

THE AUTONOMY OF THE UNIVERSITY¹

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A WORD or two first to explain the title of this paper. My subject is 'The autonomy of the university'. Actually, of course, the essential question is about the autonomy of the individual university teacher and research worker, not so much of the university as an institution, and I propose to treat the matter from that angle. Also, 'autonomy' is not the best word to express the question we are discussing. I would prefer to put it thus: 'What is the responsibility of the university to the rest of the community, and how is this responsibility to be enforced?'

I shall try to answer this question, not from special principles applicable to the university alone, but from the general rules that govern the rights and duties of all workers. I know that many people dislike the idea that the university teacher or researcher is just one more kind of worker. In this country (Austria) we have recently heard the eloquent protest of Josef Pieper on this point. But opinions will not change facts. Work is work, whether it is done by the driver of a bus, the typist at her desk, or the professor in a university chair, and the rules governing the rights and duties of workers are the same for all. Everyone who works has the right to use his special skill and ability to the full—to enjoy, if you like, full employment—for two ends. The first is the development of his own personality, for achievement in work is necessary to the growth of a mature personality. The second is service to the community. You can if you like say that the worker has a right and duty to treat his work first as a consumer good, to be valued for its own sake, or rather for its direct value to his own personality; and secondly as a capital good, a tool for adding to the stock of material and spiritual services that constitute the common good of the community, and which the community can in turn use to promote the personal development both of others and of the worker himself. Everyone has a right to work for these two ends, and therefore a right to demand as much freedom, and a duty to accept as much control, as he needs in order to do so.

¹ A paper read at the Twenty-Fourth World Congress of Pax Romana, Vienna, in September 1958.

We in the universities too have a right and duty, like everyone else, to use the particular talent that God has given us to the full. This talent is for the pursuit of rational knowledge in its depth and breadth and dynamism. We pursue rational knowledge, not because we deny that there are other kinds of knowledge, but because our special task and skill lies in pursuing that kind of knowledge which human reason can give. We pursue it in its depth, to the limits of what human reason can achieve. We pursue it in its breadth, for a university is, or should be, as Newman and Ortega and so many others have insisted, a place where one gets not merely a specialized technique but what Newman called the culture of a gentleman; the ability to situate oneself on the map of life and to judge broadly, from general principles. We pursue it in its dynamism, for the map of knowledge is continually changing and widening, and each successive generation in the university has a duty to add its quota of discovery.

We pursue knowledge first as a consumer good, as something valued for its own sake. The traditional liberal arts view is that knowledge is to be pursued, not for the use we can make of it, but as an end in itself; and that is perfectly true, provided one remembers that it is only half of the truth. The other half is that we must pursue knowledge also as a capital good, a tool in the service of the community. And here of course is where I get really into my subject, for it is at this point that there arise the various claims made on the university by the business man, the trade unionist, the politician, the Bishop, and all other kinds of practical men. All of these come knocking at our door and asking to use the tool of rational knowledge for their respective concerns. They ask that we shall give our students not only an intellectual training—a training in the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake—but a training that will fit them for their various future vocations. And they ask that we shall choose our research projects not merely for their pure contribution to knowledge but also for their contribution to solving practical problems.

There are three things to be said about these claims. First, they are extremely pressing, for knowledge is today the most powerful tool that any section of the community can possess. It has been said that if our entire material civilization were destroyed, but the knowledge in men's heads were left, in ten

years everything would be restored as it was before. It might very well be true. I hope the experiment will never be tried on a full scale; but we saw something very like it on a smaller scale in certain countries after the second world war.

Secondly, these claims are perfectly fair. Like every other sort of worker, we in the universities do have a duty to place our special skill at the disposal of other sections of the community. Canon Leclercq dealt very well with this question in a paper which he gave to a summer school of the *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales* a couple of years ago. He took the ideal of the Greek philosophers, of art for art's sake and of the pursuit of knowledge solely as an end in itself, and showed that it was up to a point noble and compelling, yet contained for a Christian one radical defect. There was no element in it of love, or service, or appreciation of the common good. But love and service and appreciation of the common good are for a Christian, as Leclercq points out, an essential part of the ethic of every vocation, and of that of the university teacher and research worker among others.

