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“Typical Protestant Mistakes”: The Influence of the Cologne School of Sociology in Early Francoist Spain

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This article provides a new look at Francoist sociology by exploring the impact of the early Cologne school of sociology in Spain prior to and after the Spanish Civil War. It starts by explaining Helmuth Plessner’s critical argument on the Renaissance and the Reformation, delving into its echo in Spain. Following the influence of Schelerian material value ethics on Spanish philosophy of right, the second section focuses on a critical analysis of José Ortega y Gasset’s sociological concepts. Going deeper into academic debate around Freyerian Wirklichkeitswissenschaft, the third section explores the parameters of early Francoist sociology’s academic implementation up to the 1950s. Summarizing the analytical results, this article concludes by evaluating the early Cologne school of sociology’s persistence in Francoist Spain in terms of a growing rhetoric associated with the rejection of alleged errors.

[T]he ultimate foundations of this conception of sociology ... stem from Max Scheler’s brilliant study *Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge*, which we hope to offer soon to our library readers.¹

Social and educational policies were key elements in the early legitimization of the Francoist regime in Spain. Determining the regime’s ideological profile by means of pragmatic internationalization, these policies contributed to paving the way towards economic and technical modernization in the 1950s.² The political stability of early Francoism was grounded in various institutionalization processes authored by functional elites who decisively impacted Spanish international politics after the

¹José Ortega y Gasset, “Prólogo a la ‘Academia Platónica’ de Pablo Luis Landsberg,” in Ortega y Gasset, *Obras Completas*, 12 vols. (Madrid, 1983–97), 6: 336. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are by the author.

²David Brydon, *Franco’s Internationalists: Social Experts and Spain’s Search for Legitimacy* (Oxford, 2019); Andrés Antolín, *Fremde Moderne: Wissenschaftspolitik, Geschichtswissenschaft und nationale Narrative unter dem Franco-Regime, 1939–1964* (Munich, 2018); Anna C. Hofmann, *Franco’s Moderne: Technokratie und Diktatur in Spanien 1956–1973* (Göttingen, 2019); Lino Comprubí, *Los ingenieros de Franco: Ciencia, catolicismo y Guerra Fría en el Estado franquista* (Barcelona, 2017).

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Second World War,³ leaving room for the integration of society's different power sectors.⁴ In this context, the ascendant discipline of sociology played a fundamental role. It was implemented at the academic level with the founding of the Instituto Balmes de Sociología in 1943 as part of the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas. This institute connected the new university departments of sociology and political science with late nineteenth-century Catholic social teaching.⁵

International research has mainly studied Francoist sociology by focusing on civil society's intellectual circles and Spanish universities' academic structures.⁶ There is a consensus regarding the influence of the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955), director of the well-known *Revista de Occidente* (1923–36), on the younger generation of intellectuals who carried out the academic implementation of sociology in Spain during the 1940s and 1950s.⁷ Among the so-called Falangist Ortegians, Alfonso García-Valdecasas (1904–93) and José Antonio Maravall (1911–86) stand out.⁸ The institutionalization of early Francoist sociology is described as a sociohistorical renaissance. Beyond this formal perspective, however, there are still many open questions concerning early Francoist sociology's key arguments, discourses, and external influences. This desideratum has to do, also, with the limits of critical research when studying Ortega's sociology.⁹ Precisely after returning from exile in 1948, Ortega came to represent Spanish elites' symptomatic ambivalence for the Franco regime. After a brief fundamentalist critique during the 1950s, Ortegianism experienced a new boom in Spain in the 1960s.¹⁰

This article provides a new look at early Francoist sociology by exploring the impact of the early Cologne school of sociology in Spain prior to and after the

³Fernando Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe (1945–57): Challenge and Response* (London, 1998).

⁴Feliciano Montero and Joseba Louzao, eds., *La restauración social católica en el primer franquismo, 1939–1953* (Alcalá de Henares, 2015); Javier Muñoz and Nicolás Sesma, "Redes de poder: La Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Económicas en la construcción del régimen franquista (1943–1956)," *Historia social* 79 (2014), 107–28; Eduardo Iáñez, *No parar hasta conquistar: Propaganda y política cultural falangista. El grupo de Escorial de la ocupación del Nuevo Estado a la posteridad (1936–1986)* (Gijón, 2010); Onésimo Díaz, *Rafael Calvo Serer y el grupo "Arbor"* (Valencia, 2008).

⁵Julio Iglesias de Ussel, "Severino Aznar: Hombre de acción y sociólogo," in Salustiano del Campo, ed., *Historia de la sociología* (Barcelona: 2001), 101–28.

⁶Raquel Sánchez, "El Ateneo de Madrid: plataforma ideológica del franquismo (1939–1963)," *Historia Contemporánea* 29 (2004), 871–94; Carolina Rodríguez, "Las universidades españolas en el arranque del franquismo: los años cuarenta," *Cuadernos del Instituto Antonio de Nebrija de estudios sobre la Universidad* 5 (2002), 85–126.

⁷José Castillo, "Ortega y Gasset y sus discípulos," in del Campo, *Historia de la sociología*, 129–60; Salustiano del Campo, "El renacer de la sociología española (1939–1959)," in *ibid.*, 161–80.

⁸Francisco J. Fresán, "Un ideólogo olvidado: El joven José Antonio Maravall y la defensa del Estado Nacional-sindicalista. Su colaboración en *Arriba*, órgano oficial de FET y de las JONS. 1939–1941," *Memoria y Civilización* 6 (2003), 153–87; Benjamin Rivaya, *Filosofía del Derecho y Primer Franquismo 1937–1945* (Madrid, 1998).

⁹Jesús M. Osés, *La sociología en Ortega y Gasset* (Barcelona, 1989); Antonio Benítez, "El concepto de acción social según Ortega (Crítica de la fundamentación weberiana de la sociología)," *Teorema* 13/3–4 (1983), 505–22.

¹⁰Antonio Martín, *Ortega y Unamuno en la España de Franco: El debate intelectual durante los años cuarenta y cincuenta* (Madrid, 2009); Pedro C. González, "Ortega y Gasset ante las Derechas Españolas," *Revista de Estudios Políticos* 133 (2006), 59–116; Gregorio Morán, *El maestro en El Erial: Ortega y Gasset y la cultura del Franquismo* (Barcelona, 1998).

Spanish Civil War through a cultural-transfer lens that focuses on so-called resemanticizations modulated by border-crossing transfer agents (individuals, social groups, institutions).¹¹ This article starts with a critical argument (in contradiction of Max Weber) by the Cologne sociologist Helmuth Plessner (1892–1985) on the Renaissance and the Reformation and delves into the broader interdisciplinary context of its echo in Spain around 1935. It turns out that the interwar debate between German Romanists and Spanish philologists, as well as the increasing influence of Schelerian material value ethics and sociology of knowledge through the so-called circle of the *Revista de Occidente*, represents crucial transfer parameters in this regard. In the second section, we further delve into this by explaining the profound impact of Schelerian material value ethics on Spanish natural-law philosophy and by underlining its convergence with Ortega's anti-Weberian sociological concepts, which he developed starting with Spanish mysticism's historical singularity. Diving into academic debate around Freyerian sociology as *Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*, the third section explores the parameters of early Francoist sociology's academic implementation up to the 1950s. Analyzing the prolonged impact of Ortega's increasing anti-Weberianism, we delve into Spanish sociology's attempt to overcome Freyerian *Wirklichkeitswissenschaft* via reactivating its Spenglerian roots, which were intensively received in Spain already during the 1920s. This article concludes by evaluating the early Cologne school of sociology's persistence in early Francoist Spain in terms of a growing rhetoric associated with the rejection of alleged errors. This article results in a reassessment of the continuities related to pre-Civil War German–Spanish cultural transfers during early Francoism, which are mainly related to the moderate, liberal–conservative character of the *Revista de Occidente*'s impulse toward cultural transfer. In the new key areas of innovative knowledge, sociology in particular, the circle surrounding Ortega maintained its compatibility with Catholic tradition.¹²

Plessner in Spain: defending the Schelerian sociology of knowledge against weber

Exiled in Groningen after being removed from his Cologne chair in 1933, Plessner diagnosed a “Spanish inability” to collaborate “in the creation of modern European values,” arguing that Spain lacks “a proper state idea” because “without the Renaissance and Reformation” it remained “pending the foundations of the medieval ordo.”¹³ Plessner started his analysis of Spain as a European “periphery” with

¹¹Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity,” *History and Theory* 45 (2006), 30–50.

¹²Carl A. Lemke, *Europabild—Kulturwissenschaften—Staatsbegriff: Die Revista de Occidente (1923–1936) und der deutsch–spanische Kulturtransfer der Zwischenkriegszeit* (Frankfurt am Main, 2014).

¹³Helmuth Plessner, “El problema de una crítica de los valores españoles,” *Las Ciencias: Revista Trimestral (Anales de la Asociación Española para el Progreso de las Ciencias)* 2/2 (1935), 429–36, at 430. Based on a lecture given at the Association of Spanish Language Teachers in The Hague, this text was translated by the Valencian philologist José Francisco Pastor (s.d.), who translated, alongside Ramón de la Serna Espina (1894–1969), the Romanist Karl Vossler (1872–1949). The original German manuscript seems to have been lost and is not included in Plessner's collected works. See Helmuth Plessner, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 12 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1980–85).

the idea of a supra-dichotomy between Mediterranean and European mentalities, referring to the director of the *Revista de Occidente*.¹⁴ In his *Meditaciones del Quijote* (1914), Ortega had explained this historical antagonism in terms of a typical southern materialistic emotiveness (pathos) versus a typical northern transcendental emotiveness.¹⁵ During his stay in Munich in 1922, he discussed this issue intensely with the Husserlian Moritz Geiger (1880–1937), as well as with Oswald Spengler (1880–1936), whose morphology of cultures had an enormous impact all over Europe, particularly in Spain. This was due to a broad transfer through the circle of the *Revista de Occidente*, which, by the end of the 1920s, aimed at overcoming Spenglerian historical morphology's so-called pseudomorphosis perceived in this circle as a crucial error. In Spain, Spenglerian pseudomorphosis had triggered two opposing resemanticizations: the Spanish left transformed it into a transition-centered concept of Europe's temporary decline, which served as a trans-ideological key reference of the moderate Spanish Spenglerism that was dominant until the mid-1930s; among the Spanish right, on the other hand, it operated as a resistance-centered battle cry for a Catholic Caesarism, particularly highlighting Spengler's corresponding prophecy of renewed religiousness.¹⁶ As we shall see in the third and last section of this article, early 1950s critique of Freyerian *Wirklichkeitswissenschaft* in Francoist Spain was substantially nurtured by the *Revista de Occidente*'s late 1920s efforts to definitively overcome Spenglerian pseudomorphosis through Schelerian material-value ethics and his sociology of knowledge.

