

Charts, Indexes, and Files: Surveillance, Information Management, and the Visualization of Subversion in Mainline Protestantism

Michael J. McVicar

By the hundreds, then thousands, the letters and telegrams rolled into the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Washington, D.C., headquarters and its dozens of field offices across the United States. These communications—by turns desperate, angry, or resigned—sought information about the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America (FCC) and its successor organization, the National Council of Churches (NCC). Before the Second World War, the FCC was the leading ecumenical Protestant body in the United States. It represented nearly thirty-two Protestant denominations, comprising nearly twenty million Christians, committed to ecumenical unity and progressive social reform. In 1950, the NCC emerged as an even more colossal ecumenical body that included over 140,000 churches associated with African American, Orthodox, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Lutheran congregations. With an estimated membership of approximately forty million Americans pastored by 107,000 ministers, the NCC continued the FCC's commitment to social justice and became a lightning rod for popular anti-communist sentiment during the Cold War.

By May 1951, the evolution of the FCC into the NCC prompted members of a Baptist church in West Virginia to send FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover a copy of a chart titled *How Red Is the Federal Council of Churches?* (Figure 1). The large, foldout pamphlet featured an expansive list of FCC-affiliated clergy, and it correlated their names to alleged Communist and subversive groups. The West Virginia Baptists demanded to know if the FCC had “ever been investigated by our government” for Communist activities. “Our church desires this information so that if the Federal Council is in any way connected with communism, we will at once cease to give it our

Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation, Vol. 30, Issue 3, pp. 307–360, ISSN: 1052-1151, electronic ISSN: 1533-8568. © 2020 by The Center for the Study of Religion and American Culture. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the Cambridge University Press's Reprints and Permissions web page, <https://www.cambridge.org/about-us/rights-permissions>. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/rac.2020.13>.



Figure 1: Cover of the pamphlet *How Red Is the Federal Council of Churches?* (Madison, WI: American Council of Christian Laymen, n.d. [1949?]), in the Billy James Hargis Papers MC#1412, box 72, folder 17. Courtesy of the Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.

support.”¹ Beginning in the late 1940s and continuing unabated until the end of the 1960s, letters such as this one flooded into the Bureau. They recounted rumors that the FCC and, later, the NCC represented an unprecedented threat to U.S. national security interests.

Much of this anti-FCC literature was graphical in nature. FBI correspondents described charts, sent graphs, or developed elaborate schematic images designed to encapsulate visually the alleged relationships behind a massive Communist conspiracy at work in American religious institutions. In fact, *How Red Is the Federal Council of Churches?*—the intricate graphic pamphlet sent by the West Virginia Baptists—alone accounted for hundreds of letters to the FBI in the 1950s and the 1960s. As one member of the Disciples of Christ explained to Hoover, “various literature,” such as *How Red* “charge[d] that the Federal Council is ‘modernist’ and, far worse, communist.” A 1958 letter to the Bureau provided an elaborate homemade chart depicting the affiliations of twenty-five clergymen associated with the NCC. Eight columns representing an array of pacifist groups and “Communist ‘peace’ organizations” allowed its

author to “graphically portray the interlocking and overlapping personnel of these groups.” By visually establishing a critical density of connections, the chart forced its author to conclude that the Reverend Edwin T. Dahlberg, the president of the NCC from 1957 through 1960, had affiliations with “sundry” “Communist projects and fronts.” As these graphic indexes of religious subversion proliferated at midcentury, loyal, God-fearing Americans turned to Hoover’s FBI for answers. An exasperated woman from Decatur, Illinois, spoke for many when she reported that her church had “seen a photostat copy of a chart naming our church” as a member of the NCC. Distressed about all of the allegations, she pleaded with Hoover, “We hardly know what to believe. Can you please inform us of the truth[?]”²

This essay explores how these letter writers came to view the FCC and, more broadly, ecumenical mainline Protestantism as a threat to the national security interests of the United States. To investigate this problem, one could focus on theological issues such as intellectual battles between fundamentalist and modernist Protestants. A different scholar might emphasize sociological issues embodied in the growing rural-urban divide in the United States. Still another path could map the hierarchical split between professional clergy and laypeople in many churches. In contrast to these approaches, this essay takes a different track. It focuses on three interconnected themes: first, the rise of the national security surveillance establishment in the United States; second, the development of new methods of information management in corporate and state bureaucracies; and, third, changes in popular visual culture in the immediate aftermath of World War I. This essay uses these three themes to situate the midcentury letters to Hoover and his G-men in a complex narrative that highlights how a network of federal bureaucrats, business leaders, and average citizens learned to visualize mainline, ecumenical Protestantism as a subversive threat to American national security. The emphasis on the *visual* here is deliberate. This essay argues that the public perception of mainline Protestantism was, in part, a function of corporate and state surveillance mechanisms that, in the literal sense of *surveillance*, attempted to *see* subversion through a number of visualization schemes and bureaucratic mechanisms that became common in the early twentieth century.

To understand how mainline Protestantism emerged as a subversive threat to national security, this essay explores a network of countersubversive institutions that emerged in American culture during the early twentieth century. Here, the essay follows the insights of political theorist Michael Paul Rogin, who argued that a

“countersubversive tradition” has dominated North American culture since before the foundation of the Republic.³ “Fearing chaos and secret penetration,” Rogin argued, “the countersubversive interprets local initiatives as signs of alien power. Discrete individuals and groups become, in the countersubversive imagination, members of a single political body directed by its head.”⁴ The countersubversive tradition “defines itself against alien threats to the American way of life and sanctions violent and exclusionary practices against them.” For Rogin, the countersubversive tradition combines fear of very real political threats against the status quo with hyperbolic and fantastic symbolic representations of subversion in literature and visual art.⁵

This essay adopts Rogin’s concept of the “countersubversive tradition” as a heuristic for exploring how mainline, ecumenical Protestantism came to be *seen* as a subversive threat. It focuses on circuits created between mundane visual and technical media used to detect and record secret, clandestine, or phantasmagoric subversive threats and, in turn, publicize the constructed “fact” of their existence in the American body politic. Situated in the immediate wake of the Great War, this essay explores how the surveillance techniques of antiecumenical countersubversives initially emerged in elite governmental, military, and business circles in the very heart of America’s power structures.⁶ By midcentury, this countersubversive sentiment crept out into American popular culture as amateur countersubversive hobbyists extended the surveillance of mainline subversion beyond the halls of power and into living rooms, pulpits, church basements, and high school gymnasias across the country.

To outline this relationship between the countersubversion tradition and mainline Protestantism, this essay explores three interrelated cultural trends and situates them in an emerging historiographic framework in American religious history that has seen scholars take a simultaneous interest in corporations and the national security establishment.⁷ First, it considers the increasing public acceptance of political surveillance by *both* state *and* corporate actors.⁸ Situated against the backdrop of the decline of the Progressive era and the outbreak of the Great War, the essay considers the rise of America’s aggressive vigilant and voluntary associations that pressed federal bureaucrats, law enforcement agents, and average citizens into the service of an expanding network of surveillance mechanisms designed to scrutinize the political loyalties of American citizens and newly arrived immigrants.⁹

Next, the essay explores how these new mechanisms of political surveillance had their roots in scientific business management practices and associated techniques of collecting, collating, classifying, and preserving vast archives of information.¹⁰

In this sense, this essay follows the so-called business turn in American religious history while also expanding this “turn” beyond a focus on specific business leaders and corporations to explore the practices, techniques, and infrastructure used in corporate bureaucracies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.¹¹ The essay argues that epistemic assumptions drawn from the business world shaped rank-and-file Protestant perceptions of society in novel and mostly unexplored ways. Thus, this essay focuses on filing techniques, information management, and new visual forms that had their roots in innovative bureaucratic schemes that emerged in corporations and government offices in the early part of the twentieth century.¹²

Finally, the essay examines how surveillance and scientific management fused in the visual tools developed by business managers to facilitate increased efficiency through rigorous oversight by mapping complex social relationships. Consequently, the essay moves away from the typical focus in religious history and religious studies on representational and symbolic forms of art—paintings, prints, and figurative ephemera—to abstract forms of visual representation embodied in the organizational chart. This graphic form emerged with the development of new bureaucratic and corporate structures of social organization in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.¹³ Although it might be tempting to find the root of visualizations of dangerous social actors in earlier religious media such as the prophecy diagrams and biblical timelines popularized by Millerites and Fundamentalists in the mid-1800s through the early 1900s, this essay argues for a different genealogy.¹⁴ Whereas Millerite charts, for example, focused on eschatological understandings of the present in terms of an imagined future in conversation with history recorded in Scripture, the charts and graphs described in this essay relied on the epistemologies of state and corporate bureaucracies to make sense of the political and social realities of the present.¹⁵ The circuits of information exchange embodied in the charts, indexes, and file systems discussed in this essay created links between political and religious actors and provided ways for critics of ecumenical Protestantism to project these constructed past relationships into the future with a certain amount of predictive confidence—even if they proved entirely fictitious.¹⁶

To explore these circuits of surveillance, archiving, and exposing, the following three sections of this essay are heuristically organized around the concepts of charts, indexes, and files. In the interest of narrative coherence, each of the sections emphasizes an exemplary user of the titular technology and the associated techniques they refined. The division, however, is artificial in the

sense that the techniques discussed in each section are irreducibly intertwined with the themes of surveillance, information management, and visualization outlined in this introduction.

Charts: Visualizing Interlocking Directorates

Before diving into the complex visualization schemes used to comprehend the alleged Communist infiltration of the FCC and NCC, we first must take a detour through the offices of the U.S. War Department's Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) in Washington, D.C. In 1923, Lucia Ramsey Maxwell, a librarian at CWS, created an elaborate chart purporting to document the influence of the "Social-Pacifist Movement" on the Women's Joint Congressional Committee (WJCC) and the National Council for the Prevention of War. Divided into three vertical rows, the chart connected fourteen national organizations—including the National League of Women Voters, the Girls' Friendly Society, the Needlework Guild of America, the Women's Christian Temperance Union, and the Young Women's Christian Association—with a dizzying network of intersecting horizontal, diagonal, and vertical lines (Figure 2). From this web of interconnected organizations emerged a massive conspiracy of suffragists, pacifists, liberal Protestants, and women's rights activists all working in concert to undermine the military readiness of the United States.

Recognizing the incendiary implications of her chart, Maxwell maintained tight control over the original handmade copy. "[A]t times," one of her friends recalled, she showed the chart "to various persons in the patriotic societies at Washington. Finally, someone asked to borrow the original chart, and rather than lend it, Mrs. Maxwell permitted a photostat to be made, of which there were several copies." From this handful of photostatic copies, Maxwell's chart spread throughout the War Department and Justice Department. After copying the chart, Maxwell sent the original copy to President Warren G. Harding, "who kept it in his desk until his death" in 1923. Upon reviewing one of its photostatic copies, a young Justice Department bureaucrat named J. Edgar Hoover enthused, "One can gain more in my estimation from examination of such a chart than he can from reading voluminous reports dealing with the same subject."¹⁷ Soon copies found their ways into the hands of likeminded leaders of countersubversive groups outside the federal bureaucracy.