Leclercq was not of course arguing that we should pursue knowledge as a service to the community as an alternative to pursuing it for its own sake. He was saying that we should do both at once. And the third thing to be said about the claims of the practical men on the university is that there is in fact no necessary contradiction between these claims and the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. What we teach in the universities is, as Newman said, not a 'disembodied' knowledge of some quite general kind. It is particular branches of knowledge such as medicine, or law, or languages, or chemistry or engineering, all of which are at least remotely and many very closely related to the needs of particular vocations. It is an advantage to the teacher that the teaching which he gives as a means of intellectual training should also have vocational value, for this adds point and interest. Most of us would have few students in our classes if we offered them nothing beyond the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. A university might almost be defined as a place where intellectual training is given on a basis of vocational interest. On the other hand it is an advantage to the practical man that vocational training should be given in the special atmosphere of a university, coupled with an interest in knowledge for its own sake. The appointments boards of British universities will tell you today

that good employers—firms or public authorities which are known to offer a worth-while career—are not much interested in the pure technician, the trained seal who has learnt the tricks of some trade and nothing more. What they want is the man or woman who is in the fullest sense a university graduate; one who is adaptable and resourceful and progressive because he has acquired a wide culture and the ability to judge from general principles, has pursued some discipline deeply enough to know what a high standard of intellectual achievement means, and has learnt to appreciate the dynamism of knowledge and the way in which the map of knowledge grows.

With research it is the same story. We in the universities find again and again that the projects that are interesting as a pure contribution to knowledge lie in fields such as economics, or political studies, or pure or applied science, where they are of at least indirect and may be of great direct value to practical men. And the practical men in their turn have come to appreciate that fundamental research of the kind carried on in universities is the essential foundation for many of their own most practical concerns. Sometimes they have discovered that it pays to carry over the university approach even into their own offices and laboratories. W. F. Whyte refers in *Organization Man* to a survey of American industrial laboratories, to find which had the best record in terms of distinguished research workers and profitable research. It turned out that even from this strictly practical point of view the laboratories which did best were those which contained a large element of the pure pursuit of knowledge.

In saying that the claims of the practical man, interested in knowledge as a capital good, need not clash with the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, I am not of course denying that such clashes often arise in practice. Sometimes they arise out of an apparent clash of ideas and doctrines, as where the work of the university teacher or researcher seems to contradict political principles or the practical conclusions of business experience, or even the doctrines of the Church itself. Of such clashes one need only say what Newman said a century ago. Newman took the strongest case of all, that where science seems to conflict with revelation. By all means, he says, be tactful; do not rashly cause scandal or antagonism, or teach what is not yet established doctrine as if it were the last word. But above all keep on working and

enquiring. Revelation completes nature but does not contradict it. If we keep working, in good faith, the apparent contradictions will eventually sort themselves out. If this is the right line to take in the most difficult case of all, where two kinds of knowledge derived from different sources seem to conflict, it must *a fortiori* be right also in the much simpler cases where the conflict is between ideas derived from a single source, that of human reason and experience.

Sometimes, on the other hand, the practical and the university man clash not so much over ideas as over methods. University people are much given to discussing the cases, found in many countries in recent years, in which politicians or business men have failed to understand the conditions that a university needs to do its work. We might more gracefully on occasion remind ourselves that we too have often been at fault. University people can be very conservative, and are often rather slow to appreciate the needs of other sections of the community or to adapt their teaching or research to them, even when this involves no real clash with the ideal of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. A good many years ago now, Dr Abraham Flexner wrote an excellent book on universities in Britain, America, and Germany. As a good American, he proceeded to give his own country the works, particularly over the tendency of some American universities to go too far in adapting to the needs of practical men. As a supreme example of this, he quoted the title of a master's thesis recently accepted by the University of Chicago, 'A Time and Motion Comparison on Four Methods of Dish-Washing'. I have not actually read this thesis, and it may for all I know have been as ghastly as Dr Flexner says it was. But I wonder. Le Corbusier and others, inside and outside the universities—it is significant how often this kind of thing has to be done from *outside*—have shown that the study of machines for living in, even down to such details as time and motion study in the kitchen, can be not only a practical but an intensely absorbing and instructive intellectual pursuit. Stresemann's famous thesis on the bottled beer trade was, I am told, as neat a bit of sociology as a board of examiners has ever approved. I note among recent reputable publications in Britain an article on the trade in used tin cans in Nigeria, which sociologically speaking is most revealing: also a book by a former member of my own department that

uses the vicissitudes of the village football club in a North Wales parish to light up, not only the proper behaviour for parish councillors, but also the whole question of the rôle of conflict in the community. I suspect that Flexner's judgment was the expression not so much of genuine academic standards as of an over-conservative temperament; tinged, perhaps, with that reluctance, which has also long been a mark of the more conservative people in universities, to take women or women's affairs seriously.

