

## Introduction

### Sovereignty as Status: Hierarchy and East Asian International Relations

[A]mong the countries in the world, it is the Asian states that most clearly approximate the Westphalian state . . . . The aspiration of the Asian political elite is to build strong, sovereign nation-states.<sup>1</sup>

[T]he Asian subsystem is dressed in Westphalian clothes, but is not performing according to a Westphalian script.<sup>2</sup>

In Japan and South Korea, important strategic debates have involved rhetorical contestation over the meaning of – and how best to achieve – sovereign autonomy. This is significant because there is only a limited availability of vocabularies and concepts with which political leaders can articulate or legitimate their actions within a given social context. And in Japan and South Korea, it is the language of sovereign autonomy that reverberates in domestic political discussions of major foreign policy issues. In Japanese and South Korean debates on alliance relations with the United States, for example, the language of autonomy has been used variously, in conjunction with criticisms of *taibei jūzoku* (subordination under the United States) or *sadaejūui* (Great-Power-revering ideology), on the one hand, and rallying calls to “catch up” with the West or exercise independent leadership in global affairs alongside the United States and other major powers, on the other.

Because the set of meanings attached to autonomy has so widely varied, even when discussing the same concept, it is not enough to simply examine the usage of the word autonomy on its own. We need to analyze the context in which it is used. To that end, this book applies

<sup>1</sup> Muthiah Alagappa, “Constructing Security Order in Asia: Conceptions and Issues,” in *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 87.

<sup>2</sup> Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 353.

the insights from Reinhart Koselleck's conceptual history (*Begriffsgeschichte*) approach, a method of analyzing the use and development of language in its social–historical context.<sup>3</sup> The basic assumption is that political vocabularies derive from the timing and mode of specific historical experiences. In the case of modern East Asian international relations, sovereign autonomy emerged as the central concept for debating strategies of state-building and status-seeking in international hierarchy in the late nineteenth century. In short, sovereign autonomy is imagined differently, and this fact has profound consequences for East Asian security politics.

The objective of this book is to show how historical experiences have contextualized East Asian security debates, as reflected in these enduring concerns with sovereign autonomy. The central claim is that competing ideas about state sovereignty resulted from complex late nineteenth-century politics at both domestic and regional levels due to the region's insertion into a global hierarchy of interstate relations.<sup>4</sup> The immediate impact was that sovereign autonomy emerged as a particularly important security concept, discussed in conjunction with sovereignty, state power, and national advancement. Moreover, this book argues, these ideas of status-seeking have remained embedded in the concept of sovereign autonomy and endure as alternative security frames that continue to inform contemporary strategic debates in East Asia.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, translated by Todd Samuel Presner et al. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002); Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, translated by Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). I discuss the conceptual history method, and how it differs from other forms of discourse or language analysis, in greater detail in the next chapter.

<sup>4</sup> In this study, I use the term “hierarchy” to refer to patterns of interaction between states based on their recognition of power asymmetry and status differentiation. On different types of unequal but stable social relations among states based on hegemonial, hierarchical, or heteronomous rule, see Nicholas Onuf and Frank F. Klink, “Anarchy, Authority, Rule,” *International Studies Quarterly* 33, 2 (June 1989): 149–173.

<sup>5</sup> It should be noted that throughout the book, I refer to a unified Korea (for example, the Goryeo and Joseon dynasties) in my discussions of pre-1945 East Asia. For the postwar period, I focus my analysis on South Korea due to both theoretical and practical reasons. A paired comparison of South Korea and Japan offers much analytical leverage given their status as secondary states in the traditional Sinocentric order and militarily weaker allies to the United

The idea that autonomy is a variable, rather than a fixed or static attribute, in world politics is itself not novel. In the literature on military alliances, for example, and international relations theory in general, loss of autonomy is viewed as a necessary trade-off for enhanced security. Bargaining power determines what Glenn Snyder refers to as the “security-autonomy trade-off,” the optimal mix of security and autonomy valued by each alliance partner.<sup>6</sup> Intra-alliance negotiations can occur over time, moreover, following changes in the level of one ally’s dependence on the other or shifting levels of external threat. Therefore, autonomy-promoting stances – particularly in weaker allies – by definition pose a challenge to existing alliance relations.

But the two sets of alliance relationships in East Asia present a more complicated picture. Autonomy matters in terms of not only its varying degree but also its kind. It is such qualitative variation in the rhetoric of autonomy that is the subject of investigation in this book. Autonomy, the book will show, has a specific set of meanings in the East Asian context. In Japanese and South Korean discussions of alliance politics, the language of autonomy has been used, in different contexts, to both dispute and strengthen alliance ties with the United States. In two of the most heated periods of alliance tensions in recent history, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio (2009–2010) used the rallying calls of “autonomous defense” and “autonomous (or independent) foreign policy,” respectively, to publicly contest existing modes of cooperation

States after 1945. In terms of feasibility, it would be difficult to conduct a systematic empirical study of foreign policy debates or other forms of political contestation on conceptions of sovereignty in North Korea. While it is beyond the scope of this study, it could be argued that even North Korea’s *jucheron* (theory of self-reliance) is based on this historically shared regional context. Other studies have already examined how sovereignty contestation drives contemporary foreign policy in China. For example, see Allen Carlson, *Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). Julia Strauss also notes the “sheer longevity” of the rhetoric on state sovereignty in modern China. Julia C. Strauss, “The Past in the Present: Historical and Rhetorical Lineages in China’s Relations with Africa,” *The China Quarterly* 199 (September 2009): 777–795; Julia C. Strauss and Martha Saavedra, “Introduction: China, Africa and Internationalization,” *The China Quarterly* 199 (September 2009): 551–562.

<sup>6</sup> Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 180–181.

with the United States. In contrast, some leaders, such as South Korean leader Park Chung Hee (1961–1979) and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, have at times defined autonomy more expansively, in terms of playing an autonomous role in global affairs, under the influence of or aided by the United States.