Plessner's 1935 critique of Spanish values was framed by sociological, historical, and philological contributions on the Renaissance, including questions of society and education, as well as issues of Spanish scientific history and, particularly, Neoplatonism.¹⁷ In his lecture, Plessner followed the Romanist Victor Klemperer (1881–1960), who, some years earlier, had been very skeptical of the idea of a Spanish Renaissance, especially criticizing two prominent defenders of this thesis, namely Américo Castro (1885–1972) and Helmut Anthony Hatzfeld (1892–1979). While appreciating Ludwig Pfandl's (1881–1942) study *Die großen spanischen Mystiker* (1925) on the importance of asceticism as an "essential preliminary stage of mysticism," Klemperer defended a continuity of "anti-Renaissance structures" (*Antirenaissancehaftes*). He did so by relying particularly on arguments from Marcelino Menéndez (1856–1912) regarding the literary conservation of a supposedly popular character in order to underline the idea of a specifically Spanish cultural nucleus essentially defined against any "development of mundane existence" (*Entwicklung der irdischen Persönlichkeit*).¹⁸ Following Vossler, and in contrast to

¹⁴Plessner, "El problema de una crítica de los valores españoles," 431.

¹⁵José Ortega y Gasset, "Meditaciones del 'Quijote'" (1914), in Ortega y Gasset, *Obras Completas* (Madrid, 1983–97), 1: 188, 309–400, at 331–3, 340–43.

¹⁶Carl A. Lemke, "Fervent Spenglerians: Romanising the Historic Morphology of Cultures in Spain (1922–1938)," *History of European Ideas* 48/5 (2022), 594–613.

¹⁷E., "Renacimiento, siempre renacido," *Las Ciencias: Revista Trimestral* 2/2 (1935), 413–18; X., "Orden social y Educación," *ibid.* 424–6; X., "Estudio sobre la Ciencia Española del Siglo XVII," *ibid.*, 427–8; Ángel González, "El filósofo, teólogo y médico hebreo cordobés Maimonides," *ibid.*, 437–41.

¹⁸Victor Klemperer, "Gibt es eine spanische Renaissance?," *Logos: Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur* 16/2 (1927), 129–61, at 131–5, 137–8, 143–5, 149–51, 154–5.

Castro, Klemperer characterized “Spanish realism” as a “peaceful compound between verism and fantasy,” representing a kind of singularity in Europe, whose historical–universal purpose retained the secret of a “second antiquity” for the present.¹⁹

Klemperer’s arguments stemmed from Vossler’s critique of French structuralists’ linguistic formalism and of the Leipzig school. Including associative references to Giovanni Gentile (1875–1944), Vossler defended a concept of psycho-cognitive identity between language and culture, insisting that “every conviction and opinion” corresponds “always” (*immer*) and “exactly” (*haarscharf*) with a “respective mode of intuition and internal form of language” (*bestimmte Anschauungsweise und innere Sprachform*).²⁰ Described as “organic back and forth between the meta-physical and empirical dimensions of linguistic communities,”²¹ Vossler’s linguistic determinism strengthened propaedeutic–methodological positions, especially of the early Cologne school of sociology, which aimed at continuing the culturalist approach found in Emil Durkheim’s (1858–1917) sociology.²² The interwar debate between German Romanists and Spanish philologists was part of a broad scientific exchange that covered the most diverse scientific field ranging from prehistory and psychology to quantum physics.²³ In this context, Vossler defended the idea of the “Spaniard in psycho-physical and phenomenological terms,” consisting of a prehistoric human type characterized by “eagerness towards the transcendent and agony towards the immanent” whose cultural-historical response to the “double assault of modern individualism,” i.e. the German Reformation and the Italian Renaissance, led to an exaggerated acceleration of its core social identity, namely the supra-naturalness of honor.²⁴ Regarding this new, historically embodied “human ideal” in a “superior military stratum,” Vossler underlined the absence of any economic element as the main cause of historical decline to be countered by a new generation of “Awakeners of Spain” (explicitly mentioning Benavente, Ganivet, Unamuno, and Ortega).²⁵

In his 1935 lecture, Plessner focused on the question of sociological concepts, pointing out a “typical error” in Klemperer when “assessing the German Reformation as progress over the Renaissance in the direction of the liberation of man.”²⁶ Qualified as typical, nineteenth-century “interpretation *ex eventu* and

¹⁹Ibid., 159, 161.

²⁰Karl Vossler, “Sprachgemeinschaft als Gesinnungsgemeinschaft,” *Logos: Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur* 13/2 (1924/25), 141–61, at 147–8, 153.

²¹Ibid., 161.

²²Stefanie Knebelspieß and Stephan Moebius, “Programm, personelle und organisatorische Entwicklung des Forschungsinstituts für Sozialwissenschaften von 1918/1919 bis zum heutigen Institut für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (ISS),” *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 71/4 (2019), 515–52. For a comparative approach to German sociological schools see Stephan Moebius, “Schulen, Akteure und regionale Zentren in der frühen Geschichte der bundesrepublikanischen Soziologie,” in Stephan Moebius and Andrea Ploder, eds., *Handbuch Geschichte der deutschsprachigen Soziologie* (Wiesbaden, 2016), 1–35.

²³Walter L. Bernecker, “Intercambios culturales y científicos germano-españoles durante la República de Weimar,” *Spagna Contemporanea* 56 (2019), 11–35.

²⁴Karl Vossler, “Spanisches Menschen- und Volkstum,” *Europäische Revue* 6/1 (1930), 265–74, at 265, 267, 270.

²⁵Ibid., 268, 270, 272–3.

²⁶Plessner, “El problema de una crítica de los valores españoles,” 433.

from a Protestant point of view,” Plessner insisted that historical concepts should “be neutral in their values and elastic in their content.”²⁷ Explicitly in contradiction of Max Weber (1864–1920) (*padece mengua la profundidad de la teoría*), he argued that, in reality, German Lutheranism, Anglo-Saxon Calvinism and the Spanish Counter-Reformation shared *nova instauratio fidei et ecclesiae*. Warning that the “affinity between Calvinist ethics and capitalist rationalization should not deceive us about the progressive character of Calvinism,” Plessner qualified as involuntary the liberation of the “productive forces of the modern nationalist and technical-capitalist world,” stressing that they have “nothing to do with the religious–ecclesiastical spirit of their founders.”²⁸

The publication of Plessner’s lecture in Spain culminated the interdisciplinary modernization process in Spanish social sciences throughout the 1920s and 1930s, driven primarily by the *Revista de Occidente*, which focused on Georg Simmel’s (1858–1918) formal sociology and Max Scheler’s (1874–1928) sociology of knowledge.²⁹ More than ten years earlier, in 1924, Plessner had contributed as a young *Privatdozent* to the second book from the early Cologne school of sociology with a study on the modern concept of research and its organization in German universities. This volume was edited by Scheler and, because of its collective nature, was quite influential.³⁰ Following the early Cologne school of sociology’s focus on “explanatory relations” between a certain “type of society” and “type of knowledge,” Plessner characterized the “modern method of investigation” as a formal rupture and reduction of the unity found in the “Aristotelian–Thomist knowledge system, and the Catholic Church as well,” transforming “autonomous research knowledge into something permanently fragmentary and transitory.”³¹ This shift triggered modern society’s “double face” found in the “industrialization of science and rationalization of social life,” which is why Plessner argued that the inclination towards research in German universities corresponded to the “open system of a great society of work acting in autonomous disciplines” (*Werkgesellschaft der autonomen Disziplinen*).³² Unlike the medieval “community of work” (*Werkgemeinschaft*), it was organized by way of the republican–democratic criteria of equality between chairs. However, the German university maintained, according to Plessner, the character of a “superior community of work” (*oberste*

²⁷Ibid., 433, 435.

²⁸Ibid., 433, 434.

²⁹Lemke, *Europabild—Kulturwissenschaften—Staatsbegriff*, 444–74, 603–25.

³⁰This volume included several studies by Paul Honigsheim (1885–1963) on scholasticism, mysticism, realism, nominalism, and so on, and an appendix on the peripatetic school taken from the doctoral thesis of Paul L. Landsberg (1901–44), alongside contributions from Paul Luchtenberg (1890–1973), Wilhelm Jerusalem (1854–1923), Hans L. Stoltenberg (1883–1963), Leopold von Wiese (1867–1969), Justus Hashagen (1877–1961), Wilhelm Vollrath (1887–1968), Kuno Mittenzwey (1881–1943), Lore Spindler (s.d.), and Walter J. Stein (1891–1957). For an introduction to the beginnings of anthropological philosophy in Cologne see Heine von Alemann, “Helmuth Plessner, Max Scheler und die Entstehung der Philosophischen Anthropologie in Köln: Eine Skizze,” *Phänomenologische Forschungen* 28/29 (1994), 10–34.

³¹Helmuth Plessner, “Zur Soziologie der modernen Forschung und ihrer Organisation in der Deutschen Universität,” in Max Scheler, ed., *Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens* (Munich, 1924), 407–25, at 407, 413.

³²Ibid., 415, 417, 424.