I have said that we in the universities have a right to use our particular talent to the full by pursuing knowledge both for its own sake, as a consumer good, and as a capital good for the use of the community; also that there is no necessary conflict between these two ends. Now comes the question, how much freedom can we claim in pursuing these ends, and how much control must we accept from the rest of the community?

I shall answer this question once again from a general principle, applicable to everyone who works and not only to those who work in universities. I mean the principle, a standard one in textbooks on management, that authority should be commensurate with responsibility. The bigger the decisions that a man has to take, the greater should be the authority, or discretion, or freedom—I do not mind which word you use—allowed to him in making them. Responsibility is difficult to measure, particularly in managerial or professional jobs where results are not easy to tie down. But a good rough guide, the job evaluation experts are beginning to find, is the so-called 'time-span of responsibility'. The greater the time that must elapse before a man's results can be checked, the greater, other things being equal, is his responsibility. Watch a girl doing a simple assembly job in a factory; you can be sure that if she makes mistakes they will be noted in a few minutes, or at most perhaps in an hour or two. She has little responsibility, and needs correspondingly little authority. Go into the managing director's office in the same plant, and you find a man whose decisions may show results only after two, five, or ten years; his responsibility is great and long-range, and his authority and discretion must be great as well. We also, in the universities, are used to making decisions of very long range. A university teacher's results can be checked, by way of his students' examinations, only after anything from a year to seven or eight

years. The university research worker's results may show their full significance only after five, ten, or fifteen years, perhaps even after a generation or more, when he himself is retired or dead. Our responsibility is great, and we can claim an authority and discretion and freedom that are great as well.

But the freedom that we can claim is not unlimited. To listen to some university people talking about the autonomy of the university, one would think that we in the universities were exempt from original sin. I have been a student and teacher in universities for a quarter of a century, and any impression I might have had of the primeval innocence of myself and my colleagues died long ago. Without being unduly nationalistic, I think I can claim that British universities stand as high as any in the world both for intellectual achievement and for the moral quality of those who work in them. Yet whenever we British university people look at our own face in the glass, the reflection we get back seems as bloated and leprous as that of the mirror in *Dorian Grey*. Fifty years ago John Cornford, of Cambridge University, in his little masterpiece the *Microcosmographia Academica*, held up the mirror to the politics in his own university. No one has ever pictured better the pettiness and self-seeking and malice of faculty politics, or their basic conservatism; their great principle, as Cornford says, that nothing should ever be done for the first time. A generation later Bruce Truscot, better known to many of us as Professor Allison Peers of Liverpool University, held up the mirror to some of our newer colleges, established in the last hundred years. In *Red-Brick University* he brought out particularly the slovenliness of much university life; the sloppy lectures, the intellectual sloth, the dishonesty of the professor who takes a comfortable salary and uses his time to cultivate his roses rather than his intellect. (That one hit me hard: I have two hundred roses). I came across the other day, in Lessius's *De Justitia et Jure*, a passage that suggests that this problem may go back some way. Have you ever noticed, says the worthy professor of Louvain, that the more learned a man is, the bigger the salary he gets, and yet the less he works? Then, after the second world war, came Sir Walter Moberly, speaking with all the authority of a chairman of the University Grants Committee, a position that gives more opportunity than any other in Britain to know what is going on throughout the university world. In his *Crisis in the University*

Moberly underlines especially the sectionalism of modern university life; its lack of a common philosophy or of real personal contact and community. To round the story off, a year or two ago Kingsley Amis, a lecturer in my own university, portrayed in *Lucky Jim* the mean and petty misfortunes that may dog the career of an Assistant Lecturer under the miserable tyranny of professors like myself. We have five colleges in the University of Wales, and I do not happen to belong to the one of which he writes. But I am told by those who do that his portraits are quite recognizable.

There is no need to pile on the agony. All of us here have worked in universities as students or members of staff, and we know very well that we are as other men are: imperfect, limited, and therefore not fit to be left entirely to ourselves. Yet we have also, rightly and properly, by right of the general principles of administration, a claim to wide freedom and authority. How is this difficult balance between authority and freedom to be resolved?