Maxwell's chart might have faded into bureaucratic obscurity had industrialist and automobile manufacturer Henry Ford not

forefront of domestic politics.¹⁸irate women's groups demanded that the *Independent* retract the publication, while the WJCC hired private detectives to track down the anonymous authors of the chart and the accompanying article. Reprinted versions of Maxwell's chart appeared in newspapers and pamphlets across the country. The War Department, embarrassed by the public relations debacle caused by the chart, acknowledged Maxwell's role in creating it and ordered copies burned. So-called patriotic societies of the day rushed to preserve copies.¹⁹ The lucky few who possessed one of the early photostats framed them.

Several historians have highlighted the significance of Maxwell's spider-web chart. Most narratives contextualize the chart's production in efforts of the CWS, Military Intelligence Division (MID), and the War Department to protect the rapid expansion of the military during the Great War.²⁰ Military advocates, fueled by the Woodrow Wilson administration's efforts to put the United States on a war footing, warned against subversive elements in the general population. The Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917 compounded these concerns as pacifist-leaning women's groups, labor unions, and progressive religious organizations increasingly drew the ire of countersubversive groups. Historians have pointed to Maxwell's chart as a salient manifestation of the collapse of civil trust in the decade following the war.²¹ Yet, the spider-web chart—often derided by contemporaries and historians alike as crude, simplistic, and amateurish—did more than embody the jingoism and paranoia of the postwar moment. It bequeathed a visual touchstone to subsequent generations of countersubversive activists seeking to impose order, uniformity, and coherence on seemingly unconnected social actors and cultural events. Maxwell's chart achieved this pioneering feat by appropriating and repurposing graphic strategies used by corporations, scientific institutions, and government agencies to map complex institutional relationships.

The spider-web chart is perhaps best classified as an "organization chart." It synthesizes the three critical visual elements of this graphic genre: analysis, relationship, and hierarchy.²² In the late 1800s, the art of charting organizational structures emerged in large-scale, corporate entities—especially in railroads and financial institutions—that needed novel means to administer complex relationships among employees and manage information across vast distances. With Daniel McCallum's 1855 "Diagram Representing a Plan of Organization of the New York and Erie Railroad" (Figure 3), organizational charts became an increasingly important way for corporate managers to grasp the size, scope, and interrelationships of their companies.²³ Visual oversight in the form of charts, graphs, and

timetables became an essential component of the “Systemic Management” or the “Scientific Management” movement developed by the likes of Frederick W. Taylor and implemented by armies of nameless managers seeking to impose order on vast corporate structures.²⁴

By the early 1900s, a large body of literature theorized that the effort to routinize and schematize management through visualization allowed corporate board members to delegate administration to their subordinates and create more efficient means for overseeing their managers and superintendents. The effect of such corporate surveillance was simultaneously to analyze an institution while integrating it into a coherent organizational structure. As Willard C. Brinton noted in *Graphic Methods for Presenting Facts*, “organization charts are an excellent example of the division of the total into its constituent components.” Likewise, in *Graphic Charts in Business*, Allan C. Haskell argued, “Probably one of the most important uses of graphic charts. . . is for the development of analytical thinking and investigation.” But, alongside analysis, organization charts could also impose unity on isolated components. According to Winfield A. Savage’s 1926 study of the use of charts and graphs by business executives, “An Organization Chart is the surest, quickest and most comprehensive means of showing what the organization is, the various divisions to which each is responsible and all subordinate thereto.” For the businessman, charts reduced complex relationships, figures, and structures into simple patterns that made it possible to “manage his business efficiently and profitably.” In fact, a graph not only made things legible at a glance, it also framed what a viewer could and could not see; a graph, in the words of Henry D. Hubbard, a member of the National Bureau of Standards, “compels the seeing of relations.” As business historian JoAnna Yates makes clear, early advocates of graphical representation exaggerated the objective nature of graphs to render complex information meaningful at a glance. This supposed objectivity, however, was also in tension with the power of graphs to “perform a persuasive function” on their readers.²⁵

Within the visual context of the first quarter of the twentieth century, the popularity of scientific management and the cultural cachet of charts and graphs all but assured the influence of Maxwell’s innovative spider-web chart for two reasons. First, her chart decoupled the organizational chart from corporate management. The spider-web chart did not map relationships inside a corporation for the purposes of increased efficiency but, instead, purported to document secret relationships between actors who intended to dissimulate their connections. Second, her chart appropriated

techniques originally developed by populist and progressive critics of corporate trusts and monopolies to document associations among actors. Activists, cartoonists, and satirists appropriated corporate charts and graphs into older visual traditions to generate fresh ways of criticizing corporate interests. Elaborate corporate organizational charts mutated into baroque organic forms: spider webs, octopuses, and anthropomorphized creatures transformed seemingly benign graphs and charts into monstrous, dangerous social agents.²⁶ As historian Peter Knight has noted, "It was important to Populist, Progressive, and Socialists critics alike to find a way of rendering visible the networks of power against which they were protesting." Quoting Louis Brandeis's study of the "money trust" problem, Knight points out that many critics of monopolistic trusts needed new ways to comprehend the abstract relationships between business leaders, corporate boards, and the corporations they managed. As a result, they appropriated new visual tools from professional management "to visualize the ramifications through which the forces [of corporate trusts] operate."²⁷

Maxwell's chart had a clear relationship to charts that appeared in the 1910s that represented the "corporate interlocks," "interlocking memberships," or "interlocking directorates" of corporate directors. These organizational charts attempted to depict graphically how a tiny number of business leaders sat on the boards of directors of many of the country's railroads, banks, and manufacturing companies. The most significant chart in this genre was Philip J. Scudder's 1913 "Diagram Showing the Affiliations of J. P. Morgan & Co., . . . with Large Corporations of the United States" (Figure 4). Also known as Exhibit No. 243 of the Pujo Committee's Money Trust Report, Scudder's elaborate, hand-drawn diagram showed that J. P. Morgan "interlocked" with dozens of corporate boards and, therefore, singlehandedly controlled a significant portion of the U.S. economy.²⁸ Various described as a "spider web" and an "octopus," the chart, as Brinton noted a year later, "shows the application of the graphic method to such complex situations as it is almost impossible to portray with language alone."²⁹ Scudder's chart inspired myriad imitators; however, most never rose to the Pujo exhibit's complexity or refinement of detail. Instead, many of Scudder's imitators produced simpler "corporate interlock" charts, such as those favored by the radical Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) labor union activists.³⁰ The IWW depictions of corporate interlocks in the coal industry flattened Scudder's intricate chart into much simpler linear connections among corporate boards and a handful of business titans.




Figure 4: Philip J. Scudder’s “Exhibit 244: Diagram Showing Principal Affiliations of J.P. Morgan & Co. of New York, Kidder, Peabody & Co. and Lee, Higginson & Co. of Boston, First National Bank, Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, and Continental & Commercial National Bank of Chicago” in *Money Trust Investigation: Investigation of Financial and Monetary Conditions in the United States Under House Resolutions Nos. 429 and 504 Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, February 25, 1913*. Courtesy of FRASER and available online at <https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/80/item/23677>, accessed August 25, 2020.

The irony is that Maxwell’s chart that depicted the alleged interlocking directorates of subversive women’s organizations drew on the visual and rhetorical metaphors developed by populist, progressive, and outright revolutionary critics of big business.³¹ Much like Exhibit No. 243 for the Pujó Committee or the IWW’s charts of mining industry interlocks, Maxwell’s chart became a powerful tool for seeing relationships among abstract and seemingly unrelated social forces. Unlike progressive or radical representations of corporate interlocks, however, Maxwell’s chart struck at the heart of America’s progressive voluntary societies. It charged that many respected organizations could not be trusted by their rank-and-file members because the societies’ various boards interlocked with a network of suspicious, unsavory, or foreign agents. If progressives and populists used their interlocking directorate charts to depict a cabal of industrial oligarchs organized against workers, then an emerging network of antiradical countersubversives would use Maxwell’s chart to visualize the amorphous network of national security threats that they saw emerging in the United States in the turbulent wake of World War I.³²




Figure 6: "Chart of Organizational 'Hook-up'" or "The Family Tree" from Le Roy F. Smith and E. B. Johns, *Pastors, Politicians, Pacifists* (Chicago: Constructive Educational Publishers, 1927).

“graphically portray[ed] the *Organization*, the *Cooperating Bodies*, and the *Spheres of Influence* of the Federal Council.”³⁴ By the early 1930s, Maxwell’s former CWS boss, Amos A. Fries, published “Sugar Coating Communism for Protestant Churches,” his very own interlocking subversive chart targeting churches (Figure 7).³⁵ His chart and its companion pamphlet revealed the FCC’s “interlocking membership” with other organizations—including the American Civil Liberties Union—that hoped to raise “a Red Flag where now waves the Stars and Stripes.”³⁶ Then, in a final significant visual mutation, Henry Bourne Joy, president of Packard Motor Car Company, published the widely circulated “Our Protestant Churches in Politics” (Figure 8).³⁷ His chart surpassed its predecessors in neatly depicting the “interlocking” relations between the FCC and subversion. Sleek and rectilinear, “Our Protestant Churches” dispensed with jumbled lists and messy connecting lines in favor of a simple, text-based index that made for easy reference by readers.

Thus, less than a decade after the publication of Maxwell’s chart, a wave of countersubversive charts had used its form and spirit to plug the FCC into a broad network of allegedly “radical” groups. The publication of these charts also indicated important changes in public discourse related to charges of clandestine subversion. First, if the War Department had once tried to destroy Maxwell’s chart and bury its accusations, then, by the end of the 1920s, retired Army officers and millionaire industrialists could, as private citizens, publish incendiary charges that implicated a wide range of voluntary associations in a web of subversive activities. Going on the record was no longer a public relations disaster; rather, it sold books and pamphlets, and it generated media interest. Next, by turning their attention to ecumenical and modernist Protestant groups, Fay, Smith, Fries, and Joy pointed to the declining influence of women’s groups in the 1920s and anticipated the resurgence of interest in Social Gospel-inspired ideas during the Depression era of the 1930s. As the influence of self-proclaimed conservative and patriotic women’s groups grew—especially the American Legion and Daughters of the American Revolution—and progressive groups split over their responses to the failures of alcohol prohibition and controversies over progressive social policies, much of the suspicion once aimed at women’s voluntary organizations shifted to religious organizations and civil liberties groups. Even as worries over the loyalties of the board members of the WJCC or Women’s Christian Temperance Union declined, by the end of the 1920s, spider-web charts had emerged as an important visual tool used by a network of




Figure 7: "Sugar Coating Communism for Protestant Churches: Spiders Web: Chart Showing Interlocking Membership of Churchmen Socialists, Pacifists, Internationalists, and Communists," from Amos A. Fries, *Sugar Coating Communism for Protestant Churches* (Washington, DC, 1932), in the Pre-Pearl Harbor Pamphlets Collected by John Bowe, Minnesota Historical Society Library. Courtesy of the Minnesota Historical Society Library.

readers could use in the service of further research. By incorporating more robust indexical tools into their charts, these graphic devices could work in tandem with book- or pamphlet-length narratives, documentary anthologies, and journalistic accounts that readers could use to “confirm” allegations of subversion. As the second and third sections of this essay argue, this development had long-term implications as it encouraged a consuming audience to investigate the connections alleged in the graphs. These charts also helped readers assemble their own evidence in the service of visualizing subversion. Because of the pioneering work of Fay, Smith, Fries, and Joy, these complex tapestries of dangerous connections would come to include an immense network of mainline Protestant denominations and parachurch organizations.