What are the consequences of such varied interpretations of autonomy? A good example illustrating the effects of different political rhetoric on autonomy is the contrasting outcomes of alliance cooperation in Japan and South Korea during the Iraq war. When, in March 2003, the United States requested aid from its allies in the Iraq war campaign, governments in both Tokyo and Seoul complied by dispatching troops to Iraq. Yet, while in Japan the effects of the Iraq war on alliance relations were fairly limited, in South Korea ensuing tensions destabilized relations with the United States and threatened to derail cooperation on a wide range of alliance commitments and issues. The nearly year-long delay of the dispatch of additional South Korean troops to Iraq, contentious negotiations on the returning of the Yongsan military base land and on the timing of relocating US forces stationed in South Korea, the moving of select American troops from South Korea to Iraq, and public disagreements on policy toward North Korea were indications of widespread politicization of alliance relations.

Such contrasting politics of alliance cooperation in Japan and South Korea in 2003–2004 was not just about the Iraq war; what mattered was whether or not there had been a preceding shift in leaders' rhetorical stance. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008) challenged the existing security consensus based on alliance-supporting roles by redefining *jaju* (autonomy) and offering his own vision of *jaju gukbang* (autonomous defense). In Japan, however, the rhetoric on autonomy was of a different nature. In justifying his decisions to send the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to Afghanistan and Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (2001–2006) continued to use the language of increasing *kokusai kōken* (international contribution), referring to the widely supported mission to increase Japan's autonomy within the alliance structure. In other words, different conceptualizations of autonomy led to varied outcomes in alliance politics. How leaders chose to describe and contest (or not) state status in dealing with dominant powers affected the type and character of alliance cooperation.

The challenge of the Iraq war for American leadership, authority, and legitimacy has been widely acknowledged.<sup>7</sup> The aftermath of the Iraq war also underscores the point that hierarchical stability depends on more than coercive power. This is consistent with the existing scholarship on hierarchy that takes seriously the necessity of examining both its material and ideational aspects.<sup>8</sup> But, as the above examples of Japan and South Korea show, the United States was not alone in facing a crisis of legitimacy. American power and influence constitute a structure of international hierarchy, one that affects foreign policy choices and paths of legitimation for political leaders in the global security partners of the United States. How international hierarchy affects domestic legitimacy politics in non-dominant states, however, has not yet been systematically examined.

This book seeks to fill this lacuna by empirically examining how political leaders talk about international hierarchy. Why is it important to examine the language of hierarchy? The type of status-seeking strategy advocated by leaders of non-dominant states can have major consequences for specific hierarchical relationships and also the stability of the international system.<sup>9</sup> For example, whether or not China

<sup>7</sup> For examples of scholarly work that deal with this topic, see Christian Reus-Smit, "International Crises of Legitimacy," *International Politics* 44, 2/3 (March/May 2007): 157–174; Martha Finnemore, "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked Up to Be," *World Politics* 61, 1 (2009): 58–85.

<sup>8</sup> David A. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); David C. Kang, *East Asia before the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Andrew Phillips, *War, Religion and Empire: The Transformation of International Orders* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, eds., *Status in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

<sup>9</sup> On the positional nature of status in international hierarchy and different possibilities for status-seeking in international relations, see Ann E. Towns, *Women and States: Norms and Hierarchies in International Society* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Ayse Zarakol, "What Made the Modern World Hang Together: Socialization or Stigmatization?" *International Theory* 6, 2 (July 2014): 311–332; Rebecca Adler-Nissen, "Stigma Management in International Relations: Transgressive Identities, Norms, and Order in International Society," *International Organization* 68, 1 (January 2014): 143–176; William C. Wohlforth, "Conclusion: A Small Middle Power," in Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B. Neumann, eds., *Small States and Status Seeking* (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 146–154. For a detailed discussion of various forms of status-seeking behavior, such as social mobility, social competition, and social creativity, see Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei

embraces a system-supporting status or seeks to revise the existing status quo has consequences for regional and global order.<sup>10</sup> In the East Asian region, domestic political debates on dealing with dominant powers continue to impact foreign policy outcomes, including in cases of Japan–US and South Korea–US alliance cooperation. Specifically, the rhetorical framing of autonomy, as seen during the Iraq war, is an important factor in explaining alliance relations and stability of the regional order in East Asia.

The book is divided into two parts, motivated by the following related questions: How did the introduction of Westphalian sovereignty principles affect the East Asian regional order in the late nineteenth century? Why, and in what ways, does sovereign autonomy remain contested in contemporary Japan and South Korea? The key insight offered in the book is that autonomy is the language with which to conceptualize and contest the status of the state within a hierarchically ordered system of international relations. This is because Westphalian sovereign autonomy was adopted as regional practice in a context where international hierarchy expanded in scope – from regional to global – in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The repeated contestation of autonomy in status-seeking states, furthermore, is what maintains the institutional and ideational foundations of a durable hierarchical order. That is, the politics of sovereign autonomy allows the continued imagining of hierarchy.<sup>11</sup>

The specific processes by which international hierarchy is reproduced via the language of sovereign autonomy in domestic legitimacy politics will be further explored in Chapter 1. The remainder of the book answers the questions raised above by first examining how sovereign autonomy was conceived as a dilemma of status-seeking in

Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy,” *International Security* 34, 4 (Spring 2010): 63–95.

<sup>10</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” *International Security* 27, 4 (Spring 2003): 5–56; Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?” *International Security* 37, 4 (Spring 2013): 7–48; Randall Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Vision of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline,” *International Security* 36, 1 (Summer 2011): 41–72.

<sup>11</sup> By imagined hierarchy, I do not mean to suggest that hierarchy is purely an ideational construct that has no grounding in differentiated coercive capabilities. Rather, I am merely emphasizing the point that hierarchy exists as both a material and social fact. Durable hierarchical orders, I contend, rely on political language and processes that keep hierarchy alive as a social fact.

East Asia against the backdrop of the region's insertion into an expanding "international society,"<sup>12</sup> and then empirically showing how these status-seeking frames continue to provide a key source of domestic legitimacy politics in Japan and South Korea, particularly in their relations with the United States.

### Significance of Study: Hierarchy and East Asian International Relations

To reiterate, this book argues that sovereign autonomy is the language with which to articulate the problem of status-seeking within international hierarchy. What are some of the theoretical and empirical contributions offered by this argument? At the level of theory, this book adds to the growing literature on the role of international hierarchy in maintaining regional order. While a number of scholars have already examined different periods of hierarchy in historical and contemporary East Asia, none have systematically compared these past and present hierarchical orders.

