

# worldview

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## SHIFTING FORTUNES, SHIFTING ALLIES

It is possible that the last several weeks will mark a crucial turning point in world affairs. Vast political realignments have taken place throughout the world in these weeks. Changes are apparent not only in shifting relations between countries but in the thinking of prominent—and not so prominent—individuals.

The reasons, of course, are clear. Hopes and illusions have fallen before the force of conventional weapons and the imminent threat of nuclear war. China and India are in open conflict over long-disputed territory and the Soviets have only just been prevented from using Cuba as a base for nuclear missiles.

What argument and logic have been unable to accomplish, what appeals to history and theory have failed to do, the events of the last month have brought about. The most startling admission of this change—at least as startling as the events themselves—was the open admission of Prime Minister Nehru: "We were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation and we have been shocked out of it . . . The real thing that's out of joint is our whole mentality. . . ."

What was artificial was his belief that India could, under the most extreme pressures, remain neutralist; that it could, when forced into a war with China, count upon the aid and support of the Soviet Union; that it could, under these circumstances, expect at least the moral support of the neutralist countries it sat with in Belgrade. It is unlikely that Mr. Nehru will ever again argue for such views.

More significant, and also more complicated, is the Cuban affair and what will follow in its wake. There are those who argue that the placement of nuclear weapons in Cuba would make no essential change in the world situation, that it would effect only marginally the relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. This view is hardly worth disputing. It is not accepted by the U.S. or her close allies, by the countries of Latin America, by many neutralist countries across the globe from Cuba, or even by Russia.

The fact is, however, that individuals and

groups in many countries, including our own, did dispute this view and, consequently, looked askance at President Kennedy's ultimatum and the show of American strength. The British Foreign Secretary said at the time, "I am astonished at the number of comparatively intelligent people who equate American actions with Russian actions and on most things give the Communists the benefit of the doubt."

Nor was he referring only to those who might be expected to display open anti-Americanism. The London *Economist*, ordinarily serious and responsible, had equated the Russian "technicians" in Cuba with members of the Peace Corps in other countries. The Manchester *Guardian*, after the quarantine was imposed, epitomized this general view: "What is sauce for Cuba is sauce also for Turkey, Berlin and other places."

Such statements would seem to issue from that "artificial atmosphere" of which Mr. Nehru spoke. Because the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. tower above all other powers as two giants they are regarded as if they were moral twins, as political Tweedledum and Tweedledee. To those who view our present world situation from this perspective, President Kennedy's action could only be viewed as dangerous and foolish, for it ran the risk of provoking large-scale conflict without real or sufficient provocation.

There is, happily, evidence that some groups who were sympathetic to this perspective have been shocked out of it by the latest chapter in the development of Castro's Cuba. They have come to see that if the U.S. had not responded strongly with a show of power in this instance, there would be increasingly less reason for allies or antagonists to think that it would act decisively if challenged elsewhere.

Even those who wholeheartedly support the President's decision, however, must face certain hard facts. For the quarantine to be effective, for the direct confrontation of Soviet intentions to be successful, several conditions were neces-

sary. The U.S. had to act massively, summoning up a full show of strength; it had to act unilaterally, without consultation with allies who had already questioned the concern our government had shown; it had to act secretly, without telling the American public what was transpiring.

## in the magazines

Among the many angles from which the recent American action in the Caribbean has been viewed in the periodical press, is Hans Morgenthau's consideration of its effectiveness in terms of long-range U.S. interests in Latin America (*The New Republic*, November 3, 1962). The case for some action against the transformation of Cuba into a Soviet military base was indicated prior to the President's quarantine statement of October 23, Morgenthau states, "and may have at best been strengthened by recent intelligence." The Soviet presence in Cuba was not, from the outset, a threat to our physical safety, but as it has sought to provide "a base for military and political subversion throughout Latin America" it "challenges an area which has traditionally been regarded an American sphere of influence . . . one of its vital interests." "It is therefore legitimate to ask oneself," Morgenthau continues, "whether the President's emphasis upon the presence of 'offensive' weapons, recently discovered, does not weaken our case. The President's statement seems to carry the implication that once the Soviet military arsenal on Cuba is limited again to 'defensive' weapons there will be no grounds for American action." And the basic problem the United States faces remains unchanged.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, director of Columbia's Research Institute on Communist Affairs, discusses "Cuba in Soviet Strategy" in the same issue of *The New Republic*. Unlike Morgenthau, he considers the sudden pouring of Soviet weapons into Cuba no less than a political threat to the physical integrity of the United States. "As their minimum objective," Professor Brzezinski writes, "the Soviets hoped to exact major concessions in Berlin in return for some adjustments in Cuba; as their maximum, our backdown in Berlin, terrorized and deflected by the sudden revelation of a powerful nuclear threat from Cuba. The Soviets furthermore hoped to confront us eventually with a nuclear challenge by proxy, thereby again avoiding a direct confrontation but benefiting by the challenge." One fruitful aspect of the American challenge to those plans was "the President's warning . . . that a U.S. retaliatory blow against Russia would follow the firing of a single

It may be that if the U.S. is to exercise its great power responsibly, if it is to form as well as respond to world opinion, we will face a diet of such hard facts. They will undoubtedly be difficult to digest, but they may be all that can sustain us.

missile from Cuba." This, in Brzezinski's opinion, "warns Khrushchev not to abdicate the ultimate power of deciding whether the USSR is to become a cemetery to a reckless Cuban Fuehrer."

The role that ideology plays in Soviet politics and pronouncements is the concern of an article by Robert V. Daniels in *Commentary* for October. Daniel's thesis—that "theory, in Communism, does not determine the nature of action; action determines the meaning of theory,"—leads him to conclude that "Communist policy decisions and actions in the short-run can be so influenced by resistance, inducement, or pressure from the United States and the Western alliance, that the long-run pattern of Communist behavior and political development will take a direction consistent with our own fundamental desire for peace with security and freedom in the Western world." "Recent developments of this sort include the acceptance of cultural exchanges, the reluctant *status quo* in Berlin and Germany, the remarkable three-year informal moratorium on nuclear testing, and the Soviet refusal to back an aggressive Chinese Communist policy."

In an article in *Modern Age* (Fall 1962), Stephen T. Possony writes that it is illusory to believe that Soviet interests in test ban negotiations as well as in Berlin are anything but part of a larger plan to create the best psychological and strategic conditions for a long-range offensive global policy. And, in his opinion, "we cannot win the struggle by relying upon economic miracles, such as the Common Market. The Common Market is not viable unless and until it is defended by arms that are suited to fight, win, and survive World War III." Among the priorities for the West in this struggle, he states, is the "immediate—or early—nuclear arming of Europe." For, "the Continent must be armed effectively, not in order to attack the Soviet Union, but in order to preclude firmly and unequivocally the continuation of the Soviet quest for world domination."

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