Indexes: Correlating Subversion

The campaign to chart “the spider’s web” inaugurated by Maxwell and perpetuated by Fay, Smith, Fries, and Joy had its roots in a concerted effort to stamp out religiously inspired political dissent. Federal bureaucrats and business leaders honed in on the powerful, well-funded FCC as a threat. Formed in 1908 as an ecumenical body to represent the social reform efforts of thirty-two Protestant denominations, the FCC grew rapidly in size and influence, garnering high-profile support from the likes of Woodrow Wilson, Andrew Carnegie, and John D. Rockefeller, Jr.³⁸ The FCC’s willingness to address controversial social and political matters related to labor, military service, and social justice made it especially vulnerable to critical attacks. To their critics, mainline clergy became part of a diffuse conspiracy to empower organized labor and neuter the military in the decade following the Great War.

Before the outbreak of World War I, the FCC acknowledged industrialization and the growth of organized labor as two of the most significant social problems facing the country. Even though the council remained ambivalent about striking, it created a network of commissions to investigate the labor problem. The FCC angered business leaders during the late 1910s and throughout the 1920s after it appeared to side with organized labor over business interests. Most notoriously, its scathing report condemning management’s actions in the 1910 Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, Steel Works strike made the FCC an easy target for probusiness advocates for more than a decade.³⁹

With the outbreak of World War I, the FCC’s diverse body of churches proved mostly supportive of the war, but the organization,

nonetheless, angered many critics by protecting pacifists, supporting minority rights in the volatile domestic political environment during and following the war, and opposing military preparedness training in public schools.⁴⁰ When combined with the council's commitment to addressing the labor problem and its willingness to address controversial theological concerns such as evolutionary theory and scriptural criticism, the FCC's wartime positions created tensions between the professional clergy that administered the council and the laity that comprised its constituent bodies.⁴¹ The progressive clergy often advocated issues and encouraged social reforms that were out of step with many of the rank-and-file in the pews.

The FCC's willingness to wade into these controversial social and political issues earned it the suspicions of powerful business leaders and prominent figures in the federal bureaucracy. Notably, in the 1910s and 1920s, the FCC attracted the investigative scrutiny of the Bureau of Investigation (BI), the precursor of the modern FBI. During World War I, the BI and its allies in Military Intelligence monitored pacifist FCC clergy who spoke out against the U.S. participation in the war. The FCC's support of labor unions and its progressive position in favor of more equitable treatment for African Americans brought further attention to the council after the war, especially by MID.⁴² The BI also paid close attention to the FCC in the aftermath of the extralegal Palmer Raids (executed in the winter of 1919–1920), in which the Department of Justice rounded up and deported suspected Communists and foreign nationals. BI agents investigated FCC clergy who drafted a resolution calling for "legislation by Congress to protect aliens in the United States" and another statement alleging "illegal acts by Department of Justice Agents in connection with the apprehension and detention of alien Communists" during the Palmer Raids.⁴³

Yet, despite these tensions, the FCC counted as its members prominent Protestant denominations, including the Presbyterian Church, USA, and major branches of the Methodist, Lutheran, and Baptist churches. By the end of the 1940s, the FCC represented thirty million Christians in the United States. Given the FCC's controversial track record, it is unsurprising that opponents of organized labor, enemies of Communism, and congregants suspicious of centralized religious authority turned their critical gaze toward the council. During the Depression and enduring throughout World War II, a new coalition of FCC critics formed from the legacy established by the likes of Maxwell, Fay, Fries, Joy, and many, many others. Led by industrialists, former Communists, military analysts, union busters, and prominent laypeople, these FCC critics produced charts and narratives documenting the infestation of Protestant groups with

subversives. These documents, like Maxwell's chart before them, had their origin in the business, law enforcement, and bureaucratic practices of the early twentieth century. Maxwell's chart relied on her private research—research she modeled on the professional techniques developed by the CWS, MID, and BI. These agencies used large, sophisticated filing systems to translate individual, disconnected acts of observation into usable, archived pieces of information and assembled them into integrated, composite accounts of the actions and beliefs of alleged subversives.⁴⁴ Although it might be tempting to see the production of such files and dossiers as simplistic, guilt-by-association rhetorical gestures, in actuality, these techniques of surveillance and information coordination were rooted in the rigorous production of "facts."

In the 1940s, a new generation of anti-FCC red hunters took up these tools of factual fabrication. No document more clearly embodied these techniques than Verne P. Kaub's *How Red Is the Federal Council of Churches?*⁴⁵ As with the spider-web charts of the 1920s and 1930s, *How Red* exposed the alleged Communist activities of ecumenical, theologically liberal Protestants. Kaub's controversial American Council of Christian Laymen (ACCL) published the document as an incendiary call-to-arms for conservative Protestants. The production of *How Red* involved the cooperation and coordination of a host of important midcentury countersubversives. Kaub, a retired public relations officer for Wisconsin Power and Light Company, worked with Allen A. Zoll, a New York advertising executive, who ran the National Council for American Education (NCAE). In turn, Zoll relied on the file system developed by notorious Communist-turned-red hunter J. B. Matthews to research the pamphlet.

In 1949, Zoll—an anti-Semite, Nazi sympathizer, and former leader of the fascist Christian Front—founded the American Intelligence Agency (AIA). Zoll's organization began as an anti-communist group but evolved into the far more complex NCAE. Over a decade of operation, the AIA and NCAE served as quasiprivate investigative agencies that gathered a massive archive of information to monitor what Zoll perceived to be a conspiracy among foreign Communist agents, clergy, and progressive educators in the United States.⁴⁶ In the education field, Zoll and Kaub published a short, narrative pamphlet titled *How Red Are the Schools?* It warned readers, "For a generation, your tax money helped pay the salaries of poisonous propagandists who have been endeavoring to make radicals out the youth of our land."⁴⁷

Shortly after collaborating on *How Red Are the Schools?*, Zoll and Kaub hatched a scheme to publish a new pamphlet attacking the FCC. Using a similar title but opting for a nonnarrative, graphic

format, *How Red Is the Federal Council of Churches?* would play a pivotal role in shaping how Americans would view mainline, ecumenical Protestantism in the second half of the twentieth century. To distribute the leaflet, Kaub created the ACCL to distance their anti-FCC organization from Zoll's already well-known NCEA. Kaub understood the implications of his connections to both councils, and he wanted to distinguish the two boards and avoid "creating more of an 'interlocking directorate'" by setting up the ACCL without Zoll serving in a formal capacity.⁴⁸ Kaub incorporated the ACCL in 1949 in Wisconsin with A. W. Larson, a Congregationalist, and E. E. Espelien, a Lutheran, both of whom were retired businessmen in Madison.⁴⁹

The research behind *How Red* reflected the complex, collaborative nature of mid-twentieth-century countersubversion. A small network of organizations and citizens managed file systems—massive collections of clippings, letterheads, business cards, public documents, private memoranda, and a host of other ephemera—that allowed them to document alleged Communist subversion in the United States. *How Red* emerged from contributions from Kaub but relied mostly on Zoll's use of J. B. Matthews's extensive personal index of names and organizations. Matthews had served as lead researcher of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), which Texas Democratic Representative Martin Dies chaired from 1938 to 1944. Matthews based his research on a private archive and index he created in the 1930s as he evolved from a Communist sympathizer into an anti-communist investigator. By the 1940s, Matthews split his time between researching un-American activities for the Dies Committee and making sure that William Randolph Hearst's newspapers remained Communist-free.⁵⁰

To understand the production of *How Red*, it is important to consider how file systems such as those used by Matthews and Zoll worked. The following discussion focuses on Matthews's methods because he frequently discussed them in public. Unlike Matthews, the secretive Zoll, who employed nearly identical methods, refused to offer interviews to the press to discuss his research techniques. On the rare occasions when he interacted with reporters, Zoll proved contentious and unrevealing. In one of his only on-the-record interviews, an agitated Zoll interrupted a *McCall's* magazine reporter by sputtering, "If you smear me, I'll cut your throat."⁵¹ In contrast, the media-savvy Matthews courted the press and bragged about his voluminous files and the exhaustive nature of his research. A compulsive collector and cataloguer, Matthews reported how he used an elaborate index card system to catalog and cross-reference every name and organization in his collection. "I have about a

quarter-million cards listing affiliations with Communist and Communist-front organizations," Matthews told the *New York Times* in 1953.⁵² Following his association with the Dies Committee, many observers believed Matthews's personal dossier collection to be second only to the FBI's in scope and content.⁵³ For individuals connected to Communism by Matthews's indexing methods, the results could be personally and professionally devastating.⁵⁴

Matthews began collecting letterheads, business cards, lunch programs, and other bits of ephemera that he weaponized in the 1930s to create connections between individuals and purported Communist-front organizations. Letterheads played a prominent role in his research techniques. In his memoir, *Odyssey of a Fellow Traveler*, letterheads emerged as the Communist Party's primary mechanism for manipulating non-Communists:

Around every injustice which might conceivably stir a spark of protest in the bosom of some middle-class citizen, the communists have built an organization—replete with executive secretary, chairman, sponsors, slogans, and letterhead. The revolutionary tactic runs somewhat as follows: If we cannot catch them with the bait of the Scottsboro Boys or the Release of Mooney or the Plight of the Arkansas Sharecroppers, we may, perchance, draw them into the Struggle for the Territorial Integrity of China.⁵⁵

Once enlisted to contribute to these front organizations, good, middle-class Americans found themselves listed on mailers, flyers, and letterheads circulated to other unsuspecting donors. Gullible Americans became pawns in an immense Communist conspiracy. They also found themselves indexed on one of Matthews's cards.

The archival systems developed by the likes of Matthews and Zoll exploited the flexibility of index cards to correlate multiple levels of information by connecting names, dates, places, and institutions. Like the graphic techniques appropriated by Maxwell a generation earlier, the indexing systems of countersubversives relied on the innovative modernizing business efficiency trends popularized in corporations in the early twentieth century. Index cards allowed for the visualization of relationships and for the easy reshuffling of these relationships—subject cards could reference publications, while cards listing publications could cross-reference subjects, for example. The result is that the easy mutability, portability, and connectability facilitated by card indexing provided the agents of blacklisting with a means for producing connections among people, events, and publications.⁵⁶

Through their collaboration on the ACCL's *How Red*, Matthews and Zoll transformed the pamphlet's reader into an amateur investigator. In a literal sense, *How Red* is nothing more or less than an index of relationships between individuals and organizations. Kaub's final document concretized the process of cross-referencing and indexing techniques honed by Matthews and Zoll into a single document. Gone were the confusing visual relationships created by Maxwell's spider-web chart that connected individuals and organizations with a tangled mess of lines. In their place were—like Joy's sophisticated index chart—neat lists of individuals and organizations. Following every suspect pastor, the reader found a series of numbers that cross-referenced a separate list of organizations. In turn, capsule descriptions accompanying each organization narrated its deceptive, Communist-related activities (Figure 9). The index then connected these descriptions to authoritative sources—New York's Lusk Committee Report, California's Committee on Un-American Activities, and Matthews's previous publications under the auspices of the Dies Committee. In




Figure 9: Annotated cover and interior page from *How Red Is the Federal Council of Churches?* in Federal Bureau of Investigation HQ file number 62-100432, serial number 1, Subject: American Council Of Christian Laymen. Courtesy of the Internet Archive's Ernie Lazar FOIA Collection available online at <https://archive.org/details/AmericanCouncilOfChristianLaymenVerneKaub/HQ62100432>, accessed August 25, 2020.

short, *How Red* is an index of indexes designed to allow its reader to generate patterns between religious leaders and Communist front groups.

