparative statics, rather than on processes and procedures, rates and sequences."

e) With such a dichotomous conceptualization, the tendency is to focus on "the social consequences" of modernization, rather than on the process of modernization itself.

It should be noted that there has been some impetus away from dichotomous conceptualization of socio-economic development in Latin American studies in recent years, principally provided by writers such as Germani[65] and Vekemans and Segundo.[66] Still, even the Vekemans-Segundo typology has at its base a simplistic contrast between characteristics of traditional societies and characteristics of modern societies. Each of the six general categories of information they use (the economy, the social stratification system, cultural factors, standard of living, ethnography, and political behavior) seems to be operationalized in terms of traditional vis-à-vis modern patterns. Further, although Vekemans and Segundo imply that political "development" (toward political "maturity") will, by and large, go hand-in-glove with socio-economic development, there is considerable doubt on this score. Silvert, for example, contends that "reasonable political inferences from this typology are not as evident as they may seem." For example, he suggests that "stability does not correlate with socio-economic indicators."[67] Silvert also properly notes that the Vekemans-Segundo typology fails to make the distinction between structural and functional modernization.

The tendency to dichotomize the value orientations of political leaders in Latin America into traditionalist and modernist schools is widespread. Perhaps the best example of this tendency is in Silvert's essay on political leadership formation and its relation to modernization.[68] Here Silvert contrasts the "Mediterranean/Iberian traditionalist" posture, based on ritualism, absolutism, and stasis, with the "Western" modernist posture, based on rationalism, relativism, pragmatism, experimentalism, and self-adjustment to change.[69] Silvert does note that "these two categories are insufficient to cover all Latin American cultures from nomadic tribes to industrial urban persons." Methodologically-inspired caution again turns out to be easy to overcome, however, for Silvert then proceeds to use the dichotomous conceptualization, "merely for convenience . . . and because the immediately important political actors in Latin America are all within the greater Mediterranean cultural continuum."[70] Unless the latter assertion is rendered valid by definition, it seems empirically questionable.

A third conceptual difficulty in studies of Latin American politics rests in the absence of serious efforts to agree on (or even to make explicit) conceptual definitions of frequently-used terms which describe the environmental context within which political leaders operate. The extent of agree-

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ment among Latin Americanists as to the major features or essential character-istics of Latin American politics is impressive. But this superficial unanimity becomes doubly frustrating when one observes that the concepts used in de-scribing these essential characteristics are almost never defined. How often, for example, can one find specific conceptual or operational definitions of central concepts such as instability, legitimacy, constitutionalism, personalism, charisma, revolution, nationalism, or traditionalism? Literally hundreds of examples of the undefined use of these concepts could be offered from the literature on Latin American politics. Does "instability" refer to the presence of violence in resolving disputes? Is it to be equated with a high rate of turn-over of political elites? Or is it indexed by the absence of commitment to a shared set of broad values by the principal political actors in a system? Is "legitimacy" really the same as acquiescence? Or must "legitimacy" rest on some measure of active support for a regime? If active support is required, support by whom for whom? Is a palace coup a "revolution"? Or must a "revolution" involve fundamental changes in the values on the basis of which a society is governed? If it is the latter, how does one ascertain whether given changes are "fundamental," or genuinely "revolutionary"? Were we to cata-logue the diverse implicit definitions given these major concepts in the litera-ture on Latin American politics, the confusion would doubtless seem over-whelming.

It is not necessarily to be assumed that the long-run interests of research on political leadership in Latin America would be best served if scholars in the area agreed tomorrow on standard definitions of these concepts. Naturally, the comparability and thus the cumulative significance of the research done would be enhanced if congruent definitions were in wide use. Still, it may yet be too early to ascertain which conceptual definitions best facilitate the study of these phenomena in Latin American settings. But it is clear that some kind of dialogue on these thorny questions must be understaken. The first step would be the consistent explication of conceptual and operational definitions of cen-tral terms.

A fourth set of conceptual problems is created by the parochialism of approaches used by United States scholars studying other areas of the world. Until recently there has been a marked tendency to force information on Latin American government and politics into a perspective shaped largely by tradi-tional approaches to the study of United States political institutions. Textbooks on Latin American politics have been legalistic in perspective, have focused on formal constitutional prescriptions, have accorded great importance to the no-tion of historical evolution of predominant political patterns, have given major attention to the structure of the branches of government and their interrela-tions, and have discussed the importance (demonstrated or potential) of re-

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sponsible political parties in stabilizing political activity. Not only is such an approach of dubious relevance to the realities of politics in some Latin American systems, but also, by looking at Latin American politics through these parochially North American lenses, it seems to lead some scholars to expect Latin American systems to exhibit many of the same operating features as does the United States. Thus, three of the most commonly-remarked features of political life in Latin America are treated, to one degree or another, as aberrations from a presumed set of political norms. These features are the persistence of direct military involvement in politics; the high incidence of violence, revolt, and similar forms of "revolutionary" behavior; and the high rate of turnover of major political personnel. There has been considerable reluctance to treat these circumstances as "normal" or expected, or to consider the possibility that they may persist, perhaps indefinitely, regardless of the pace or extent of socio-economic development. It is quite possible that this conceptual problem may be related to the presence of normative concerns among students of Latin American politics. That is, one who desires to see democracy develop in Latin America may find it more difficult to accept the notion that political practices which seem antithetical to democratic development may represent a "normal," or modal, state of affairs.

