

On balance, this volume is disappointing. Many of the most important documents have appeared in print before, and several others simply restate data repetitiously. Let us hope that some of the new documents which could have been included have been held out for publication in the forthcoming volume concerning the Omladina.

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HRVATSKO-UGARSKA NAGODBA 1868. GODINE. By *Vasilije Krestić*. Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti. Posebna izdanja, vol. 428. Odeljenje društvenih nauka, no. 65. Belgrade, 1969. 424 pp. 155 new dinars. Paper.

Vasilije Krestić's study of the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise of 1868 is in a sense a history of Croatian weakness at mid-century. Krestić believes that the solution of the economic problems facing Croatia in the 1860s, which included lack of credit and insufficiently thorough land reform, depended on creating an equitable political relationship between Croatia and Hungary. In his thoroughly documented discussion of Croatian political struggles with Austria and Hungary during the sixties, Krestić shows in detail how the Croats failed to achieve this agreement in 1868. He identifies one source of Croatian weakness as a failure of political leadership, showing, for example, how Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer often misjudged the political situation.

The irony of the problem the Croats faced in the sixties, however, was that political impotence made it impossible to solve their economic problems, but at the same time economic weakness was a major source of their political impotence. Krestić convincingly argues that the inability of the Croatian middle class to support an independent political movement was a basic cause of Croatian political failure. He explains that this inability was brought on not only by structural problems of the Croatian economy but by the coming of the railroads and by deliberate Austrian policy in the fifties. Thus, whereas the major portion of this study concerns political history, perhaps the most important part of the book is the introductory section of almost one hundred pages, in which Krestić thoroughly analyzes the decline of the Croatian economy from 1848 to 1868.

The final fifty pages of the book are important also, because in them Krestić discusses Serbo-Croatian relations during the sixties. He shows how Prince Michael hoped to use Croatian help to obtain Bosnia for Serbia, and how these plans weakened Croatian resolve to resist the Hungarians in the critical year between the Ausgleich of 1867 and the Compromise of 1868. Krestić exaggerates the duplicity of Count Gyula Andrassy's offer to help Michael in this effort, but his analysis shows that even at this relatively early date Bosnia divided Serbs and Croats. Bishop Strossmayer's turn from federalism to support of Serbia, and then to Yugoslavism, is well depicted in this section.

Advocates of economic rationality in contemporary Yugoslavia will be interested to note that this paperbound volume sells for \$12.40. Fortunately, it is worth it.

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