The influence of *How Red* on midcentury Protestantism was immediate. Newspapers across the country covered the pamphlet throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Major dailies, including the *New York Times*, noted its incendiary charges but allowed FCC defenders the last word.⁵⁷ Local papers were much more critical of the FCC. Some editorials reprinted the pamphlet's charges and used them to implicate local church officials in its spider's web of conspiracy. Churches advertised using the pamphlet in Sunday sermons and Bible study groups.⁵⁸ One story recounted how the chart prompted a newspaper editor in California to offer Dr. E. Stanley Jones, a Methodist missionary indexed in the chart, \$1000 to submit to a two-hour interrogation with a stenographer present.⁵⁹ By the FBI's own estimation, the chart had driven a considerable amount of the negative mail urging the Bureau to investigate the FCC and its descendent bodies, the National and World Councils of Churches. Further, as religious historian Peter J. Thuesen has noted, the chart helped drive a significant amount of the distrust in the Revised Standard Version of the Bible.⁶⁰

The chart's notoriety and popularity in the 1950s followed close behind calls by public figures for laypeople to be on guard against the threat of collectivism in their churches. Most infamously, in March 1947, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover told the HUAC, "I confess to a real apprehension so long as Communists are able to secure ministers of the Gospel to promote their evil work and espouse a cause that is alien to the religion of Christ and Judaism."⁶¹ Hoover's fleeting reference to Communist efforts to manipulate "ministers of the Gospel" proved a godsend to the Zolls, Matthews, and Kaubs of the world. Kaub appended Hoover's words to an updated 1949 edition of *How Red*, and the quotation regularly appeared in literature printed by countersubversive organizations. Hoover, intentionally or otherwise, had waded into almost a half-century of controversy over the nature of American Protestant activism and, in the process, seemed to endorse the role of blacklist entrepreneurs and amateur countersubversive investigators.

Files: Seeing Like the FBI

Hoover's dire warnings about the Communist threat to American religious institutions helped cultivate the deep distrust many laypeople in mainline denominations already harbored against

their ministers and church leaders. His words seemed to validate the rumors and whispers promoted by over thirty years' worth of countersubversion activists. Maxwell's spider-web chart and its many descendants (including Kaub's index of indexes) had taught vigilant anti-communists how to visualize the relationships among Communists, fellow travelers, and church leaders. By the middle of the century, figures ranging from national titans such as J. Edgar Hoover to obscure redbaiters like Verne P. Kaub insisted that researchers could best recognize Communists not by documenting their direct actions but, instead, by tracking down their hidden associations. Behind every effort to chart these associations and every graphic representation of communistic connections stood an archive of ordered, correlated information. By midcentury, any aspiring Communist hunter understood that filing cabinets and index cards had become the requisite investigative hardware of the era. This climate of paranoid vigilance, facilitated by legislative investigative committees and surveillance entrepreneurs, found ample reinforcement in the rise of American mass media culture, especially in popular media, and in the widespread availability of cheap mechanical textual production and efficient information storage.

At midcentury, innumerable books, motion pictures, and radio and television programs idealized the limitless research files of surveillance agencies such as the FBI. In the popular imagination, the Bureau's files represented the federal government's ability to watch its citizens and to retrieve even the most obscure bit of information and mobilize it as evidence in a criminal investigation. Popular television programs, such as *I Led 3 Lives* (broadcast from 1953 to 1956), claimed to draw their "fantastically true" stories from exclusive access to the secret files of FBI informant Herbert A. Philbirk and other famous counterespies.⁶² As media historian Michael Kackman has argued, producers filmed *I Led 3 Lives* and similar programs in a "semidocumentary" style that blended "'based-in-fact' truth claims" with "a kind of civic nationalism" to allow viewers to imagine themselves playing an important role in the contemporary battle against Communism.⁶³

This sensibility reached its popular visual and narrative apotheosis in Warner Brothers Studio's Jimmy Stewart film *The FBI Story*.⁶⁴ Described by media scholar Thomas Doherty as a "biopic of bureaucracy," this 1959 film focused not on Stewart's portrayal of G-man Chip Hardesty but on the way the character becomes a "cog in the precision machineworks of [J. Edgar] Hoover-style law enforcement."⁶⁵ The film made clear that the real heroes of the FBI are not only its faceless contingent of agents, researchers, secretaries, and lab assistants but also its boundless infrastructure of

surveillance, intelligence gathering, and information management. As the prelude of the film insisted, no criminal could escape the "broad research powers of the FBI—its high-speed communications, its endless flow of vital correspondence, a laboratory equipped to analyze all documents, a serology section geared to break down every known blood sample, a firearms section containing two thousand weapons." Long, patient tracking shots lingered over an ocean of file cabinets and a roiling mass of agents combing through their contents in search of evidence. The message was clear: surveillance and information management went hand-in-hand; seeing and recording what one sees were essential, interrelated tasks in the war against subversion and crime in the United States.

Yet, regardless of the deep faith many Americans had in the surveillance conducted by law enforcement agencies, federal and local laws restricted access to the information generated by such activities. The secrecy surrounding official investigations into the threat of Communist subversion drove intense public interest in the matter. The midcentury period witnessed an explosion of countersubversive groups seeking to bridge the information gap between the FBI's secret files and the public clamor for information regarding Communist infiltration of American institutions. As Major Edgar C. Bundy—a retired Air Force intelligence officer, Baptist minister, chairman of the Church League of America, and a leading critic of the FCC-style liberal ecumenism—informed his readers, "A citizen . . . cannot go to a local FBI office or to Mr. Hoover's headquarters, and ask for the names of all clergymen or church groups which have aided the cause of Communism, and expect to get them. They are not available. However, this does not mean that they do not exist."⁶⁶ In his books, newsletters, and public speeches, Bundy advised concerned laypeople to subscribe to his newsletters and to read the publications of organizations ranging from Kaub's ACCL to Robert Welch's John Birch Society.⁶⁷ Bundy used Hoover's public calls for vigilance as endorsements for his activities and those of his countersubversive peers.

A network of private organizations emerged that operated in a bureaucratic gray area between nonprofit religious educational organizations and private investigative firms. Many maintained their own subversive lists, which subscribers could purchase. Some of these organizations had a national scope with leaders who, such as Bundy, had direct connections to military intelligence and law enforcement, or they were former employees of the American Legion or similar countersubversive organizations. Four of the largest religiously affiliated countersubversive operations—M. G. Lowman's Circuit Riders Inc., Billy James Hargis's Christian Crusade, Bundy's

Church League of America, and Kaub's ACCL—were nonprofit educational organizations supported by business, law enforcement, and religious interests. These groups fused the intelligence-gathering, secrecy-obsessed culture of the midcentury period with the populist antielitism of twentieth-century anti-communism into a potent attack on midcentury mainline, ecumenical Protestantism. Students of their publications learned how to see the Communist plot against America's churches and, in turn, became vigilant private investigators who could connect the dots of conspiracy when the FBI could not publicly do so.

Against this cultural backdrop, it should not be surprising that private surveillance became a hobby for Americans from a variety of political or social backgrounds. Civic organizations such as the right-leaning Chamber of Commerce and the more liberal Institute for American Democracy (IAD) counseled Americans to create private file systems for collecting and collating information on their neighbors. The Chamber advised every local branch to create an elaborate file system to serve as the "eyes of the community" looking for local Communist activities. "If you keep track of the players," an IAD pamphlet similarly explained, "you quickly learn the score on extremist activity in your community. Files become the garden implements for workers in democracy's vineyard." The fundamentalist American Council of Christian Churches reminded "re-awakened" college students that "one of the most neglected needs" of young Christians "is an adequate filing system so that information read today can be located when it is needed for documentation tomorrow."⁶⁸

Industrious amateur investigators developed complex file systems for housing an ever-expanding collection of clippings culled from local and national newspapers, *The Congressional Record*, and various legislative committee reports. They also bought information and outsourced surveillance to trusted watchers: those with money could purchase preclipped and annotated material. They received national publications such as the *Dan Smoot Report*, the various periodicals of the John Birch Society, or Stuart McBirnie's *Documentation* and clipped and indexed the issues to suit their purposes.

Women were especially active watchers.⁶⁹ As Gary North, a Southern California conservative activist, remembered decades later, many of these women belonged to a network of right-wing groups, and they did their research out of a profound sense of patriotic duty. Remembering a close friend of his parents, North recalled in 2002:

She was an inveterate collector of *The Congressional Record*. She clipped it and lots of newspapers, putting the clippings

into files. . . . She was representative of a dedicated army of similarly inclined women in that era, whose membership in various patriotic study groups was high, comparatively speaking, in southern California. These women are dead or dying now, and with them go their files—files that could serve as primary source collections for historians of the era. I suspect that most of them disposed of their collections years ago, cardboard box by cardboard box, when they ran out of garage space, and their nonideological husbands and children finally prevailed.⁷⁰

Historian Michelle Nickerson's study of the political activism of Southern Californian housewives provides a rich narrative capturing the broader cultural context of the kind of surveillance described by North. For example, she observed that the Network of Patriotic Letter Writers, a collective of mostly female activists, "had been monitoring Communism and accumulating files" for much of the 1950s.⁷¹ As they clipped, attended meetings, and watched their neighbors, the network's files had swelled. Before the end of the decade, the network had to recruit a full-time researcher and rent office space to house their ninety-nine boxes of files.⁷²

In churches across the United States, this midcentury investigative spirit helped spur the widespread proliferation of innumerable ad hoc committees, layperson commissions, and informal panels assigned to probe the alleged subversive activities of the NCC. These religious roundsmen patrolled the boundaries of orthodox Protestantism and guarded it against alleged Communist influence. Methodists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Congregationalists, Baptists, and fundamentalists of all descriptions clipped newspapers, read congressional reports, interrogated clergy, wrote their public officials, and assembled their conclusions into reports, memoranda, and presentations at church board meetings and general assemblies.

