

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ALBANIA, BULGARIA, GREECE, ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA. By *George W. Hoffman*. Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development. New York, Washington, London: Praeger Publishers, 1972. xx, 322 pp. \$17.50.

I wish I knew what questions Professor Hoffman had in mind when he set out on his project. Because although he serves us a variety of answers—partial, fragmented, and overlapping as they may be—he never makes it quite clear what questions they are supposed to answer. It is as if he had “let the facts speak for themselves,” without addressing any questions to them in particular. Geographers may find such a descriptive, “storytelling” approach to regional development acceptable. But, writing at least as an economist, it leaves me unsated.

The subject of Hoffman’s book is inherently interesting and important. We have here five countries, three of which have been centrally administered since World War II (Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania), one of which went through a period of administrative centralization, then was gradually decentralized to a reasonable approximation of a market economy (Yugoslavia), while the fifth was and remained a “capitalist” market economy, subject only to indicative macroeconomic planning (Greece). How did the growth of their national incomes compare over a twenty- or twenty-five-year span? Their progress toward industrialization? The aggregate productivity of their labor and capital inputs? Their investment rates? That there are no systematic comparisons along these lines cannot be explained by a narrow *regional* definition of the book’s topic, since over half of the study is devoted to overall development strategies. I should have thought that such comparisons would have preceded almost any attempt at a region-by-region analysis.

If I had embarked on a project in this general area, the first questions that would have occurred to me regarding regional development in the Balkans would have included these: (1) In each of the five countries in the study, how does the regional concentration of industry compare before World War II, in 1950, and today? (To answer such a question would require a preliminary discussion of alternative measures of concentration, a worthwhile subject in itself.) (2) Did the centralized economies achieve more or less progress toward regional deconcentration than the market economies? (3) Are the five countries more or less well integrated internally than before the war? (In particular, is the percentage of industrial or agricultural output consumed in any region relative to total output greater or smaller than before? How did the shares of output exported abroad and of output exported to other regions evolve over time?) (4) Are indicators of industrial concentration and integration affected by the domination of different ethnic groups in each broad region (e.g., the Hungarians in Transylvania and the ethnic Rumanians in the other main regions of Rumania as compared with the relative ethnic homogeneity of Bulgaria or Greece)? (5) What is the effect of the priority development of the heavy branches of industry (primarily in Bulgaria and Rumania but also to some extent in Yugoslavia) on regional concentration? What is its effect on economic activity in small- and medium-sized towns not located near important raw-material resources?

No doubt these questions that first come to mind cannot be easily answered. A sample limited to four or five countries (depending on whether Albania can be included) can only serve to suggest answers to the questions that I have posed; it most probably is too small to support firm conclusions. In addition, changes in

regional administration have occurred in the Balkans that complicate comparisons between prewar and postwar statistics. Perhaps where prewar data are unavailable on a comparable basis, it would be necessary to limit comparisons to, say, the early 1950s and the late 1960s. But abundant industrial and agricultural statistics and employment data are available by subregion (e.g., by *județ* in Rumania) for all countries in the group with the possible exception of Albania, so that intertemporal and cross-sectional comparisons can probably be made once these detailed data are regrouped by broad regions that are at least roughly comparable over a fair period of time. To reaggregate basic data in order to make them comparable over time and across countries would require a good deal of work. But isn't painstaking work of this kind supposed to be the scholar's long suit?

J. M. MONTIAS
Yale University

PRESIDENTIN MUOTOKUVA. 2 vols. By *Kyösti Skyttä*. Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä, 1969–70. Vol. 1: 294 pp. Vol. 2: 298 pp. Paper.

KOLME MATKAA MOSKOVAAN. By *J. O. Söderhjelm*. Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä, 1970. 229 pp. Paper.

OMAA TIETÄÄN KULKI VAIN. By *Rainer von Fieandt*. Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä, 1970. 372 pp. Paper.

Kyösti Skyttä's two biographical volumes attempt to trace the life and career of Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, now in his fourth term as president of the Finnish Republic. It is no easy task. Mr. Kekkonen has had an unusually long and stormy political career: he has been actively involved in most of the significant political controversies that have rocked his country during the past half-century.

Born in a log cabin in northeastern Finland in 1900, the son of a lumberjack, Kekkonen nevertheless succeeded in securing a secondary-school education and volunteered to fight in the "White army" which defeated the "Red revolution" of 1918 in a bitter civil war. In the 1920s he studied jurisprudence, worked for the state security police, and emerged as an aggressively nationalistic and outspoken publicist and student leader famed for his sarcastic polemics against the Swedish-speaking minority of the country and the Russian "archenemy." Launching upon a new career in national politics as the bright young man of the Agrarian Party, a key party in Finland, he reached the rank of cabinet minister in 1936. Excluded from a cabinet post during the war years, he tried to find an outlet for his energies as a member of the parliament and as a publicist. From an unbending and implacable foe of the Russians (he was one of the few members of the Finnish parliament who voted against armistice during the Winter War and also engaged in aggressively anti-Soviet polemics during the first years of the so-called Continuation War, the second Finno-Russian conflict during the Second World War) he evolved toward the end of the war into an advocator of early peace and the establishment of new friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

Such a change of views and a prominent role as the minister of justice in the Soviet-inspired prosecutions of Finnish wartime political leaders as war criminals gave him a good launching pad for a career in postwar Soviet-dominated Finnish politics. After an unsuccessful bid for the presidency in 1950, Kekkonen served several times as prime minister before his election as president of the republic in