

should be the expected result. It is not that Thomists have become Wittgensteinians, or vice versa, but that common truths are acknowledged. Finally, one is simply doing philosophy but in a way that relates the present to the past as contemporary philosophers sometimes seek not to do. That is, one who philosophizes out of the Catholic tradition will be alive to the chronological chauvinism and other arbitrary narrowings that can characterize philosophy at a give time and place. For example, he is not likely to share the view that philosophy began only a decade or two ago, when a linguistic turn was taken, say. For all that, he should enter into the fray with gusto.

What is the fly in this unction? Once there were graduate programs which systematically prepared people in Thomism. They are no more. Bare ruined choirs where late the sweet bird sang. When an undergraduate asks where he might pursue graduate studies in Thomas Aquinas, what do you tell him? Thomism is in diaspora. We cannot take it for granted that it will be passed on as their patrimony to students in Catholic colleges and universities. The first place where the thought of Thomas has to be made known is in Catholic institutions. For the foreseeable future, students of Thomas will be largely autodidacts. But then, to a great extent both Maritain and Gilson taught themselves Thomism, so perhaps this is not all bad. Provided we are blessed with a few minds of their calibre, that is.

## Hayden Ramsay

In recounting something of the family history of Thomism John Haldane describes the fruitfulness of various tensions: that between textual interpretation and the application of ideas to contemporary problems, dialogue with opposing schemes of thought, synthesis with the best aspects of alternatives. These are, of course, also the marks of a living religious tradition, and it is worth reflecting on the relations of Thomism and neo-Thomism to the religious tradition it so clearly underpins. First, however, I want to say something about Haldane's appeal for an 'analytic Thomism', and in particular the implications of this for moral philosophy.

Haldane encourages Thomists to profit from the insights of other philosophies; and since the current Thomist revival has been conducted largely through dialogue with philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition, he rightly sees analytic thought as the most promising avenue.

However, analytic Thomists cannot be complacent about this. After all, the previous generation of Thomists was trained to combat the spectres of idealism, materialism and positivism then associated with analyticity, and leading Thomists today such as John Paul II work within quite different traditions, e.g. phenomenology. Thus there is still something of a professional fight for analytic thinkers to win if they want their tradition to dominate Thomism. Why do Anglo-American philosophers think they should play the key role in any Thomist revival?

Analytic philosophy came about as a result of idealist challenges to realism and rationality. The British preference for empiricism, careful reasoning and open debate was briefly suppressed by neo-Hegelians such as Green, Bosanquet and Bradley. Bradley in particular scored some direct hits at metaphysics, theory of mind and the favourite British pastime of epistemology. The work begun by Moore and Russell to combat this idealism succeeded not only in this but in revitalising professional philosophy, encouraging research into historical texts and forging new links with logic, mathematics, science, linguistics, psychology, and to some extent law, politics and art. Ironically, an enterprise which started by engaging with other disciplines, history and broader social life then grew rapidly into a rather smug and self-satisfied concern with meaning and correct usage; two generations of undergraduates were trained in techniques for sharp, clear thinking but it was all a bit like the playing of Kreisler and the singing of Melba: bravura stuff that no one but an eccentric could find a life or waste a passion upon.

Some would say it is not modern philosophy's purpose to ground real human lives: after 2,500 years philosophy is too technically advanced to turn back to the original questions of reality, knowledge, human good, beauty; to do so would risk infantilising our debates, losing too much of what has already been achieved. Instead, we should follow the present argument wherever it goes, shut out all 'external' considerations, and if necessary embrace what less enlightened thinkers would have rejected as false, nonsense or evil. However, as Haldane argues, and as John Paul teaches in *Fides et Ratio*, the systems of professional philosophers are answerable to the human capacity for philosophical enquiry and the universal need for philosophical answers. To avoid self-obsessed analytic philosophy we need something like a philosophy of philosophy, on-going meta-enquiry into what we are all doing in the first place. Some version of this is no doubt what postmodernism attempts, but decades before this, British analytic philosophers had turned to Aristotle and the Greek tradition as a model of philosophical reflection on the place of philosophy within a human

life. The revitalisation of analytic thought that started with Anscombe, Kenny, Williams *et al* teaching and researching Aristotle now embraces Aquinas and the medieval tradition. Unsurprisingly, analytic Thomist thinkers are keen to persuade their Thomist colleagues to join them.

This brief history suggests that the (re?)-emergence of Thomism in analytic thought is a distinct historical development from its revitalisation after *Aeterni Patris* via Maritain, Gilson and others. Thomism's sudden popularity in analytic schools rides on the back of the Aristotelian and Greek revival started in the 1950s as a corrective to the philosophy of the war years, itself a corrective to the neo-Hegelianism that succeeded Kantianism and the classic debates of the British empiricists and the continental rationalists. If this is right, then as well as recommending analytic thought within the revival of Thomism, analytic philosophers ought also to study the role Thomism is playing in reviving analytic philosophy, opening it up again to the broader academic and popular worlds. Analytic Thomists should be seeking to win over their analytic colleagues to Thomism—something perhaps more urgent than winning Thomists to analyticity.