In his seminal study of premodern East Asian international relations, David Kang has argued that the region has historically been most stable under a single dominant power.<sup>13</sup> Because his emphasis is on the shared cultural norms and institutions underpinning the Sinocentric tributary order, however, Kang overemphasizes the "Chinese" character of hierarchical order in the region's history. In fact, he restricts the applicability of his hierarchical stability argument to countries within the region,

<sup>12</sup> On the expansion of international society, see Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). For examples of recent works that engage and expand the English School perspective and its neglect of the more hierarchical aspects of international society, see Ian Clark, *Hegemony in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Edward Keene, "The Standard of 'Civilization,' the Expansion Thesis and the 19th-century International Social Space," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 42, 3 (2014): 651–673. According to Shogo Suzuki, East Asian elites were very much aware of the dualities inherent in the European "society of states." Shogo Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter with European International Society* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).

<sup>13</sup> Kang, *East Asia before the West*; David C. Kang, *China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); David C. Kang, "Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations," in G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, eds., *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 163–190.

from which outside powers such as the United States are explicitly excluded.<sup>14</sup> The different types and sources of non-balancing behavior in hierarchical orders, however, need not only apply to a regional scenario in which China is dominant.

In fact, it could be argued that hierarchical order in the region was reestablished with stronger impetus in the late nineteenth century via European gunboat diplomacy, imperialism, and “civilizational” standards.<sup>15</sup> In his study of East Asian socialization into European international society during this period, Shogo Suzuki examines how Chinese and Japanese elites began to recognize that “the international environment was not simply that of anarchy and power but of differentiated modes of interaction.”<sup>16</sup> In other words, hierarchy did not disappear with the arrival of the West and the decline of China. It simply expanded, from a regionally circumscribed hierarchical order (the traditional Sinocentric order) to a global hierarchy which included the militarily dominant European powers as well as the United States.

Indeed, Edward Keene suggests we should replace the concept of “expansion” with “stratification” of the international social space in the nineteenth century.<sup>17</sup> Similar to the argument presented in this book, Keene contends that social stratification, determined not only by the material capability of states but also by their relative social standing based on prestige and authority, is a key attribute of international hierarchy during this period.<sup>18</sup> Global racial discrimination added another layer to this social context of international hierarchy. Japan’s quest for greater status vis-à-vis the Western powers – in particular, Britain and

<sup>14</sup> Kang, *China Rising*, pp. 187–188.

<sup>15</sup> On the application of a European “standard of civilization” to other regions of the world in the nineteenth century, see Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

<sup>16</sup> Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire*, p. 9.

<sup>17</sup> Keene, “The Standard of ‘Civilization’.”

<sup>18</sup> East Asian regimes were not alone in facing this global status hierarchy. Ottoman, Russian, as well as Japanese elites “believed, along with their European contemporaries, that there really was a developmental lag between civilizations. In other words, the problem of relative strength was no longer seen simply as difference in material capability . . . but had become a moral, social, and cultural issue. It had become an existential dilemma par excellence.” Ayşe Zarakol, *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 55–56. See also Zarakol, “What Made the Modern World Hang Together”; Adler-Nissen, “Stigma Management in International Relations.”



the United States – continued in the first half of the twentieth century, taking the form of diplomatic measures (seeking, for example, to propose a racial equality clause at Versailles in 1919 and to overturn the Immigration Act of 1924 in the United States, which sought to exclude Asian immigrants) and eventually imperialism and militarization.<sup>19</sup>

After 1945, by virtue of its dominant material capabilities and unsurpassed political influence in East Asia, the United States has shaped and led the regional order. The special role that the United States plays in East Asian security has been well documented in terms of its security commitments to its allies, threat-balancing between China and Japan, and political and economic leadership.<sup>20</sup> In recognition of such American power and influence, the regional order has been variously characterized as a “hub-and-spokes” system of bilateral alliances, “incomplete hegemony,” or hegemony under the United States.<sup>21</sup> Yuen Foong Khong claims that “the United States is so deeply embedded in the international relations of Asia in general, and implicated in the region’s relative peace and economic dynamism in particular . . . that it is not

<sup>19</sup> Naoko Shimazu, *Japan, Race and Equality: Racial Equality Proposal of 1919* (London: Routledge, 1998); Barbara J. Brooks, *Japan’s Imperial Diplomacy: Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China 1895–1938* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2000); Jung-Sun N. Han, *An Imperial Path to Modernity: Yoshino Sakuzō and a New Liberal Order in East Asia, 1905–1937* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); Barry Buzan, “The International Society Approach and Asia,” in Saadia M. Pekknæen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot, eds., *Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 100–119.

<sup>20</sup> Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” *International Security* 23, 4 (Spring 1999): 49–80; G. John Ikenberry, “America in East Asia: Power, Markets, and Grand Strategy,” in Ellis S. Krauss and T. J. Pempel, eds., *Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); Peter J. Katzenstein, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Evelyn Goh, “Hierarchy and the Role of the United States in the East Asian Security Order,” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 8, 3 (2008): 353–377.

<sup>21</sup> Michael Mastanduno, “Incomplete Hegemony: The United States and the Security Order in Asia,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Order* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 141–166; Mark Beeson, “Hegemonic Transition in East Asia? The Dynamics of Chinese and American Power,” *Review of International Studies* 35, 1 (2009): 95–112; Clark, *Hegemony in International Society*, especially chapter 8.

possible to analyze the international relations of the region without reference to the United States.”<sup>22</sup>

Seen from this perspective, hierarchy never left East Asia since the decline of the premodern Sinocentric order. In the late nineteenth century, a new global hierarchy replaced the existing regional system of stratification. In other words, hierarchy did not exit the region, but rather expanded in scope. A new global and regional hierarchy was firmly established under US leadership after 1945. While existing studies of hierarchy have conducted cross-national comparisons of hierarchical relations with the United States (or other dominant powers), this book focuses on how hierarchy has continued to evolve over time in a specific regional context – that of East Asia.<sup>23</sup>