A fifth and final conceptual problem in research on Latin American political leadership concerns the fascinating "everything-but-nothing" role of developmental concepts and hypotheses. If Latin Americanists agree on anything, they agree that the area can indeed be characterized as developing, that the processes of social and economic development are among the major stimuli for political change in some Latin American systems, and that even in those countries not now experiencing significant economic growth, the desire for such development has considerable impact on politics. It is therefore striking that there have been so few efforts to conceptualize Latin American politics using developmental concepts and hypotheses. It must be emphasized that using the word "development" does not constitute using a developmental approach. For example, although Vekemans and Segundo[71] discuss development, they cannot be said to have a developmental approach, since 1) they make no effort to explain the process of development; 2) they generally do not use concepts which refer to the developmental process; and 3) they include among their 25 aggregate indicators of socio-economic development not a single change-oriented index. All of their indicators are static and do not refer to the process of change in any way. Although Blanksten's contribution to the Almond and Coleman volume[72] nearly a decade ago might have provided a stimulus to efforts to view Latin American politics developmentally, few heeded the clarion call. There are not extant studies of Latin American systems which might comfortably be fitted, for example, into the Almond and Powell framework.[73] This

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conceptual problem seems consequential in terms of theory-building. If we genuinely wish to explain the impact of socio-economic development on the nature of political leadership in Latin America, it behooves us to utilize systematic explanatory models based on developmental concepts and hypotheses.

DATA COLLECTION

1. *Availability and Access.* It is common for students of political leadership in Latin America to cite limitations on data access as a principal justification for the methodologically underdeveloped state of their specialization. Published biographic and related kinds of data are not uniformly available over time, or across nations. The information which is readily obtained, principally in Quién es Quién?-type publications and in newspaper files, cannot always be considered reliable. Structured interviews with major political personalities are sometimes difficult to obtain, and mail questionnaires are notoriously ineffective.[74]

There are no easy answers to these problems. Latin Americanists are frequently faced with the unenviable choice of working with poor data, or doing strictly impressionistic analyses. The latter course clearly is modal. Yet there are at least three tentative steps which might be taken to improve the data base from which students of Latin American political leadership must operate.

First, in order to provide some guidance for future research efforts, those who have done research should report their sources, research procedures, and findings as fully as possible. The failure to do this is generally considered inexcusable in scientific disciplines, and has especially unfortunate consequences in a research area where relatively little sound work has been done. To illustrate this failure to document sources and to detail research procedures and findings, we may refer to two of the more important pieces of research done in recent years on political leadership in Latin America: Ranis' study of Peronismo in Argentina[75] and Johnson's work on military-civilian relations.[76]

Johnson tells us that he used "printed documents, manuscript materials, and information collected . . . from interviews with approximately 500 military men and civilians." We are assured that "the printed materials . . . are representative of the literature for the republics in general." This is important, since the volume refers to Latin America as a whole. Unfortunately, we must rely on the author's assurances alone that the materials are "representative." Johnson does provide a vague notion of the nature of the printed and related material he used "to illustrate social attitudes." His comments on these attitudes constitute an important part of his study, but his "sources" do not inspire methodological confidence. Included in this material are "literature, folklore, and art." More specifically,

I undertook the examination of a sizable body of material—approximately one hundred selected novels and anthologies and more than five hundred essays, poems, folk songs, and bits of folk verse, plus at least two thousand paintings in a dozen art museums, and dozens of art volumes and journals—not because I felt I had any particular expertise in analyzing such sources, but because I believed they could be used to add a human dimension to a very human problem.[77]

Apparently because of the importance of assuring anonymity for his respondents, Johnson provides no details concerning his 500 interviews. Finally, he declines to comment further on the "manuscripts" which were used, since they "were made available to me by agencies in Latin America and the United States to which attribution cannot be made."[78]

At the risk of belaboring the obvious, several questions should be raised about Johnson's "sources and documentation."

a) Were there any explicit criteria used in selecting respondents for the interviews? In general, what kinds of political positions did they hold, or what political functions did they perform? How many were interviewed in each country included in the study?

b) Were the interviews structured; i.e., was there a specific interview schedule? If so, what questions were included? Were both open-ended and forced-choice questions used? How were the interview responses coded for analysis, if at all?

c) How were the printed and related materials for studying "social attitudes" selected? Were they examined according to any explicit analytic scheme? We know, for example, that researchers using content analysis consider the development of an underlying theoretical rationale and the construction of content analytic categories to be invariant prerequisites for the examination of large bodies of literature. Was there any concern for theoretical issues behind Johnson's examination of these sources?

d) What segments of the study were dependent on the unidentified manuscripts?

e) Finally, on the basis of what criteria is it possible in scholarly research to justify the use of manuscripts supplied by government or other agencies for which no attribution of any kind can be made?