Although it is difficult to draw concrete conclusions about which American Christians most actively guarded the frontier between religion and Communism, declassified FBI files provide some clues.⁷³ The Bureau maintained many domestic security files on issues related to the communist infiltration of religious organizations in the United States. One of the largest, a file of more than 2,400 pages titled "Communist Infiltration of Religion" (file number 100-HQ-403529), recorded the Bureau's efforts to assess the accusations swirling around mainline Protestant denominations, with specific focus on the NCC.⁷⁴ This file collected inquiries from adherents from a variety of denominations, but Protestant mainline churches in the Methodist, Presbyterian, Episcopal, and

Congregationalist traditions were the most frequent.⁷⁵ After letters from authors from mainline churches, inquirers from an assortment of unaffiliated and nondenominational Protestant churches and a few nontrinitarian groups, sent the Bureau inquiries.⁷⁶ Regardless of the authors' denominational affiliations, their letters came from everywhere—from the megalopolises of New England and the mid-Atlantic states, the rural South, small towns in the Midwest, and the burgeoning population centers of the Sunbelt.⁷⁷

These FBI files point to the existence of a nationwide movement of citizens trying to untangle the FCC–NCC–Communism knot. Because many of the church investigators believed they needed a final, trusted arbiter of the facts, they inundated J. Edgar Hoover and his FBI with the letters, charts, and fallacious reports that formed the bedrock of the FBI's own investigations into ecumenical Protestantism. This recursivity pointed to the profound epistemological uncertainty that lay at the heart of the problem. Many of the FBI's correspondents acknowledged that they could not find any factual proof of the NCC's collusion with Communists, but they traced this lack of evidence to the problematic nature of the "facts" themselves. As one correspondent wrote to Hoover, "The officers of the [redacted] Presbyterian Church are trying to make a study of the National Council of Churches However, we are finding it next to impossible to locate any factual unbiased information in this regard."⁷⁸

Other investigators believed they had discovered the verifiable "facts" that they sought, only to realize that many in their own congregations refused to accept their "proof." A Methodist fact-finder noted that his congregation's support for the NCC had prompted "quite a bit of feeling" in the church. Some in the congregation "rely completely on the charges of Edgar C. Bundy and Carl McIntyre [*sic*]" to condemn the NCC, while other church members rejected the findings of these anti-communist authorities. To settle the matter, the church appointed a committee to investigate the NCC. After some wrangling in the church, the committee concluded that "they have every confidence in anything that" Hoover might say on the matter—so they wrote the FBI director. Another chairman of a similar ten-member Methodist Church committee, which was formed to investigate the NCC, pleaded with Hoover, "Could you please send us information as to where we can get information about this that would be the truth[?]" It is difficult to believe that the FBI's inevitable nonresponses to these inquiries—such as, "I hope you will not infer either that we do or do not have material in our files relating to the [NCC]"—did not strike some readers as the bureaucratic equivalent of Pilate's infamous proto-postmodern rebuke, "What is truth?"⁷⁹

Not all of the investigators approached Hoover in search of more trustworthy information. Some believed they had uncovered the necessary facts to condemn the NCC, and they wrote the Bureau to share their findings. In Admore, Oklahoma, St. Philip's Episcopal Church organized an Americanism Committee to research the NCC. After concluding their investigations, the committee assembled a thirty-four-page booklet titled "A Two Hour Parish Study of Communism and the Episcopal Church." Confident in their research and its pedagogical utility for other loyal Americans, in 1961, the St. Philip's Episcopalians sent their study course to the HUAC and to Hoover. They hoped that Hoover, like HUAC chairman Francis Walters, a Democrat from Pennsylvania, might do the church the honor of placing the booklet in the FBI's permanent research files. "You are," they wrote Hoover, "the Moses of today whom the Lord has raised up to lead our people through the wilderness of Communism and onto the promised land, once again, of the sound and solid principles of our Christian American heritage."⁸⁰ Meanwhile, in Sewickley, Pennsylvania, another Episcopal congregation started a committee they called "Call to Arms." The committee focused on creating "informed and convinced" Christians who can "conquer the Communist conspiracy even in its floodtide." The committee, rather than asking Hoover for information, instead asked for his "endorsement" of their research endeavors, which they hoped to publish in the parish magazine. Hoover declined an official endorsement but he commended their focus on becoming "better informed" "through the process of Christian education."⁸¹

Almost as frequently as inquiries from official church investigations, letters came from rogue inquisitors seeking information from the FBI to buttress their efforts to police their denominations and challenge dissenting members of their congregations. A Baptist pastor from Wisconsin told members of his church's board that the "American Baptist Convention is Modernistic" and associated with the communistic NCC. When members of the board resisted the pastor's claims, he turned to Hoover for help in clarifying the matter: "Now I realize that this is a strong accusation to make, but I have heard of men in the National Council of Churches that deny God Himself, Jesus Christ, and the Virgin Birth of Christ as well as His atoning death upon the cross. Is not this one of the main doctrines of the Communist Party?" In another case, a member reported that his church's "Social Action and Education Committee" had "investigated" the NCC and concluded that there was "no truth in the charges" against the ecumenical organization. Angered by his fellow committee members' blithe ignorance to the Communist menace, the writer reached out to the

FBI for “conclusive proof that the Protestant churches of America have been infiltrated by the Communists.”⁸² The FBI, as was its wont, refused to comment on the matter.

Conclusion

On May 15, 1956, a Special Agent from the FBI’s Washington, D.C., headquarters sat down to interview a woman claiming to have incendiary information regarding Communist efforts to infiltrate the University Congregational Church near the campus of the University of Washington in Seattle. The woman “spoke for approximately 3 hours” with the agent as she recounted a byzantine tale of conspiracy and religious intrigue in which a senior prelaw and psychology major at the University of Washington inquired about becoming a theologian.⁸³ Although seemingly unremarkable, the student’s banal professional aspirations swelled into something dark and twisted as the woman spoke. According to her story, the student began insinuating himself into church groups around the university. He “appears to be an atheist,” she told the agent, “in that he stresses disbelief in God and the fact that pure science can solve all problems.” Further, a summary of the agent’s interview recounted that the student “is critical of the Government, and builds up agitation between the economic classes in all his teachings and is completely negative and depressive.” Parents of other students attending these church groups came to believe their children “seem to be going through a complete ‘brainwashing’” by the aspiring atheist-theologian. The perplexed agent noted that the woman “rambled off in many directions,” and he expressed concern when he found it “difficult to keep her on the subject matter of her main complaint.” As he pressed the woman to keep on task, she produced a “brief case full of newspaper clippings, charts and diagrams and what appeared to be numerous rambling notes.” Confused and likely exhausted by yet one more fevered attempt to map Communist infiltration of a Protestant church, the agent dismissed the woman as “overly alarmed” and concluded the memo by offering no recommendation for further investigative action.

In the end, this bureaucratic oddity—and so many thousands of others like it—came to nothing. For all the attempts by the likes of this would-be informant to chart, index, and archive the Communist threat to America’s Protestant churches, the evidence proved stubbornly elusive. In fact, FBI investigators had dismissed the infiltration of Communism in the churches even if the Bureau’s public rhetoric still implied the potential of such threats. Internal

memoranda produced by J. Edgar Hoover and his agents showed that many of the attacks on the FCC and NCC originated as an internal Protestant fight between rival sects. As early as the mid-1950s, internal FBI documents conceded that nearly all of the “derogatory information” about the FCC and NCC “comes from rival church groups,” especially those from fundamentalist or conservative evangelical backgrounds.⁸⁴

But the FBI’s effort to reduce these controversies to interchurch organizational disputes or theological infighting was, at best, a selective and self-serving assessment of the issues involved. At every step, from the end of the First World War to the onset of the Cold War, the federal bureaucracy had played an instrumental role in facilitating a context that framed citizenship, civic voluntarism, and domestic loyalty in terms of resistance to foreign Communism. World War I-era efforts to enlist citizens as voluntary agents of and docile targets for state surveillance meant that average Americans looked for subversion in the institutions that dominated their everyday lives: their schools, workplaces, families, voluntary associations, and their churches. Further, the valorization of business interests in the face of Communist threats tended to make many—but certainly not all—Americans skeptical of labor unions and hesitant to support social projects that emphasized state regulation of economic activity. By the late 1940s, these durable cultural tendencies found an acute expression in the general skepticism of the FCC and, eventually, the NCC. These ecumenical religious organizations—with their historic sympathy with labor unions, Social Gospel-inspired progressivism, and willingness to address controversial issues ranging from civil rights for African Americans to the diplomatic recognition of Soviet Russia—seemed to flirt with the very political, social, and economic projects generations of Americans had been encouraged to distrust. Indeed, as a young bureaucrat in the Justice Department, Hoover had voiced support for Maxwell’s early efforts to stoke countersubversive zeal through visual media such as her infamous spider-web chart. This complex cooperation between countersubversive elements in the Justice Department, the military, and a network of business leaders created a framework for visualizing a vast web of subversive agents that expanded to include the largest ecumenical Protestant parachurch organization of the twentieth century.⁸⁵

Although it is easy to dismiss these countersubversive forces—and, by extension, Hoover’s thousands of anti-FCC and anti-NCC interlocutors—as engaging in naïve guilt-by-association polemics, the fact is they were part of a more than half-century-long tradition of sophisticated political surveillance and factual fabrication. These

activists learned how to identify domestic threats, mastered techniques of sorting and fabricating connections between social actors, and deployed novel visualization and archival techniques for rendering these complex relationships legible to likeminded Americans. In our contemporary moment in which prominent national figures have called for the resurrection of HUAC to monitor the political loyalties of suspect religious populations and in which privately held corporations admit that domestic political surveillance is as important to corporate risk assessment as maintaining tight security protocols, reevaluating the relationship between state and private surveillance networks seems especially salient.⁸⁶ As electronic databases and internet-based social networks replace card indexes and paper-based file systems as ways of knowing the social and visualizing its shape, and as “Sharia law” displaces ecumenical Protestantism as America’s next great internal religious threat, new ways of charting social networks and visualizing their political influence are likely to mingle with this much older and durable culture of voluntary domestic religious surveillance.⁸⁷

Notes

I owe so much to so many people who helped me complete this article. At Florida State University, all of my faculty colleagues—John Corrigan, Jamil Drake, Sonia Hazard, Laura McTighe, and Amanda Porterfield—in the American Religious History track made vital contributions during every phase of this project. Graduate students in our ARH colloquium read and commented on an earlier version of the project, with now Drs. Charlie McCray and Meredith Ross offering incisive feedback. I should also single out Tim Burnside, who has helped me test drive many of my stranger ideas before I make the mistake of committing them to writing. Thanks and apologies are also due to everyone in my graduate seminar on religion and surveillance; our conversations reformed this project in important ways. My Undergraduate Research Opportunity research assistants—Nacia Goldberg and Katie Shapiro; Will Dibbs, Maria Guevara, and Stephen Whittle; and, Thomas Ossi—did all of the hard work of coding and tabulating details in FBI file number 100-HQ-403529, “Communist Infiltration of Religion.” Kevin Kruse and Molly Worthen responded to versions of this paper at meetings of the American Historical Association and Society for U.S. Intellectual History, respectively. Damon Berry, Sylvester Johnson,

Matthew Sutton, and Hugh Urban all contributed directly or indirectly to elements of this article. Generous financial support from FSU and a summer stipend from the National Endowment for the Humanities helped me to afford the travel necessary for researching the project. Finally, I can attribute the major thematic elements of this paper—visualization, bureaucracy, epistemology, and modernity—to my conversations with Alan Beyerchen when I was an undergraduate at Ohio State. It has only taken me about twenty years to process what we were talking about over so many Junior Bacon Cheeseburgers at that Wendy's on High Street.

¹[Redacted] to J. Edgar Hoover, May 22, 1951, Federal Bureau of Investigation HQ file number 100-50869, serial number 158, Subject: National Council of Churches; hereafter cited as *100-HQ-50869*. This FBI domestic security file and all subsequent citations from it have been released through the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts and are available online at "Ernie Lazar FOIA Collection: General Files A–Z," *Internet Archive*, https://archive.org/details/ernie1241_general, accessed March 20, 2018.

²[Redacted] to J. Edgar Hoover, December 7, 1952, 100-HQ-50869-213; [Redacted author], memorandum dated July 18, 1958, to the FBI, title "Pacifism, Communism, and National Council of Churches," December 7, 1952, 100-HQ-50869-316; [Redacted author], memorandum dated July 18, 1958, to the FBI, title "Pacifism, Communism, and National Council of Churches," December 7, 1952, 100-HQ-50869-316 (the chart appears to have been redacted from the declassified files because of the potentially libelous, or even criminal, nature of the accusations); [Redacted] to J. Edgar Hoover, March 7, 1960, 100-HQ-50869-364.