There are two major reasons why a diachronic analysis of the East Asian region is important for understanding hierarchy. Because of the historical influence of Confucianism in East Asia, and the Confucian rules and rituals upon which the Sinocentric tributary system was built, it is too easy to assume that belief in hierarchy is somehow hardwired into the region.<sup>24</sup> While shared cultural norms no doubt played a central role in maintaining hierarchical relations in the premodern diplomatic order,<sup>25</sup> hierarchy continued to be part of East Asian countries’ strategic environment even after the end of Sinocentrism, imperialism, and colonization. In that sense, the East Asian region offers a unique opportunity to study the effects of cultural influences compared to other causal factors on the maintenance of hierarchical orders. The findings from this book show that, hierarchy, like any other form of power, has always been politically contested, even in cases we are most likely to uncritically accept as hierarchy-prone, such as the Sinocentric

<sup>22</sup> Yuen Foong Khong, “Foreign Policy Analysis and the International Relations of Asia,” in Saadia M. Pekkanen, John Ravenhill and Rosemary Foot, eds., *Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 82.

<sup>23</sup> See, for example, Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations*; Alexander Cooley, *Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States, and Military Occupations* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005); Paul K. MacDonald, *Networks of Domination: The Social Foundations of Peripheral Conquest in International Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

<sup>24</sup> However, Rozman et al. show the nuanced and variegated nature of the Confucian legacy in modern East Asian politics. Gilbert Rozman, ed., *The East Asian Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

<sup>25</sup> Kang, *East Asia before the West*, pp. 54–71.

tributary system.<sup>26</sup> That is, hierarchy is neither culturally innate to the region nor structurally determined by asymmetrical distributions of power. The variations in historical experiences and foreign policy outcomes in Japan and Korea reveal that hierarchy in East Asia has been *politically* constructed and contested – by legitimacy-seeking political leaders. In contrast to most existing studies, this book analyzes hierarchy as is experienced and politicized from the non-dominant state's perspective. This emphasis on the domestic politics of hierarchical relations also highlights the agency of local actors in sustaining the material and ideational structures of international hierarchy.

A second way in which the temporal dimension of hierarchy in East Asia stands to offer important theoretical and empirical insights is by showcasing the significance of the long-enduring domestic political and institutional context in which hierarchy has persisted. This is not to say that a prior history of hierarchical orders necessarily creates conditions for uncritical acceptance of hierarchy in the future. But it is important to recognize that hierarchical orders are not newly created on blank canvases. The postwar security and economic “contract” between the United States and its allies in East Asia took place in a region-specific context already familiar with the political challenge of advancing the nation within international hierarchy. The postwar context in East Asia was one that was embedded with a set of institutionalized ideas and practices of hierarchical relations. In other words, the language with which to articulate, problematize, and legitimate a course of action on dealing with the condition of international hierarchy existed as a “usable past” for Japanese and Korean political leaders.<sup>27</sup> What I am not suggesting here is that the imagining and use of history is purely instrumental. In this book, I am interested in examining how the condition of international hierarchy has

<sup>26</sup> Erik Ringmar argues in his comparative study of the traditional East Asian order that hierarchy (or anarchy) was interpreted in different ways, depending on how it was framed. Erik Ringmar, “Performing International Systems: Two East-Asian Alternatives to the Westphalian Order,” *International Organization* 66 (Winter 2012): 1–25. See Chapter 2 of this book for a detailed discussion of the variations in the politics of domestic legitimation in Japan and Korea that sought to confirm or contest Sinocentric hierarchy.

<sup>27</sup> Casey Nelson Blake, “The Usable Past, the Comfortable Past, and the Civic Past: Memory in Contemporary America,” *Cultural Anthropology* 14, 3 (August 1999): 423–435; Jeffrey K. Olick, “From Usable Pasts to the Return of the Repressed,” *The Hedgehog Review* 9, 2 (Summer 2007): 19–31.

repeatedly *become* a usable past in Japanese and Korean politics. As Thomas Berger argues, official political narratives are neither historically determined nor unrestricted in their malleability and use by powerful political actors. Rather, collective memory “sets sharp boundaries to the kind of historical narrative that can be adopted and sustained over time,” although narratives do become reshaped through processes of political contention and cultural resistance.<sup>28</sup>

The continued debates on the meaning of sovereign autonomy and the type of status to pursue vis-à-vis dominant powers in discussing Japan–US and South Korea–US relations indicate the enduring ideational foundations of hierarchical order in East Asia. Hierarchy, in this sense, should not be understood as an “independent” variable that competes with and outperforms alternative causal explanations. Rather, the theoretical framework of hierarchy complements existing accounts of East Asian international relations by adding explanatory depth to what has previously been treated as instances of ordinary alliance negotiations, nationalism, or anti-Americanism in Japan and South Korea.<sup>29</sup>

Still others might question just how much hierarchy matters in postwar Japan and South Korea, especially given the significant domestic and global transformations in the twentieth century. This puzzling resonance of the sovereign autonomy concept and language, which suggests a strong hierarchical worldview, is what motivated the research questions raised in this book. Rather than theoretically precluding it a priori, however, I believe the degree of hierarchy’s relevance and significance in postwar East Asian international relations is an empirical question that deserves systematic exploration, which I seek to do in this book. The evidence suggests that the need to enhance status within an international hierarchy has surprisingly, and quite

<sup>28</sup> Thomas U. Berger, *War, Guilt, and World Politics after World War II* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 24.

<sup>29</sup> Similarly, Caroline Fehl argues that constructivist explanations of international institutions complement and “deepen” rationalist arguments that focus on cooperation problems and transaction costs. Caroline Fehl, “Explaining the International Criminal Court: A ‘Practice Test’ for Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches,” *European Journal of International Relations* 10, 3 (2004): 357–394. See also Alexander Wendt, “Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design,” *International Organization* 55, 4 (2001): 1021–1053; Craig Parsons, *How to Map Arguments in Political Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

stubbornly, remained a resonant goal among Japanese and Koreans. This has remained the case despite structural transformations – including deimperialization, decolonization, rapid economic development, and democratization – that have pushed these two countries to become modern “Westphalian” states.

