Figures

I.I	Redistribution across political geographies – high congruence	
	and low congruence	page 41
2.1	Precolonial polities and historically acephalous regions	54
2.2	Colonial-era dynamics predicting erasure of precolonial legacies	63
3.I	Colonial changes to cantons by cercle and region, 1895–1960	88
4.1	Map of surveyed departments	98
4.2	Difference in means in elite social ties	110
4.3	Evaluations of local government performance	120
	Evaluations of local government performance by family relation	121
	Local government responsibilities (% responses)	122
	Precolonial capitals and discount rate illustration	140
5.2	Effect of institutional congruence on village access to new	
	social services	145
5.3	Effect of alternative explanations on village access to	
	new social services	147
	Trust estimates	149
	Illustration of location-allocation models	152
	Effect of institutional congruence on location-allocation choices	153
5. 7	Placebo models – effect of institutional congruence on	
	central-state-allocated goods	153
	Family network relations between village chiefs	166
	Friendship network relations between village chiefs	167
6.3	Network relations between village chiefs and local elected	
	officials	168
	Kebemer public goods delivery	179
	Koungheul public goods delivery	180
	Elite networks in Koumpentoum	185
6.7	Koumpentoum public goods delivery	187

vii

viii List of Figures

7.1	Effect of institutional congruence on new social service access	
	over time	195
7.2	Basic services over time	197
7.3	Marginal effect of centralization on education and	
	health attainment	198
7.4	Effect of colonial exposure on service access over time	206
7.5	Linear fit between early colonial and subsequent service access	207
7.6	Effect of early investments on later investments	209
7.7	Colonial favoritism on service access over time	212
8.1	Difference of means – DHS data	224
8.2	Difference of means - DHS data, accounting for variation in	
	level of decentralization	228
8.3	Difference in means – Afrobarometer data	230