

unravels complicated arguments from about 1250 to 1350 over issues in philosophical psychology: in particular, bringing the positions of Peter John Olivi (c. 1248–98) and William Ockham (c.1285–1347) to bear on the Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas (who died in 1274). Etienne Gilson, from the 1920s onwards, taught one generation after another to believe that one way of combating the modern assumption that what we know directly are the data provided by our senses or some other representation in our heads of things out there, is to return to the premodern philosophy of Aquinas. He asks, for example, whether what we know are things themselves or our representations of them, and comes down firmly in favour of the former (e.g. *Summa Theologiae* 1a., 85. 2). With his Aristotelian thesis that, in thinking, our minds take on the form of the external object of our thought, Aquinas has no gap between the world out there and the world as pictured in our heads. Robert Pasnau's research undermines this story. He shows convincingly that, in his early writings, Aquinas's account of acts of knowing focuses on a relationship to some object internal to the mind (pp. 200–208). While allowing us space to argue for development, Pasnau himself maintains that, even in his mature theory, though 'subtle and interesting', Aquinas 'shares the presupposition, characteristic of seventeenth century philosophy, that the immediate and direct objects of cognitive apprehension are our internal impressions' (p. 293). Pasnau hopes, indeed, that this book will put an end to the story propagated by Richard Rorty as well as Gilson. In an appendix on 'the identity of knower and known', he contends that the significance of the thesis is 'neither as striking nor as mysterious as Aquinas's students often claim' (pp. 295–305). For once, then, a book that should engage analytical philosophers as well as medievalists, not to mention Thomists of whatever persuasion: a good deal of detailed discussion of texts would be required to refute Pasnau and save Aquinas's mature theory of knowledge from incipient 'Cartesianism'. Funnily enough, Olivi and Ockham turn out to be the ones who reject any account of thought that postulates mythical inner representations that mediate between our cognitive acts and the objects of these acts in the external world.

SANCTIFY THEM IN THE TRUTH: HOLINESS EXEMPLIFIED
by Stanley Hauerwas *T&T Clark* Edinburgh, 1998, Pp. 267,
£14.95 pb.

Stanley Hauerwas teaches theological ethics at Duke University, North Carolina, and is to give the Gifford Lectures in the year 2000–2001 at the University of St Andrews. This substantial collection of essays appears in the 'series of short

(sic) books specially commissioned by the editors of *The Scottish Journal of Theology*: the four lectures actually delivered in Aberdeen, as required by the invitation, have been supplemented by ten more together with a handful of sermons. His liking for paradox comes out, for example, in the sermon for 'Reformation Sunday' in his local Methodist church: instead of celebrating Protestant liberation from works righteousness, papal autocracy, etc., as the occasion invites, he points out that 'at least Catholics have the magisterial office of the Bishop of Rome to remind them that disunity is a sin' (p. 242). It may be excessive to regard keeping Jesuits, Dominicans and Franciscans within the same church as 'amazing'; but he is surely right that, traditionally at least, being in communion with one another means, for Catholics, something deeper than simply holding a certain set of beliefs. 'How much of this do we have to believe?', Hauerwas says, is the typically Protestant question to Christian tradition. 'Look at all the wonderful stuff we get to believe!' is the Catholic attitude, he says, again rightly, no doubt, but not so common as it once was. In the Aberdeen lectures, Hauerwas undermines a wellknown story about theological ethics based on natural law and theological ethics based on the Cross by showing how close Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther are in their understandings of the Decalogue (pp. 37–59). The second lecture prefers Augustine to liberal protestant accounts of sin (pp. 61–74). The third defends 'peasant Catholicism' against modernist notions of the self (pp. 77–91). The fourth insists that Christians have to be pacifists (pp. 177–190). All the way through, Hauerwas converses with Barth, Alasdair MacIntyre, the Niebuhr brothers, and many other colleagues and friends (some listed on p. 9). He writes of Herbert McCabe's *Law, Love and Language* (1968, US edition: *What is Ethics All About?*) as 'one of the genuinely great books written in ethics over the past fifty years': 'That it has been overlooked and ignored says much more about our context than it does about the importance and profundity of McCabe's book' (p. 54 footnote). In these and scores of other ways, these essays display the incisiveness and originality of one of the most indispensable voices in current theological debate (like the accent or hate it!).

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