## The Language of Sovereign Autonomy

The late nineteenth century provides a critical political–historical context for East Asian international relations because the adoption of Westphalian sovereignty principles and socialization into an expanded international hierarchy were shared regional experiences. While the transition from feudal societies to modern nation-states was a varied experience for each individual country, encounters with European powers during this period necessitated changes in regional diplomatic relations and domestic legitimacy politics in China, Japan, and Korea. Practices (and statuses) that had been bilaterally negotiated between each country fell victim to the new “script” of Westphalian sovereignty.<sup>30</sup> At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, regional encounters with the Western state system based on sovereign autonomy crystallized the notion that external – and separate – standards of power determined the strength and status of non-Western nation-states.

One of the most fundamental transformations during this period was the creation of a regionally shared language of sovereign autonomy. Contemporary security concepts, such as sovereignty, autonomy, and (state) power, were recreated through translation, transliteration, or recombination following regional encounters with Western powers in the nineteenth century.<sup>31</sup> Whereas past security discourses and regional diplomacy in East Asia had been conducted in a language

<sup>30</sup> Michel Oksenberg, “The Issue of Sovereignty in the Asian Historical Context,” in Stephen D. Krasner, *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp. 83–104.

<sup>31</sup> Many of the neologisms – for example, state, nation, sovereignty – were translated from the original European texts by Japanese modernizers such as Fukuzawa Yukichi in the late nineteenth century and diffused to China and Korea. See Douglas R. Howland, *Translating the West: Language and Political Reason in Nineteenth-Century Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002); Lydia Liu, ed., *Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1999).

common to a largely Confucian (or Confucian-influenced) elites across the region, the concept of autonomy helped to create new elites and sources of political mobilization that led to the vertical incorporation of various societal members into a national citizenry.<sup>32</sup>

Thus, the new language of sovereign autonomy helped reshape the legal and institutional context for conducting foreign relations in the region. But it is also important to recognize that the new rules and principles of Westphalian sovereignty did not simply replace, but were rather juxtaposed against, traditional diplomatic practices. That is, discourses of Westphalian autonomy and Western international law emerged in the context of legal pluralism in the last phases of the Sinocentric order.<sup>33</sup> As a consequence, a central problem facing East Asian state officials was not merely responding to Western demands for trade and extraterritoriality, but dealing with intra-regional complexities arising from this dual political institutional context. Western standards of statehood introduced another layer of international hierarchy rather than erasing the existing hierarchical order in the region.<sup>34</sup>

As China, Japan, and Korea deepened their interactions with the Western powers, gaining recognition as capable modern states and enhancing status vis-à-vis other Great Powers became a shared concern. In Japan and Korea, Western political concepts such as privilege, right, and sovereignty were also carefully studied and reconstructed during this time to connote the power and authority of the state (*kokken*). Sovereignty itself was given a strictly state-centric interpretation, as “a term representing a country’s esteem and prosperity, its unlimited powers, its unrestricted *kokken*.”<sup>35</sup> Even the imperial institution was linked to *kokken* in that Shinto was made a state

<sup>32</sup> On the bureaucratic “incorporation” of nations by aristocratic elites via grafting of symbols and myths through wars, mobilization, and administrative and fiscal incorporation, see Anthony D. Smith, “The Origins of Nations,” in Geoff Eley and Ronald Suny, eds., *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 106–130.

<sup>33</sup> Pär Kristoffer Cassel, *Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

<sup>34</sup> Seo-Hyun Park, “Changing Definitions of Sovereignty in Nineteenth-Century East Asia,” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 13 (2013): 281–307.

<sup>35</sup> Howland, *Translating the West*, p. 139. See also Joseph Pittau, *Political Thought in Early Meiji Japan, 1868–1889* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 118.

religion.<sup>36</sup> The symbolism of the emperor changed from its emphasis on the “national essence” (*kokutai*) to the external civilizational status of the Japanese state.

What is notable about the nineteenth century, and what makes it such a “critical” juncture for studying region order, is this mixed legacy of Westphalianization. Reaching advanced-nation status through a “rich country, strong army” (*fukoku kyōhei* in Japanese, *buguk gangbyeong* in Korean) became an all-important agenda, but within the context of a reimagined and reified hierarchical order.<sup>37</sup> In other words, to be a truly sovereign state was to be judged favorably against civilizational standards, as promoted by dominant powers in the international system.<sup>38</sup>

The new legitimating language of sovereign autonomy emerged as a focal point and shared knowledge for regional diplomacy. But the task of state-strengthening via status enhancement remained in the late nineteenth-century context of a reconstituted regional hierarchy. Sovereign autonomy was understood as status to be negotiated with dominant powers, either by integrating into the existing hierarchy or by seeking insulation from, or minimizing dependence on, external influences. These strategies of integration and insulation, not surprisingly, were adaptations of the alternative security frames that had at various times legitimated and challenged Japanese and Korean rulers in the

<sup>36</sup> Tetsuo Najita, “Conceptual Consciousness in the Meiji Ishin,” in Michio Nagai and Miguel Urrutia, eds., *Meiji Ishin: Restoration and Revolution* (Tokyo: The United Nations University, 1985), pp. 83–85.

<sup>37</sup> According to Peter Katzenstein, civilizations are internally diverse and contested, but “as social constructions of primordiality, civilizations can become political reifications, especially when encountering other civilizations.” See Peter J. Katzenstein, “A World of Plural and Pluralist Civilizations: Multiple Actors, Traditions, and Practices,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 6. See also Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2006) on the socially contested nature of inter-civilizational interactions.

<sup>38</sup> For a detailed discussion of the traditional Chinese diplomatic order as a civilizational standard (*chūka*), see Chapter Two. On the continued relevance of “externally established benchmarks for socio-political self-organization” within the current globalization debate, see Brett Bowden and Leonard Seabrooke, “Civilizing Markets through Global Standards,” in Brett Bowden and Leonard Seabrooke, eds., *Global Standards of Market Civilization* (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 5–7.

previous hierarchical order. In other words, as a recalibrated hierarchy was established in the region, previous frames that offered solutions to dealing with international hierarchy were mobilized for political action. It is these existing modes of legitimation and contestation in international hierarchy that endure as institutionalized ideas in contemporary Japanese and South Korean security politics.