Werkgemeinschaft). It did so by preserving the disciplines' distinct atmosphere and by integrating "ethnic-cultural particularity" (*völkische Eigenart*) as a "vital value of education" due to its social appreciation in Germany with an "semi-divine aura" (*fast religiöse Weihe*).³³

Although Plessner was critical of Weber regarding the "decisive influence" of the inner-worldly asceticism found in Calvinist ethics on the development of modern capitalist society, he admitted that today's "unconditional respect for ascetic enthusiasm" had "undoubtedly" emerged from a sufficiently formalistic deontological ethic of love embodied by the system of specialized professions. This professional ethic proceeded, as Plessner highlighted, from "progress's implicit tendency towards infinity," and was identical with modern research and its character as an idea "achievable only in an asymptotic way." Unlike Weber's epistemic-logical concepts of sociology, Plessner understood the foundation of modern ethics as a "psychic conviction formulated as an ideal type" (*psychische Haltung idealtypisch gefaßt*) with a focus of interest leaning toward the future. Channeled through a "logic of inner-worldly ethics" (*Logik innerweltlicher Lebensauffassung*), this invasion of the future corresponded to the "ethics of an autonomous society" (*Ethos der autonomisierten Gesellschaft*).³⁴

For the early Cologne school of sociology, Plessner's psychological reduction of Weber's sociological concept of the ideal type (*Idealtypus*) was representative, corresponding, moreover, with the pseudo-Weberian positions of Eduard Spranger (1882–1963), whose pedagogical psychology had significant impact in interwar Spain.³⁵ Plessner softened his critique of Weber after 1945 by speaking of the "many misunderstandings" and "rejections" that Weber's thesis on the origin of capitalism in Calvinism had provoked, admitting partial validity "within the affinities that can be demonstrated" between inner-worldly asceticism and the modern ethic of work. According to Plessner, the various schools of sociology represented a "purification of the atmosphere," finally disconnecting the new discipline from presumed positivist historiographies (associated here with Lamprecht, Breysig, Spengler, Toynbee, and Taine). However, categorical structures of society (*Kategorialstrukturen menschlichen, in casu sozialen Seins*), in terms of tools for identifying relative aprioristic relationships (*Feststellung relativ apriorischer Zusammenhänge*), remained a matter of reductive phenomenological analysis. In this sense, Plessner followed Scheler's thesis of an *ordo amoris*, arguing that "in each of the scientific disciplines the lover is prior to the researcher, preparing the way."³⁶

In 1924, Scheler outlined a broad sociology-of-knowledge program directed specifically against Weber's *verstehende Soziologie*, including multiple associative

³³Ibid., 424–5. Plessner amplified and modified this text in 1966, changing "ethnic-cultural particularity" (*völkische Eigenart*) to "national particularity" (*nationale Eigenart*). See Helmuth Plessner, "Zur Soziologie der modernen Forschung" (1924), in Plessner, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 10: 7–30, at 29.

³⁴Ibid., 15–17; Plessner, "Zur Soziologie der modernen Forschung und ihrer Organisation in der Deutschen Universität," 414–15.

³⁵Carl A. Lemke, "'La socialización del hombre': Sociedad y educación en España de entreguerras (1923–1936)," *Spagna Contemporanea* 56 (2019), 37–67, at 58, 64 n. 108.

³⁶Helmuth Plessner, "Aspekte sozialer Gesetzmäßigkeit" (1949), in Plessner, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 10: 95–106, at 102–4; Plessner, "Der Weg der Soziologie in Deutschland" (1960), in *ibid.*, 191–211, at 198 n. 5.

references not only to Spengler but also to the political theology of Carl Schmitt (1888–1985).³⁷ The same sociology program also appeared two years later as the first part of the book *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* (1926), translated without the second and third parts by José Gaos (1900–1969) for the *Revista de Occidente*'s publishing house at the peak of the transfer of Schelerian sociology to Spain prior to the Civil War.³⁸ Significantly, Scheler represents a vital backdrop to Schmitt's early impact in Spain, which began around 1929 or 1930, via the circle of the *Revista de Occidente*.³⁹ In the third part of the *Wissensformen*—focused on the question of university reform previously published in the inaugural volume of the *Forschungsinstitut für Sozialwissenschaften in Köln*⁴⁰—Scheler advocated for a strict separation between university teaching and scientific research, particularly underlining the idea of a synthetic culture based on value judgments as a structural paradigm for science and education institutions.

According to Scheler, each of the institutional levels within public higher education corresponded to a certain type of educator: (1) “excellent teachers” for universities transformed into vocational training centers, (2) “researchers” for specialized research institutes, (3) “intellectual synthesizers” (*geistige Synthetiker*) for institutes focused on value-based culture (*Anstalten/unter dem Lichte der verschiedenen Weltanschauungen*), (4) “popular educators” (*Volksbildner*) for popular schools independent of universities, and, (5) “social and political ideologues” for academies focused on the social and political sciences, meant to establish a dialogue between the third and fourth levels with a focus on major public–political issues.⁴¹ This vision of a great national education system directly influenced the idea of the university that Ortega outlined in 1931. But, unlike Scheler, who expressly intended to reactivate the Humboldtian tradition (*geistige Synthetiker großen Stils*),⁴² Ortega not only reduced this vision substantially to a culture–profession–research triad, but also restricted its synthetic cultural paradigm to a kind of simplified charismatic education without further explanation of the modern academic's specific qualities.⁴³

³⁷Max Scheler, “Einleitung: Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens,” in Scheler, *Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens*, 1–146, at 6, 46, 83, 96, 111. For Scheler's critique of the Weberian idea of science as profession (*Beruf der Wissenschaft*) and the postulate of freedom from value judgments (*Werturteilsfreiheit*) see Max Scheler, “Weltanschauungslehre, Soziologie und Weltanschauungssetzung,” in Scheler, *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre*, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1923–24), 1: 1–25.

³⁸Max Scheler, *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* (Leipzig, 1926); Scheler, *Sociología del saber*, trans. J. Gaos (Madrid, 1935; reed. Buenos Aires, 1973). For an introduction to Scheler's pre-Civil War impact in Spain see Carl A. Lemke, “‘Von Kant zu Aristoteles’: Transformationen des Neukantianismus bei José Ortega y Gasset und seinem Schülerkreis (1905–1936),” *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 64/6 (2016), 894–924.

³⁹Carl A. Lemke, “‘Catholic Nietzscheans’: Framing Carl Schmitt's Impact in Interwar Spain,” *Global Intellectual History* (2022, in press), at <https://doi.org/10.1080/23801883.2022.2093769>.

⁴⁰Max Scheler, “Universität und Volkshochschule,” in Leopold von Wiese, ed., *Soziologie des Volksbildungswesens* (Munich, 1921), 153–91.

⁴¹Scheler, *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*, 494–5, 501–6, 508–10.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 506.

⁴³Carl A. Lemke, “‘Límites de innovación’: La Misión de la Universidad y el concepto orteguiano de ciencia (1922–1936),” *Estudios sobre Educación* 35 (2019), 391–408.

Unmutated singularity: values as *questio iuris* and spanish mysticism

Presented as the first contribution to the historical–philological section, Plessner’s reflections on the Renaissance and the Reformation were published in the then newly founded journal of the Asociación Española para el Progreso de las Ciencias (AEPC, 1908).⁴⁴ Founded a year after the Junta para Ampliación de Estudios e Investigaciones Científicas (JAE, 1907), this association was part of the largest public initiative for scientific and academic modernization in twentieth-century Spain.⁴⁵ Until 1934, the AEPC held the largest national science congress of the interwar years on a biannual basis, which was interrupted at the outbreak of the Civil War. It continued on after 1938 as one of the first major internationalization initiatives of Francoism with scientific delegations present from Portugal, Italy, and Germany, including the German ambassador, Eberhard von Stohrer (1883–1953) and his cultural attaché, Wilhelm Petersen (s.d.).⁴⁶ Aiming to “synthesize the state of science,” the AEPC journal was one of the first interdisciplinary scientific publications in Spain to widely address both specialized readers and the “general public.”⁴⁷ It was markedly traditionalist in the social sciences and humanities, and included collaborators like José Gascón (1875–1962), former minister of education and culture, and Xosé María Castroviejo (1909–1983), Falangist and, starting in 1937, adviser to the Dirección General de Relaciones Culturales del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, alongside other more moderate Catholics such as the priest and philosopher Juan Zaragüeta (1883–1974) and the Arabist Ángel González (1889–1949).

Remarkably, AEPC’s synthetic science program was significantly influenced by the circle of the *Revista de Occidente*, Ortega in particular. An emblematic case, in this regard, corresponds to the Zaragoza professor of natural law Enrique Luño (1900–58), who had been JAE research fellow in Italy and Germany between 1925 and 1929, becoming rector of the University of Barcelona from 1945 to 1951. In his extensive double essay published in the AEPC journal’s philosophy subsection, Luño focused on the legal philosophy of the Galician theologian Ángel María Amor (1869–1930), an expert in canon law and a pioneer of linguistics in Spain, whose criticism of classical scholasticism saw a revival at the end of the 1940s.⁴⁸ Luño insisted on a convergence between the “metaphysical orientation of the value theory that Amor supported” and “current phenomenology,” introducing in great detail German keys transferred by the *Revista de Occidente*.⁴⁹ With regard to the “incredible fertility of the issue of values considered in objective terms,” Luño

⁴⁴Elena Ausejo, “La Asociación Española para el Progreso de las Ciencias en el Centenario de su creación,” *Revista Complutense de Educación* 19/2 (2008), 295–310.

⁴⁵Isidro Sánchez, ed., *Educación, Ciencia y Cultura en España: Auge y colapso (1907–1940). Pensionados de la JAE* (Ciudad Real, 2012).

⁴⁶José M. Torraja, “La asociación española para el progreso de las ciencias en su primera época (1908–1936),” in Asociación Española para el Progreso de las Ciencias, ed., *XV Congreso Santander* (Barcelona, 1938), 7–25.

⁴⁷Luis Marichalar, “Presentación y saludo,” *Las Ciencias: Revista Trimestral* 1/1 (1934), 5–7.

⁴⁸Antonio Domínguez, “La correlación ontológica del lenguaje en Ángel Amor Ruibal (precursor lingüístico del siglo XX),” *Estudios de Lingüística del Español* 36 (2015), 335–58.

⁴⁹Enrique Luño, “La filosofía jurídica del Prof. Amor Ruibal,” *Las Ciencias: Revista Trimestral* 2/2 (1935), 195–214, and 2/4 (1935), 705–730, at 195–6.

emphatically highlighted that “Professor Ortega y Gasset in his exquisite and suggestive [1923] study,” followed a Schelerian argument (*siguiendo a Scheler*), by “sharply” observing that value “is not a *questio facti*, but a *questio iuris*.”⁵⁰ Against this background, Luño defended the “immutability of natural law” by identifying it as a fusion between Thomism and Augustinianism, with “consciousness as an expression of values.” He not only skipped all the differences between new and former natural-law concepts (Kant versus Wolff), but also deformed the Vienna school’s modern legal positivism, arguing with a supposedly dominant and continuous concept of “ontological value,” starting from Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and culminating with Hans Kelsen (1881–1973).⁵¹ Luño searched for an anti-Roussonian, “organicist” concept of power by insisting that “human authority” can only result from a type of society “immediately in accordance with the collective goal and mediately in accordance with the general plan of divine order.” In this way, updating phenomenology served to defend his idea of a pure society derived from the “verification of the universal order established and ruled by God in the world,” which consequently became manifest when “subjects unite in an inseparable relationship through the legal bond.”⁵²

Luño’s arguments defending pre-Kantian natural law remarkably converge with Ortega’s sociological analysis in *El hombre y la gente*. Given as lectures in Valladolid (1934–35) and Rotterdam (1936), and developed further in a small seminar at the University of Madrid entitled Estructuras de la Vida Histórica y Social, Ortega presented this sociological analysis as an extended university course in Argentina from 1939 to 1940, leading to the definitive text of the course given at the Instituto de Humanidades from 1949 to 1950 finally published as a book in 1957.⁵³ Seeking a “new linguistics,” Ortega referred to the Vossler student Eugen Lerch (1888–1952) in Lesson XI, outlining an ontological identity dimension of “coexistence” prior to the dialectical state of “dissociety” (*disociedad*) considered as “coexistence

⁵⁰Luño, “La filosofía jurídica del Prof. Amor Ruibal,” 197, 203–4, 206; José Ortega y Gasset, “¿Qué son los valores? Iniciación en la Estimativa,” *Revista de Occidente* 4 (1923), 39–70. After pre-publication in 1936, the complete translation of Scheler’s *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (1913) was delayed until the early 1940s. See Max Scheler, “La experiencia fenomenológica,” *Revista de Occidente* 152 (1936), 187–208; Scheler, *Ética: Nuevo ensayo de fundamentación de un personalismo ético*, trans. H. Rodríguez (Madrid, 1942).