³Michael Paul Rogin, *Ronald Reagan, the Movie and Other Episodes in Political Demonology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). Rogin identifies "three major moments" in the countersubversive tradition. The first, which predated the Republic, revolved around fears of subversion related to race and fantasies of "savagery." This earliest manifestation of the countersubversive tradition emerged from the slave trade and the genocide of Native Americans. The second, following the Civil War, projected these earlier racial fears onto ethnic minorities and class conflict in urban areas from the 1870s to about 1940. Finally, the rise of anti-Communism in the post-World War II moment marked the synthesis of these previous countersubversive traditions into Rogin's third major moment. This summary is based on Rogin, *Ronald Reagan*, chapters two, "Political Repression in the United States," 44–80, and eight, "Kiss Me Deadly," 236–71.

⁴Rogin, *Ronald Reagan*, xiii. For a concise summary of the complex argument that Rogin develops across multiple essays in *Ronald Reagan*, see his “The Countersubversive Tradition in American Politics,” *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 31 (1986): 1–33.

⁵Rogin, *Ronald Reagan*, 45.

⁶Following Rogin, historians Alex Goodall and Nick Fischer situate the modern countersubversive tradition in the volatile environment of the post–World War I moment. See Alex Goodall, *Loyalty and Liberty: American Countersubversion from World War I to the McCarthy Era* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2013); and Nick Fischer, *Spider Web: The Birth of American Anticommunism* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2016). Goodall, after Rogin, insisted that this early twentieth-century phase of countersubversion cut across the political spectrum—from far left to extreme right—and that those motivated by countersubversion “argued it was necessary to defend” the American “political system from covert threats.” Goodall, *Loyalty and Liberty*, 3–4. Likewise, Fischer treats anti-communism as a subgenus of the wider category of countersubversion in American culture. Fischer, *Spider Web*, 2. Rogin, Goodall, and Fischer all agree that countersubversives may have variously warned about secret African American, Jewish, Catholic, Mormon, immigrant, Communist, pacifist, monopolist, or reactionary forces conspiring to destroy the American system, but, regardless of the threat, all countersubversives shared the basic conviction that nefarious, clandestine forces were at work undermining American democracy.

By placing the countersubversive tradition directly within the structures of America’s elite governmental, military, and business institutions, Rogin, and those who follow his insights, explicitly reject the “status anxiety” and “paranoid style” analyses of fringe conspiracy thinking popularized in such works as Daniel Bell, ed., *The Radical Right: The New American Right*, 2d ed. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964); Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays* (New York: Vintage, 1967); and Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, *The Politics of Unreason: Right Wing Extremism in America, 1790–1970*, Patterns of American Prejudice Series, v. 5 (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). Works in this “consensus” (or *symbolist*, in Rogin’s terms) tradition tend to situate countersubversion as an irrational outlier of American political culture. Hofstadter’s paranoid style, Rogin argues, envisions countersubversion and conspiracy thinking as happening at the political margins, “far from institutional centers of power.” Rogin, “The Countersubversive Tradition in American Politics,” 3. This allowed Hofstadter and those in his interpretive tradition to contrast

the paranoid style with an ostensibly mainstream “pluralist pragmatism” that Hofstadter saw as the essence of liberal, democratic values in the United States. Rogin, “The Countersubversive Tradition in American Politics,” 9. In the works of Rogin, Goodall, and Fischer, countersubversion is not a marginal outlier at the edges of the American system; rather, it is the norm. It operates at the very “center of American politics” as a driving force in the governmental, corporate, and voluntary institutions that make up public and private life in the United States. Rogin, *Ronald Reagan*, viii.

A significant number of scholars have called attention to the relationship between national security and religion. General works on national security and culture in the United States have emphasized the significance of religion during the Cold War. See Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, 2d ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Patrick Allitt, *Religion in America since 1945: A History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); and Jason W. Stevens, *God-Fearing and Free: A Spiritual History of America's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). Specialists who study religion have honed these general insights to much finer points, especially in works such as Jonathan P. Herzog, *The Spiritual-Industrial Complex: America's Religious Battle against Communism in the Early Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). Some of the most recent and significant work has focused on critical studies of religion and the FBI, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and its successor agency, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). For important works about the FBI, domestic security, and religion during the twentieth century, see Hugh B. Urban, “Fair Game: Secrecy, Security, and the Church of Scientology in Cold War America,” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 74, no. 2 (April 2006): 356–89; Steve Rosswurm, *The FBI and the Catholic Church, 1935–1962* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010); part three of Sylvester A. Johnson, *African American Religions, 1500–2000* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 273–406; the essays collected in Sylvester A. Johnson and Steven Weitzman, eds., *The FBI and Religion: Faith and National Security before and after 9/11* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017); and Lerone Martin, “Bureau Clergyman: How the FBI Colluded with an African American Televangelist to Destroy Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,” *Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation* 28, no. 1 (Winter 2018): 1–51. On the OSS and CIA, see Michael Graziano, “Religion and the Birth of the American Intelligence State” (PhD diss., Florida State University, 2016); and Matthew Avery Sutton, *Double Crossed: The Missionaries Who Spied for the United States during the Second World War* (New York: Basic Books, 2019).

⁸This essay owes much of its inspiration to the field of surveillance studies, a relatively new area of research that joins concerns from the humanities and the social sciences into a more or less coherent area of study focused on the problem of surveillance in modern societies. Foundational works in surveillance studies include Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan, 2d ed. (New York: Vintage, 1995); Gary T. Marx, *Undercover: Police Surveillance in America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); and David Lyon, *Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994). Important recent trends in the field have turned to a more critical assessment of surveillance, gender, and race. See, for example, Christian Parenti, *The Soft Cage: Surveillance in America from Slavery to the War on Terror* (New York: Basic Books, 2003); Simone Browne, *Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015); and Rachel E. Dubrofsky and Shoshana Amielle Magnet, eds., *Feminist Surveillance Studies* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015).

⁹The substantial body of scholarship on the rise of America's surveillance state can be sampled in works such as Joan M. Jensen's pioneering study, *The Price of Vigilance* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), and her *Army Surveillance in America, 1775–1980* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), both of which document the linkages between the First World War, military intelligence, and local policing. Likewise, Frank J. Donner, *Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America's Political Intelligence System* (New York: Vintage, 1981), and William Preston, *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933*, 2d ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), make a strong argument for the long history of federal and local surveillance stretching from the early twentieth century through the Great Depression and into the Cold War. Finally, Christopher Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), and Goodall, *Loyalty and Liberty*, situate the growth of domestic surveillance in the context of the proliferation of voluntary associations in the 1910s and 1920s. These groups—especially the American Protective League, the American Legion, and the Daughters of the American Revolution—helped give rise to the perennial surveillant demand: “If you see something, say something!” Media scholar Joshua Reeves has argued that this demand forms the heart of what he calls “seeing/saying citizenship.” Over the course of the twentieth century, according to Reeves, the seeing/saying citizen was “endowed with unique intelligence-gathering potential” by both state and nonstate bureaucracies that “empower[ed] citizens

to police their own geographic, professional, political, and moral communities” as “an essential political demand of late liberal government.” Joshua Reeves, *Citizen Spies: The Long Rise of America’s Surveillance Society* (New York: New York University Press, 2017), 4, 10.

¹⁰In the field of surveillance studies, scholars generally treat surveillance as a network of practices related to observing and recording information in order to sort, sift, and constitute the social. Key works in this trend include Oscar H. Gandy, *The Panopticon Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993); David Lyon, *Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination* (New York: Routledge, 2003); and Ansgar Josef Teboho, *Identify and Sort: How Digital Power Changed World Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). Surveillance in this context means much more—and also much less—than the sort of state-centered, law enforcement-oriented practices of monitoring the behavior of citizens to generate actionable intelligence and prevent crime. As a broader set of practices related to social sorting and the collection and coalition of information about social actors, the concept of *surveillance* captures a wider network of practices ranging from the efforts of corporations to track the shopping practices of their customers, states’ efforts to generate useful information about their citizens, and a general bureaucratic trend toward the creation of enormous archives of data on average citizens that fundamentally altered the relationship between the public and the private spheres in democratic institutions and civic society during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

¹¹On the “business turn,” see Amanda Porterfield, Darren E. Grem, and John Corrigan, eds., *The Business Turn in American Religious History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). Similarly, a number of important recent studies have emphasized the role of corporations and business management in shaping white, evangelical Protestantism; see especially Bethany Moreton, “Why Is There So Much Sex in Christian Conservatism and Why Do So Few Historians Care Anything about It?” *Journal of Southern History* 75, no. 3 (August 2009): 717–38; Timothy Gloege, *Guaranteed Pure: The Moody Bible Institute, Business, and the Making of Modern Evangelicalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Matthew Avery Sutton, *American Apocalypse: A History of Modern Evangelicalism* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014); Kevin M. Kruse, *One Nation under God: How Corporate America Invented Christian America* (New York: Basic Books, 2015); and Darren E. Grem, *The Blessings of Business: How Corporations Shaped Conservative Christianity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). This essay seeks to synthesize American

religious historians' abiding interest in business practices and corporations with the new "archival turn" emerging in anthropology and cultural studies. The archival turn attends to the forms of information collected by states, corporations, and other systems of bureaucratic surveillance by studying the material mechanisms and cultural practices used to create, preserve, and distribute these records. See Matthew S. Hull, "Documents and Bureaucracy," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 41 (2012): 251–67; Paul N. Edwards and others, "AHR Conversation: Historical Perspectives on the Circulation of Information," *American Historical Review* 116, no. 5 (December 2011): 1393–1435; Bruno Latour, *The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d'état* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2013); and Lisa Gitelman, *Paper Knowledge: Toward a Media History of Documents* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014).

¹²In this sense, this essay is not about the way religious organizations use business practices to "sell" religion—a strata of research exemplified by R. Laurence Moore, *Selling God: American Religion in the Marketplace of Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

¹³For Americanists, the pioneering work of Colleen McDannell, David Morgan, and Sally Promey comes immediately to mind. For McDannell's important work on the intersection of the material and visual in American Christianity, see *Material Christianity: Religion and Popular Culture in America*, 2d ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), or, for her work on photographing religious difference during the Great Depression, see *Picturing Faith: Photography and the Great Depression* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004). For Morgan, see his *Protestants and Pictures: Religion, Visual Culture, and the Age of American Mass Production* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), and *The Embodied Eye: Religious Visual Culture and the Social Life of Feeling* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012). Sally M. Promey, *Spiritual Spectacles: Vision and Image in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Shakerism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), is significant for its study of visions and visual culture in the nineteenth century. Likewise, her important collaboration with Morgan and others have helped shape the study of the relationship between religious and visual culture in the United States; see David Morgan and Sally M. Promey, eds., *The Visual Culture of American Religions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); and Sally M. Promey, ed., *Sensational Religion: Sensory Cultures in Material Practice* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014).