### The Dual Frames of Sovereign Autonomy

A careful examination of discussions about sovereign autonomy reveals that they occur within certain “patterned constraints.”<sup>39</sup> That is, foreign policy problems – including the quest for sovereign autonomy – are presented as choosing between two alternative status-enhancing security frames.<sup>40</sup> My definition of frames as schemas of interpretation, or filters to make sense of the world, is similar to that of Goffman, Gamson, and other social movement scholars.<sup>41</sup> Frame analysts have pointed out that frames are context-dependent and in many ways culturally constrained.<sup>42</sup> Frames are made possible through

<sup>39</sup> In their study of foreign policy debates in Germany and Japan, Katja Weber and Paul Kowert show that elite discussions on what kind of role to play in the postwar international order have repeated themselves within “patterned constraints.” Katja Weber and Paul A. Kowert, *Cultures of Order: Leadership, Language, and Social Reconstruction in Germany and Japan* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), p. 4. On Japan’s dual identity, see also Yoshihide Soeya, *Nihon no “midoru pawaa” gaikō* [Japan’s “Middle Power” Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho, 2005).

<sup>40</sup> I use Goffman’s classic definition of frames as “basic frameworks of understanding available in our society for making sense out of events.” See Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 10.

<sup>41</sup> Goffman, *Frame Analysis*; William A. Gamson, *Talking Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Charlotte Ryan and William A. Gamson, “The Art of Reframing Political Debates,” *Contexts* 5, 1 (Winter 2006): 13–18. For a concise summary of the different variants of framing research, see Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, “Framing Theory,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 10 (2007): 103–126.

<sup>42</sup> On the cultural and institutional dimensions of frame effects, see Mayer N. Zald, “Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing,” in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Francesca Polletta and M. Kai Ho, “Frames and Their Consequences,” in Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Marc W. Steinberg, “The Talk and Back Talk of Collective Action: A Dialogic Analysis of Repertoires of



socially shared expectations – based on common political vocabularies and knowledge of what is being discussed. Framing vocabularies “provide words for interpreting things – and interrelated set of terms through which meaning, value, and reason are attributed to the world. The vocabulary is intersubjective, a social fact, and it is handed down to us by a shared tradition to which each successive generation adds its respective neologisms.”<sup>43</sup> Within this intersubjective context, alternative frames exist and are pitted against each other.<sup>44</sup>

Each frame of status-seeking in hierarchy emphasizes either *integration* into or *insulation* from the dominant power’s “sphere of influence.” Through integration, states gain coveted membership into an exclusive club of “advanced” or “civilized” nations. Integration has meant the emulation of “advanced countries” (*senshinkoku* in Japanese, *seonjin-guk* in Korean) or to “become advanced (countries)” (J: *senshinka*, K: *seonjinhwa*), a consistent theme in Japanese and Korean politics and foreign policy.<sup>45</sup> Other common terms or phrases that indicate the frame of integration include “international contribution” (J: *kokusai kōken*, K: *gukje gongheon*), global standards, national status, or position, and “catching up” with the Great Powers of the world.<sup>46</sup>

The insulation frame on the other hand emphasizes a very different type of status for the state: self-reliance, or foreign policy

Discourse among Nineteenth-Century English Cotton Spinners,” *American Journal of Sociology* 105, 3 (November 1999): 749.

<sup>43</sup> Ringmar, “Performing International Systems: Two East-Asian Alternatives to the Westphalian Order”: 7.

<sup>44</sup> For recent empirical studies of competing frames, see Ulrika Mörth, “Competing Frames in the European Commission – the Case of the Defence Industry and Equipment Issue,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 7, 2 (June 2000): 173–189; David Levin, “Framing Peace Policies: The Competition for Resonant Themes,” *Political Communication* 22, 1 (2005): 83–108. For a summary of the notion of competing frames in politics, see James N. Druckman, “Competing Frames in a Political Campaign,” in Brian F. Schaffner and Patrick J. Sellers, *Winning with Words: The Origins and Impact of Political Framing* (New York and London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 101–120.

<sup>45</sup> See, for example, David Leheny, *The Rules of Play: National Identity and the Shaping of Japanese Leisure* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed., *The Developmental State* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

<sup>46</sup> Masaru Kohno, “The Domestic Foundations of Japan’s International Contribution,” in Thomas U. Berger, Mike M. Mochizuki, and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, eds., *Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), pp. 23–46.

independence. The goal of insulation is to minimize the direct involvement – and indeed, the political authority – of the dominant powers. In recognition of the power and authority of local or global hegemonies, however, insulation has not meant complete isolation or “exit” from the system but rather creating distance from outside influences or “hiding” from the dominant power.<sup>47</sup> Keywords representative of the insulation frame include (un)equal status, independence, self-reliance, and economic or cultural sovereignty.

The frames of integration and insulation represent ideal types of enduring foreign policy ideas in Japan and South Korea.<sup>48</sup> At any given time, leaders will espouse foreign policy positions that usually mix elements of both but emphasize one over the other, especially when facing intense political competition. While in international relations theory the term “autonomy” conventionally evokes the frame of insulation and demands for equal status with more powerful countries, the catch-up mentality undergirding the integration frame has been just as prominent in the East Asian region. Framed as integration, foreign policy autonomy is seen as more fluid and complex, based on a general recognition of limits to complete autonomy as “small states.”<sup>49</sup>

<sup>47</sup> On “hiding” strategies, see Paul W. Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory,” *International Security* 19, 1 (Summer 1994): 108–148; Daniel Deudney, “Binding Sovereigns: Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in Philadelphian Systems,” in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 190–239.