Nevertheless, Haldane's hope is to convert some Thomists to his view. What does 'reformed' analytic thought, Anglo-American philosophy after the Greek-Medieval revitalisation, still have to offer Thomists? First, it is generally anti-idealist, and so (despite an earlier transcendentalist turn) is Thomism. In fact, Thomistic realism means we should expect to have a number of surprising bedfellows in coming years: with the feminists we take the body seriously, with the Kantians we believe in virtue, freedom grounded on moral law, and moral absolutes, and with many analytic philosophers we believe in natural kinds, objective knowledge, rational principles and ethical cognitivism. The fact that we must say 'many analytical philosophers' is a reminder that analytic philosophy is still sufficiently mainstream to constitute not a particular school of thought but a general method of philosophical thinking found throughout Western philosophical culture; thus some who pursue the analytic ideals of rigour, argument and proof will diverge from the 'core' analytic commitments to realism, objectivism and cognitivism.

A second worthwhile feature of analytic thought is its respect for the union of faithful interpretation of texts and application of ideas to contemporary problems—something which, as Haldane argues, also represents Thomism at its best. Analytic philosophy's strong commitments to argument through texts and philosophical solutions to urgent problems in the world are extremely close to the Thomist agenda. Aquinas's own thought jumps off from the required reading of the day

and the new texts of Aristotle, and with these he debates such burning issues of the thirteenth century as the eternity of the world, the nature of the intellect and the relation of philosophy to doctrine; his followers too have read (his) texts with scrupulous care while contributing to the solution of problems extending from medieval debates over voluntarism and nominalism to modern debates over war and euthanasia.

One particular reason why modern analytic philosophers owe gratitude to Thomists—and other Aristotelians—concerns moral philosophy. Despite fairly distinguished contributions to ethics from Moore, Ross and Pritchard, Russell started a tradition of condescension towards ethics which carried British moral philosophy to the depths of Ayer's positivism and the sterility of the period that culminated with Hare. With some honourable exceptions, including some good historical commentary (e.g. Paton on Kant), metaethics exhibited practically no progress in the first half of the century, normative ethics disputed half-baked deontological and utilitarian theories, and applied ethics just ceased. With Foot's first rate attacks on Hare and Anscombe's occasional papers the ethical revival of the '70s and '80s was initiated and with it the surprising new popularity of 'Catholic' moral ideas. Thomist moral philosophers who 'borrow' from analytic ethics today still risk buying into a linguistic ethics or a liberal/utilitarian philosophy still found in some universities. Of course we should join (and try to win!) debates with colleagues; but we should recognise that in using 'the insights of analytic ethics' Thomists may well be promoting ethical concepts and arguments originally imported *from Thomism into* secular, analytic ethics, e.g., virtue, conscience, theory of action, human goods, absolute norms.

This suggests another point. For Thomist moral philosophers, ethics is completed in moral theology; for Thomist philosophers in general, though their discipline's autonomy means they need know no theology to pursue the truth, the results of their researches must not contradict revelation; this would be a *reductio* of the research. Now, this does not sit well with the anti-religious bias of analytic philosophy. As many of us know, religious thought, in which is often included Thomist philosophical thought, is unwelcome in many academies. This dogmatic atheism is, of course, something to be challenged and changed, but it is also a reason for Thomists to have some scepticism of 'the analytic school'. If a serious dialogue is to be attempted, an understanding of the nature of revelation and the relation of faith to reason, doctrine to philosophy, has to be communicated to other analytic philosophers so that they can respect the Thomist enterprise. As Haldane says, modern Catholic philosophy has often demonstrated low intellectual standards;

to change this perception requires teaching others honestly what it is that we do and do not believe, not leaving them with the impression that faith is a matter of irrational and incommunicable 'personal belief' or a mere 'underpinning narrative' of the real philosophy.

In *Fides et Ratio* the Pope writes that Catholics may build upon various systems of thought such as Asian and African philosophies. Thomism has no monopoly on truth; the Church has no philosophy of her own. There is a danger, however, of analytic philosophers believing that their framework can deal sufficiently with everything, that no other system has anything to offer; hence the image of the TV philosopher pontificating on everything from political economy to philosophy of physics, NATO to birth control. Thomists should not be seduced by this vision of the professional philosopher; we have a clear picture of the proper place of philosophy: autonomous, but intimately tied to theology in its search for truth. Most Thomists, medieval philosophers and Catholic ethicists are notable for the rigour and courage of their arguments; they should continue in this analytic endeavour, and in dialogue with the best of secular thought, but they should be wary of analytic philosophy as a system that can inhibit religious thought and belittle the general human urge to philosophical enquiry which is Thomism's starting point.

## Nicholas Rescher

Dissent is a prime mover of philosophical work. Committed to the cultivation of truth, we philosophers have a penchant for pursuing our ends by way of explanations of how the others have got it wrong. On this basis, John Haldane's superb lecture was something of a disappointment to me because I can find in it so little with which I disagree. From its magisterial initial exposition of the historical background to its wise concluding recommendation of a constructive engagement between Thomism and analytic philosophy, the lecture's forceful and cogent discussion of the issues enlists my admiration and approbation. Such caveats as I have relate at most to matters of emphasis.

What is it that a productive philosopher of one era can derive from one of an earlier day? There are many possibilities here. The principal sorts of things for which our own work can be indebted to a predecessor include: