

The book is equipped with a useful name index and a list of periodicals mentioned in the text. It also includes a bibliographical guide to Limanowski's publications in the period 1919–35, a list of the works he had read, and fifteen portraits from the Party Central Archives. In addition, the appendix includes Limanowski's articles on the East Prussian Mazurians, his inaugural address in the Senate, and a vehement appeal directed to President Ignacy Mościcki. The book is a valuable historical source reflecting the political and socioeconomic preoccupations of the period.

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**HITLER'S FREE CITY: A HISTORY OF THE NAZI PARTY IN DANZIG, 1925–39.** By *Herbert S. Levine*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1973. xii, 223 pp. \$7.50.

The interlude in history during which Gdańsk was a free city, especially its role as a political and social entity, has attracted surprisingly little attention. The generally accepted view—reinforced by historians—is of Gdańsk as a bone of contention, a “Sarajevo,” as it were, of the Second World War. Nazi propaganda calling for the “return of Danzig to the Reich” and the pro-Nazi attitude of later collaborators (“Mourir pour Danzig,” Marcel Déat, May 4, 1939) are better remembered than the striking local successes of the NSDAP, all the more noteworthy because they came about in a closed and fairly homogeneous urban community and under the specific conditions of international control. In Gdańsk the Nazi movement developed in what might almost be called a “test-tube environment,” although it is true that neither the geographical frontier nor international agreements provided much of an obstacle to outside infiltration.

Professor Levine's study does much to fill the gap in the existing literature on Gdańsk. It is based on a conscientious study of documents from the archives of the former Free City, the Reich, and private collections owned by institutions in the United States, the Federal German Republic, and Poland. Careful use has also been made of the growing body of background literature, with the sole exception, perhaps, of overall analyses of fascism inspired by sociological and political theory, whose importance, however, Levine acknowledges (notes, p. 183).

As its title suggests, Levine's work is less a book about Gdańsk than a study of the NSDAP, and as such will have an important place in the literature on the subject. The position of the Nazi party in Gdańsk can be regarded as exceptional for two reasons at least. First, Gdańsk was an “isolation zone,” which meant that communications with headquarters—first in Munich and later in Berlin—proceeded along somewhat different channels than in Germany itself, while at the same time local political and social conditions required certain specific adaptations. Second, the isolation of the community as a whole plus internal tension (among Germans, Poles, and Jews) clearly determined the scope and intensity of political campaigning.

A weakness of the book is the superficial treatment of the city's social infrastructure and economic dependence. The author has not attempted the difficult but fruitful method of “urban” history undertaken so successfully ten years ago by W. S. Allen (*The Nazi Seizure of Power*, Chicago, 1965), although admittedly Gdańsk would have presented far more difficult a task in this respect than Nort-

heim, with its mere ten thousand inhabitants. Nevertheless, no answer is supplied to the problem of what conditions bred attitudes that allowed Nazism to seize power in Gdańsk with relatively more votes in the elections of 1935 than the party gained in Germany itself in March 1933.

Relatively little space is devoted to conflicts based on nationality. The fate of the Jewish community has been chronicled by Erwin Lichtenstein, whose work (*Die Juden der Freien Stadt Danzig unter der Herrschaft des Nationalsozialismus*, Tübingen, 1973, 243 pp.) appeared almost simultaneously with Levine's study. Lichtenstein's work is both exhaustive and instructive, and the two books complement each other. But the history of the Polish community in Gdańsk still remains to be told. In Levine's work it is of marginal importance as a mere background to the Nazi excesses. In certain matters, however (the port, the post office, and the Gdańsk Polytechnic), the Poles played a disproportionately large role in relation to their numbers, and this had a direct effect on the activities of the Nazi organizations. Although Professor Levine's study undoubtedly makes available many new facts and interpretations, it would seem that there is still considerable room for research in this field.

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THE WARSAW RISING OF 1944. By *Jan M. Ciechanowski*. Soviet and East European Studies. New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1974. xii, 332 pp. \$19.50.

This work, a revised version of the author's Polish edition (1971), is an excellent piece of research, richly informative, and timely.

The author is preoccupied with why the Polish underground Home Army took it upon itself to liberate Warsaw shortly before the Russians entered the capital, even though it was so lacking in troops and ammunition. He is also puzzled that the approaching Russians were not informed, and wonders why, on the other hand, the Red Army failed to take the Polish capital at the beginning of August 1944, as Stalin promised and as the Polish commander in chief of the Home Army, General Bor-Komorowski, anticipated.

The author examines in detail the political, diplomatic, ideological, and military background of the rising, and the events and decisions which preceded it, in the first three chapters. Then he traces Polish politics, strategy, and diplomacy during the whole of the Second World War, to show the activities of the exiled Government in London and the underground movement at home, and to reveal relations between Polish Communists and nationals, which became a crucial point, especially when after Stalingrad (1943) and the Teheran Conference it became clear that Poland would be liberated by the Russians. The crux of the matter appears in the last three chapters, with the details of the insurrectionary operations conducted by the Polish Home Army east of the city in the spring and summer of 1944, and of the attempts and various operations to influence the Poles' determination to fight for their capital.

The author attempts to be objective, although he has a tendency to side with the Russians. It would seem that he fails to see the Poles' hatred of Russians from the historical perspective, which perhaps led Polish nationals to be extremely cautious in any dealings with the Russians. All in all, the author's painstaking and