<sup>48</sup> For examples of other studies on enduring and competing ideational frames that inform contemporary strategic debates, see Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Alice D. Ba, *(Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Gilbert Rozman, *Northeast Asia's Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Jeffrey W. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005); Ted Hopf, *Reconstructing the Cold War: The Early Years, 1945–1958* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

<sup>49</sup> Such recognition of externally imposed constraints (and threats), and the accompanying sense of vulnerability, are at the core of “small state” identities, which appeal to, and are largely accepted by, publics in both Japan and Korea. While the dominant perception in each country is that their position is uniquely vulnerable, comparative analysis shows that a self-defined sense of vulnerability can also explain a variety of security and political economic outcomes in Asia

Thus, we see tacit accommodation of some sovereignty violations in exchange for security and economic benefits.<sup>50</sup> Emphasis is put on pockets of autonomy in global affairs alongside, and usually in support of, what are perceived to be “global standards” or the dominant power’s rules and institutional preferences.<sup>51</sup>

A common reference point for both of these frames, and what ties them together, is an underlying worldview of international hierarchy that recognizes differential power and status among states.<sup>52</sup> Objectively accurate or not, modern readings of Japanese and Korean histories of foreign relations are often premised on such Great-Power-centrism. Security choices are about the fate of “small countries” surrounded by Great Powers and striving to become Great Powers themselves. Integration and insulation then represent competing modes of status-seeking within the social context of international hierarchy. These security frames also reflect a deeply embedded foreign policy perspective based on international hierarchy.

Hierarchy then is reproduced through patterned usage of language, one that indicates a distinct “problem-space” reflecting East Asian

and Europe. See Peter J. Katzenstein, “Japanese Security in Perspective,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External Dimensions* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 5–6. See also Kimura Kan, *Chōsen/Kankoku nashonarizumu to ‘shōkoku’ ishiki: chōkōkoku kara kokuminkokka e* [Choson/Korean Nationalism and “Small State” Identity: From Tributary State to Nation-State] (Kyoto: Minerva Shobō, 2000).

<sup>50</sup> David Vital, *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Powers in International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967) and Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke, *Strategies of Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemma of Smaller Asian States* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978) note the potential sacrifice of autonomy in small states in exchange for allying with larger powers.

<sup>51</sup> Paul Johnson describes a strategy of seeking a “special relationship” with the regional hegemon by subordinated states, who strive hard “to please in every respect that the hegemon’s leaders will feel moved to reciprocate in the grand manner by showing special favoritism or generosity,” in order to secure protection from dominant powers. See Paul M. Johnson, “The Subordinate States and Their Strategies,” in Jan F. Triska, ed., *Dominant Powers and Subordinate States* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), p. 300. A similar concept is the “ingratiation effect” in Brian Healy and Arthur Stein, “The Balance of Power in International History: Theory and Reality,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 17, 1 (March 1973): 33–61.

<sup>52</sup> Similarly, Alica Ba argues ASEAN states’ “self-identification as lesser powers informs their worldviews and conceptions of what they should and should not do, which in turn colors and constrains what regionalism looks like in East and Southeast Asia.” Ba, *(Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia*, p. 25.

experiences in the late nineteenth century. Put simply, a “problem-space” is a demarcated discursive context, a context of language and argument. It is:

an ensemble of questions and answers around which a horizon of identifiable stakes (conceptual as well as ideological-political stakes) hangs. That is to say, what defines this discursive context are not only the particular problems that get posed as problems as such (the problem of ‘race,’ say), but the particular questions that seem worth asking and the kinds of answers that seem worth having.<sup>53</sup>

In other words, the nineteenth-century political experience of compromised sovereignty – both perceived and real – provides the politically “identifiable stakes” and continues to inform Japanese and Korean security debates.<sup>54</sup> Hierarchical ranking and status, especially their

<sup>53</sup> David Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004), p. 4. Similarly, Prasenjit Duara argues that “the aporia and the anxiety embedded in that time also generates a representation of timelessness that serves as an anchor for identity in modern histories and a foundation of the symbolic regime of nation-states.” Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and East Asian Modern* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), p. 27.

<sup>54</sup> Other scholars have noted the significance of the late nineteenth century for East Asian international relations. Some have attributed the lingering influence of this period to what they characterize as an “incomplete transition” to the Westphalian model of modern nation-states in East Asian international relations. See Chaesung Chun (Jae-seong Jeon), *Dong Asia gukje jeongchi: yeoksa e seo iron euro* [Theory of East Asian International Relations] (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2011); Chaesung Chun, “Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? Reflections on and From Korea,” in Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, eds., *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2010); Chaesung Chun, “South Korea’s Foreign Policy and East Asia,” in Rudiger Frank and John Swenson-Wright, eds., *Korea and East Asia* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 155–179. Akihiko Tanaka makes a similar point about the uneasy coexistence of “modern” and “postmodern” principles of interstate relations in the region and shows that the availability of multiple substitute terms is an ongoing aspect of security politics in East Asia. Akihiko Tanaka, *Waadō politikusu: gurōbarizeisyon no naka no nihon gaikō* [Word Politics: Japanese Foreign Policy in the Era of Globalization] (Tokyo: Chikuma shohō, 2000). In China, the nineteenth century’s influence is felt in the near-consensus on the importance of the “century of humiliation” problematique, despite differences in strategies for overcoming it. On how the “century of humiliation” continues to frame foreign policy objectives and debates, see Alison Adcock Kaufman, “The ‘Century of Humiliation,’ Then and Now: Chinese Perceptions of the International Order,” *Pacific Focus* 25, 1 (April 2010): 1–33.

country's standing in the world, remain all-important to the Japanese and Koreans.<sup>55</sup> Since the Meiji period, Japanese leaders strove to “catch up with and surpass” (*oitsuku* or *oikosu*) the West and become a “first-class nation” (*ittō koku*).<sup>56</sup> According to Akira Iriye, Japanese political leaders in the modern era have been devoted solely to the enhancement of the power of the state (*kokkashugi*).<sup>57</sup>

While a burgeoning literature on the origins of modern political concepts has surfaced in the study of East Asian international relations, the focus of these studies has been on how concepts emerged during critical junctures in regional political development, such as the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century or the postwar period.<sup>58</sup> What has not yet been systematically explored is the political origins

<sup>55</sup> For instance, Japanese elites situate their country not only horizontally (in unipolar or multipolar international systems) but also in the stratified international order (for example, patron–client relations). See G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi eds., “Introduction,” in G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi eds., *Reinventing the Alliance: U.S.-Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change* (New York: Palgrave, 2003), pp. 10–11. See also Warren S. Hunsberger, “Introduction: Japan’s International Rankings and Roles,” in Warren Hunsberger ed., *Japan’s Quest: The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect* (M. E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. xxv–xxxiii; R. P. Dore, “The Prestige Factor in International Affairs,” *International Affairs* 51, 2 (April 1975): 190–207.