¹⁴This essay primarily concerns itself with the development of organizational charts in modern industries as a mechanism for visualizing social relationships. As the next section argues, this genus

of charts is used to simultaneously analyze social relationships and impose visual and temporal unity on diverse actors working asynchronously over vast distances. In this sense, organizational charts are related to another contemporary graphical innovation of the railroad industry: timetables. As British sociologist Anthony Giddens argues, like the organizational chart, the timetable “is one of the most significant of modern organizational devices, presuming and stimulating a regulation of social life by quantified time in a manner quite unknown in prior types of societies. . . . *A time-table is a time-space organizing device, which is at the heart of modern organizations.*” Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, vol. 2 of *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1985), 174; emphasis in the original. Modern visual schema such as organizational charts and timetables conspire to synchronize the activities of social actors cooperating discontinuously over large distance. In this sense, they are akin to visual representations of space-time pioneered in the field of scientific management in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (a topic discussed in greater depth in the next section of this essay). These time studies, through the development of new photographic and plastic modeling technologies, allowed researchers to envision motion—which has both duration and discontinuous locations in space—as a static, synchronic form that made space-time visible in two or three dimensions. For fuller developments of this point, see Siegfried Giedion, *Mechanization Takes Command: A Contribution to Anonymous History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), 100–107; and Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space, 1880–1918*, 2d ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 115–17. In contrast to visualizing the synchronic coordination of social action facilitated by timetables and organizational charts, the prophecy diagrams, biblical timelines, and eschatological charts that developed in the nineteenth century emerged from the pedagogical need to help students of the Bible envision the past and its relationship to the present and future as ordered and measurable—a fundamentally imaginative, diachronic function. See B. M. Pietsch, *Dispensational Modernism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

¹⁵See Morgan, *Protestants and Pictures*, especially chapter four, “Millerism and the Schematic Imagination,” 123–58; and Pietsch, *Dispensational Modernism*, chapters 5, “Building the Dispensations,” 125–45, and 6, “Engineering Time,” 146–72.

¹⁶As noted previously, this essay is indebted to B. M. Pietsch’s *Dispensational Modernism*. Like Pietsch’s book, this essay explores how nonreligious epistemological trends associated with the modern sciences, such as engineering and scientific management, shaped the

thinking of some religious Americans. In contrast to Pietsch's focus on the appropriation of new techniques in measurement and engineering into religious media, however, this essay considers a different range of technical practices related to recording, archiving, and visually representing complex social relationships.

¹⁷Mrs. Randolph Frothingham, "The War Department Letter that Pacifists Conceal," *Woman Patriot*, June 1, 1927, 83, Women's Studies Manuscript Collections from The Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College; J. Edgar Hoover to Lucia R. Maxwell, May 19, 1923, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1922–1935 (Chemical Warfare Ban), file no. 10110–1935, *US. Military Intelligence Reports: Surveillance of Radicals in the United States, 1917–1941* (microfilm), reel 19, frame 00529.

¹⁸Maxwell's chart appeared anonymously alongside An American Citizen, "Why Don't Women Investigate Propaganda," *Dearborn Independent*, March 22, 1924, 10, 13. The "American Citizen" behind the article was Haviland Lund, a fact acknowledged in Frothingham, "The War Department Letter that Pacifists Conceal," 83. Further, W. J. Cameron, an editor at the *Dearborn Independent*, admitted that Lund authored the article (W. J. Cameron to Ethel M. Smith, May 12, 1924, League of Women Voters [U.S.] records, 1884–1986, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., microfilm edition, reel 4, frame 762). Both sources, however, insisted that Lund did not provide the spider-web chart to the *Independent*, although they refused to clarify who did.

¹⁹In the fraught political environment of the post-World War I moment, Maxwell and her allies in the federal bureaucracy worked closely with business leaders and voluntary societies to claim the label of "patriots." Much to the chagrin of progressive and left-leaning groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union, "patriot" and "patriotism" became increasingly identified with a number of countersubversive, promilitary, right-wing or right-leaning voluntary associations. This, ironically, was partly a symptom of literature designed to expose and challenge right-wing countersubversive organizations. Most notably, Norman Hapgood published the paradigm-defining *Professional Patriots: An Exposure of the Personalities, Methods and Objectives Involved in the Organized Effort to Exploit Patriotic Impulses in These United States during and after the Late War* (New York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1927). Although Hapgood clearly intended his work to challenge the right's presumed monopoly on patriotism, his work's title bestowed an evocative alliterative phrase to a generation of leftists, left-leaning academics, and moderate critics of the American right wing. In the years that followed, many of these left-leaning critics would essentially cede the term to their political

enemies. As a consequence, by the 1950s and 1960s, prominent consensus-minded social scientists and historians, including Daniel Bell and Richard Hofstadter, used expressions such as *super patriots* and *ultra patriots* to describe the subjects of their studies, whereas conservative countersubversives were all too happy to accept the moniker of *patriot* even if they remained ambivalent about prefatory adjectives denoting extremism.

²⁰Historians of the women's groups and antisubversive organizations have carefully documented how figures such as General Amos A. Fries and Maxwell, Fries's librarian, were suspicious of women's religious organizations and antiwar groups. For histories situating the spider-web chart in this cultural context, see Fischer, *Spider Web*, 71–79; and, Jan Doolittle Wilson, *The Women's Joint Congressional Committee and the Politics of Maternalism, 1920–30*, *Women in American History* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007), 148–70.

²¹See Paul L. Murphy, "Sources and Nature of Intolerance in the 1920s," *Journal of American History* 51, no. 1 (1964): 72–73.

²²As Johanna Drucker notes, "Charts, graphs, and other structures, like trees . . . use contrast, comparison, sequence, ordering, rates of change, distribution across the plane, bivariate and multi-variate axes, and time axes to show temporal activity or causality." Johanna Drucker, *Graphesis: Visual Forms of Knowledge Production* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 96.

²³Alfred D. Chandler, *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977), 103–9.

²⁴Winfield A. Savage, *Graphic Analysis for Executives* (New York: Codex, 1924), 138, relates organizational charts to Taylor's development of a science of corporate organization.

²⁵Willard Cope Brinton, *Graphic Methods for Presenting Facts* (New York: Engineering Magazine Co., 1914), 15, <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/005797865>; Allan Cecil Haskell, *Graphic Charts in Business: How to Make and Use Them* (New York: Codex, 1922), 3; Savage, *Graphic Analysis for Executives*, 130, 1; Henry D. Hubbard, "Magic in Graphs," in Willard Cope Brinton, *Graphic Presentation* (New York: Brinton Associates, 1939), 2; JoAnne Yates, *Control through Communication: The Rise of System in American Management* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 89–90.

²⁶Jeffrey Wheatley, "Enchantments of the Octopus: Pre-Modern Religions, Hyper-Modern Races, and Corporate Monopolies in the Nineteenth-Century United States," paper presented at the Florida State University Graduate Symposium, February 2016, Tallahassee, Florida.

²⁷Peter Knight, *Reading the Market: Genres of Financial Capitalism in Gilded Age America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 242; Louis D. Brandeis, *Other People's Money, and How the Bankers Use It* (New York: Stokes, 1914), 30, quoted in Knight, *Reading the Market*, 242.

²⁸Arsène Pujo, *Money Trust Investigation: Investigation of Financial and Monetary Conditions in the United States Under House Resolutions Nos. 429 and 504 before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, 1912–1913* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1923). All twenty-nine parts of the report and its supporting exhibits are available online at Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRASER, <https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/80>.

²⁹For “spider web” and “octopus” references, see, respectively, “The Money Trust Visualized,” *Annalist: A Magazine of Finance, Commerce, and Economics*, March 2, 1913, 193; and Ida M. Tarbell, “The Hunt for the Money Trust,” *American Magazine*, May 1913, 13. For the Willard C. Brinton quotation, see his *Graphic Methods for Presenting Facts*, 15.

³⁰Educational Bureau of the Industrial Workers of the World, *Coal-Mine Workers and Their Industry: An Industrial Handbook* (Chicago: Industrial Workers of the World, 1923).

³¹Michael Paul Rogin suggests there is nothing “ironic” in Maxwell’s appropriation of progressive and radical visual schemes. He argues that “countersubversive theory mirrors the enemy it is out to destroy.” Rogin, *Ronald Reagan*, 246.

³²Although it might be tempting for scholars of American religion—especially those studying white, conservative, Protestant evangelicals—to follow historians such as Mark A. Noll, Nathan O. Hatch, and George M. Marsden and situate all of this interest in charts and graphs as an epistemic manifestation of popular democratic sentiments rooted in the long cultural legacy of “common-sense” realism, I suggest that the reality is much more complicated. On “common-sense” realism, see, respectively, Mark A. Noll, “Common Sense Traditions and American Evangelical Thought,” *American Quarterly* 37, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 216–38; Nathan O. Hatch, *The Democratization of American Christianity* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 162–189; and George M. Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture*, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). As B. M. Pietsch has demonstrated, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, American Protestants of all persuasions began to appropriate some aspects of “the taxonomic mind” that came to prominence among engineers, industrial and corporate managers, and specialized academic faculty. Pietsch, *Dispensational Modernism*, 27. These

methods of knowledge production rejected long-standing appeals to the “common sense” of all and, instead, “grounded . . . knowledge in specialized processes of measurement, efficiency, classification, and standardization.” Pietsch, *Dispensational Modernism*, 27. Because of the growing emphasis on the management of human actors at a distance via railroads and telegraphic systems or, conversely, in highly concentrated spaces such as factories and cities, new methods of systemic social oversight—especially in the form of scientific management—became necessary. On this emphasis in churches, see Pietsch, *Dispensational Modernism*, 31–34.

Maxwell’s chart manifests these broader cultural trends and the concomitant socioepistemological problems. First, as should be clear from even a cursory glance at some of the charts included with this essay (see, for example, [Figures 2, 5, and 6](#)), these graphical tools are difficult to read and take significant effort to interpret. The spider-web charts and various interlock graphs emphasize complexity, overlapping agencies, and social messiness over elegance and clarity of visual exposition. Consequently, these graphs and charts subtly worked to reinforce the sense that early twentieth-century American culture was growing increasingly complex and social relationships harder to understand. Urbanization and industrialization had, as Robert H. Wiebe notes, corroded nineteenth-century faith in “individualism and casual cooperation” that dominated the towns and countrysides and replaced it with “new virtues” such as “regularity, system, [and] continuity.” Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877–1920* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 14. The nineteenth-century mythology of the sovereign individual functioning as the atomic limit of social organization faced a growing network of challenges in the form of corporations, trade unions, state bureaucracies, and other systems that threatened to subsume individuals into “the social.” On this shift from individual autonomy to a growing sense of collective subordination, see Wiebe, *The Search for Order*; Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998); and Jonathan Levy, *Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). Organizational charts and graphs emerged at precisely the moment in which business managers, urban administrators, and state bureaucrats needed to rein in autonomous self-rule to facilitate new forms of governance acting synchronically over large distances via vast social structures. See, for example, the discussion of the rise of salaried managers and their innovations in social management at a distance in Chandler, *The Visible Hand*, 94–109.

Increasing social stratification, intensifying densities of social relationships, and expanding distance between social actors made it harder to grasp the nature and shape of seemingly rudimentary social relationships. The increasing prevalence of wage labor and social arrangements structured by contractual obligations changed civic relationships while secrecy and intentional obfuscation by some actors made modern relationships seem less trustworthy. One way to deal with these changes was to attempt to map obscured or concealed relationships through the use of new visual means—including graphs and charts—because “common sense” no longer provided accurate social guides.

³³Charles Norman Fay, *Social Justice: The Moral of the Henry Ford Fortune* (Cambridge, MA: Cosmo, 1926). Religion earned two dedicated chapters in which Fay condemned the idea of equality and implicitly attacked ecumenical Christianity and the Social Gospel as contributing forces to the “Gospel of Jealousy” fomented by Marxism. “The whole conception of free, voluntary, individual charity, as taught by Christ,” he wrote, “is absolutely destroyed by the doctrine of compulsory, collective, statutory obligation, as taught by Marx.” Fay, *Social Justice*, 250.