⁵¹Luño, “La filosofía jurídica del Prof. Amor Ruibal,” 209–12, 710–11, 714–15, 723–4, 728–9. For an introduction to the paradigm shift in natural-law theory in Germany at the turn of the nineteenth century see Diethelm Klippel, “Kant im Kontext: Der naturrechtliche Diskurs um 1800,” *Jahrbuch des Historischen Kollegs* (Munich, 2001), 77–107; and, for a comprehensive study, see Klippel, *Politische Freiheit und Freiheitsrechte im deutschen Naturrecht des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Paderborn, 1976), 75–81, 96–8, 124–31. Regarding the transfer of Kelsen to Spain see Gregorio Robles, “Die Aufnahme von Kelsen in die spanische Rechtswissenschaft,” in Seepo Laakso, ed., *Der Einfluß der reinen Rechtslehre auf die Rechtstheorie in verschiedenen Ländern*, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1983), 2: 81–136.

⁵²Luño, “La filosofía jurídica del Prof. Amor Ruibal,” 729.

⁵³José Ortega y Gasset, “El hombre y la gente (Conferencia en Valladolid),” in José Ortega y Gasset, *Obras Completas*, 10 vols. (Barcelona, 2004–10), 9: 166–74; Ortega y Gasset, “Estudio sobre la estructura de la vida histórica y social,” in *ibid.*, 175–83; Ortega y Gasset, “El hombre y la gente (Conferencia en Rotterdam),” in *ibid.*, 203–17; Ortega y Gasset, “El hombre y la gente (Curso de 1939–1940),” in *ibid.*, 281–437; Ortega y Gasset, “El hombre y la gente (Curso de 1949–1950),” in *ibid.*, 10: 139–326, corresponding to José Ortega y Gasset, “El hombre y la gente,” in Ortega y Gasset, *Obras Completas* (Madrid, 1983–97), 7: 79–269.

of friends and enemies.” It started not only from Husserl’s 1931 meditations and those of other prominent disciples (especially Schütz, as well as Fink and Löwith) but, particularly, from the psychology of Karl Bühler (1879–1963).⁵⁴ Between two direct references to Bühlerian psychology,⁵⁵ Ortega explained the “enormous paradox” of the “withgiven presence of the Other Man” (*presencia com-presente del Otro Hombre*)—explained as “ab initio reciprocative, and, therefore, what is social”—in terms of a vital resistance to the state of “Being a stranger to me, the essential foreigner.” The dis-social dimension of the “pure Other” referred to unknown man present through the “pseudo-life of conventionality.” Here, Ortega highlighted a “constitutively dangerous” character, defined explicitly as a “hostile and fierce” potentiality caused by the quality of all “ex-perience” (associated with the Latin *periculum*), for being opposed to the “withdrawal” (*retiro*) of the “authenticity of my life as radical loneliness.” Given the “numbness or dullness” in certain historical moments, “for the obvious and basic truth that every neighbor is ultimately dangerous,” this sociological analysis revealed, according to Ortega, a basic category of universal history: the vital “[state of] alert” (*alerta*) whose loss caused much “suffering and catastrophe over the last thirty-five years.”⁵⁶

In *El hombre y la gente*, Ortega elaborated on ideas he had been outlining since 1924 on a philosophical anthropology by connecting new psychology (Freud, Adler, Klages, and others) with the early Cologne school of sociology, i.e. mainly the Schelerian doctrine of sympathy developed starting in 1913 and culminating in *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* (1923, 3rd edn 1931).⁵⁷ In order to specify the philosophical foundation of *Grenzen der Gemeinschaft* (1924), in 1931, Plessner also expanded on the idea of an “existential–vital relationship of friends and enemies” (*urwüchsige Lebensbeziehung von Freund und Feind*) towards a “sphere of trust” (*Sphäre der Vertrautheit*) opposed to the “mysteries of the strange” (*Unheimlichkeit des Fremden*). But, instead of identifying this Freudian psychology of the unknown in terms of hostility (Schmitt) or with an ontological anchoring in a sphere of authenticity (Ortega), Plessner argued for “existential immanence that is open in a double sense” (*in doppeltem Sinne eine offene Immanenz*), thus making it possible to “convert the *natural* relationship between past and present towards the dimension of reflection on man.”⁵⁸

⁵⁴Ortega y Gasset, *Obras Completas* (Madrid, 1983–97), 7: 148, 157, 160–62, 181, 183, 194, 241.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 157, 194. Bühler intervened alongside Schmitt and other prominent right-wing thinkers like Giuseppe Bottai (1895–1959) and Eugenio d’Ors (1881–1954) at the sixth conference of the Fédération internationale des unions intellectuelles in 1929 in Barcelona. See Guido Müller, *Europäische Gesellschaftsbeziehungen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg: Das Deutsch–Französische Studienkomitee und der Europäische Kulturbund* (Munich, 2005), 417–20, 449 and *passim*.

⁵⁶José Ortega y Gasset, “El hombre y la gente,” in Ortega y Gasset, *Obras Completas* (Madrid, 1983–1997), 7: 159–60, 175, 178, 188–9.

⁵⁷Lemke, *Europabild—Kulturwissenschaften—Staatsbegriff*, 383–9.

⁵⁸Helmuth Plessner, “Macht und menschliche Natur: Ein Versuch zur Anthropologie der geschichtlichen Weltanschauung” (1931), in Plessner, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 5: 135–234, at 187, original emphasis, 192; Kai Hauke, “Plessners ‘Grenzen der Gemeinschaft’: Eine Kritik des deutschen Idealismus,” *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 48/2 (2000), 237–64; for more details on the Nietzschean background as regards Plessner being an antipode to Schmitt see Alexey Zhavoronkov, “Nietzsches Idee der Gemeinschaft zwischen Liberalismus und Konservativer Revolution: Helmuth Plessner contra Carl Schmitt,” in

Taking up his ambiguous comment on Weber in Lesson VII of the Argentine course (*toma la vía errada*)⁵⁹, after returning to Spain, Ortega more explicitly presented *El hombre y la gente*'s definitive version in opposition to the "greatest recent sociologist, Max Weber," whose doctrine he qualified not only as "most vulgar," but also and simply as "pure error."⁶⁰ This harsh conclusion referred to the initial pages of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (1921), where Weber had collected, in a simplified manner, previous analysis *Über einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie* (1913), meticulously explaining his fundamental sociological concepts, i.e. *erklärendes Verstehen*, *Sinnadäquanz*, *Wertrationalität*, *Idealtyp*, and so on.⁶¹ According to the table of contents associated with the course he gave at the Instituto de Humanidades, Ortega pretended an even more complete rejection of modern sociology by announcing in its final Lesson XI, "Some sociologists are done for: Weber, Durkheim, Bergson."⁶² Indeed, *El hombre y la gente* explicitly started out as an effort to remedy Durkheim, presented as "closest to an accurate intuition of the social fact," but confused by the idea that "society is the true God." Against this backdrop, Ortega explained his sociological concept of paradoxical coexistence by means of "three different moments that cyclically repeat themselves throughout human history in increasing complexity, and density," namely alteration, self-interiorization, and action (*alteración/ensimismamiento/acción*). Following Scheler (deemed "my great friend"), this conceptual proposal came from a rereading of Bergsonian intuitionism and culminated in the Eckhartian metaphor of the "silent desert that is God," presented not only as the "most brilliant of European mystics," but also as decisive for understanding inter-individual human dialectics.⁶³

With *El hombre y la gente*'s core proposal, Ortega reconnected not only with the Schelerian sociology of knowledge, but also with a key thesis that was intensely debated in the circle of the *Revista de Occidente* (by Giménez Caballero, Sánchez Rivero, Castro, and others), namely the existence of a Spanish pre-Protestantism in favor of an awakening of the modern individual conscience through Neoplatonic mysticism. It was seen by some as the exemplary religious conscience of sixteenth-century Spanish Catholicism. This debate focused on Spain's historical-cultural singularity (Asín, Sánchez-Albornoz, García Gómez, and others) by including, among other research topics, specialized studies on Salomon Ibn Gabirol (1021–58, known as Solomo), Moisés ben Maimon (1135–1204, known as Maimonides) and Jehuda Leon ben Isaak Abrabanel (1460–1535, known as

Sebastian Kaufmann and Andreas Urs Sommer, eds., *Nietzsche und die Konservative Revolution* (Berlin and Boston, 2018), 343–61.

⁵⁹José Ortega y Gasset, "El hombre y la gente (Curso de 1939–1940)," in Ortega y Gasset, *Obras Completas* (Barcelona, 2004–10), 9: 375.

⁶⁰José Ortega y Gasset, "El hombre y la gente," in Ortega y Gasset, *Obras Completas* (Madrid, 1983–97), 7: 152, 203.

⁶¹Joaquín Abellán, "Estudio preliminar," in *Max Weber: Conceptos sociológicos fundamentales*, trans. and ed. J. Abellán (Madrid, 2006), 9–61; Gertrude Hirsch, "Webers Idealtypus als Methode zur Bestimmung des Begriffsinhaltes theoretischer Begriffe in den Kulturwissenschaften," *Journal for General Philosophy of Science* 28 (1997), 275–96.

⁶²José Ortega y Gasset, "El hombre y la gente," in Ortega y Gasset, *Obras Completas* (Madrid, 1983–97), 7: 271.

⁶³*Ibid.*, 77–8, 81, 85, 88, 145, 199.

