

rather labored defense of Makhno's various agreements of expediency with the Bolsheviks and of the atrocities charged to Makhno's forces, but he concludes with an incisive and frank evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the movement Makhno led. He notes the courage and love of freedom that undoubtedly characterized many of Makhno's supporters, while conceding the movement's lack of clear goals and positive policies, its increasing militarization, the personal weaknesses of Makhno, and the insouciance of Makhno's attitude toward the Bolsheviks.

Voline's study, though it adds little specific information to our knowledge of the Russian Revolution, nevertheless remains a forthright statement of the views of a small but important group of losers in that great upheaval.

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GERMANY'S DRIVE TO THE EAST AND THE UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION, 1917-1918. By *Oleh S. Fedyshyn*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1971. xii, 401 pp. \$15.00.

Dr. Fedyshyn tries to evaluate in his book the interplay of the German *Ostpolitik* and the Ukrainian striving for national self-determination during the eventful years of the Ukrainian Revolution in 1917-18. While making an extensive use of German and Austrian official documents, numerous memoirs, and an impressive number of secondary works written in English, German, Russian, and Ukrainian, the author guides the reader briefly through the history of the Ukrainian national awakening, and then deals more elaborately with the major stages of the German involvement in the Ukrainian problems from the outbreak of World War I up to the ultimate collapse of the Second German Empire. Whereas most of the primary sources cited in this work are not new, but have been used already in related writings by Reshetar, Fischer, Baumgart, Borowsky, and others, the broader aspects of the German war aims and of the German occupation policy in the years in question, with particular reference to the Ukraine, were never before integrated and presented in such a systematic fashion.

In dealing with the German policy toward Russia before the outbreak of World War I, and shortly after the war began, the author finds no evidence of an official German policy in favor of a Ukrainian state within the framework of a so-called *Randstaatenpolitik* (policy of buffer states), thus disagreeing with the version of Professor Fritz Fischer and his "school" on this account. He describes the official German support to the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine from the beginning of hostilities as one of the measures of psychological warfare, contending that the concept of a Ukrainian state independent of Russia emerged in the official German war plans only at a later time, as a result of the German military successes on the Eastern front (pp. 18-20, 30, 38-41).

The ambiguity of the German attitude toward the Ukraine provides the setting for Fedyshyn's thesis that the German military intervention in the Ukraine caught the German leaders politically unprepared, and that the lack of clearly defined aims and an inadequate evaluation of the situation in the Ukraine led to a policy of narrow-minded economic exploitation that was geared to the needs of the German war economy. He states that economic rather than national or ideological considerations determined the overthrow of the Rada and the support of the Hetman's state by the Germans (pp. 257-58).

The limitations of Fedyshyn's thesis lie first of all in his failure to investigate more carefully the German *Randstaatenpolitik*. In the diplomatic history of the Second Reich this concept could have been traced indirectly to Bismarck, who was concerned primarily not with the economic penetration of the East but with providing an alternative policy toward Russia, in case revolutionary movements or expansionist Pan-Slavist forces should gain an upper hand there, thus threatening the social and political status quo in East Central Europe. The buffer-states concept including the Ukraine was stressed in the German diplomatic correspondence at the very early stage of the war (see, for example, the documentation in P. Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik, 1918*, Lübeck, 1970, pp. 34–35), and there is no evidence that the German government abandoned its social and political criteria while building the buffer states in the East. Obviously the socialist Ukrainian state under the Rada was rather a liability than a barrier, as far as the danger of the spreading of revolutionary ideas was concerned. The Hetman's government proved hardly more productive from the standpoint of the German war economy, taking into consideration, among other things, the disruption caused by popular uprisings at the time, and the number of German casualties suffered in suppressing them. Yet the Germans supported Skoropadsky till the bitter end.

By sidetracking the political and social aspects of the German policy to a considerable degree in order to illuminate the economic concerns of the German leaders, Fedyshyn does not always succeed in giving a balanced account of some of the German political moves in the Ukraine. He pays little attention and attributes minor significance to the German long-range plans for economic penetration of Eastern Europe, which started to emerge during the occupation of the Ukraine. Yet a more intensive analysis would have provided not only some additional clues to the occupation policies but also a better realization of the precarious position of the Ukraine if the Germans had won.

Despite the limitations mentioned, the work renders correctly the general characteristics and the sequence of events in connection with the German drive to the Ukraine, and the reader will find the collection of documentary sources and the excellent bibliography useful and enlightening. This is the first comprehensive scholarly work on the topic in English, and thus provides a welcome base for a further exploration of this field.

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1919: RED MIRAGE. By *David Mitchell*. New York: Macmillan, 1970. 385 pp. \$7.50.

The year 1919 was the 1848 of the proletarian revolution—a year of galloping revolutionary infection radiated by Petrograd's example (like Paris in the earlier, bourgeois-democratic instance), a year when the hopes and fears of social overturn were never so passionately rampant, a year nonetheless ending almost everywhere in bloody cures at the hands of the counterrevolutionary establishment. The struggles of 1919 between utopian fervor and status-quo panic have acquired an almost quaint remoteness in the perspective of welfare-state evolution on the one hand, and the crimes of more recent dictators on the other. Still, the aborted or self-betrayed revolutionary upheavals of 1919 represent a critical and revealing stage