In general, then, the methodological difficulties with Johnson's study concern his willingness to extrapolate liberally from information, the precise genesis of which he is unwilling to identify. Ranis' research, by contrast, suffers from the opposite tendency: a reasonably adequate description of his research procedures, but an unwillingness to report the details of his findings. Thus, Ranis indicates that he administered a

detailed six-page questionnaire which was conducted with over 75 members of the 1963–65 National Chamber of Deputies. The deputies were asked to comment on their (1) social background; (2) psychopolitical affinities toward political opposition; (3) political perceptions of the role of parties and the variuos means available

to as well as the goals of the Argentine political community; and (4) issue orienta-
tion toward contemporary problems such as *peronismo*, petroleum, the military, in-
flation and the role of labor as an organized force. Complementary interviews were
also held with leading political figures from ex-President Arturo Frondizi to *peron-
ista* youth leaders. Labor leaders, businessmen, intellectuals and newspapermen were
also consulted.[79]

To be sure, this description of the interviewing procedure is less than
ideal. It would be especially important to know, for example, how Ranis
operationalized items on "psycho-political affinities toward political opposi-
tion." In broad-brush terms, however, the research procedure is made known.

We are led to believe that the interview responses were analytically mean-
ingful. Ranis characterizes his respondents as "eloquent and critical" and indi-
cates that they were "a valuable source of information." Therefore, it is
doubly frustrating that virtually none of the actual data supposedly emerging
from this research were reported in the Ranis article. There were no tables,
no statistical summaries, and no indications of attempts to interrelate the four
types of data gathered. Relatedly, although there appears to be an implicit
conceptual scheme underlying Ranis' study, there is no reference to any such
model in the article itself. We are left with the hope that the data themselves,
along with their theoretical rationale, will later be presented elsewhere.

A second step which might be taken to enlarge the data base for studies
of political leadership in Latin America would be more extensive use of exist-
ing data collections. For example, there has not been to my knowledge a single
use of computer content analysis to identify the value or issue orientations of
Latin American political leaders. Content analysis is a "multi-purpose research
method developed specifically for investigating a broad spectrum of problems
in which the content of communication serves as the basis of inference."[80]
This technique seems especially relevant to the study of political leadership.
Content analysis focuses on what many social scientists consider to be the
central process in all social interaction, communication.[81] Further, communica-
tion is especially important in the management of political affairs. Political
leaders spend a considerable portion of their time transmitting ideas. To put
this another way, much of the behavior of political leaders in which we are
interested is, in fact, communication of one kind or another. Thus it is easy
to understand why a significant part of the available data on political leaders
is in the form of communications from, to, or about them. And in the study of
Latin American political leadership, this data pool is essentially untapped.

There have been important improvements of late in content analytic
techniques, most made possible by enlisting the aid of computers. First, con-
tent analysis has advanced beyond the stage of gross word-counting to more
sophisticated and meaningful modes of textual inventorying. The question,

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"How often did a word appear?" has been replaced by the query, "In what form and context did an idea appear, e.g., with what intensity?" Further, it is now possible to combine the inventorying functions of content analysis with the application of statistical and related techniques designed to synthesize and organize data. Examples of such techniques would be factor analysis and pattern analysis.[82] Further, the use of computers in content analysis has vastly increased the volume of material that can be handled and the speed with which analyses can be undertaken. These benefits of analytic flexibility, speed, and volume are best combined in the Inquirer II system of content analysis programs.[83]

Content analysis of political elite communications should provide insight into 1) elite political culture (including values, beliefs, and attitudes); 2) leadership perceptions of unfolding political situations; 3) techniques of communication, including propagandizing, preferred by different leadership groups; and 4) the salience of different types of events for an explanation of elite behaviors and policy preferences. The significance of such data for research on political leadership in Latin America seems obvious.

A third step which should contribute to a firming of the data base would be the use of more comprehensive and explicit research designs and data collection instruments. A reading of the literature suggests that students of political leadership in Latin America rarely give more than passing attention to the basic desiderata of research design,[84] especially including the need to

a) formally state the problem to be researched;
b) suggest how the research in question relates to the existing literature on the subject;
c) clearly specify the research questions and the research hypotheses, and to distinguish between the two;
d) specify the independent, intervening, and dependent variables;
e) indicate what, if any, control procedures are present in the research design;
f) specify how each central concept is to be operationalized;
g) indicate what configurations of data will be accepted as bases for supporting or rejecting hypothesized relationships;
h) specify what statistical tests or other synthetic or analytic techniques may properly be used with the data, and indicate what substantively-relevant influence the logic of the model underlying the technique may have on the data;
i) show the nature of any sampling procedures or other criteria of subject-matter selectivity which may be used; and
j) justify the breadth of any generalizations which are to be made from the findings.

In short, researchers often do not "have" data because they do not look for them. They do not look for data because they have not developed explicit notions of what information really is necessary to test their hypotheses, why

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those particular data are needed, or how the data can be handled to maximize their research utility.

