

Stagnation and Renovation," "Critical Realism Against Bloc-Orthodoxy," "Preliminary Conclusion: Official Thought and Other-Thinking in the Soviet Union Today," "Muscovite Orthodoxy to New Fronts," "Contestation Within Soviet Philosophy and Ideology," "Ideological Reintegration and Democratic Alternatives," "Can the Soviet Union Survive 1984?," and "Reformist Thought and Emancipation: Deideologization of Sociology, History, Politics?"

True to the quasi-Sartrean vision of his *Evolution wider Willen* (1968), Professor Marko sees every effort of official Soviet ideology to cope with the major contemporary challenges as doomed to generate the very evil it tries to ward off. For example, it is in the name of the "unity of the socialist camp" that the Soviets make their moves in the Sino-Soviet conflict. It is these very moves which serve to prevent the realization of this unity. The so-called scientific-technological revolution poses an even more delicate problem. In order to benefit from it, the Soviet power structure has to act as if the benefits can be reaped without profound and "anti-Marxist" changes, such as those intimated in the views of the Richta group and others involved in the Prague Spring. But no one can guarantee that the operation will succeed. If it does not, the damage to "communism in the USSR" could be catastrophic, with hordes of deideologized technicians running all over the Soviet Union, not only unwilling but unable to respond to party slogans.

There is a similar "boomerang effect" in the series of repressive moves the Soviets have felt obliged to make in the recent past. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was successful in terms of short-range political benefits; but it is becoming clearer and clearer to the Soviets that their violation of their own political beliefs has made even their best friends wary. The author also examines in some detail the reverse effects of efforts to repress *samizdat* activities. Even clearer is the sort of "institutionalized martyrdom" of Soviet thinkers who are guilty of slight deviations from rigid orthodoxy and who are "not worth" hitting too hard. A sort of brinkmanship results from individual thinkers learning how to profit from this state of affairs.

All in all, Professor Marko has done a useful piece of work, supplying not only much interesting information on the current state of the ideological scene in the Soviet Union but also making fruitful efforts to develop comparative methods for dealing with ideology and philosophy under authoritarian regimes.

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WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1930-1945. By *Antony C. Sutton*. Second volume of a three-volume series. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971. xxiv, 401 pp. \$12.50.

Antony Sutton's study of the role of Western technology and technicians in the Soviet economy is a major contribution to a neglected but important aspect of Soviet growth. His second volume, covering the period 1930 to 1945, carefully documents the wide use and critical importance of Western technology and technical skills in the high-priority sectors during the early five-year plans, and summarizes the major technological transfers occurring through the Lend Lease agreement. As in the first volume, the strength of the second is the rich amount of data assembled from unpublished sources, company files, and participants. Sutton's well-organized industry-by-industry review of Soviet use of Western technology and technicians shows the

many methods and problems of transferring technology and the great impact that just blueprints and a dozen engineers can have on an industry. This book in essence gives us a good descriptive case study of an economy that successfully borrowed foreign technology to accelerate its industrialization.

Sutton's concluding chapters, however, are marred by faulty analysis and an inadequate study of economics and other scholars' work on the Soviet economy. At times his analysis suggests a personal distaste for the Soviet regime. (See my review of the first volume in this journal, June 1970, pp. 337–38.) For example, Sutton finds that growth rates of industries are directly correlated to their (crudely measured) dependence on foreign technology. From this he makes the unwarranted conclusion that "Western technical assistance was the major causal factor in Soviet economic growth for the period 1928–1945" (p. 339), and he dismisses the contribution of labor and capital as unimportant. But, in fact, as Richard Moorsteen and Raymond Powell point out in their 1966 study, the major part of Soviet growth can be attributed to additional capital and labor rather than technological progress. Sutton also concludes that Soviet technical personnel failed to make many significant technological advances in this period because the "Soviet system" stifled Russian creativity. This issue cannot be resolved here, but there is another reasonable explanation for the Soviet failure to advance their own technological frontier during this period. Technical skills were so scarce that it was more efficient to use these scarce skills to adapt and introduce proven Western technology into the Soviet economy than to try to develop domestic designs. After all, isn't this the advantage of being relatively backward?

Sutton overlooks interesting implications of his own research. For example, he ignores the growing Soviet ability to carry out routine design, construction, and operations without the numerous foreign personnel required in pre-1917 Russia. He also has missed a more important development. The Soviet regime reaped many of the benefits of foreign investment without being "burdened" with foreign capitalists. The Soviet government purchased the technologies, technicians, and sophisticated machines from major Western firms for a fixed fee, but supplied their own capital, labor, land, and entrepreneurship. Thus the profits of technological innovation accrued to the Soviet economy rather than to the foreign investor. This was a major innovation in economic development!

Yet, despite these shortcomings, Sutton's second volume is an important definitive study of Western technology in the USSR during 1930–45 and merits reading by both Soviet specialists and persons involved in the technical and economic development of less developed countries.

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THE PREDICTION OF COMMUNIST ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE. Edited by P. J. D. Wiles. Soviet and East European Studies. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971. x, 390 pp. \$13.00.

The twenty-seven pieces of varying length—by about half as many contributors—cover the USSR, China, and Eastern Europe (including Albania but not Yugoslavia). The core of the collection is a dozen essays written and originally published (in *Analyse et Prévission*) in 1967 in an attempt to test the possibility of predicting