I do not think that one gets far, in trying to answer this question, by arguing about different sorts of governing body. I have worked in or known well universities controlled by the state, by town councillors (my present university is a case in point), by the Church, or by guilds or convocations of teachers or graduates. The resemblances are more striking than the differences; any of these sorts of governing body can be a great success or a catastrophic failure. The essence of the matter is that, whatever the governing body, the right rule of administration should be observed. This rule can be approached by keeping in mind two simple distinctions. The first is between control that is formal, rigid, and compulsory, or on the other hand informal, by way of persuasion and influence. The second is between control by insiders, who can appreciate a teacher's or research worker's work while it is still in progress, and by outsiders, who judge only when results not only are finished but have had time to be judged in their true colours. And the administrative rule to observe is this; that control of the work of a university teacher or researcher can and should be continuous and detailed in so far as it is by insiders and by way of informal influence, but that control by outsiders, or by way of rigid and formal compulsion, should only be intermittent, and should be general rather than in detail.

The most important body of insiders, the people who usually

stand closest to a university teacher's or researcher's work, consists, of course, of a man's own colleagues in the university itself. Even if they are not familiar with his particular speciality, they are at least aware of the conditions needed for university work, and may be able to make some judgment about his progress. Colleagues in the university do in fact exert close and continuous informal control over one another through common-room gossip, informal contacts at faculty and other meetings, or the exchange of ideas through the learned journals. They also exert formal control at particular points in an academic career; when a student graduates, when he applies for a higher degree, or when he looks for a new appointment.

It is sometimes argued that this formal control should be tighter. Truscot, for instance, argues that there should be no such thing in a university as permanence of tenure. Even the most senior members of staff should be expected at intervals of, say, seven years, to justify themselves before their colleagues, and if they fail to do so should be cast into the outer darkness to weep and gnash their teeth. It is a point of view that must attract much sympathy, for the abuses of permanence of tenure in universities are often great. All of us know the elderly colleague who has been writing a great work for twenty years; and we know very well, as he too does when he is honest with himself, that ten years hence, when he retires, that work will still be no more than a list of chapter headings in the top drawer of his desk. But most of us in the universities feel, and I for one would say rightly, that tighter formal control within the university would bring more dangers than it would be worth. University people often have the worst as well as the best qualities of the guild spirit. Watching the wheels of university administration go round, one is reminded of that re-translation by Sellars and Yeatman, in *1066 and All That*, of a certain passage in Magna Carta: 'That the Barons should not be tried except by a jury of other Barons, who would understand.' There is a basic conservatism at work, a tendency to turn in the same circle and defend established prejudices, which often brings it about that it is just those who stand nearest to a new piece of work who can understand it least. They are experts, well versed in the established ways of thought in their field. For that very reason they are often inclined to smell heresy and incompetence, to tread hard on the small green shoot as it shows above

ground, to treat the good new experimental strain as just one more of the weeds that flourish too abundantly in their students' minds. Tenure, for all its abuses, is the lesser evil. Prescribed courses and directed schemes of research are useful to standardize and rationalize what has already sprung from the initiative of individual teachers and research workers. But they should be used only with the greatest caution to lay down what direction that initiative itself is to take.

What would on the other hand be well worth while is what Moberly recommended in *Crisis in the University*; to tighten colleagues' informal, persuasive control over one another by promoting more personal contact and discussion within the university. It is instructive to read in Newman's *Apologia*, or rather to gather from what it implies, how his own ideas and those of other reformers of the university and the Church made their way through Oxford a century ago. Their spread was helped to some extent by outside pressures. But essentially what happened was that at first one or two, then rather more, then a whole school of active-minded men began to talk, and discuss, and make friends, and influence pupils who presently themselves took up the same themes in their posts in or out of the university. Little by little, as one academic generation succeeded another, the whole atmosphere of the university and of the Church of England was revolutionized. It is a lesson from which we can still learn today.

There remains the question of control over the university by outsiders, such as politicians, business interests, or the Church. These have in common that they stand some distance away from the work of the university. They can judge only by results that have had time to mature and show their full value. For that reason the control they exercise cannot be as close as that of colleagues. Yet control they must have; for the university has a duty to serve them, and they have a right and duty to ascertain that that service is being well performed. The solution would seem to lie in two directions.