León Ebreo). Remarkably, Ortega's young assistant, María Zambrano (1904–91), started a doctoral thesis project (unfinished) on salvation ethics in Baruch de Spinoza (1632–77).⁶⁴ In this context, Ortega's university course *Sobre la Época de Galileo* (1550–1650), which took place in February and June 1933, impacted debate.⁶⁵ Lesson VIII, on the transition from Christianity to rationalism, was immediately published and collected as a book entitled *En torno a Galileo* (1933), and Lessons V to VIII were republished separately almost ten years later under the title *Esquema de las crisis* (1942).⁶⁶ In the penultimate lesson, on fifteenth-century European society, Ortega followed Dutch historian Johan Huizinga's (1872–1945) study entitled *Herfsttij der Middeleeuwen* (1919), which had clear Spengler influences, and was then widely studied in the *Revista de Occidente*.⁶⁷ In it, Ortega identified a secular mutation of Christian religiosity as analogous with ancient Stoicism presented as modernity's origin. According to this perspective, the *devotio moderna* consisted precisely in a humanization of Christianity through an ambivalent mystique opposed to the world (*De contemptu mundi*).⁶⁸

The *Revista de Occidente's* debate on Spanish culture and history also included voices that defended ethno-psychological positions associated with Spanish Neoplatonism, which was again present in the context of Plessner's 1935 critique of Spanish values. The philologist Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez (1897–1986), member of Acción Española and first Francoist minister of education, published an extensive essay, which corresponded to Chapters 1, 4, and 6 of his National Prize for Literature-winning book on Spanish mystical literature, focusing on mysticism's connection “with the psychological and artistic characteristics of Spanish people” in terms of a kind of national essentialism (*país de los místicos*).⁶⁹ Sáinz argued with the convergence between Spanish Neoplatonism (León Ebreo in particular) and the reformed theology of the Middle Ages, highlighting the moral dimension of missionary Catholicism as a direct response to the Renaissance idea of *libre arbitrio*. Thus practical Catholic moralization became Spain's essence and “national philosophy” according with the idea that “ethics had always dominated

⁶⁴Lemke, *Europabild—Kulturwissenschaften—Staatsbegriff*, 124–39, 156–60, 462–4. For a critical analysis of the difference between ascetic self-perfection according to Weber and mystical self-annihilation according to Eckhart see Otto Langer, “*Sich lazen, sin selbes vernihten*: Negation und ‘Ich-Theorie’ bei Meister Eckhart,” in Walter Haug and Wolfram Schneider-Lastin, eds., *Deutsche Mystik im abendländischen Zusammenhang* (Tuebingen, 2000), 317–46.

⁶⁵María Zambrano, “Ortega y Gasset: Ideas en torno a las generaciones decisivas en la evolución del pensamiento europeo (Sobre la época de Galileo 1550–1650),” *Revista de Pedagogía* 12 (1933), 133–9, 174–83, 221–9, 271–8, 320–29, 368–75.

⁶⁶José Ortega y Gasset, “En el tránsito del cristianismo al racionalismo,” *Revista de Occidente* 123 (1933), 339–61; José Ortega y Gasset, “En torno a Galileo” (1933), in Ortega y Gasset, *Obras Completas* (Madrid, 1983–97), 5: 9–164, the eight lessons correspond to pages 93–106.

⁶⁷Johan Huizinga, “La nostalgia de una vida más bella,” *Revista de Occidente* 84 (1930), 265–99; Huizinga, *El otoño de la Edad Media: Estudios sobre las formas de la vida y del espíritu durante los siglos XIV y XV en Francia y en los Países Bajos*, trans. J. Gaos, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1930), 1: 46–82.

⁶⁸José Ortega y Gasset, “En torno a Galileo” (1933), in Ortega y Gasset, *Obras Completas* (Madrid, 1983–97), 5: 147–8.

⁶⁹Pedro Sáinz, “El problema histórico del misticismo español,” *Revista de Occidente* 45 (1927), 324–46, at 328–9; Sáinz, *Introducción a la historia de la literatura mística en España* (Madrid, 1927; reed. 1984), 11–16, 192–6, 309–16.

metaphysics.⁷⁰ From Sáinz's perspective, Spaniards had never been a "people of contemplatives," but rather are steeped in the "great social significance" of the "doctrine of love," even beyond the "cultured mass in general," a state that originated from Neoplatonism.⁷¹

This idea of a Spanish ethno-psychological identity served a year later as the definitive backdrop for *La Gaceta Literaria's* special issue on "Catolicismo y Literatura," including essays by Sáinz, Zaragüeta, and "other Catholics of solid faith" (like Ossorio and Arboleya) who represented right-wing traditionalist ideology (including Maeztu, d'Ors, and Salaverría).⁷² Together with the Augustinian priest Bruno Ibeas (1879–1957), another Acción Española collaborator and Schelerian philosophy defender,⁷³ they joined the Zaragozaan historian of natural law Salvador Minguijón (1874–1959), who was elected member of the Tribunal de Garantías Constitucionales in 1933.⁷⁴ Responding to the question of "Catholicism's future," in the face of Spengler's declared "decline of the West," Minguijón underlined a "double defensive and expansive function" by stressing, above all, "its mystical values" as a basis for the "synthesis of Germanism and Latinism." Here, he referred to spiritual "superiority" in terms of "Latinism lived out by Germans," confirmation of which required "scientific study of Catholicism in Spain" (naming Asín, Gómez, Zubiri, Zaragüeta, Amor, and others as representatives thereof).⁷⁵ *La Gaceta Literaria* identified this political education program with a culturally radicalized Catholicism in terms of "defense of the West," i.e. "Greek–Latin and Hebrew traditions" against the "all-pulverizing Orientalism" embodied by Russia as a historical agent.⁷⁶ Remarkably, Pastor (Plessner and Vossler's translator), who also collaborated in the right-wing journal *Conquista del Estado*, was a noteworthy spreader of this program.⁷⁷ In view of Minguijón's vision of Germanized Catholic Latinism, he proposed universal vitalism following a Schelerian "logic of the heart" whose methods he believed capable of "delivering the essences" of a rejuvenating German "spiritual movement" (associated with Keyserling, Spengler, and Otto).⁷⁸

Envisioned as a fusion between the "Castilian spirit of superiority" and the "Catalan bourgeois conscience," Vossler argued for the singularity of the Spanish universal-historical anti-Reformation identity as proof of a specific type of

⁷⁰Sáinz, *Introducción a la historia de la literatura mística en España*, 311; Sáinz, "El problema histórico del misticismo español," 340.

⁷¹Sáinz, "El problema histórico del misticismo español," 340; Sáinz, *Introducción a la historia de la literatura mística en España*, 194.

⁷²Editorial, "Catolicismo y Literatura," *La Gaceta Literaria* 31 (1928), 1; Pedro Sáinz, "La mística española," *ibid.*; Juan Zaragüeta, "Problemas del catolicismo moderno," *ibid.*, 1–2.

⁷³Bruno Ibeas, "Max Scheler: Schriften aus dem Nachlass, Bd. I, Berlín 1933," *Boletín Bibliográfico del Centro de Intercambio Intelectual Germano Español* 7/1 (1934), 2–3.

⁷⁴Juan F. Baltar, "Los ejercicios de oposiciones a profesor auxiliar de Salvador Minguijón," *Glossae: European Journal of Legal History* 10 (2013), 70–87.

⁷⁵Salvador Minguijón, Carlos Rodríguez, Bruno Ibeas, and Maximiliano Arboleya, "Encuesta a católicos de España," *La Gaceta Literaria* 31 (1928), 2.

⁷⁶Editorial, "Catolicismo y Literatura," 1.

⁷⁷Juan M. Bonet, *Diccionario de las Vanguardias en España (1907–1936)* (Madrid, 1999), 467.

⁷⁸José F. Pastor, "Para una apología de la Europa actual," *La Gaceta Literaria* 65 (1929), 3.

human superior power.⁷⁹ The essence of this “Spanish superior man” consisted in a “healthy sense of reality,” which had been incarnated, according to Vossler, in Lope de Vega’s (1562–1635) “authentic poetic realism.”⁸⁰ This vision of Spain not only promoted Vossler’s dissemination throughout the circle of the *Revista de Occidente*,⁸¹ but also engendered favor from the cultural department of the German embassy in Madrid in the context of his invitation to the Santander Summer University in 1933.⁸² Two years later, Vossler inaugurated the Lope centennial celebrations, which the German ambassador Johannes Bernhard Graf von Welzeck (1878–1972) organized in Madrid.⁸³ And finally, in 1944, he became the first German academic to receive an *honoris causa* degree from a Francoist university in Madrid.⁸⁴

Germanized Latinism and the Spenglerian roots of Freyerian *Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*

Early Francoist sociology aspired to implement Minguijón’s vision of Germanized Catholic Latinism by following German–Spanish interwar cultural transfers revolving around a Schelerian renewal of spiritual communitarianism. As a discipline not “yet definitively constituted,” Catholic sociology was projected as a political–romantic struggle against the “hypotrophy of the self” (*hiptrofía del yo/es preciso que el individuo muera, si la persona debe resucitar*), a notion explicitly associated with Schmitt and Scheler in order to seek the formation of “rules, types (average types and logical *ideal* types) and where possible, of laws.”⁸⁵ The main weapon of this anti-Spencerian struggle consisted of a neo-Kantian and phenomenological “theory of values” (Rickert, Husserl, Scheler) ultimately meant to reveal the “need for redemption” as a “metaphysical truth.”⁸⁶

A young representative of early Francoist sociology and self-declared Ortegian,⁸⁷ Salvador Lissarrague (1910–67), taught classes at the Instituto de Estudios Políticos (IEP) from 1942 as an assistant to Gascón. In 1955, Lissarrague was eventually

⁷⁹Karl Vossler, “Die Bedeutung der spanischen Kultur für Europa,” *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 8/1–2 (1930), 33–60, 402–17, at 33–4, 40, 45–7, 53–5, 108.

⁸⁰Karl Vossler, *Realismus in der spanischen Dichtung der Blütezeit* (Munich, 1926), 3–4, 16; Karl Vossler, *Lope de Vega und sein Zeitalter* (Munich, 1932), 4, 327–8.

⁸¹Karl Vossler, *Lope de Vega y su tiempo*, trans. R. de la Serna (Madrid, 1933).

⁸²Wilhelm Petersen, “Vossler, Karl: Die Bedeutung der spanischen Kultur für Europa (Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte VIII, 1/2 1930, S. 33–60 und 402–417),” *Boletín Bibliográfico del Centro de Intercambio Intelectual Germano Español* 3/3 (1930), 58–9.

⁸³Crónica, “Homenaje a Lope de Vega,” *Investigación y Progreso* 9/11 (1935), 343.

⁸⁴Carolina Rodríguez López, “La universidad de Madrid como escenario de las relaciones hispano-alemanas en el primer franquismo (1939–1951),” *Ayer: Revista de historia contemporánea* 69/1 (2008), 101–28.

