

ROSSIIA I MEZHDUNARODNYI KAPITAL, 1897–1914: OCHERKI ISTORII FINANSOVYKH OTNOSHENII. by B. V. Anan'ich. Leningrad: "Nauka," 1970. 316 pp. 1.62 rubles.

The subtitle is a more accurate guide than the title to the contents of this book, which outlines the financial relations between the tsarist government and its European creditors, more particularly the French. Though Germany and Britain, and occasionally the United States and Holland, were actual or potential creditor countries, they rarely assume much importance in the story. The book can best be described as a history of the diplomacy of Franco-Russian financial relations against the background of Russia's international and internal political situation, as seen mainly through Russian official archives (though British, French, and German published diplomatic documents have been drawn upon, as well as memoirs). Bankers, journalists, and the Bourse are often involved but are never figures of flesh and blood with particular interests at stake which could be at variance with those of governments, never adding up to what Ananich terms in his title "international capital." The actual financial transactions discussed are mainly direct and guaranteed government loans; private investments by foreigners in Russia are mentioned only obliquely.

The book is in three parts. The first, covering 1897 to 1903, deals with Witte's unsuccessful attempts to open the London and New York markets to Russian bonds because of the concern expressed by France's financial authorities over the vast amounts of French holdings in Russian securities. Some of the material presented here has appeared in *Istoricheskii arkhiv* (nos. 1 and 2). The second part of the book covers the period of the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 Revolution and its aftermath, through 1907. It is by far the longest section and is replete with dramatic detail, most of which is already available in B. A. Romanov's *Rossia v Man'chzhurii, 1892–1906* (Leningrad, 1928), his *Ocherki diplomaticheskoi istorii rusko-iaponskoi voiny* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1947 and 1955), and his collection of documents, *Russkie finansy i evropeiskaia birzha v 1904–1906 gg.* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1926). In the third section, which deals with the vicissitudes of Russia's relations with her creditors in the six years preceding the outbreak of World War I, the author draws on the Izvolsky correspondence (published in both French and Russian), on Kokovtsov's memoirs, and on the debates in the Duma—the creation of which had more than ever complicated Russia's relations with her creditors.

Although the book contains little that is entirely new, and though the previously published material has stolen most of the limelight by highlighting the most dramatic parts of the story, nevertheless Ananich has performed a useful service by piecing together the whole story and filling in the more prosaic details. The evidence from the minutes of Finance Committee meetings, ministers' memoranda, State Bank reports, and so forth, which, though often quoted in footnotes as not wholly relevant to the matter at hand, is invaluable for the student of Russian financial and monetary policies, as are the details of the terms on which the Russian government floated its loans, the bankers' commission, and so forth.

The documentation is certainly the most valuable part of the book. The ample and fair presentation of the evidence will enable the reader to reach conclusions often diametrically different from the author's implicit assumptions that Russia's financial weakness had exposed the government to pressure from its creditors, who gained concessions, extracted usurious terms, and even blackmailed the govern-

ment into submission. The author rarely subjects his material to analytical scrutiny; the nearest he comes is to quote, from the archival material, the differing views of prominent officials on a particular matter. He rarely distinguishes tactical moves from underlying policies. His main difficulty is that having chosen a subject which involves the interrelation between finance and politics, he is a specialist in neither. However, the student of Russian history, the diplomatic historian, and the student of finance and monetary problems will find much of value in this carefully documented, fair, and lucidly written account of the vicissitudes of Russia's financial relations with her creditors.

OLGA CRISP
University of London

PRELUDE TO REVOLUTION: THE PETROGRAD BOLSHEVIKS AND THE JULY 1917 UPRISING. By *Alexander Rabinowitch*. Indiana University International Studies. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1968. xi, 229 pp. \$8.50.

The biased approach of Soviet historiography, and the apogetics of émigré politicians for having missed a golden opportunity of getting rid of the Bolshevik danger, make a dispassionate and meticulous analysis of the happenings of July 1917 absolutely necessary for the advancement of our knowledge of the whole course of events in Russia in 1917. This task has been admirably carried out by Professor Rabinowitch. Basing himself firmly on a wide range of primary sources and critically exploiting secondary ones, he persuasively presents his answers to the main questions, without forcing his conclusions on the reader.

The main problem—whether the Bolsheviks had provoked and organized the July demonstrations—is answered clearly: Rabinowitch believes that a section of the Bolshevik party connected with the military organization and the Petersburg Bolshevik committee was systematically preparing the disturbances which broke out on July 3, while at the same time the central committee of the party did all in its power to create the impression of urging on the soldiers and workers of Petrograd restraint and peaceful methods of political struggle in the extremely permissive conditions under the Provisional Government. Not even when the central committee reversed its original resolution, and decided to lead the movement which it alleged had begun spontaneously, was Lenin's attitude toward the tactics of the committee clear. Nor is it clear whether the Bolshevik leadership ordered the laying down of arms by the mutineers when the movement collapsed. The concealments, ambiguities, evasions of official Soviet historiography on these points reflect, Rabinowitch tells us, a profound conflict inside the Bolshevik party, the admission of which would contradict the slogan of the monolithic unity of the party throughout its existence. Brilliant and straight as the methods of this author are, they fail to illuminate certain particularly dark corners of this drama. Whatever made the Deputy Minister of Justice Karinsky warn Lenin, through the latter's friend Bonch-Bruевич, of the imminent issue of a warrant for his arrest? Whatever made the same Karinsky draft such an aggressive—though inept—indictment of the Bolsheviks, both those imprisoned and those fugitive? What effect did the situation at the front have on the Bolshevik decision surreptitiously to foment unrest in Petrograd? How was this decision affected by the flow of German financial support, which began to reach the Bolsheviks a few weeks before the uprising? These questions will have to be inves-