First, control even by outsiders can and should be fairly close and continuous in so far as it is informal. Outsiders can and should regularly be given the chance to inform themselves of the work of the university, and to discuss and influence it. In my own university we find that one of the most useful means of doing this is by exploiting the complications of our federal constitution.

We have five colleges, to govern which there are, in addition to a number of purely academic bodies, six courts and six councils made up predominantly of outsiders, Two advantages follow. On the one hand, every interest in the Principality of Wales—the business men, the trade unionists, the town and county councillors, the religious and national leaders, the members of Parliament—finds a voice and can exert an influence through one or more of these bodies and their various sub-committees. Yet on the other hand the constitution is so fantastically complicated that our administrators are kept busy chasing one another round Wales in large fast cars, and have no time to get in my or my colleagues' hair. We have effective representation of outside interests, yet without undue control by them. However, a constitution like ours is a gift of God: not everyone can aspire to it. A more ordinarily available, and still more useful channel of contact with and influence by the community is through a university's past students. This contact may be purely individual, or it may be organized through a convocation or guild of graduates. Either way, the best channel of communication with the community that a university can have is its own alumni, drawn from and, though necessarily rather less so, returning to all classes and occupational groups. Yet another channel is through contacts between members of the teaching or research staff and the various outside groups with which they have a connection either through their work or as citizens or members of a church. Departments of science, especially applied science, should normally have a wide range of contacts in the business community and in some departments of government. Medical departments have their contacts in the hospitals, social science departments in business or public administration or the labour movement, language or history departments in the schools.

But though informal control by the community over the university is essential, it is not sufficient. I come back to the theme that we too, in the universities, have been touched by original sin. Outsiders are qualified to judge us only at intervals, on the basis of results that have had time to mature, and in a general way. Also they can exercise control best—at any rate formal or compulsory control—by way of stimulation rather than of prohibition. There is a whole list of fields—medicine, social science, Oriental studies, African studies, technology—in which outside

pressure in recent years has encouraged British universities to expand to their own as well as the community's great advantage. I would feel much more doubtful about outside pressure to induce a university to discontinue work that the university thought worth while. But with all these reservations, experience shows that it is good for the university, that is for its teachers and research workers, as well as for the community, that they should not always be left the last word about the service they are to render. Authoritative reviews of university affairs on behalf of the community at large, backed with the power to compel, are needed at least from time to time.

My own country's policy as regards such reviews is twofold. First, it is becoming part of our tradition that the whole work of the universities should be reviewed about once in every generation by a Royal Commission, followed if necessary by legislation. We are about due for another review of this kind now. Secondly, less extensive reviews are needed at shorter intervals as a basis for financial grants by the State, and, less important in our case, by private donors. The work of the universities expands and changes, and the value of money falls; one cannot wait a whole generation for a financial review. The practice has come to be that State grants are made for five years; reviews of policy take place once in each quinquennium, towards its end. Grants by private donors are also often fixed, owing not so much to policy as to an accident of our income tax laws, at so much per annum for seven or more years. Five or seven years are a rather short time in the life of a university. Outsiders are often not really in a position to judge of the progress made in so short a time. It has therefore proved useful to pass both State and private grants through bodies which can act to some extent as insiders, keeping in close touch with university affairs and basing their judgments on better information than a business man or civil servant could hope to command by himself. For State grants the chief such body is the University Grants Committee. This is appointed by the Government but made up of senior members or ex-members of university staffs, people therefore who are thoroughly familiar with and sympathetic to university needs. The U.G.C. negotiates on the one hand with the Government on behalf of the universities, and on the other with the universities on behalf of the Government; and in this buffer rôle it has proved very successful indeed. A rather

similar rôle is played in the case of private grants by the great Foundations, such as Nuffield or Rockefeller, which transmit donations to the universities with more inside knowledge of university affairs than the donors themselves could expect to have. As a further safeguard against the misdirection of the universities' policy through short-term judgments by the outsiders who supply their finance, university staffs enjoy by custom and constitution certain personal and corporate rights. Decisions on education and research, in so far as they do not involve new finance, are entirely in their hands, and after two or three years' probation they enjoy in the great majority of appointments full security of tenure. A lecturer was once dismissed from a college of my own university for a political act; in the interests of Welsh nationalism he attempted to burn an establishment of the Royal Air Force, for which he was sentenced to a term in jail. After a decent interval he was reappointed in the same grade in my own college. But short of arson or adultery we sleep secure in our appointments. And in these days even adultery, unless perhaps with a student, is not much of a bar.