⁸⁵Salvador Minguijón, “Sobre el objeto de la Sociología,” *Revista Internacional de Sociología* 4 (1944), 5–22, at 9–10, 20, and 5 (1944), 5–33, at 33, original emphasis.

⁸⁶Salvador Minguijón, “La cuestión del progreso,” *Revista Internacional de Sociología*, 8 (1944), 5–35, and 9 (1945), 5–42, at 19–20, 25–35. The neo-Kantian methodological dualism of Rickertian *Kultur- und Naturwissenschaften* (1899) represented the starting point for the scientific innovation program of the *Biblioteca de las Ideas del Siglo XX* (1922–36) that Ortega edited.

⁸⁷Salvador Lissarrague, “Ortega y la circunstancialidad de su obra,” *Cruz y Raya* 2 (1933), 164–71.

awarded the first chair in political sciences in Madrid.⁸⁸ From his wide-ranging research topics, his studies from between 1951 and 1962 dedicated to the three classics of sociology, Weber, Durkheim, and Bergson, stand out.⁸⁹ The first focused on Weber's concept of social action elaborated, according to Lissarrague, as a "nucleus of social reality" precisely "prior" to questions analyzed in formal and relational sociology (by Simmel and von Wiese). Notably, Lissarrague offered a private translation of Weber's fundamental sociological concepts for the exclusive use of his students in a seminar he directed on social and political theory.⁹⁰ However, in striking contrast to all of that, his 1951 study skipped over Weber's fundamental concepts, basically following *El hombre y la gente*. Starting from the hostile dimension of "human coexistence" in openly Ortegaian terms and considering it the "basic environment prior" to the collective and its "realization through human acts," Lissarrague even contributed to camouflage the recycling of the early Cologne school's philosophical anthropology when speaking of "man's ontological openness towards others" as if this concept were original to Francisco Javier Conde (1908–74).⁹¹

Lissarrague began publishing studies on the classics of sociology in 1951 to counter the harsh critique that his doctoral thesis, *El poder político y la sociedad* (1944), published by the IEP, had received. Qualifying it as empty eclecticism, a prominent representative of social Catholicism, Antonio Perpiñá (1908–84),⁹² rejected it immediately. Lamenting the "excessive number of different authors, opposing mentalities and antagonistic schools," he even saw it as a "disjointed and fragmentary exposition of different issues," leading him to conclude that the "author's own thought ... doesn't really exist."⁹³ A year earlier, Perpiñá had reviewed Ortega's 1933 course on Christian religiosity's secular mutation, which was reedited in 1942. Starting by polemically describing Ortega's particular style as sometimes similar to "Keyserling's dilettantism," he expressly welcomed the "fine interpretation of the Renaissance phenomenon," but stressed his disappointment regarding Ortegaian sociological keys (social authenticity, in particular) precisely because of their proximity to historicist displacement of "human essence from nature to history (as Spengler already did)."⁹⁴ Perpiñá qualified this

⁸⁸María M. Campo, "Límites de la sociedad y perspectivas de la sociología: El planteamiento de Salvador Lissarrague," *Política y Sociedad* 41/2 (2004), 99–112; Benjamin Rivaya, "Un orteguiano en la corte de la escolástica: Salvador Lissarrague Novoa," *Anuario de Filosofía del Derecho* 7 (1991), 365–87.

⁸⁹Salvador Lissarrague, "El acto social," *Revista de Estudios Políticos* 56 (1951), 27–42; Lissarrague, "La consistencia de la sociedad," *Revista de Estudios Políticos* 107 (1959), 5–44; Lissarrague, "Durkheim y el problema del colectivismo," in Instituto Balmes de Sociología, ed., *Estudios Sociológicos Internacionales*, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1961), 2: 263–86; Lissarrague, "El perfil de la convivencia en Bergson," *Revista Internacional de Sociología* 78 (1962), 149–57.

⁹⁰Lissarrague, "El acto social," 27–9; Max Weber, "Conceptos fundamentales de sociología," unpublished translation by S. Lissarrague, CSIC/CCHS/Biblioteca Tomás Navarro Tomás/Folletos: Fol/145140.

⁹¹Lissarrague, "El acto social," 29–31, 35, 38, 41; Joachim Fischer, "Exentrische Positionalität: Plessners Grundkategorie der philosophischen Anthropologie," *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 48/2 (2000), 265–88.

⁹²José L. Monereo, "Antonio Perpiñá Rodríguez (1910–1984): El tratamiento transdisciplinar de la Seguridad Social," *Revista de Derecho de la Seguridad Social: Laborum* 16 (2018), 283–300.

⁹³Antonio Perpiñá, "Salvador Lissarrague: *El Poder político y la sociedad*. Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1944," *Revista Internacional de Sociología* 10 (1945), 547–50, at 548.

⁹⁴Antonio Perpiñá, "José Ortega y Gasset: *Esquema de las crisis y otros ensayos*. Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 1942," *Revista Internacional de Sociología* 5 (1944), 255–9, at 255–8.

“Spenglerian, disjointed succession of cultures” as a dehumanization of history, insisting on a divine teleology of humanity—i.e. contemplation of ideas “for their moral and social value, for their transcendence towards an outside, aiming at divinizing them”—meant to facilitate an “integral understanding of man and his mission” in terms of “reality and healthy realism.”⁹⁵

Although he considered Ortega a “genius,” in 1961 Perpiñá qualified Ortegian sociology as a simplistic theory of cultural behavior whose focus on an “[o]ntology of interhuman reality” lacked a “clear notion ... as science in positive and empirical terms,” therefore constituting “at most, a social philosophy, but never a sociology.”⁹⁶ He believed this based on an implied phenomenological solipsism incapable of “explaining social life.”⁹⁷ Since the first volume of his study *Teoría de la realidad social* (1949/58), Perpiñá qualified it as “sociological trans-individualism,” a purely theoretical and “completely misleading as well as inaccurate” approach. Instead, he defended so-called “supra-objective social units” conceived as “given through the will of living socially,” i.e. as sociologically detectable units “within real living” (*vivencia efectiva*). Here, he relied on Schelerian sociology, expressly described as the completion of Weberian ideas (*Max Weber ha adivinado esto, aunque no lo desarrolló*).⁹⁸ Following this approach, in 1961, Perpiñá insisted (without even mentioning Weber) on sociology as an “applied or applicable science” according to a concept of a “norm that aspires to be fulfilled” (*deber ser que es*), which he presented as a “third concept that escapes classic ... Kantian and neo-Kantian dualism.”⁹⁹

This proposal stemmed from his 1951–2 critique of Hans Freyer (1887–1969), a leading sociologist of the Leipzig school whose anti-Maineckian ontological historicism decisively impacted the history of structures and concepts after World War II.¹⁰⁰ In his critique, Perpiñá referred to Freyer’s omnipresence in Spain as both an *en vogue* and a principal sociologist whose texts had become semiofficial books in many universities. This was certainly the case of *Einleitung in die Soziologie* (1931), which he meticulously commented on, in addition to *Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft* (1930).¹⁰¹ Perpiñá presented Freyer’s “revolution of social science,” first of all, as an attempt to rescue Diltheyan foundations, identifying an anti-Kantian “gnoseological *super-realism*” anchored in “phenomenological

⁹⁵Ibid., 258–9.

⁹⁶Antonio Perpiñá, “El pensamiento sociológico de Ortega y Gasset,” *Arbor* 183 (1961), 253–80, at 257, 263, 266, 272; Perpiñá, “Análisis sociológico de la doctrina orteguiana de los ‘usos’,” *Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Madrid* 13 (1962), 119–49.

⁹⁷Perpiñá, “El pensamiento sociológico de Ortega y Gasset,” 263.

⁹⁸Antonio Perpiñá, “Sujeto y objeto de la relación social: El problema de la individualidad,” *Revista Internacional de Sociología* 30 (1950), 283–312, at 288–9, 293–4, 297–9, 302–3, 306–8, 310.

⁹⁹Perpiñá, “El pensamiento sociológico de Ortega y Gasset,” 276 n.

¹⁰⁰Timo Pankakoski, “From Historical Structures to Temporal Layers: Hans Freyer and Conceptual History,” *History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History* 59/1 (2020), 61–91, at 77, 80.

¹⁰¹Hans Freyer, *La sociología ciencia de la realidad: Fundamentación lógica del sistema de la sociología*, trans. F. Ayala (Buenos Aires, 1944); Freyer, *Introducción a la sociología*, trans. F. González Vicén (Madrid, 1945). The first Spanish translator of Freyer’s *Wirklichkeitswissenschaft* was Francisco Ayala (1906–2006), an outstanding young disciple of the circle of the *Revista de Occidente* closely involved in the reception of Herman Heller (1891–1933) and Karl Mannheim (1893–1947) during the Second Spanish Republic. See Lemke, *Europabild—Kulturwissenschaften—Staatsbegriff*, 42, 472, 543–6, 551–2.

analysis.” From this perspective, Freyerian sociology consisted of a “*simple social physiology*” opposed to Weber’s “logic of rational–teleological thought to construct his ideal types,” given that Freyer rejected “Rickertian distinction between idiographic and nomothetic science.”¹⁰² Elaborated in more detail in 1958, Perpiñá simplified here Weberian *Wertfreiheit* by erroneously identifying it with Rickertian *Wertbeziehung*, as if Weber had been “following Rickert” on the “selection of the object operating *through value references*.”¹⁰³ The core problem of Freyerian sociology, according to Perpiñá, refers to the meaning attributed to the “term *reality (Wirklichkeit)*,” which is supposed to unite “excessive voluntarism” with “strong social determinism,” and causes an inversion of sociology, turning it into a “science of normative mandates.”¹⁰⁴ Perpiñá rejected this dialectical conversion of “overarching and categorical structural laws of community and society” by qualifying it as an antisociological “confusion” between the “experience of the social (not simply the mental category of the social)” and the “experience of temporal succession” (*Erlebnis des Sozialen [nicht bloß die Denkkategorie des Sozialen] ist etwas anderes als das Erlebnis der Zeitfolge*).¹⁰⁵ Here, remarkably, he followed Leopold von Wiese (1876–1969), who had criticized Freyer for identifying the *Beziehungslehre* as a merely logical and ahistorical science opposed to sociology as *Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*.¹⁰⁶

Against this background, Perpiñá identified a “deep error that presides over the entire Freyerian thesis” in that it skips all the “elementary assumptions necessary to construct rational knowledge,” referring to abstract and timeless concepts, as well as to laws built on formal–relational analysis of “small, microscopic processes” (Simmel). Furthermore, Perpiñá’s “strongest objection” to Freyer refers to his reduction of sociology to a naturalist “inverted philosophy of history” that Perpiñá considered a “typical nineteenth-century evolutionist approach.” Categorically rejecting Freyerian monism (*un proceso/una comunidad/una sociedad*), Perpiñá insisted on defending a pluralistic cultural sociology (*diversos procesos completos de culturas históricas/diversas comunidades y diversas sociedades*), relying explicitly on “Oswald Spengler’s categories of culture and civilization.”¹⁰⁷

Following the early Cologne school of sociology’s perspective, and reaffirming it with reference to René König (1906–92), Spenglerian morphology of cultures

¹⁰² Antonio Perpiñá, “Anti-Freyer o la revolución de la ciencia social de Hans Freyer,” *Revista Internacional de Sociología* 35 (1951), 25–44, at 39, 36 (1951), 317–42, at 325–9, 335, 339, and 37 (1952), 5–34, at 19, original emphasis.

