

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA. By *William E. Butler*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. xiii, 245 pp. \$12.00.

With his characteristic thoroughness Dr. William E. Butler of the University of London has written an exhaustive monograph, treating every aspect of tsarist and Soviet attitudes toward the law of the sea, beginning with the traditional problem of what is the High Sea and progressing to what should be done in the future in view of the newly discovered accessibility of the resources of the deep sea bed. Good maps illuminate a text replete with quotations and citations. The volume is a model of what scholars can do to determine Soviet legal and political attitudes through use of doctrinal materials and state practice.

Butler concludes that tsarist positions were supported both by Soviet authors and Soviet state practice until about 1945. Then, during intensification of the cold war, emphasis was placed upon maximum protection of Soviet territory. After 1960 another shift occurred as the Soviet Union emerged as a major naval power. Today emphasis is upon a law which would give its fishing fleets and navy the widest possible access to the waters of the world.

Butler finds no Marxist-Leninist ideology inspiring the various positions taken. Pragmatism rules supreme. Perhaps this is because it is hard to find a relation between ideology and the sea. Still, there may be one exception when use of the sea can contribute to or hamper efforts to expand the Marxist-oriented world or to protect the outlying members of the Marxist family. The Cuban blockade of 1962 suggests the problem. Butler notes that the Soviet leadership entered the conflict with blockading warships of the United States without an announced official position. One author had previously suggested that to attempt to pass through a blockade was illegal. After the Cuban incident another author declared a blockade of this character "aggression." The theoretical issue was not resolved when Soviet ships withdrew without legal argument under President Kennedy's pressures. The Cuban incident stands as a new triumph of practicality over ideologically sound but untenable positions.

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RUSSIAN SEA POWER. By *David Fairhall*. Boston: Gambit, 1971 [London: André Deutsch, entitled *Russia Looks to the Sea*]. 287 pp. \$10.00.

Written by the *Manchester Guardian's* defense analyst, who is quite familiar with both Western and Soviet sources, this book provides more than adequate information and perspective to a layman interested in the problems posed by the dramatic expansion of Soviet sea power. Fairhall's major thesis is that the Soviet Union, with its centralized planning, is better equipped than any other nation to coordinate its efforts in oceanographic research, merchant marine and fishing operations, and other activities supporting its naval power.

Many Western experts would probably disagree with Fairhall's evaluation of the actual military threat posed by the rapidly growing Soviet navy, which he sees only as a very long-term proposition. But he realistically dismisses Soviet claims that the expansion of their navy is fully a part of their overall defensive strategy to deter "imperialist aggressors." Aside from asserting its global interests by "showing the flag" in all the oceans, the Soviet Union is obviously impressed by

the purely military advantages of having a strong navy. As seen from Moscow (and not only Moscow), the history of local conflicts involving American interests—such as interventions in Suez, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam—has demonstrated the vital importance of controlling the high seas. The humiliating Soviet withdrawal from Cuba in 1962 was predetermined by the weakness of their naval power, and probably gave impetus to the subsequent expansionist program.

The author fully recognizes the immense political effect of the Soviet presence in seas that had never seen the Red flag. In the Eastern Mediterranean it has already inhibited Israel and reduced the role of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Middle East conflict. The presence of Soviet naval units in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf will doubtless influence political developments in many Arab sheikdoms, once the scheduled withdrawal of the British forces from the points east of Suez is completed. With the Soviet flag following trade, we may witness considerable changes in international trade patterns in some of the Latin American countries. And whether the Suez Canal is reopened or not, South Africa's strategic importance is bound to increase. These and many related questions are well treated in *Russian Sea Power*, and raise in turn many new ones.

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A CENTURY OF RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE: FROM ALEXANDER II TO KHRUSHCHEV. By *Lazar Volin*. Russian Research Center Studies, 63. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. vi, 644 pp. \$18.50.

The untimely death of Lazar Volin in December 1966 doubly saddened those of us fortunate enough to know him. Not only had we lost an outstanding mentor and colleague, but we feared we would never read his major work on Russian agriculture which we had so long and eagerly awaited. Thanks to the efforts of Harry Walters and others, these fears proved groundless. The resulting volume, a detailed interpretive survey of Russian agriculture from the mid-nineteenth century through 1966, will be indispensable for both specialists and general readers interested in the Soviet area. Although the treatment is generally nontechnical, even the more specialized student of Soviet agriculture will find Volin's interpretations of specific policies and practices interesting and thought-provoking.

The book is divided chronologically into three main sections: the reign of Alexander II through the October Revolution, "war communism" through the Stalin era, and the Khrushchev era and beyond. Within these historical sections are numerous topical chapters and subsections with substantial economic and, to a lesser extent, political analysis. Volin has relied primarily on information from published Soviet and pre-Soviet sources. Quantitative data are presented in a readily assimilable form. (There are approximately one hundred tables.) Volin's frequent comparisons with Western data and agricultural practices are very illuminating, as are his references to his own varied experiences in the Soviet Union. Fortunately for the general reader the writing style is lively, and complex technical questions are handled in a clear, comprehensible manner.

Volin manages to present his interpretations in a judicious yet extremely forceful way. His use of historical evidence is infused with a tough, critical spirit. Although the occasional resort to historical analogies between the tsarist and Soviet periods can be disconcerting, he usually gets considerable mileage from historical