

and what the Angolan adventure has perhaps brought to the fore, is the potential inability of the Soviet Union to control particular phases of socialist expansion around the world, while remaining flexible enough to gain long-term advantages.

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THE SOVIET UNION AND BLACK AFRICA. By *Christopher Stevens*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976. xiv, 236 pp. Tables. \$24.00.

SOVIET AND CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD. Edited by *Alvin Z. Rubinstein*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. xii, 232 pp. \$17.50, cloth. \$4.95, paper.

The intricate and often perplexing pattern of Soviet relations with the Third World forms the basis of the two works under review. In terms of approach, Dr. Stevens confines his inquiry to the Soviet Union and seven nations of Black Africa (Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and Tanzania), while the area specialists contributing to Professor Rubinstein's study encompass a broad geographical spectrum of such diverse nations as India, Indonesia, Egypt, and Cuba, in an attempt to examine Soviet (and to a lesser degree, Chinese) influence in the Third World at large. However similar the two works may appear in their exploration of Soviet ties with developing states, fundamental differences surface in the objectives and techniques adopted for the volumes. Stevens sets forth and probes the evolution and specific nature of Soviet-African relations with the aim of arriving at a series of general observations concerning those relations. Rubinstein, on the other hand, presents an analytical framework for the concept of influence building and calls upon the various contributors to assess the effects of Soviet and Chinese influence relationships upon target states. Thus Stevens's renunciation of grand theories in favor of "recording facts" stands in sharp contrast to Rubinstein's inductive method of testing a theory through empirical data.

Dr. Stevens's study is noteworthy for its richness of detail, which attests to the author's obvious familiarity with the African political and economic scene. The chapters dedicated to the patterns of trade and aid are a laudable feature of the study and, through numerous tables and charts, offer the reader a lucid and perceptive assessment of such topics as cost-benefit calculations, the effectiveness of foreign aid, and the adaptability of Soviet economic endeavors to conditions in technologically backward regions which are not always receptive to economic programs and formulas designed in Moscow. Unfortunately, a significant portion of the statistical data assembled by the author does not extend beyond 1970, and therefore needs to be updated.

In terms of the work's overall value, it is regrettable that attempts to relate economic pursuits to political objectives receive only casual treatment in the body of the text, with the author's own interesting and at times provocative conclusions left for the last few pages. As a result, statements such as "there appears to be some correlation between the USSR's economic and foreign policies" lack the persuasiveness which a set of hypotheses clearly stated at the outset and systematically examined throughout the study could have provided. These shortcomings notwithstanding, Dr. Stevens has succeeded in vividly portraying an area which, as more recent events have shown, figures prominently in the course of Soviet foreign policy.

Professor Rubinstein's *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World* pursues the ambitious goal of analyzing Soviet and Chinese relations with developing states by utilizing the concept of influence within a well-ordered methodological framework. The first chapter, written by Rubinstein, is a commendable attempt at drawing definitional parameters around an elusive topic. With notable skill, the assumptions underlying the idea of influence are lucidly conveyed, the hypotheses succinctly stated, and

the problems involved in handling data forthrightly acknowledged. While considerations of space preclude an appraisal of each case study in the book, a few general observations about their success in upholding the impressive degree of analytical rigor in the first chapter are in order.

One notes that although individual contributors offer numerous insights into events in their areas of specialization, similar depth is lacking in their review of trends and developments within the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Perhaps as a direct consequence of this nominal attention to factors shaping Moscow's and Peking's policies, fluctuations in the nature of superpower-developing state (or A-B) relationships are largely attributed to shifts in the goals and interests of the dependent state. A more thorough examination of Soviet and Chinese literature dealing with the areas discussed in the book would have added a dimension and balance which are largely lacking. Where such an analysis is undertaken, as in the chapters by Drs. Bettie and Oles Smolansky and Dr. George Ginsburgs, the persuasiveness of the authors' arguments is greatly enhanced. Furthermore, as noted by the editor, a thorough exploration of more general material, such as joint communiqués and key press statements, would presumably furnish indicators of perceptual and attitude changes. But such materials were untapped by most of the contributors. Consequently, the demanding task of delving into the elusive, speculative, and, at the same time, intriguing topic of attitude change as a basic determinant of influence awaits further study.

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THE BOKARO STEEL PLANT: A STUDY OF SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. By *Padma Desai*. Amsterdam and New York: North-Holland Publishing Company and American Elsevier Publishing Company, 1972. xviii, 108 pp. \$9.75, paper.

Padma Desai courageously ventures into a field where almost all economists now fear to tread: political economy and the proper technological choice as a key aspect of economic development. Her daring foray is successful.

As in the case of the Aswan Dam, the United States first considered construction of the enormous Bokaro iron and steel plant, opted out, and the Russians stepped in. "The Soviet Union has traditionally managed to secure generous returns on its aid program in India by 'doing what the West would not do,' especially in the areas of heavy industry and oil. However, in the case of the Bokaro Steel plant, it landed itself into a tricky and novel situation. By the time aid negotiations for the steel plant were initiated, India had already reached a stage of technological maturity so that local expertise in designing and constructing steel plants was available. Indeed, the prestigious firm of M. N. Dastur and Company was actively associated with the early planning of the project and had the competence to assess critically the proposed Soviet designs; it was, however, muscled out by the Soviet negotiators from the final aid-contract to the chagrin of an articulate and aroused public opinion cutting across most political parties" (p. xi).

The author believes that the Russians should have permitted the Indian firm, Dastur and Company, to play an important role in planning, equipping, and constructing the plant, instead of insisting on a turnkey project with minimal Indian participation. On the other hand, Dastur, although knowledgeable, had never undertaken a large steel project, and the record of Indian participation in the construction and operation of public sector steel plants was disastrous, as William Johnson showed in *The Steel Industry of India* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966). Furthermore, the completely Russian, turnkey Bhilai steel plant, which the Soviets had built for the Indians, was generally con-