¹⁰³ Antonio Perpiñá, *Teoría de la realidad social*, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1949–58), 2: *Métodos y criterios de la sociología contemporánea*, 101–4, 243–55, 295–304, 423–7, at 123, original emphasis.

¹⁰⁴ Antonio Perpiñá, “Anti-Freyer o la revolución de la ciencia social de Hans Freyer,” 37 (1952), 8–15.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 21–2.

¹⁰⁶ Leopold von Wiese, *System der Allgemeinen Soziologie als Lehre von den sozialen Prozessen und den sozialen Gebilden der Menschen (Beziehungslehre)* (Munich, 1933), 78. This critique should not obscure the fact that von Wiese, as president of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie, promoted Freyer’s academic rehabilitation in Germany after 1945. For an introduction beyond von Wiese’s ideological adaptation during the National Socialist regime see Karl-Siebert Rehberg, “Neuanfang und Geschichtsflucht: Ambivalenzen der Soziologie als einer ‘Gründungswissenschaft’ der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” in Michaela Christ and Maya Suderland, eds., *Soziologie und Nationalsozialismus: Positionen, Debatten, Perspektiven* (Berlin, 2014), 528–54.

¹⁰⁷ Perpiñá, “Anti-Freyer o la revolución de la ciencia social de Hans Freyer,” 37 (1952), 24, 32–3.

allowed Perpiñá to turn around Freyerian *Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*. In order to diversify it “into many systems,” and syntonize it with cultural morphology’s manifold historical senses, Perpiñá resemantized Freyer’s “valid volitional content of the present” (*contenido volitivo ‘valido’ del presente*).¹⁰⁸ Here, he referred explicitly to the “nations as validity areas for society’s new forming principle” (*Völker als die Geltungsräume des neuen gesellschaftsbildenden Prinzips*) that Freyer had identified with the “valid historical will of change” of the present’s “dialectical content” (*geschichtlich gültigen Willen zu ihrer Veränderung/dialektischen Gehalt der Wirklichkeit*), i.e. the “concept of true will” (*Begriff des ‘wahren Willens’*).¹⁰⁹ Announced as the new “contiguity system” (*sistemática de la contigüidad*), Perpiñá underlined Freyerian “duality of degree-value and layer-value” (*Zweiheit von Stufenwert und Schichtenwert*) as a key characteristic of “all formations of social reality” (*alle Gebilde der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit*) in terms of “delimitation and reciprocal action of degree-value and layer-value” (*Verschränkung und Ineinanderarbeitung von Stufenwert und Schichtenwert*).¹¹⁰ Against the universalism of “cultural evolution ‘stages’” (*‘estadios’ de la evolución cultural*), referring to Freyerian *Stufen* (*grados*), Perpiñá resemantized sociology as science of reality by particularly emphasizing the so-called “strata’ of any social structure” (*‘estratos’ de cualquier estructura social*), referring to Freyerian *Schichten* (*capas*). This historical dialectic corresponded to the “eminent and preferential microscopic forms of sociability” as the result of a “realist scientific analysis” of “social value systems” that Perpiñá identified as the “very simple answer” to the question of the “specifically significant content of society.”¹¹¹

Perpiñá’s resemantizations of Freyerian sociology were shaped in the extensive second section of his *Teoría de la realidad social*. There, he elaborated a series of “errors” (following and expanding on Scheler), seeking to “overcome the value category” by reinstating human existence’s vital hierarchy, proposing (with Ortega and Spranger) religion as the “crown” value in terms of the “perfect expression of moral life.”¹¹² Symptomatically, Weber’s explanations of the need to avoid value judgments (*Werturteilsfreiheit*) given at the Verein für Sozialpolitik in 1913 were used here as a key argument taken out of context. By distorting Weber’s careful differentiation between freedom of teaching at the university and freedom of expression in public (*mag [und: soll] er tun, was sein Gott oder Dämon ihn heißt*),¹¹³ as if pursuing a Thomistic argument against relativism, Perpiñá instrumentalized it to

¹⁰⁸Ibid., 34, original emphasis.

¹⁰⁹Freyer, *La sociología ciencia de la realidad*, 342, 344; Hans Freyer, *Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft: Logische Grundlegung des Systems der Soziologie* (Leipzig, 1964), 306, 307, original emphasis.

¹¹⁰Perpiñá, “Anti-Freyer o la revolución de la ciencia social de Hans Freyer,” 37 (1952), 32; Freyer, *La sociología ciencia de la realidad*, 248, 258–9; Freyer, *Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*, 217, 227–8.

¹¹¹Perpiñá, “Anti-Freyer o la revolución de la ciencia social de Hans Freyer,” 36 (1951), 341, 37 (1952), 32; Freyer, *La sociología ciencia de la realidad*, 248, 258–9; Freyer, *Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*, 217, 227–8.

¹¹²Perpiñá, *Teoría de la realidad social*, 1: *Los problemas del hombre y de la vida humana*, 221–438, at 416–35.

¹¹³Max Weber, “Der Sinn der ‘Wertfreiheit’ der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften,” *Logos: Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur* 7/1 (1917–18), 40–88, at 44.

reject any “independent autonomy” or possible validity “of proper merits” not grounded in the “supreme value” of “religiosity” (Spranger).¹¹⁴

In this way, Perpiñá reaffirmed the initial context of Freyer’s reception in Spain through the circle of the *Revista de Occidente*, which he had explained some years before, demanding “a historical investigation ... that is, a true *sociology of sociology* (Freyer).”¹¹⁵ On that occasion, he not only qualified Weberian sociology as unfinished for its “blindness to values,” but also connected von Wiese’s *Beziehungslehre* (given its “foundation in and explanation of the vitalist substratum of human sociability”) directly with Schmitt’s “well-known definition of the political,” highlighting that “*political science’s* highest goal” is contemplation of the “vitalist aspect of societies.”¹¹⁶ Finally, in 1949, he anchored Schmittian concepts of “friendship and enmity” explicitly in Scheler’s “values of *sympathy* and *antipathy*,” criticizing Schmitt’s “error of perspective” by exclusively understanding them as criteria of the political.¹¹⁷

Indeed, in 1931, the *Revista de Occidente* had published Freyer’s introductory contribution to the first volume, *Das Erwachen der Menschheit* (1931), of the *Propyläen-Weltgeschichte* (1929–33). Said volume was edited by the historian Walter Goetz (1867–1958) and translated by the Spengler translator Manuel García Morente (1886–1942) at Espasa-Calpe from 1932 to 1936. This Freyerian introduction instantly became a prolegomenon in Spain’s interest in universal historiography, which Spengler’s reception inspired and which was mainly cemented in the ten-volume series *Historia del mundo* (1926–33) and the five-volume collection *Summa artis* (1931–5) edited by the Catalan historian Josep Pijoán (1881–1963).¹¹⁸ Freyer started his explanation of universal history’s fundamental forms with a Nietzschean–Spenglerian diagnosis according to which all “healthy culture” had been replaced by the “chaos of modern education and the weariness of a decadent age.” This situation was only curable by shoring up “intimate connections” (*innerer Zusammenhang*) between history and its pending reactivation through estimative decisions on “meaning relations” (*sinnhafte Beziehung*).¹¹⁹ Set against “accumulated facts,” Freyer defended a holistic approach as an “intelligible nexus” (*Einheit, als Sinnzusammenhang*) that demands “switching from history as the past into the present as vitally valid” (*Umsprung aus gescheher Geschichte in gelebte Gegenwart*). This qualitative change required a “specific ‘point of view’; that is, “awareness of certain value decisions” (*bestimmter “Standpunkt”, das heißt das Bewusstsein bestimmter Wertentscheidungen*) that bring about two effects by means of their “value content” (*Wertgehalt*): (a) radiating into the future in terms of requirement and “advancement of history to be intrinsically carried out” (*notwendig zu vollziehende Fortbildung der Geschichte*) and (b) constituting,

¹¹⁴Perpiñá, *Teoría de la realidad social*, 1: 287–8.

¹¹⁵Antonio Perpiñá, “La concepción sociológica de lo social,” *Revista Internacional de Sociología* 13 (1944), 15–43, at 15, 43, original emphasis.

¹¹⁶Ibid., 20–21, 28, 34, 38–9, original emphasis.

¹¹⁷Perpiñá, *Teoría de la realidad social*, 1: 357–8, original emphasis.

¹¹⁸Antonio Obregón, “José Pijoán y su ‘Historia del Mundo’,” *Revista de Occidente* 124 (1933), 118–23.