It must be emphasized again that there is one major exception in the literature on Latin American political leadership to the general absence of systematic research design. This exception is the work of Bonilla and Silva Michelena and their associates,[85] who have developed an integrated analytic scheme which holds considerable promise for studying political leadership. Researchers in the area might do well to proceed from the impressive beginnings reflected in the Bonilla research design.

2. *Cross-National Incomparability.* It has already been noted that there has been precious little genuinely comparative cross-national research on political leadership in Latin America. The literature is largely composed of single-country studies, with the remainder of the published work being global comparisons of the entire Latin American area, commonly unfettered by specific data. Systematic studies of leadership in clusters of nations do not exist. Still, we must assume that the strident calls for systematic cross-national research which are being sounded in the field of comparative politics will eventually be heard in Latin American studies. As the need for such comparative work becomes more insistent, increased attention must be given to problems of cross-national comparability of data.

Two major problems suggest themselves. First, there are cross-national positional-functional discontinuities which can be particularly troublesome. Thus, elite groups that occupy similar positions in the political structures of two Latin American countries may not perform comparable political functions. Facile comparisons of the former Uruguayan collegial executive with the Mexican cabinet would have little significance, then, unless care were taken to include, in addition, other political leaders outside those two bodies. Similarly, the functional division of responsibilities within Latin American political partes varies sufficiently so that meaningful comparisons cannot be made simply by looking at the members of national party executive committees or bureaus. Eventually, it would appear necessary that we use functional definitions of elites or leaders in order to escape the pitfalls of cross-national institutional incomparabilities.

A second problem of cross-national comparison concerns the relationships between cultural norms and the backgrounds of leaders. The environmental context of a datum may considerably affect its significance for the researcher. Thus the normal or expected representation of persons of given ethnic, religious, or occupational backgrounds would vary considerably between systems. This variation would be related not only to quantitative demographic, social, and economic indicators, but also to cultural value patterns that have evolved over time in each society. Consequently, the significance of levels of repre-

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sentation, or of changes in representation, of persons of given backgrounds would vary between countries. Relatedly, considerable care must be exercised in constructing elite typologies based on background and career attributes, since these may not be cross-nationally useful. Not only must such typologies embrace the range of leadership types actually observed in each system, but care also must be taken to insure tha tthe definitions of career types are cross-nationally applicable. Hence the definition of the words oligarch, bureaucrat, technocrat, or ideologue must be based on sensitivity to possible differences in the ways these terms are used in different societies.

DATA ANALYSIS

1. *Intrusion of Inexplicit Assumptions.* Studies of political leadership in Latin America are frequently burdened with significant and highly problematic assumptions. These assumptions are sometimes left implicit, sometimes treated as if they were data-supported conclusions. Two such sets of assumptions may be cited.

First, the literature abounds with assumed relationships between changes in the composition of political leadership groups and broader processes of economic and social change. For example, it is commonly presumed that any significant social change will be accompanied by changes in the composition of political elites, and perhaps in the patterns of political leadership. Alteration of the social fabric is assumed to imply changes in all components thereof. Furthermore, macro-change and micro-change are assumed either to be linked together causatively or to be congruent. Another way of stating this is to say that either the broader social change causes changes in political leadership, or that leadership change is one element of the indicated pattern of social change. Bazzanella offers a classic statement of such reasoning when he suggests that it is obvious that modernization, urbanization, and changes in the system of social stratification have broken "the dominant influence of the traditional ruling classes," and are "causing alterations in the power structure."[86] Eisenstadt suggests that modernization brings about a diffusion of potential power in the system, a weakening of traditional elites and traditional bases of legitimacy, and a decline in ascriptive criteria for elite recruitment.[87] And Johnson traces the increased "power potential" of the emerging "middle sectors" in some Latin American countries to their "functional significance . . . to the economic development needs of the society."[88] The point is not that connections such as these between systemic variables and political leadership characteristics may not exist. Rather, the difficulty is that students of Latin American politics have not yet made serious efforts to document such relationships. One searches

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in vain in the literature for a study relating aggregate indicators of social, economic, and political system change to modifications in the composition or behaviors of political leadership groups.[89]

The converse is also sometimes assumed: that changes in political leadership must necessarily be both directional and consequential for the analyst. The possibility that political leadership may change in unpatterned and socially inconsequential ways is generally overlooked. For example, Abegglen and Manneri assert that "the patterns of mobility to eelite positions . . . shape the direction and goals of the total system."[90] Nadel[91] and Shils[92] have argued that the personal characteristics of political leaders become "secondary societal values" which have considerable influence on subsequent patterns of social change. Horowitz and Hirschman have indicated that the presence of genuinely charismatic authority in a political system will, depending on the temporal and environmental circumstances, serve either as a stimulus to social change or as a brake on systemic change.[93] Janowitz asserts that the "mechanisms for maintaining and altering internal elite group stratification have a crucial impact on social change in society at large."[94] And Higgins echoes Hagen's contention that "social tensions among the elite" are major causes of social change.[95]

Again, it would be unreasoning folly to suggest that changes in political leadership may not have significant impact on broader currents of social change. But this impact must be systematically researched, rather than simplistically assumed.

