1 percent per year—not very impressive, even if we take into account war, territorial losses, and the world economic crisis (see Frederick Hertz, *The Economic Problem of the Danubian States*, London, 1947).

The book offers a thorough analysis of all essential aspects of economic growth: the development of industry and agriculture, the role of banking and the formation of a modern transport system, the rise of the entrepreneur, the structure of trade, and the problems of fiscal policy. The editors regret that some foreign contributors were not in a position to keep their promises (a hint at the delicate character of collaboration with scholars from the other side of the Iron Curtain?).

Most of the essays are amply furnished with statistics and charts. Three maps (by H. Matis and K. Bachinger) show the distribution of jobs and branches of industry. An extensive index makes this praiseworthy compilation of outstanding studies also a highly valuable reference book henceforth indispensable for anybody interested in the modern history of "Mitteleuropa."

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A NEMZETŐRSÉG ÉS HONVÉDSÉG SZERVEZÉSE 1848 NYARÁN [The Creation of the National Guard and of the Honvéd Army in the Summer of 1848]. By *Aladár Urbán*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1973. 426 pp. + 8 pp. plates. 83 Ft.

In the spring of 1848, Hungary was granted virtual independence within the Habsburg realm. With her own ministries of finance and war, and with the beginnings of a diplomatic service, she was preparing to shed anything more than a mere personal union with the rest of the Monarchy. Since, however, the authority of the Hungarian war minister over the regular troops stationed in Hungary, and over Hungarian regiments stationed outside the country, was rather doubtful, it became imperative for the new Hungarian government to create an armed force ready to protect the bourgeois national revolution. National Guard companies had at first been formed spontaneously in the Hungarian cities; then they had been expanded rapidly and efficiently by Prime Minister Lajos Batthyány. He was able to turn the voluntary movement into a nationwide obligation and to put the National Guard under his own authority. Officers and NCO's were lured from the imperial-royal army. In opposition to older Marxist historiography, Professor Urbán argues that Batthyány's swift action was due not only to his desire to prevent massive proletarian and peasant uprisings but also to his determination to make Hungary truly self-governing. Nor was the National Guard a consequence of unrest among the non-Magyar nationalities: when the Guard was created, the nationalities had still been quiet. Yet the Guard system did not quite achieve its purpose. The peasants generally disliked their new obligation, and increasingly so did the non-Magyar nationalities. The Guard was organized on a county basis, and the Guardsmen were determined to fight only within the narrow confines of their homeland.

When the Serbs revolted, in the summer of 1848, Guard units were engaged to serve against them for only four weeks. Poorly armed Guardsmen created nothing but trouble, and many headed for home soon after arriving at the front. Fortunately for Hungary, Batthyány had already set up special mobile Guard battalions ready to serve for the duration. More important, in May 1848 a regular

force of 10,000 men had been created that became the nucleus of the later *honvéd* army of 170,000. If from Urbán's account Batthyány emerges as a determined nationalist (one begins to understand why Schwarzenberg had him executed in October 1849), Kossuth's role in the first months of the revolution is correctly diminished. The author, a rather young docent at the University of Budapest now specializing in British and U.S. history, is a thorough researcher who consulted many provincial archives. His argument is quiet and persuasive, although sometimes crammed with unnecessary details. But then his book was once a Kandidat's dissertation at the Academy of Sciences, and the miseries of dissertation writing in a socialist country are not unlike those in the United States.

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A MARSEILLE-I GYILKOSSÁG NEMZETKÖZI JOGI VONATKOZÁSAI. By *Pál Nándori*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1972. 284 pp. 56 Ft.

The assassination of the French foreign minister, Jean Louis Barthou, and King Alexander of Yugoslavia at Marseilles in October 1934 led to a diplomatic crisis. The assassin was a member of the terrorist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, and was also connected with the Croatian Ustaši. Both Hungary and Italy were suspected of complicity in the crime, but charges centered on Hungary. The Yugoslavs claimed that Hungarian authorities had protected and given aid to a group of émigré Croatians belonging to the Ustaši. Those responsible for the assassination—so it was claimed—had been able to carry out training activities on a farm called Janka Puszta in southern Hungary, and the dispute was taken to the League of Nations in December 1934. Budapest denied any involvement in Ustaši activities, and the Council of the League ended by asserting only that some Hungarian authorities may have had, perhaps through negligence, responsibility for some acts leading to the murders at Marseilles.

This monograph seeks to prove on the basis of extensive research in Hungarian archives that according to international law Hungarian authorities were indeed guilty of complicity in the crime, support of political assassination being an expression of Fascist policy. The author demonstrates to his own satisfaction through inference and indirect evidence, for example, that the assassin actually lived in Hungary before going to Marseilles, but fails to produce any concrete documentation. His conclusions are much sounder when discussing Hungarian contacts with the Ustaši during the 1920s, for here the Hungarian archives hold a wealth of hitherto unexploited material. Herein, in fact, lies the main value of the monograph. It is well known that in the interest of revision during the interwar years Hungarians had contact with subversive organizations not only in Yugoslavia but also in Czechoslovakia and Rumania. Yet we know very little about the nature of these contacts and the people involved. This book may inspire other studies concerning Hungarian relations with such groups.

The strongest point of the book—use of unpublished and otherwise unavailable Hungarian archival material—also constitutes one of its limitations. A more complete analysis of events surrounding the assassinations at Marseilles would need to avail itself of Yugoslav, Italian, and possibly Bulgarian sources as well.

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