¹¹⁹Hans Freyer, “Die Systeme der Weltgeschichtlichen Betrachtung,” in Walter Goetz, ed., *Propyläen-Weltgeschichte*, 10 vols. (Berlin, 1929–33), 1, *Das Erwachen der Menschheit*: 3–28, at 3, 6; Freyer, “Los sistemas de la historia universal,” *Revista de Occidente* 99 (1931), 249–93, at 251, 255.

with regard to the past, a “picture of the historical course including interpretation of phases and turns” (*Bild des geschichtlichen Verlaufs und eine Deutung seiner Etappen und Wendungen*).¹²⁰ In the final part, Freyer identified, in this regard, the three main value decisions in the concepts of freedom, cycle, and dialectics. Here, he singled out Spengler as the “purest representative” of a value decision focused on the “plurality of particular cultures” (*Vielheit der Einzelkulturen*), conceived as “conclusive historical cycles” (*Mehrzahl geschlossener Kulturabläufe*) set against the “unity of universal history as an arc of superior radius” (*Einheit der Weltgeschichte als ein höherer Bogen*), and focused on the “people’s spiritual essence that survives” (*geistigen Ertrag, der das Volkstum überdauert*) studied (by Lamprecht, Breysig, and others) in terms of “cultural rebirth, reception, and exchange” (*Renaissancen, Rezeptionen und Kulturdurchdringungen*).¹²¹

Freyer celebrated the Spenglerian opus magnum as early as 1921 precisely for its proximity to his own neo-Hegelian approach, enthusiastically welcoming its vision of future socialism in terms of cultural activism (*spätherbstliche Taten wollen ebenso getan werden wie frühlinghafte*).¹²² Like Spengler, during the 1920s he developed a philosophy of technique as an expression of Faustian culture, i.e. in Hegelian terms and conceived as the “manifestation of a historical will.”¹²³ In 1933, Freyer strongly supported Spengler’s candidacy as director of the Institut für Kultur- und Universalgeschichte (replacing Goetz, who retired for political reasons), a position that he himself accepted after Spengler rejected it.¹²⁴

Freyer’s introduction to Spain in the early 1930s came about as part of an increasing neo-Hegelian dynamic among the members of the *Revista de Occidente* circle, which was initiated, in 1928, with the Spanish translation of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s (1770–1831) *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte* (1837). This two-volume book was published in Spanish as an inaugural number of the newly established Biblioteca de Historiología;¹²⁵ it included a prologue from Ortega, which was taken from an essay published in Spain and Germany almost simultaneously.¹²⁶ In 1935, Felipe Eduardo González Vicén (1908–1991),¹²⁷ who later, in 1945, served as a translator of Freyer’s introduction to sociology, translated the first partial version of Hegel’s *Grundlinien*

¹²⁰Freyer, “Die Systeme der Weltgeschichtlichen Betrachtung,” 7; Freyer, “Los sistemas de la historia universal,” 259.

¹²¹Freyer, “Die Systeme der Weltgeschichtlichen Betrachtung,” 9–20, 21, 27–8; Freyer, “Los sistemas de la historia universal,” 261–78, 280, 289–91.

¹²²Hans Freyer, “Der Untergang des Abendlandes,” *Die Tat* 11 (1919–20), 304–8, at 304, 308.

¹²³Hans Freyer, “Zur Philosophie der Technik,” *Blätter für Deutsche Philosophie* 3 (1929–30), 192–201, at 197–8.

¹²⁴Siegfried Hoyer, “Hans Freyer als Direktor des Instituts für Universal- und Kulturgeschichte,” *Geschichte und Gegenwart: Vierteljahrshäfte für Zeitgeschichte, Gesellschaftsanalyse und politische Bildung* 9 (1990), 61–74, at 62–3, 66–7.

¹²⁵Georg F. W. Hegel, *Lecciones sobre la Filosofía de la Historia Universal*, trans. J. Gaos, prol. J. Ortega y Gasset, 2 vols. (Madrid 1928).

¹²⁶José Ortega y Gasset, “La ‘Filosofía de la historia’ de Hegel y la Historiología,” *Revista de Occidente* 56 (1928), 145–76; Ortega y Gasset, “Geschichte als Wissenschaft: Hegels ‘Philosophie der Geschichte’ und die Historiologie,” *Europäische Revue* 4/1 (1928–9), 259–72.

¹²⁷Benjamín Rivaya, “Una biografía intelectual de Felipe González Vicén (1908–1991),” *DOXA: Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho* 42 (2019), 223–57.

der Philosophie des Rechts (1821); it was published in the *Revista de Occidente* collection entitled *Textos Filosóficos*. There, in his introductory comment, Vicén highlighted Hegel's anti-natural-law position.¹²⁸ The pre-Civil War transfer of Hegel in Spain was determined by so-called liberal-critical Hegelian arguments (opposing Freyer and Schmitt), especially from Heinz Heimsoeth (1886–1975), as well as Hermann Heller (1891–1933).¹²⁹ At the same time, this neo-Hegelian dynamic strongly diverged from Spanish Krausist traditions, which notably preserved a pre-Kantian natural-law perspective compatible with the Thomistic idea of society as a well-ordered community.¹³⁰ Nineteenth-century Spanish Krausist social organicism argued for the state's merely tutelary function, an argument that builds on a concept of pre-political, self-regulating social harmony, that stemmed from French liberalism's eclectic trends, and aligned with anti-Hegelian arguments.¹³¹ Adolfo González-Posada y Biesca (1860–1944), a key representative of interwar Spanish Krausist traditions, was influenced by Léon Duguit's (1859–1928) organicism.¹³² Regarding *Souveraineté et liberté* (1922), which was translated into Spanish in 1924, the *Revista de Occidente* circle immediately identified the core of Duguit's basic norm of social solidarity (derived from Durkheimian sociology) as a concept of metaphysical superiority grounded in natural-law realism.¹³³ In his 1934 Cátedra de Valdecilla lecture, Posada demanded revision of all the basic elements of the then current concept of the state according to this Krausist anti-Hegelian natural-law tradition that had been renewed through Duguit's organicism. Symptomatically here, Posada particularly referred to Scheler's 1933 posthumous essay on ontological hero typology.¹³⁴

Conclusion

As a key discipline in the new regime's functional training of the elite, early Francoist sociology was deeply rooted in the early Cologne school of sociology, which the circle of the *Revista de Occidente* transferred to Spain as part of scientific modernization prior to the Spanish Civil War. The early Cologne school's sociology of knowledge and its core of Schelerian material-value ethics permeated not only

¹²⁸F. G. V., "Advertencia preliminar," in Georg W. F. Hegel, *Filosofía el Derecho: Introducción—La Eticidad*, trans. F. E. G. Vicent (Madrid 1935), vii–xiii, at ix.

¹²⁹For an introduction see Ernst Vollrath, "Zum Hegelverständnis Hermann Hellers," *Hegel-Studien* 27 (1992), 111–31; Henning Ottmann, *Individuum und Gemeinschaft bei Hegel* (Berlin, 1977), 224, 247, 259–60, 286, 299.

¹³⁰Joaquín Abellán, "Sobre la recepción de Krause en España: La continuidad del derecho natural tradicional," in Miguel Ángel Vega Cernuda and Henning Wegener, eds., *España y Alemania: Percepciones mutuas de cinco siglos de historia* (Madrid, 2002), 131–44.

¹³¹José L. Malo Guillén, *El Krausismo económico español* (Madrid, 2005), 50–52, 61–6.

¹³²Ángel L. Sánchez Marín, "La concepción de la sociedad y el Estado en Adolfo Posada," *Revista Telemática de Filosofía del Derecho* 6 (2002–3), 97–101.

¹³³José Gómez de la Serna Favre, "Léon Duguit: Soberanía y Libertad, trad. y prolog. J.G. Acuña, Madrid 1924," *Revista de Occidente* 16 (1924), 156–60; Dieter Grimm, *Solidarität als Rechtsprinzip: Die Rechts- und Staatslehre Léon Duguits in ihrer Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main, 1973), 8–10, 27–9, 99–104.

¹³⁴Adolfo Posada, *La crisis del estado y el derecho político* (Madrid, 1934), 8–10, 36, 44–5, 50–58, 61–4; Max Scheler, "Der Held," *Europäische Revue* 9/1 (1933), 302–10; Scheler, "El hero," *Revista de Occidente* 120 (1933), 241–56.

Ortega's idea of the university, but also his sociological concepts elaborated during the 1930s and 1940s. As shown in the second section of this article, Schelerian ethics strongly influenced, by way of Ortega as well, Spanish efforts to update philosophy of right in terms of a pre-Kantian natural law (Luño). By the end of the 1920s, the early Cologne school's sociology of knowledge started to more directly influence the idea of a rebirth of a genuinely Spanish Catholic sociology, which aimed for greater scientific rigor and the cultural spread of a new paradigm-changing social ideal, namely Germanized Latinism (Minguijón, Sáinz).

In the first section of this article, we saw how Plessner's 1935 argument against the Protestant Reformation as the origin of European modernity represented an emblematic effort in this regard. Speaking of a typical Protestant error, specifically criticizing Weber, Plessner demanded neutrality of value judgments when analyzing historical concepts, arguing in favor of Spain's historical-cultural singularity. This key thesis, which the circle of the *Revista de Occidente* defended with great intensity, was further elaborated by Ortega at the beginning of the 1930s in terms of Christian religiosity's secular mutation, presented as an alternative explanation of European modernity's origins. As explained in the second section, Spanish Neoplatonic mysticism was decisive in this regard and Ortega implemented it later to ontologically anchor his sociological concept of authenticity as sheltered radical solitude. An important argument for this ontological identity anchor, explored in the first section of this article, came from linguistic psychology (Vossler, Bühler, Lerch), which contributed to shaping the early Cologne school of sociology's arguments against the Protestant Reformation as the origin of European modernity (Klemperer).

It is clear that Plessner's 1935 reflections on the Renaissance and the Reformation accelerated discourse in defense of Catholic culture in Spain centered on Spengler, Scheler, and Schmitt. Starting in the mid-1920s, it received growing support from German cultural politics. In this pre-Civil War context, critique thereof was extremely prudent until 1933–4. As explained in the second section, for instance, Ortega himself displayed this level of prudence when referring to the sources of his thesis in *En torno a Galileo* (namely Spengler and Huizinga). During early Francoism, nevertheless, stressing alleged errors became a rhetorical standard for self-differentiation, which even Ortega implemented after his return to Spain, although with destructive ends in mind. In particular, the sociologist Perpiñá harshly criticized not only presumed systematic errors of early Francoist semiofficial sociology (Freyer), but also notably extended this rhetoric to his attempt to rebuild and strengthen Schelerian ethics' connection with neo-Thomism, which included the need to correct Schmitt.

As shown in the third section of this article, the early Franco regime's model of society referred to a Catholic community of wills, with sociology in charge of building its foundation centered on Spain's historical-cultural singularity. Characteristically, in this context, material-values ethics and relational sociology (derived from the early Cologne school of sociology, particularly Scheler and von Wiese) were combined with normative sociology's ethno-pluralist background (Freyer, Spengler). By recovering the neo-Kantian parameters of its foundation as a discipline rooted in formal sociology (Rickert, Simmel), early Francoist sociology contributed to the obstruction of an adequate reception of Weberian sociology.

In tune with discourse in defense of Catholic culture, Weber's approach not only was qualified as incomplete and basically wrong, but also became the target of an ideological stigmatization that rejected all non-Catholic universalism as stealthy cultural colonization. In order to fight Protestant intellectual imperialism, the concept of spatial differentiation according to nations as validity areas (Freyer) became a crucial argument. Singular normative sociologies and their corresponding volitional principles of society's formation merged with a pluralist cultural morphology of universal history (Spengler). This resemantized ontological historicism categorically excluded relativizing value spheres in the different scientific disciplines. During early Francoism in Spain, the Cologne school of sociology's persistence was transformed into an inescapable disciplinary guardian that set the boundaries for all future attempts at a Catholic sociology.

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