A second set of common assumptions concerns the relationships between background characteristics, career attributes, and value and issue orientations of political leaders. Several researchers who have gathered background and career data on political leaders seem comfortable with the undocumented presumption that there are significant relationships between these personal characteristics and the positions taken by elites on political issues. A serviceable example of this kind of assumption is found in the work of Cochrane on Mexican cabinet members.[96] Cochrane gathered data on the "social or class status," place of birth, principal place of residence, education, occupation, and age of the 22 persons appointed by Díaz Ordaz when he assumed office in 1964. The author reports frequency distributions and percentages only; no attempt is made to interrelate the items of information. Cochrane's "conclusion" is that "the data [support] the proposition that most of the cabinet members are *científicos,* i.e., technicians, specialists, or experts in a particular facet of government activity."[97] Having reached this conclusion, Cochrane properly pauses to ask if such a finding has any significance. He suggests that it does have importance because of "the probable orientation, values, and skills of the cabinet members and the relationship between orientation, values, and skills on the one hand

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and policy-making and administration on the other."[98] The author then illustrates this point by discussing what an urban-oriented person (meaning a person from an urban area) is likely to see and to advocate.

Two points should be made concerning Cochrane's analytic posture. First, he appropriately recognizes that the background data he has gathered have little importance *per se*; rather, they assume significance only as they can be related to value and issue orientations of these political leaders. Second, however, having brought us to this crucial juncture with the aid of some reasonably hard data, Cochrane must then step disappointingly into speculation, precisely at that point at which the research could be most meaningful. The author cannot document the relationships between background characteristics and orientations: thus, he must assume them.

2. *Modes and Techniques of of Analysis.* One of the most striking characteristics of the literature on political leadership in Latin America has been its highly descriptive, impressionistic flavor. We have already noted that these studies rarely exhibit any concern for theoretical rationale, conceptual schemes, or research design. In addition, statistical and computer techniques have rarely been used in conjunction with such research. The intrusion of quantitative or mathematical modes of analysis has been minimal, indeed.

One result of (and perhaps reciprocally, one reason for) this neglect of newer modes and techniques of analysis has been the disappointing character of the few efforts at such analysis which have been undertaken in Latin American studies. As Kling notes, these efforts at quantification "deserve commendation for their good intentions rather than for their accomplishments."[99]

Fitzgibbon's often-criticized misadventure in quantifying democracy in Latin America is a prime example.[100] The technique is by now familiar to Latin American specialists. Here it bears little elaboration, except to point out that, every five years since 1945, it has involved asking a panel of journalistic and academic specialists on Latin America to rank the countries of the area on 15 criteria of "democracy." The objections to this research are properly numerous, and we can stress only the most significant ones here. First, the focus of the scale itself is parochial, involving as it does the explicit presumption that democracy is a meaningful dimension along which Latin American nations may be ranked, and the implicit presumption that there is operative in Latin America a developmental process, the end-state of which is political democracy. Second, as Kling notes, "each participant in the polls responds on the basis of individual, subjective judgments; the application of uniform standards by the judges cannot be assumed."[101] Third, Fitzgibbon's criteria represent a mixture of *defining* and *accompanying* characteristics of democracy, yet no attempt is made to distinguish among the two types of criteria. For example, the level of education of a population and its standard of living surely cannot be considered *defining* criteria for the existence of democracy. Fourth, although

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the criteria are frequently ambiguous, they are eventually treated in the analysis and conclusions as if they were reasonably precise items. In short, the substantial methodological limitations of Fitzgibbon's work render it at best of passing interest, and certainly not of scientific utility.

In short, the time has come for students of political leadership in Latin America to evaluate in earnest the prospects for using statistical and related computer techniques in the accumulation and analysis of data. It is not the purpose of this essay to catalogue the several possibilities for such applications, but it may be suggested that

a) computer content analysis be used to obtain data on the value and issue orientations of political leaders;
b) as a matter of course, all biographic information gathered on political leaders be coded and placed into machine-readable form, so that subsequent verificatory or creative uses of the data could be undertaken;
c) background and career attributes be factor-analyzed to obtain empirically-based typologies of elites;
d) data on value and issue orientations of political leaders be factor-analyzed to obtain typologies of elite perspectives;
e) quantitative indicators of social and economic development be gathered, put into machine-readable form, and factor-analyzed to obtain typologies of socio-economic systems;
f) systemic indicators and data on political leaders be interrelated by the use of a variety of statistical techniques to attempt to ascertain what kinds of factors influence patterns of leadership recruitment, as well as the perspectives of political leaders.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that students of Latin American political leadership must seek a broader, fresher set of approaches and techniques. The methodological shortcomings of the extant literature in this area are substantial; the task ahead is formidable. Generally, students of political leadership in Latin America must 1) develop a much more sophisticated and explicit concern for theory; 2) exercise considerably more care in research design and data collection; and 3) make intelligent use of statistical and other computer-based techniques in data analysis. These efforts would represent at least initial steps in the direction of firming up the methodological base of research on political leadership in Latin America. Much more would remain to be done. Surely it is time to begin.

