located in intensive districts of heavy industry, such as the Ruhr, Upper Silesia and Halle-Merseburg in central Germany, while the conservatives were found in smaller mining regions elsewhere in Germany. He also overlooked the wide variation between mining towns within a district such as the Ruhr; mining politics were not random within each mine, but rather each mining town in the region had its own autonomous political configuration.

In the audience discussion following the papers, Melvyn Dubofsky (SUNY–Binghampton) emphasized the importance of internal union conflicts in promoting radicalism. Challenges by "outs" were usually couched in terms of a denunciation of the lack of radicalism of the "ins." Even John L. Lewis could write "Your's for the Revolution" in the heat of a union campaign. Bernard Moss (USC) pointed out the important chronological differences in the strike behavior of miners. In the nineteenth century miners were not as heavily unionized as workers in other industries, and were consequently less inclined to strike. But in the twentieth century, organized miners have developed a pattern of more frequent strikes than other workers. Tilly and Shorter put too much emphasis on the earlier period and missed the later shift in the strike behavior of miners.

The whole session on comparative international mining history showed the great gains in analytic precision made by labor historians in the last decade. Laslett's paper posed the important questions of the political sociology of miners within a structural framework which simply did not exist when Kerr and Siegel and Rimlinger were writing. The other papers varied in their sensitivity to the central methodological and analytical problems involved in comparative mining history, but all of them had important contributions to make to an understanding of the experience of miners. The session should be a reminder of the labor historian's responsibility, even when dealing with national or local movements, to contribute the vital local data necessary for developing an international and comparative understanding of working class history.

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FEMINISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN PRE WORLD WAR I EUROPE

The recent AHA meeting in Atlanta included a session entitled "Separatism and Equality – or Unity and Subordination: A Cross-Cultural Investigation of Women's Participation in Socialist Movements before World War I." It was, by far, the best panel I have attended in a long time: informative, provocative and entertaining. The participants – Karen Honeycutt, "Conflicting Loyalties: German Social Democrats Confront the Woman Question," Charles Sowerwine (University of Melbourne) "Causes and Choices: French Working Women in the Face of Feminism and Socialism, 1899-1914" and Barbara Evans Clements (University of Akron) "Russian Social-Democracy and the Woman-Question, 1905-1914" – had exchanged papers well in advance of the session; issues were carefully chosen and developed in concert.

The panelists set out to test an hypothesis: that the emphasis of Marxist doctrine on unity,

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discipline and subordination worked against its commitment to women's liberation. In practice, it cast woman in the role of "comrade" undistinguishable from her male counterpart and branded any special attention to her needs as diversionary and definitely disruptive of the greater goal of socialist revolution. In other words, the panelists posited that a measure of organizational "separatism" was necessary for a healthy marriage of socialism and feminism. As is true with much of women's history, the issues raised here illustrated related questions in all history: Helmut Gruber, chairperson and student of international socialism, pointed out that ethnic, racial and cultural differences within European Social Democracy posed similar problems of balancing unity and diversity.

Germany, France and Russia provided the test cases for the inquiry. Each country was at a different stage of industrial development and the political climates varied greatly. Republican France integrated its working class politically into the state; authoritarian Germany permitted a hostile labor movement to exist but excluded workers from effective political decision-making; in Russia, political organizations for the working class were illegal and economic activity was suspect and curtailed. These differences, as Renate Bridenthal pointed out in her interesting commentary, offer fertile ground for comparison of, for example, women in the economy in relation to those who joined the socialist movement or, prevailing attitudes among the working classes toward women and female labor. Did peasant and communal values favor separatism? Were workers fearful of proletarianization and thus hostile to women's needs? The answers to these questions are still open; the panel's focus was on ideology and organization.

Despite the different milieus within which socialist women operated, their concerns were remarkably similar in the three countries under investigation. All faced the need to determine priorities, to balance and reconcile the varying pulls of class and sex on working class women's loyalty. They were all loyal to the socialist parties and in each country a deep hostility to bourgeois feminism influenced the character of their movement and limited options. As Charles Sowerwine attests for France, the mistrust of bourgeois feminism increased socialist women's dependency on the party. Barbara Evans Clements shows that middle class efforts to reach working women during the upheavals of 1905 in Russia galvanized socialists such as Aleksandra Kollontai into the task of winning over women for their cause. Russian socialist feminism was, in large measure, a reaction to bourgeois feminism. In Germany, as Karen Honeycutt notes, existing class hostility coupled with a strong socialist party upholding the principle of non-collaboration encouraged segregation between socialist and bourgeois women. (England was equally class stratified but the absence of such a party favored feminist efforts to bridge the class barriers.) None of the papers raised the question of the fragility of a descriptive identity such as sex for the purposes of political mobilization, although Sowerwine provided a fine example: the failure of French women to create a feminist union transcending class because of the hostility of bourgeois ladies to the idea of a day off for their maids.