³⁴Le Roy F. Smith and E. B. Johns, *Pastors, Politicians, Pacifists* (Chicago: Constructive Educational Publishers, 1927), v; emphasis in the original.

³⁵Amos A. Fries, *Sugar Coating Communism for Protestant Churches* (Washington, DC, 1932), 1, no. 1 in the Pre-Pearl Harbor Pamphlets Collected by John Bowe, Minnesota Historical Society Library. For Fries’s other attack on ecumenical Protestantism and the FCC, see Amos A. Fries, *Communism Unmasked* (Washington, DC: Georgetown Press, 1937). In 1929, Fries retired from the Army and turned his attention to full-time countersubversive research. During the 1930s and 1940s, he maintained a number of targets, including Catholics, pacifists of any sort, and ecumenical Protestants. Fries continued his countersubversive activism well into the middle part of the twentieth century and became an important influence on Allen A. Zoll, a key character in the next section of this essay. Adam Laats, *The Other School Reformers: Conservative Activism in American Education* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 144.

³⁶Fries, *Sugar Coating Communism for Protestant Churches*, 12.

³⁷Henry B. Joy, “Our Protestant Churches in Politics” (advertisement), *Detroit Free Press*, November 2, 1930, 11.

³⁸On the size of the council, see Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, *Report of the First Meeting of the Federal Council*, ed. Elias B. Sanford (New York: Revell, 1909), iii.

³⁹As Martin E. Marty noted, “Few Protestant church people, including liberals, favored labor strikes as a general policy. Many of

them were pacifists, and strikes implied the potential of violence or provoked open conflict. . . . To face the issue at all, the Federal Council of Churches leadership had to overcome its own reluctance to support actions which might include violence." Martin E. Marty, *Modern American Religion*, vol 2: *The Noise of Conflict, 1919–1941* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 226. See also Federal Council of Churches, *Report of Special Committee Appointed by the Commission on the Church and Social Service of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America Concerning the Industrial Situation at South Bethlehem, Pa.* (New York, 1910).

⁴⁰The FCC's response to the war was complex. On one level, the pacifism of many clergy prevented it from taking an aggressive stand for intervention in the European conflict. Prominent early leaders of the ecumenical social Christianity embodied in the FCC, such as Shailer Mathews and Walter Rauschenbusch, initially refused to support the war. See Gary J. Dorrien, *Soul in Society: The Making and Renewal of Social Christianity* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 51–60. In contrast, many preachers associated with FCC churches became dedicated boosters of the war effort who traded in anti-German sentiment and overt xenophobia. For an account of the more troubling relationship between FCC clergy and wartime hysteria, see Ray H. Abrams, *Preachers Present Arms* (New York: Round Table, 1933), 93–226. On yet another level, many leaders felt compelled to support the democratic idealism and progressive spirit represented in President Woodrow Wilson's justifications for entering the war, and the FCC played an important role in shaping the military chaplaincy during the war. See Abrams, *Preachers Present Arms*, and Cara Lea Burnidge's discussion of progressive, social Christians in *A Peaceful Conquest: Woodrow Wilson, Religion, and the New World Order* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). On the chaplaincy and the FCC, see Ronit Y. Stahl, *Enlisting Faith: How the Military Chaplaincy Shaped Religion and State in Modern America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017). Following the war, leading figures in the FCC argued that federal expenditures for preparedness programs were too expensive and threatened to overwhelm other forms of domestic spending.

⁴¹A. James Reichley, *Religion in American Public Life* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1985), 275–78; Gary S. Eller, "Special Interest Groups and American Presbyterians," in *The Organizational Revolution: Presbyterians and American Denominationalism*, ed. Milton J. Coalter, John M. Mulder, and Louis B. Weeks (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992), 254–78.

⁴²On federal efforts—especially by the MID—to surveil and ultimately compel black loyalty during and after the war, see

Theodore Kornweibel, *Seeing Red: Federal Campaigns against Black Militancy, 1919–1925* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999); and Theodore Kornweibel, *“Investigate Everything”: Federal Efforts to Ensure Black Loyalty during World War I* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002).

⁴³See, respectively, Department of Justice Memorandum, “In re: The Federal Council of Churches of the Churches of Christ in the USA,” December 2, 1920, 204048-P; and Department of Justice Memorandum, “Re: Complaint of Federal Council of Churches of the Churches of Christ in America on Treatment of Arrested COMMUNISTS,” December 24, 1920, 204048-20. Both files are archived in the microfilm edition of the Investigative Case Files of the Bureau of Investigation, 1908–1922, United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁴⁴Useful, in this context, is Bruno Latour’s concept of *oligoptica*. Latour contrasts *oligoptica* with Foucault’s well-known concept of *panoptica*: “As every reader of Michel Foucault knows, the ‘panopticon’ [is] an ideal prison allowing for a total surveillance of inmates.” Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory*, Clarendon Lectures in Management Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 181. Here, Latour critiqued Foucault’s oft-cited discussion of “Panopticism” in *Discipline and Punish*, 195–228. In contrast to Foucault’s *pan-*, or *all-seeing* visual metaphor of the *panopticon*, Latour suggests the circumscribed idea of *oligo* (from the Greek for “few” or “small in number”) as a useful countermetaphor. “*Oligoptica*,” according to Latour, are connected mechanisms of seeing and recording—arrays or networks of a variety of diverse, but discrete, instruments such as telescopes, microscopes, seismographs, bureaucratic forms, dossiers, single computers, and so on—that are “exactly the opposite of *panoptica*.” Latour, *Reassembling the Social*, 181. Individually, these instruments see and record “much too little to feed the megalomania of the inspector or the paranoia of the inspected, but what they see, they see it well.” Latour, *Reassembling the Social*, 181; emphasis in the original. As with laboratories (Latour’s primary object of study), most mechanisms of modern surveillance, whether in the form of closed-circuit cameras, government intelligence agencies, or bureaucratic filing systems, are not *panoptical* in nature but, rather, *oligoptical*: they are discrete, individual seeing-recording instruments that are connected and integrated into larger networks. It is only within the context of these networks that surveillance systems emerge.

⁴⁵*How Red Is the Federal Council of Churches?* (Madison, WI: American Council of Christian Laymen, n.d. [1949?]).

⁴⁶Stuart J. Foster, *Red Alert! Educators Confront the Red Scare in American Public Schools, 1947–1954*, Counterpoints 87 (New York: P. Lang, 2000).

⁴⁷National Council for American Education, *How Red Are the Schools?* (1948), 3, in box 130, folder 2, "National Council for American Education," Alfred Kohlberg Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, California.

⁴⁸Verne P. Kaub to Fred L. Heath, June 28, 1950, reel 1, frame 419, microfilm edition of the American Council of Christian Laymen Records, 1950–1963, Wisconsin Historical Society (hereafter cited as ACCL).

⁴⁹Verne P. Kaub to P. B. Dyck, May 22, 1950, reel 1, frame 302, ACCL.

⁵⁰Nelson L. Dawson, "From Fellow Traveler to Anticommunist: The Odyssey of J. B. Matthews," *Register of the Kentucky Historical Society* 84, no. 3 (July 1, 1986): 299.

⁵¹Arthur D. Morse, "Who's Trying to Ruin Our Schools?" *McCall's*, September 1951, 94.

⁵²C. P. Trussell, "Senators Predict Matthews Ouster: Republicans Expect McCarthy to Accept Resignation on New Committee Challenge," *New York Times*, July 9, 1953, 9.

⁵³Robert M. Lichtman, "J. B. Matthews and the 'Counter-Subversives': Names as a Political and Financial Resource in the McCarthy Era," *American Communist History* 5, no. 1 (June 1, 2006): 25n57. In fact, in the 1930s, the FBI consulted Matthews's files but eventually distanced itself from the investigator when he leaked sensitive information to the press.

⁵⁴Matthews's exposés (and those produced by other countersubversives) led to a rush of "clearing" efforts by people swept up in his indexes. See, for example, *The Road Back* (New York: AWARE, 1955), Alan Hewitt Papers, 1930–1986, Dartmouth Rauner Special Collections Library, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, a pamphlet describing how a "Communist and Communist-helper in entertainment-communications who seeks to clear himself" of alleged Communist connections might go about the process.

⁵⁵J. B. Matthews, *Odyssey of a Fellow Traveler* (New York: Mount Vernon, 1938), 224.

⁵⁶As historians have documented, one important early adopter of the index card for law enforcement and intelligence gathering purposes was J. Edgar Hoover. Most of his biographers agree that a young Hoover, while serving as a clerk at the Library of Congress, mastered the library's indexing and cross-referencing system and intuited its relevance for indexing people instead of books. Hoover, in 1921, applied this insight to an overhaul of the BI's files. For

accounts of Hoover's use of index cards and cross-referencing see, most recently, Kenneth D. Ackerman, *Young J. Edgar: Hoover and the Red Scare, 1919–1920* (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2007), 43; and Library of Congress, *The Card Catalog: Books, Cards, and Literary Treasures* (San Francisco: Chronicle, 2017), 150. Although it is likely true that his work in the Library of Congress system inspired Hoover, there is also an air of hagiography in the biographies of Hoover on this point. Historians can accurately describe Hoover as an innovative bureaucrat, but it is also true that organizations as varied as the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, the U.S. military, and numerous corporations in the emerging credit industry had been using index cards, smart number systems (like the Dewey decimal system), and cross-referencing to track people at the end of the nineteenth century. For more on the long history of the card index and its pre-Hoover role in governing populations and creating linkages among people, places, and events, see Markus Krajewski, *Paper Machines: About Cards and Catalogs, 1548–1929*, trans. Peter Krapp (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2011); and Teboho, *Identify and Sort*. The more general insights about social recording, mutability, and connection are from Bruno Latour, "Visualisation and Cognition: Drawing Things Together," in *Knowledge and Society Studies in the Sociology of Culture Past and Present*, ed. H. Kuklick, vol. 6 (Stamford, CT: Jai, 1986), 1–40, available online at <http://www.bruno-latour.fr/node/293>; and Maurizio Ferraris, *Documentality: Why It Is Necessary to Leave Traces*, trans. Richard Davies (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012).

⁵⁷"Laymen Form Group, Hit Church Council," *New York Times*, January 3, 1950, 6.

⁵⁸"Downtown Protestant Churches" (advertisement), *Long Beach Independent*, April 15, 1950, 8.

⁵⁹R. C. Holies, "Common Ground," *The Odessa (TX) American*, January 11, 1950, 8.

⁶⁰Peter J. Thuesen, *In Discordance with the Scriptures: American Protestant Battles over Translating the Bible* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 103. The FBI maintained a file on inquiries related to the Revised Standard Version (RSV) of the Bible, which was published in 1952. Clergy associated with the NCC oversaw the translation of the RSV, and it sold more than twenty-six million copies in the first year following its publication. Because of the controversies associated with the NCC and Communism, however, the RSV prompted numerous questions and warnings about the political loyalties of the panel of translators involved in the project. The FBI took the charges seriously enough to open domestic security file number 100-HQ-413026, Subject: Revised Standard Version of

the Bible. The file is currently archived at the United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁶¹*Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States, Part 2: Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), 35, 44, 43.

⁶²Quoted in Martin Grams, *I Led 3 Lives: The True Story of Herbert A. Philbrick's Television Program* (Albany, GA: BearManor Media, 2007), 44–47.

⁶³Michael Kackman, *Citizen Spy: Television, Espionage, and Cold War Culture*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 3.

⁶⁴*The FBI Story*, directed by Mervyn LeRoy (1959; