

shake the ideological foundations of the party (p. 51). The most fruitful Soviet sociological studies have focused precisely on intraclass divisions. It is undivided political loyalty rather than social and economic homogeneity that party ideology now seems to require.

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DIE LIVLÄNDISCHE KRISE, 1554–1561. By *Knud Rasmussen*. Kopenhagen: Universitets Slaviske Institut, Studier 1. Copenhagen: Universitetsforlaget i Kopenhagen, 1973. 241 pp. 2 maps.

This book treats, once more, the diplomatic history of the end of the Livonian state. The story has been fully told before. If the author nevertheless retells it without using other sources than those his predecessors used, he seems to feel the need for reinterpretation. For "nicht richtig" and "falsch" are termed certain interpretations of Möllerup, Hubatsch, Kirchner, Donnert, Jasnowski, Novoselsky, Engberg, Koroliuk, and Arnell! No reference is made to them (or others) when they may be "right."

Most of Rasmussen's objections refer to interpretations of details in the diplomatic developments. Thus Hubatsch is called "incorrect" with regard to Prussia's role; yet Rasmussen must confess that his own interpretation is only a hypothesis. Rasmussen at one point denies that Denmark's negotiations of 1557 were a "fiasco," as others have stated; yet he must, a few pages later, agree that they were a failure ("im Sande verlaufen"); and still later he himself uses the word "fiasco." According to Rasmussen, as opposed to others, the king of Poland did not seek to dominate Livonian internal affairs through the treaty of Poswol of 1557; yet Sigismund Augustus must have reversed himself quickly; for, as Rasmussen states correctly, two years later he claimed the Livonians as his subjects and within another year demanded complete submission.

Despite his "corrections," Rasmussen comes, as he must, to the same results as his predecessors; and they, in turn, will find no major fault with his conclusions, though they may reserve their judgments in some details.

More serious is Rasmussen's failure to take adequate account of the internal divisions in Sweden and Livonia. Having not perused the Burwitz report of 1555, he neglects the effects of these conflicts on Denmark, Poland, and Russia. Even if Gustavus Vasa undertook little, Denmark, even more than others, could not ignore the aspirations on Livonia which many Swedes entertained, including Gustavus's own sons. Nor can the policies of Master of the Order Kettler be treated as a mere continuation of those of his predecessor Fürstenberg, when Kettler's aims were diametrically opposed to those of Fürstenberg. Since Sweden, Denmark, Poland, and Russia each had sympathizers in Livonia, and since the burghers of Riga and Reval played a major role long before Rasmussen considers them (about 1560), the fact is submerged that the need to prevent another nation's conquest of Livonia was no less a motivation for each of the contenders than their own desire to seize it.

What, then, is the contribution Rasmussen's book can possibly make? Perhaps a few points: (1) Although generally the Russian attack of 1558 has taken the central place in the histories of the Livonian crisis, it may be useful to focus attention on the initiatives of the other nations. (2) Although Prussia's role was played

out before the crisis started, her ambitions as early as 1554 may merit attention. (3) Although the influence of the Crimean Tatars on Russian policies has never been neglected, that on Poland's diplomacy may be worth more consideration. (4) Although internal power struggles in Sweden and Russia have been extensively discussed, those in Denmark and in other countries may merit further investigation.

Yet it seems that unless a fundamentally different kind of source is consulted, the topic of the Livonian crisis will yield few new insights. Perhaps such sources exist—among them those concerning the influence on *internal* power struggles within the various countries, or those which deal with *internal* economic motivations. These must be demonstrated concretely, and possibly statistically.

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PALACKÝ: THE HISTORIAN AS SCHOLAR AND NATIONALIST. By
Joseph Frederick Zacek. The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1970. xiv, 137 pp.

Although as a historian František Palacký's achievements as the "founder of modern Czech historiography" (p. viii) are in many ways comparable to those of Leopold von Ranke, and although Palacký has been regarded by many as the "father of the Czech nation," little is known about him in the West except for his role in the 1848 revolution. Moreover, there is not even a full-scale scholarly biography of him in Czech. In 137 closely packed pages, Zacek has succeeded admirably in filling part of this lacuna by presenting the reader with a good, solid evaluation of Palacký's accomplishments as a historian and as the chief leader of the Czech national movement. He has done so through making a critical "synthesis of the published material" and combining it with the results of his own "researches into the pertinent primary sources" (p. viii).

In the first chapter the author gives a brief survey of Czech historiography prior to the nineteenth century. The succeeding chapter is a biographical sketch of Palacký. Chapters 3–5 constitute the heart of the work. In the third chapter Zacek traces Palacký's evolution as a historian and describes the laborious research which preceded the publication in 1836 of the first volume of his history of Bohemia. Next the author guides us expertly through Palacký's relations with his sponsors, his altercations with the censors, his quarrels with his critics, and the gradual progress of the history. Chapter 5 deals with Palacký's theory and philosophy of history. In the final chapter, "The Palacký Legacy," the author describes the unsuccessful efforts to find a suitable successor to Palacký to continue the history beyond 1826; makes a judicious evaluation of Palacký's importance as a historian; and describes the main trends of Czech historical writing since Palacký's death in 1876. Together, Chapters 1 and 6 actually constitute a brief but adequate survey of Czech historiography from earliest times to the present.

All in all, the above study is an excellent one. It has been well organized and well written by a historian who has made a painstaking study of the large number of primary and secondary sources which he has managed to uncover.

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