<sup>56</sup> Richard J. Samuels, *Machiavelli’s Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 12.

<sup>57</sup> Cited in Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), p. 45.

<sup>58</sup> On the translation and appropriation of foreign ideas and concepts in the late nineteenth to early twentieth century in China, see Joachim Kurtz, “Translating the Vocation of Man: Liang Qichao (1873–1929), J. G. Fichte, and the Body Politic in Early Republican China” in Martin J. Burke and Melvin Richter, eds., *Why Concepts Matter: Translating Social and Political Thought* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012), pp. 153–175; Federico Masini, *The Formation of Modern Chinese Lexicon and Its Evolution Toward a National Language: The Period from 1840 to 1898* (Berkeley: Journal of Chinese Linguistics, 1993); Marina Svensson, *Debating Human Rights in China: A Conceptual and Political History* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2002); Michael Schoenhals, *Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1992); Joachim Kurtz, *The Discovery of Chinese Logic* (Leiden: Brill, 2011); Michael Lackner, Iwo Amelung, and Joachim Kurtz, eds., *New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China* (Leiden: Brill, 2001). For Japan and Korea, see Howland, *Translating the West*; Young-Sun Ha (Yeong-seon Ha), *Geundae han-guk ui sahoe gwahak gaenyem byeongseongsa* [The History of the Development of Social Science Concepts in Modern Korea] (Seoul: Changbi, 2009). On translation and translingual

of the sovereign autonomy concept and its long-term impact – that is, how it has been contested throughout key structural changes in the East Asian region, such as the decline of the premodern Sinocentric order in the late nineteenth century, the end of the Asia-Pacific War in 1945, and the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. Based on the recognition that references to and contestation over sovereign autonomy occur within the nineteenth century problem-space described above, I conduct a historical analysis of the concept of sovereign autonomy in East Asia, tracing security debates in Japan and Korea from the late nineteenth century to the post-Cold War period.

A major purpose of this study then is to show how the concept of sovereign autonomy in East Asia – as it has evolved since the late nineteenth century – is not analogous with the conventional assumption of formal (Westphalian) or legal sovereignty.<sup>59</sup> In Japan and South Korea, this book argues, sovereign autonomy is commonly understood as status to be negotiated through relations with other dominant powers in the international system. The patterns of language use in Japan and South Korea reveal hierarchy to be a regionally shared constraint – embedded in the concept of autonomy. Hierarchical orders endure not because of voluntary consent but because the constraints of hierarchy are a socially recognized fact and they provide meaning for leaders' actions and words. This novel conceptual historical approach to studying regional security order allows us to recognize such key moments of legitimacy politics during which hierarchy is politically reconstructed.

practices, see Lydia H. Liu, *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity – China, 1900–1937* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Carol Gluck and Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, eds., *Words in Motion: Toward a Global Lexicon* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2009).

<sup>59</sup> In this sense, my work is motivated by Robert Jackson's seminal study on the variegated origins and practices of sovereignty in the African region; see Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). In the European context, scholars have noted the historically variable interpretations of sovereignty as a source of legitimation for state practices. See, for example, Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Samuel J. Barkin and Bruce Cronin, "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations," *International Organization* 48, 1 (Winter 1994): 107–130.

## **Plan of the Book**

This book examines the recreation of hierarchy in the regional order in the late nineteenth century and its lasting impact on contemporary East Asian international relations. In the following chapters, I seek to explain how contemporary security debates – surrounding the concept of autonomy – are informed by specific historical configurations of sovereign statehood and status-based conceptions of state power. Specifically, I argue that strategic debates in East Asia are based on shared contextual knowledge – that of international hierarchy. The mechanism that reproduces this lens of hierarchy is domestic legitimacy politics that contest the meaning of sovereign autonomy in order to reorient state status vis-à-vis the dominant power.

Chapter 1 introduces the theoretical framework of the book – on the enduring social context of hierarchy in East Asian international relations. I show how the nineteenth-century problem-space, reflecting a lens of Great-Power-centric hierarchy, has been institutionalized through practices of legitimation – which involve the usage of specific language (that of sovereign autonomy) and the interpretation of its meaning (within the frames of integration or insulation). Chapter 2 examines how hierarchy and power asymmetry provided varying sources of regime legitimacy in premodern East Asia. For ruling regimes in Joseon (Chosŏn) Korea and Tokugawa Japan, positioning and status-seeking vis-à-vis China was crucial for domestic political legitimation. Through this comparison, this chapter shows the political variability of hierarchical order in the region. In Chapter 3, I compare how sovereign autonomy as a concept was reformulated and contested in Japan and Korea as both countries attempted to transition to modern statehood. I also examine the domestic political processes by which hierarchy was reconfigured in the regional order in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Chapter 4 examines how status-seeking security frames persisted in Japanese and South Korean language and legitimacy politics during the Cold War. This is illustrated in Chapter 5 through empirical case studies of Japanese and South Korean leaders attempting to generate political legitimacy by promoting alternative conceptions of sovereign autonomy: Kishi Nobusuke's rejection of Yoshida's "Middle Power" integration strategy and his attempt to achieve greater foreign policy autonomy through the revision of the security treaty with the United

States; and Park Chung Hee's mobilization of a comprehensive, nationwide "self-reliance" movement in the aftermath of the Guam Doctrine and the Nixon administration's decision to reduce the number of US troops in South Korea.

Chapter 6 analyzes two additional periods during which legitimacy politics occurred via pro-autonomy mobilizations: the Roh Moo-hyun presidency in South Korea in the early 2000s and Japan under Hatoyama Yukio in 2009–2010. While both instances were conventionally portrayed as expected stories of anti-American or "nationalistic" responses to American foreign policy choices, I argue it was the attempt to shift the framing of autonomy in each case that prompted widespread societal mobilizations and political backlash. The final chapter concludes with a discussion of the broader theoretical and policy implications of this study.