NOTES

1. Martin C. Needler, *Latin American Politics in Perspective* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1963), 33.
2. Charles W. Anderson, *Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics* (Nashville, Tennessee:

Vanderbilt University, Graduate Center for Latin American Studies, Occasional Paper No. 2, February, 1964). An increasing interest in studying elites and leadership in Latin America is hopefully reflected in the publication of a collection of essays on *Elites in Latin America,* edited by S. M. Lipset and Aldo Solari (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967). Unfortunately, only two of the 15 chapters deal directly with political or military elites. Of these two chapters, only that by Horowitz on the military reports any specific data. It should also be mentioned that there are useful studies of political elites and leadership in Latin America which are not referred to specifically in this paper .Four of the best examples are Daniel Goldrich, *Sons of the Establishment: Elite Youth in Panama and Costa Rica* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966); W. V. D'Antonio and W. H. Form, *Political Influentials in Two Border Cities* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1964); José Luiz de Imaz, *Los que mandan* (Buenos Aires, 1964); and Dario Cantón, *El parlamento argentino en épocas de cambio: 1890, 1916 y 1946* (Buenos Aires: Editorial del Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, 1966).

3. See Kalman H. Silvert, "Leadership Formation and Modernization in Latin America," *Journal of International Affairs,* 20:2 (1966), 318–331.

4. For example, see Waldermiro Bazzanella, "Priority Areas for Social Research in Latin America," in E. de Vries and J. Medina Echavarria (eds.), *Social Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America* (Paris: UNESCO, 1963), 361–380; also see James L. Payne, *Patterns of Conflict in Colombia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

5. For a discussion of recent trends in model-building in comparative politics, see this writer's "Some Leading Approaches Methodologically Viewed, I: The Comparative Study of Political Systems," in Robert T. Golembiewski, William A. Welsh, and William J. Crotty, *A Methodological Primer for Political Scientists* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), 229, 241–261.

6. See David E. Apter, "A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics," *American Journal of Sociology,* 64 (Nov., 1958), 221–237.

7. The basic model was advanced in David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics,* 9:3 (April, 1957), 383–400.

8. Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (New York: The Free Press, 1966); also see his "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review,* 55:3 (1961), 493–514.

9. Herbert J. Spiro, "Comparative Politics: A Comprehensive Approach," *American Political Science Review,* 56:3 (Sept., 1962), 577–595.

10. *Inter-American Economic Affairs,* 21:1 (1968), 61–72.

11. *Inter-American Economic Affairs,* 21:1 (1968), 3–30.

12. *Inter-American Economic Affairs,* 18:2 (1964), 3–45.

13. *Inter-American Economic Affairs,* 17:3 (1963), 3–18.

14. *Inter-American Economic Affairs,* 16:4 (1963), 11–19.

15. *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* 3:1 (1961), 81–95.

16. *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* 8:1 (1966), 112–128.

17. *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* 9:2 (1967), 236–247.

18. *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* 9:2 (1967), 283–295.

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19. M. Mörner, "Caudillos y militares en la evolución hispanoamericano," *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* 2:1 (1960), 295–310; J. León Helguera, "The Changing Role of the Military in Colombia," 3:3 (1961), 351–358; Edwin Lieuwen, "The Changing Role of the Military in Latin America," 3:4 (1961), 559–570; R. A. Potash, "The Changing Role of the Military in Argentina," 3:4 (1961), 571–578; Daniel Goldrich, "Panamanian Students' Orientations toward Government and Democracy," 5:3 (1963), 379–404; L. Ronald Scheman, "The Brazilian Law Student: Background, Habits, Attitudes," 5:3 (1963), 333–356; Harry Kantor, "Los partidos populares de América Latina," 6:2 (1964), 221–234; John D. Martz, "Venezuela's 'Generation of '28': The Genesis of Political Democracy," 6:1 (1964), 17–32; Thomas M. Millington, "President Arturo Illía and the Argentine Military," 6:3 (1964); 405–424; Jordan M. Young, "Some Permanent Political Characteristics of Contemporary Brazil," 6:3 (1964), 287–301; Kenneth F. Johnson, "Political Radicalism in Colombia: Electoral Dynamics of 1962 and 1964," 7:1 (1965), 15–26; Albert Lauterbach, "Government and Development: Managerial Attitudes in Latin America," 7:2 (1965), 201–225; Aaron Lipman, "Social Background of the Bogotá Entrepreneur," 7:2 (1965), 227–235; Leonard D. Therry, "Dominant Power Components in the Brazilian University Student Movement prior to April, 1964," 7:1 (1965), 27–48; Franklin Tugwell, "The Christian Democrats of Venezuela," 7:2 (1965), 245–247; Howard Wiarda, "The Politics of Civil-Military Relations in the Dominican Republic," 7:4 (1965), 465–484; Ronald C. Newton, "Students and the Political System of the University of Buenos Aires," 8:4 (1966), 633–656; Frederic Hicks, "Politics, Power, and the Role of the Village Priest in Paraguay," 9:2 (1967), 273–282; Orville G. Cope, "The 1965 Congressional Election in Chile: An Analysis," 10:2 (1968), 256–276; Michael J. Francis, "Revolutionary Labor in Latin America: The CLASC," 10:4 (1968), 597–616; Robert H. Rehder, "Managerial Resource Development in Peru: Directions and Implications," 10:4 (1968), 571–586; Jaime Suchlicki, "Stirrings of Cuban Nationalism: The Student Generation of 1930," 10:3 (1968), 350–368; and Charles H. Weston, Jr., "An Ideology of Modernization: The Case of the Bolivian MNR," 10:1 (1968), 85–101.

