

force of 10,000 men had been created that became the nucleus of the later *honvéd* army of 170,000. If from Urbán's account Batthyány emerges as a determined nationalist (one begins to understand why Schwarzenberg had him executed in October 1849), Kossuth's role in the first months of the revolution is correctly diminished. The author, a rather young docent at the University of Budapest now specializing in British and U.S. history, is a thorough researcher who consulted many provincial archives. His argument is quiet and persuasive, although sometimes crammed with unnecessary details. But then his book was once a Kandidat's dissertation at the Academy of Sciences, and the miseries of dissertation writing in a socialist country are not unlike those in the United States.

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A MARSEILLE-I GYILKOSSÁG NEMZETKÖZI JOGI VONATKOZÁSAI.

By *Pál Nándori*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1972. 284 pp. 56 Ft.

The assassination of the French foreign minister, Jean Louis Barthou, and King Alexander of Yugoslavia at Marseilles in October 1934 led to a diplomatic crisis. The assassin was a member of the terrorist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, and was also connected with the Croatian Ustaši. Both Hungary and Italy were suspected of complicity in the crime, but charges centered on Hungary. The Yugoslavs claimed that Hungarian authorities had protected and given aid to a group of émigré Croats belonging to the Ustaši. Those responsible for the assassination—so it was claimed—had been able to carry out training activities on a farm called Janka Pusza in southern Hungary, and the dispute was taken to the League of Nations in December 1934. Budapest denied any involvement in Ustaši activities, and the Council of the League ended by asserting only that some Hungarian authorities may have had, perhaps through negligence, responsibility for some acts leading to the murders at Marseilles.

This monograph seeks to prove on the basis of extensive research in Hungarian archives that according to international law Hungarian authorities were indeed guilty of complicity in the crime, support of political assassination being an expression of Fascist policy. The author demonstrates to his own satisfaction through inference and indirect evidence, for example, that the assassin actually lived in Hungary before going to Marseilles, but fails to produce any concrete documentation. His conclusions are much sounder when discussing Hungarian contacts with the Ustaši during the 1920s, for here the Hungarian archives hold a wealth of hitherto unexploited material. Herein, in fact, lies the main value of the monograph. It is well known that in the interest of revision during the interwar years Hungarians had contact with subversive organizations not only in Yugoslavia but also in Czechoslovakia and Rumania. Yet we know very little about the nature of these contacts and the people involved. This book may inspire other studies concerning Hungarian relations with such groups.

The strongest point of the book—use of unpublished and otherwise unavailable Hungarian archival material—also constitutes one of its limitations. A more complete analysis of events surrounding the assassinations at Marseilles would need to avail itself of Yugoslav, Italian, and possibly Bulgarian sources as well.

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