Karen Honeycutt began the discussion in light of the contemporary and present-day assessment of the relative "success" of German socialist women in creating a model women's movement in Social Democracy. The term "success" was not defined beyond numbers: 16% of the German Socialist Party was female in 1914 compared to never more than 3% for France. In large measure

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German women's success reflected their distance from the party structure. German women sought semi-autonomy (reinforced until 1908 by laws in many German states which prevented women from participating in politics) because by the early 1890s they had come to realize that separatism offered important psychological, social and political advantages. It provided protection for women as a minority within the party, allowed them to pressure for reforms related to their interests such as maternity insurance, permitted them to devise tactics geared to working class women's specific needs and experiences as workers, wives, mothers and consumers, and, finally, helped women overcome conditioned traits such as shyness and deference which thwarted their impact in the socialist movement. Unlike France where the women's movement in 1913 was just an auxiliary to help women already in the party, the German organization continued to attract members and promoted its interests well into World War I. Ironically, as Honeycutt notes, despite their relative success, German women had no lasting impact. Their fate, of course, was intricately tied up with that of German Social Democracy. Honeycutt attributes this to the movement's integration into a male-dominated and reformist party after 1908; women lost maneuverability, independent decision-making and, as my own research had found, were increasingly segregated into their own "sphere" of municipal welfare activity. Why did German women accept integration? The answer lies less, I believe, in the persistence of traditional role expectations resting on the patriarchal family, as Honeycutt asserts, than in the nature of the choices socialist women made. They actually welcomed integration (although they sought to preserve some independence in their own educational sessions and conferences) because they had linked their goals to the socialist movement to such a degree that they subordinated the cause of feminism to the final drive to socialism. Socialism alone, in their analysis, promised liberation. The process involved them in ambiguities on choices which were never resolved.

The priority question and the resultant tensions also run through the history of French socialist feminists. In the post 1905 era, as Sowerwine shows, women resolved the contradictions by simply refusing to press their own demands. Many like Louise Saumoneau became, in her own words, "anti-feminists." Saumoneau forcefully stressed the need for party unity (at women's expense) and rejected the notion of mobilizing women directly: "one had to convince the father, brother and husband," she prescribed, "and remain womanly and be amiable." These attitudes spelled the death-knell of the French women's movement. Yet between 1899 and 1902 when female socialists had been more independent of the party they had had more import. Loose organization and lack of party support and interest allowed for this initial development. A Feminist Socialist Group was formed with ties to the provinces, a secretariat, and its own newspaper. These women chose reformism during the move to unify French socialism after 1902 but were spurned by Jaures' Independent Socialists. Eventually, females were frozen out of the unified French Party (SFIO) as a bloc but accepted as individuals.

Clements generalized about male sentiments because in Russia, too, men were unwilling to take up the women's cause, betraying attitudes ranging from "indifference" to "distrust." While sexism was not inherent in Marxism, she argues, individual Marxists could be and were sexist; they treated women as if they were inferior. She gave numerous examples in the Russian experience to bear out her contention (examples could as easily be mustered in the German and French case).

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For example, when the Menshevik Aleksandra Kollontai sought to reach working class women in 1905 she found neither sympathy nor support; when she fled Russia in 1909, efforts on behalf of women languished. The opportunity to work for women came as a result of factional struggles between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. In the hope of capitalizing on the new social unrest of 1912 in which women figured prominently, each group took up the women's question. The Russian case study, too, was designed to offer proof of the general hypothesis: Bolsheviks were the most successful in making the revolution yet most mistrustful of separatism generally; their party was most committed to unity and subordination and the least willing to recognize the need for female activism. These sentiments would later block the efforts of Kollontai and others to liberate Russian women and form a truly new society after 1917.

The polarization of Social Democracy into basically radicals and reformists prior to World War I, as Bridenthal noted, carried with it different positions on the women's question. Recognizing great individual variations, radicals tended to stress unity while reformists, less emancipated from tradition, were often blatantly sexist. But the net result was similar: hostility within the European socialist camp toward a degree of self-determination for the female sex. On balance, ideological assumptions and organizational needs and choices combined to undercut the employment of feminist tactics within Social Democracy and thus produced further imbalance in the uneasy alliance of socialism and feminism.

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THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE WORKING CLASS IN IMPERIAL AND WEIMAR GERMANY

This session was part of the American Catholic Historical Association's Annual Meeting held at Boston College on April 4–5, 1975. Three papers were read at the session: "Catholics Face the Social Question: the Case of Essen, 1867-1877" by J. D. Hunley (Allegheny College), "The Religious Factor in Weimar Labor Politics" by Robert Wheeler (University of Southern California) and "The Voting Patterns of Catholic Workers in the Weimar Republic" by Brian Peterson (Florida International University). Commenting on the papers were Werner Braatz (University of Wisconsin – Oshkosh), Harold Poor (Rutgers University) and Andrew Lees (Rutgers University – Camden). All three papers were concerned with Catholic workers' support for the institutions of political and social Catholicism, the German Center Party and the Catholic labor movement. It was also observed by one of the discussants that as many questions were raised on this issue as answers were given.

In his paper, J. D. Hunley focused on Catholic workers in Essen, and the organization of early Christian-Social Associations. As a heavily Catholic region, and one which underwent extraordinarily rapid industrialization beginning in the 1860's, Essen provides a good case study of the

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