

The real issue in the clash between revisionist and orthodox historians has been an attempt to establish blame: who caused the cold war? On this issue Gaddis has a dual position. He leads his readers to believe that he has gone beyond this quarrel: "The Cold War is too complicated an event to be discussed in terms of either national guilt or the determinism of inevitability" (p. 360). He tells his audience, "If one must assign responsibility for the Cold War, the most meaningful way to proceed is to ask which side had the greater opportunity to accommodate itself, at least in part, to the other's position given the range of alternatives as they appeared at the time" (p. 360). It was the Soviets, according to Gaddis, who had the greater range of alternatives. Consequently, Stalin, because of the very nature of the Soviet system, had *more* options available than the United States did. Gaddis finds the "Russian dictator" immune to the domestic pressures that American policy-makers faced. He concludes that this narrowness in options for American leaders left the United States with little choice, and little responsibility. Furthermore, although Gaddis's argument takes into account the impact of Soviet actions on U.S. policy, it does not examine in the same light or with any thoroughness the impact of American actions on Soviet foreign policy.

Hence, it appears to me that ultimately this logic is successful only as a restatement of the orthodox argument. As an attempt "to go beyond revisionism" it has not succeeded. The reader finds no new facts or interpretations. The work is not a synthesis, and it reinforces the argument that the United States was less responsible than the Soviet Union in initiating the cold war. Although it is a fine and integrated coverage of the period, the book offers no new conceptual framework, and once again we have not been taken beyond either orthodoxy or revisionism.

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THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL DISPUTE. By *Tai Sung An*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973. 254 pp. \$8.95.

REALIGNMENT OF WORLD POWER: THE RUSSO-CHINESE SCHISM UNDER THE IMPACT OF MAO TSE-TUNG'S LAST REVOLUTION. 2 vols. By *Oton Ambroz*. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1972. Vol. 1: xxx, 338 pp. Vol. 2: 406 pp. \$25.00.

Both of these books combine carefully documented history with responsible speculation about the troubled relationship between Moscow and Peking. *The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute* examines the background of the border problem, its exacerbation since the fighting along the Ussuri River in 1969, and the possibility that it will lead to war. An appendix containing English translations of Russo-Chinese treaties and protocols from 1689 through 1915 is of sufficient interest by itself to warrant buying the book, despite occasional inconsistencies in transliteration.

The author contends, "The Sino-Soviet conflict, which began as an ideological dispute in 1960, has degenerated into a nationalistic clash based on territorial issues." He comments that some Soviet "hawks" might like to launch a preventive attack against China, before Peking acquires a large arsenal of ICBMs. Even so, "In large measure, the future prospect of war or peace at the Sino-Soviet border

will probably depend more on China than on the Soviet Union, for the territorial claims are all on the Chinese side." Since Moscow enjoys enormous nuclear superiority, An doubts that Peking will attempt any military adventures, and estimates the probability of a Sino-Soviet war in the next decade to be only one in ten.

But An is less consistent than one might wish. He comments in the last chapter, for example, "The territorial issue between China and the Soviet Union is only a sidelight. It can be turned on or off as the overall political climate changes." If this is true, then An's stress on the territorial issue—and perhaps even his belief that the decision for war or peace on the Sino-Soviet border rests primarily with China—would seem to require revision. He presents many useful interpretations of Soviet and Chinese policies, yet never adequately compares the relative importance of the territorial dispute with other factors which influence the formulation of those policies. Although the significance of the border problem is still unclear, An does much to fill a serious gap in our understanding of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

*Realignment of World Power* discusses the effects of the Chinese Cultural Revolution on the two great Communist rivals, the Communist movement, and international relations. Ambroz believes that the Sino-Soviet conflict presents the West with a major opportunity for new initiatives in foreign policy. He argues that the United States can and should take advantage of it to weaken Soviet control over Eastern Europe and to perpetuate the status quo on Taiwan.

Ambroz traces the cause of the Sino-Soviet conflict to power politics: "A weak China is in the interest of Russia as it has been over the centuries" (p. xxviii). After showing the existence of a "strong—and contagious—revisionist faction" in China, he describes the Cultural Revolution as a "Great Purge" of pro-Soviet elements, as well as a power struggle and a succession crisis: "Mao's struggle against the Soviet leadership, now enemy number one, and against his own opposition are interrelated. One of the purposes of the cultural revolution is the fostering and training of the new generation in hostility against the Soviet Union, perpetuation of the present state of affairs, and exclusion of any accommodation in the future" (p. xvii). Ambroz contends that Mao attained his goal, irrevocably precluding a full reconciliation between Moscow and Peking. Thus he attributes the continuing unrest in China to anti-Maoists or even anti-Communists, rather than to the allegedly defunct pro-Soviet faction.

Ambroz deserves much praise for his detailed use of Yugoslav, West German, and Chinese Nationalist accounts, in addition to the more familiar sources. His discussion of the Cultural Revolution lacks coherence, perhaps because the book is longer than it needs to be, but many chapters elucidate specific aspects of that struggle quite well. His prediction that Mao's successors will never restore the Sino-Soviet alliance needs more testing against the evidence than it receives here. The circumstances of Lin Piao's death and other events since the completion of this study suggest that Ambroz may have written the epitaph of the pro-Soviet faction in Peking a bit prematurely. If that faction regains its strength, then the ambitious American foreign policy which Ambroz advocates will have little chance of success.

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