British universities are now financed overwhelmingly by the State, either directly through the U.G.C. or indirectly through State and local authority grants to students; the local authority grants in turn being largely paid for out of grants to these authorities by the State. Even with the precautions I have mentioned, many people in our universities are worried, at least slightly, lest this combination of overwhelming financial dependence on the State with reviews of university policy, on behalf of the State, at rather short intervals may lead to rash judgments and misguided policies. I cannot find much evidence that anything has gone badly wrong as yet. But it certainly might; politicians are led easily into temptation. One way out is of course to seek more private donations. Another, which we as a Catholic organization might be particularly well placed to explore, would be to extend family allowances so as to enable students or their families in all social classes to pay the full cost of their university career without State aid.

I have listed some of the devices used to secure the right amount of control or influence over the universities by outsiders. But I have deliberately not gone too far into them, for I do not want to give the impression that constitutional gimmicks can supply all

or even the main part of the answer. They are useful, but nothing like the whole story. The devices I have mentioned work, on the whole, very well in Britain, not because they are foolproof, but because they have been made to work well and skilfully in the past, and people now have confidence in them and are willing to keep on working them. A few years ago an American committee studied the British system of State grants to universities, including the University Grants Committee, and concluded that the U.G.C. is not for export. They did not, of course, mean that it would be impossible to set up the same sort of machinery elsewhere. They meant rather that the smooth running of the U.G.C. and the respect that British politicians and university people feel for it are based not on its constitutional perfection, but on years of successful experience in the past. And this experience cannot be improvised in a new country overnight.

But, if, in that case, the solution of the problem of the autonomy of the university depends as much and more on experience and skilled management as on constitutional tricks, on whom does the responsibility for this management chiefly rest? A modern university is the centre of a vast web of interests, into which every section of the community is caught up; to all of them the university owes a service, and all have a right to some voice in its affairs. But the vast majority of these interests are concerned with only one aspect of university life. The business man sees one angle, the politician another, the bishop a third. In the whole of the community there is only one group which stands at the centre of university affairs and can oversee and plan for them all, and that is the group of full-time members of university teaching, research and administrative staffs. On these, therefore, rests the chief responsibility for seeing that the relations between the university and the rest of the community are set up and worked for the common good of both. University staffs must be prepared to go in for politics; certainly for university politics, perhaps for other kinds as well.

That, to many of us in the universities, is an unwelcome conclusion. To anyone who is not by temperament a committee-sitter, it is a great temptation to leave university politics to those who like that kind of thing. No one has ever stated that temptation better than Cornford in the book I just mentioned. He presents us first with what he calls the Young Man in a Hurry:

newly appointed, full of fresh ideas, and naively convinced that he has only to state a reasonable case for action to follow forthwith. He is snubbed, his toes are trodden on, he comes at last to understand that in a university nothing is ever done until it is too late, and the time has come to do something else. Then, somewhere in early middle age, when the iron is entering into his soul, the devil comes and whispers in his ear, offering, according to the Young Man's character, either of two equally devilish paths. To the sea-lawyer and committee-sitter he offers the path of power, to the exclusion of true humanity and scholarship. Such a man, says Cornford, will become complacent, and in his turn an oppressor. He will be a powerful person himself. The toes he has trodden on will be as the sands on the seashore, and from far below him will mount the roar of a ruthless multitude of Young Men in a Hurry. 'You may perhaps', says Cornford, 'grow to be aware of what they are in a hurry to do. They are in a hurry to get you out of the way.'

But to the scholar the devil offers a subtler bait. He has only, the devil says, to retire to the 'silent, reasonable, world, where the only action is thought, and thought is free from fear'. And there he will find peace, and no one will wish him out of the way.

The temptation either way is a great one; but it must be resisted. Let us have by all means some specialization of scholars and administrators. But in the last resort it is only if the scholar remains something of an administrator, and the administrator something of a scholar, that the universities can be well run or their relation to the community correct. For it is these staff members alone, as I have said, who are in a position to see the university and all its problems and relationships as a whole and to steer them right. And if they too shut themselves up in specialized, partial views, who shall replace them? For all of us in the university the motto must be that the price of freedom is an everlasting sense of responsibility *for* our universities and *in* and *to* the community as a whole.