20. For an excellent discussion of this theme, see Merle Kling, "The State of Research on Latin America: Political Science," in Charles W. Wagley (ed.), *Social Science Research on Latin America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 168–207. Despite the fact that Kling wrote the article six years ago, his characterization of the field remains essentially accurate.

21. Frank Bonilla and José A. Silva Michelena (eds.), *A Strategy for Research on Social Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), 26.

22. *Ibid.,* 175.

23. *Ibid.,* 176.

24. Gabriela de Bronfenmajer, "Elite Evaluation of Role Performance," *ibid.,* 217.

25. *Ibid.* Also see Kalman H. Silvert and Frank Bonilla, *Education and the Social Meaning of Development: A Preliminary Statement* (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1961).

26. Edwards.

27. Ranis.

28. Payne.

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29. Peter G. Snow, "El político argentino," *Revista Española de Opinión Pública*, No. 6 (Oct.–Dec., 1966), 135–149.

30. Richard R. Strout, *The Recruitment of Candidates in Mendoza Province, Argentina* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968).

31. Golembiewski, Welsh, and Crotty, *op. cit.*, 229.

32. Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952).

33. Carl Beck and James Malloy, *Political Elites: A Mode of Analysis* (Pittsburgh: Archive on Political Elites, University of Pittsburgh, n.d.).

34. Bonilla and Silva Michelena.

35. See Golembiewski, Welsh, and Crotty, *op. cit.*, 241–261.

36. Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).

37. Easton.

38. See John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

39. Roger Vekemans and J. L. Segundo, "Essay of a Socio-Economic Typology of the Latin American Countries," in de Vries and Medina Echavarría, *op. cit.*, 67–94.

40. Silvert, "Leadership Formation . . .," 319.

41. *Ibid.* It should be emphasized that Silvert's work is frequently singled out for comment in this paper not because his work is an easy target for criticism, but because in many ways his work is the *best* available.

42. François Bourricaud, "Structure and Function of the Peruvian Oligarchy," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 2:2 (1966), 17–31.

43. John D. Martz, "Dilemmas in the Study of Latin American Political Parties," *The Journal of Politics*, 26:3 (Aug., 1964), 515.

44. *Ibid.*, 519.

45. Rollie E. Poppino, "Who Are the Communists?" from his *International Communism in Latin America* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964). Reprinted in Peter G. Snow (ed.), *Government and Politics in Latin America: A Reader* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967). See p. 495 in Snow.

46. Silvert, "Leadership Formation . . . ," *op. cit.*; in addition see Gino Germani and Kalman Silvert, "Politics, Social Structure and Military Intervention in Latin America," *European Journal of Sociology*, 2 (1961), 62–81; also see Germani, *Política y sociedad en una época de transición* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos, 1963).

47. E.g., Vekemans and Segundo.

48. See Anatol Rapoport, *Two-Person Game Theory: The Essential Ideas* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966), 15–16.

49. Silvert, Leadership Formation. . . ."

50. See Anderson. The Anderson typology is largely implicit.

51. François Bourricaud, "Las élites en América Latina," *Aportes*, 1 (July, 1966), 121–123.

52. This problem also is severe in the literature on leadership in Communist systems. See Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., "Soviet Area Studies and the Social Sciences: Some Methodological Problems in Communist Studies," in Fleron (ed.), *Communist Studies and the Social Sciences: Essays on Methodology and Empirical Theory* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1969), 12–17.

53. Silvert, "Leadership Formation . . .," *op. cit.*, 326 (first emphasis in quote supplied).

54. "Elsewhere," that is, in the same article. See *ibid.*

55. *Ibid.*, 326–327.

56. Beck and Malloy. Their approach is based on Easton.

57. At the same time, the surfacing of concern for the study of informal political processes in Latin America is recent. In 1964, Kling still found an overwhelming concentration on formal governmental structures.

