

four of which go to the Communist Party of Japan. Not much that is new can be said in so few pages. On the whole the author moves on ground covered before, for his sources are mainly well-established books and other printed materials, such as—for his military chapter—the publications of the London Institute for Strategic Studies.

In a new edition the author could perhaps cover more fully the profound effect which China's return to world affairs after the Cultural Revolution has had on Soviet-Chinese relations, and also standardize his spelling of Chinese names (he now uses three versions: Mao Tse-Tung, Peng Te Huai, Liu Shao-chi).

The main virtue of the book is that the author has accomplished what he set out to do—to write a general study of Soviet interests in the Asian area on a broad basis, both inside and outside the Soviet borders. The book can be recommended as a useful text for all those interested in the subject.

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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EMERGING NATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS INDIA. By *Harish Kapur*. London: Michael Joseph Ltd., for the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 1972. 124 pp. £3.50. Distributed by Humanities Press, New York. \$10.50.

Professor Kapur's study does not provide a detailed analysis of Soviet policy toward India, but it is valuable because the author pinpoints certain aspects of Soviet and Indian policies often neglected by other scholars, and offers some interesting and provocative interpretations. Kapur points out that initially India's policy was very pro-Western, since the country was still tied to the West, especially Great Britain, both economically and militarily. The policy changed, however, with the Communist victory in China. India responded to this northern "threat" by moving toward a "political rapprochement with the Communist world" as the "only rational substitute to a military confrontation."

In Kapur's view, Soviet policy toward India was not so much a response to these changes in Indian policy as it was an effort on Moscow's part to prevent the Communist leadership in Asia from passing into Chinese hands. The Soviets, who were already critical of Nehru in 1947–48, became more critical of his policies in 1949 as the victorious Chinese Communists called the Indian leader an "imperialist running dog" and Mao openly called for a Communist victory in India. Later, the Chinese were to change their policy because of India's opposition to several American moves during the Korean War. It was *after* the change in China's policy that the Soviets also decided to change their policy toward India so they would not be left isolated in Asia and leave the "field wide open for China to increase her influence in the area." Thus we have elements of Soviet-Chinese rivalry present even at this early date. Kapur, however, does not provide any evidence to support this view. In the opinion of this reviewer, Moscow's policy can still best be studied as a response to India's changing postures and the consideration of Soviet national interests.

The author's discussion of the period of "crisis" in the late 1960s is one of the most valuable portions of the book. Here he provides some interesting details about those issues which at the time created difficulties in Soviet-Indian relations.

Although published in 1972, this book does not discuss the latest phase of Soviet policy which was inaugurated in 1969 with the announcement of the Brezhnev plan of collective security in Asia, when India seemed to have acquired a new importance in Soviet strategy in Asia, and which eventually led to the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty in August 1971. Despite this limitation, the volume is a valuable addition to the growing literature on Soviet-Asian relations.

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COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF THE THIRD WORLD. By *Edward Taborsky*. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1973. iii, 500 pp. \$12.50.

Professor Taborsky has made an heroic effort to cover in a single volume the current doctrines and policies of some nine Communist states vis-à-vis all the regions of the Third World, embracing a veritable plethora of activities—overt and covert. The attempt was worthwhile, and the results certainly should prove useful to many who labor in this field, even if the very scope of the undertaking has led to limitations that perhaps were inevitable under the circumstances.

In his evident desire to distill from his study a single coherent and consistent pattern of contemporary Soviet and East European ideological and policy approaches toward the Third World, presumably to give readers a clearer overview, the author has compressed the whole period from Khrushchev's ascendancy to the present day (1954–73) into an arbitrary monolithic entity. Works and statements emanating from different policy periods and from writers and spokesmen representing, in fact, conflicting schools of thought and interpretation (and enjoying, probably, the patronage of rival factions in the Soviet party leadership) are cited often rather indiscriminately, creating the impression somehow that, apart from the Maoist heresy, there has been a single, almost unaltering and unchallenged, Communist view of various Third World problems during the last two decades. The reader might well be led to believe (1) that, in this period, there had been no important changes in the general party line toward the Third World and in Moscow's tactics toward specific areas and states, (2) that there had been no well-documented "debates" between certain academicians from the various institutes and even between political leaders, and (3) that there had not been an endemic contradiction between the aspirations of local Communist parties in the Third World and Moscow's self-serving interests in supporting the military dictatorships that were suppressing all opposition elements, including the Communists.

Perhaps most puzzling is the author's persistent down-playing of pre-Khrushchevian, and especially Leninist, contributions to current Soviet doctrine concerning the Third World. Thus he speaks of "Lenin's well-nigh all-inclusive preoccupation with Europe in contrast to his rather cursory and definitely quite secondary interest in other continents. . . ." Is he referring to the same Lenin who emphasized that "the socialist revolution will not be solely or chiefly a struggle of the revolutionary proletariat in each country against their bourgeoisie—no, it will be a struggle of all colonies and . . . of all dependent countries against international imperialism" and who actually changed the *Communist Manifesto's* slogan to read "Workers of all countries *and oppressed nations, unite!*"? Similarly, the author treats such terms as "national democratic," "revolutionary democrats," and so forth,