58. Silvert, "Political Leadership and Institutional Weakness . . .," *op. cit.*, 95.

59. See Beck and Malloy, *op. cit.*, 13–15; also, Laswell, Lerner, and Rothwell, *op. cit.*, Ch. I.

60. The major efforts at explicating the concept "elite" are found in Beck and Malloy; Laswell, Lerner, and Rothwell; Geraint Parry, *Political Elites* (London: Georges Allen and Unwin, 1969); T. B. Bottomore, *Eiltes and Society* (London: Penguin Books, 1966); Michalina Clifford-Vaughn, "Some French Concepts of Elites," *British Journal of Sociology,* 11:4 (Dec., 1960), 319–331; Hans P. Dreitzel, *Elitebergriff und Sozialstruktur* (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1962); S. F. Nadel, "The Concept of Social Elites," *International Social Science Bulletin,* 8:3 (1956), 413–424; Marian W. Beth, "The Elite and the Elites," *American Journal of Sociology,* 47 (March, 1942), 746–755; Ralph Gilbert Ross, "Elites and the Methodology of Politics," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 16 (Spring, 1952), 27–32; Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *American Political Science Review,* 52 (June, 1958), 463–469. The most useful of numerous efforts at explicating the concept "leadership" are Lewis J. Edinger, "Political Science and Political Biography, Reflections on the Study of Leadership," Parts I and II, *Journal of Politics,* 26:2 (May, 1964), 423–439; and 26:3 (August, 1964), 648–676; Richard T. Morris and Melvin Seeman, "The Problem of Leadership: An Interdisciplinary Approach," *American Journal of Sociology,* 56 (Sept., 1950), 149–155; Malcolm Moos and Bertram Koslin, "Political Leadership Re-examined: An Experimental Approach," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 15 (Fall, 1951), 563–574; and Robert Tannenbaum, and Fred Massarik, "Leadership: A Frame of Reference," *Management Science,* 4 (Oct. 1957), 1–19.

61. See also his "National Values, Development, and Leaders and Followers," *International Social Science Journal,* 15:4 (1963), 550–570.

62. It should be pointed out that *The Conflict Society* was not originally published in 1966, but in 1961.

63. Wilbert E. Moore, "Introduction: Social Change and Comparative Studies," *International Social Science Journal,* 15:4 (1963), 519–527.

64. *Ibid.* The listing itself has been abstracted from the text of Moore's article.

65. See Germani's work referred to in n. 46, above.

66. Vekemans and Segundo.

67. Silvert, "Leadership Formation . . .," *op. cit.*, 320.

68. *Ibid.*

69. *Ibid.*, 324.

70. *Ibid.*

71. Vekemans and Segundo.

72. George Blanksten, "Latin America," in Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960).

73. Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966). Hopefully, this comment does not apply to volumes on Latin American nations which might be published in the Little, Brown comparative politics country series.

74. The above-cited works by Bonilla and Silva Michelena, Payne, and Ranis all refer to these kinds of data-collection problems. In addition, the present writer has experienced considerable difficulty in using mail questionnaires in studying political elites in six of seven Latin American countries. Surprisngly, the response has been reasonably good for Uruguayan elites. See William A. Welsh, *Political Leadership in Latin America* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, forthcoming).

75. Ranis, *op. cit.*, 113.

76. Johnson.

77. *Ibid.*, ix.

78. *Ibid.*

79. Rains, *op. cit.*, 114.

80. Ole R. Holsti, "Content Analysis in Political Research," paper, Computers and the Policy Making Community Institute (Livermore, Calif., April, 1966), 1. See his *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969).

81. Indeed, communication approaches may well emerge as being among the most useful types of theories for comparative political analysis. Especially see Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government.*

82. See Robert C. North, *et al., Content Analysis* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), especially 105–128.

83. The Inquirer II System, a considerably revised version of the General Inquirer System, is described in Dennis J. Arp, J. Philip Miller, and George Psathas, *An Introduction to the Inquirer II System of Content Analysis*; and J. Philip Miller, *Inquirer II Programmer's Guide.* These publications are available through the Washington University Computer Facilities, St. Louis, Missouri.

84. For an elaboration of these *desiderata*, see Fred N. Kerlinger, *Foundations of Behavioral Research* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964).

86. Waldemiro Bazzanella, *op. cit.*, 375–376.

87. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Primitive Political Systems: A Comparative Analysis," *American Anthropologist*, 61 (April, 1959), 200–220.

88. John J. Johnson, *Political Change in Latin America, The Emergence of the Middle Sectors* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958). See especially Chs. 1 and 9.

89. One of the few systematic efforts at relating these variables is M. George Zaninovich,

"Elites and Citizenry in Yugoslav Society," chapter in Carl Beck, Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., Milton Lodge, William A. Welsh, and M. George Zaninovich, *Comparative Communist Political Leadership* (forthcoming).

90. James C. Abegglen and H. Manneri, "Leaders of Modern Japan, Social Origins and Mobility," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 4:2 (Oct., 1960), 109–134.

91. S. F. Nadel, "The Concept of Social Elites," *International Social Science Bulletin*, 8 (Fall, 1956), 413–424.

92. Edward A. Shils, "The Intellectuals and the Powers," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1 (Oct., 1958), 5–22.

93. Irving Louis Horowitz, *Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 230; Alfred O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958).

94. Morris Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1959).

95. Benjamin Higgins, "Requirements for Rapid Economic Development in Latin America," in E. de Vries and J. Medina Echavarría, *op. cit.*, 156.

96. Cochrane.

97. *Ibid.*, 70.

98. *Ibid.*, 71.

99. Kling, *op. cit.*, 186.

100. See, for example, Russell H. Fitzgibbon and Kenneth F. Johnson, "Measurement of Latin American Political Change," *American Political Science Review*, 55:3 (Sept., 1961), 515–526.

101. Kling, *op. cit.*, 186.

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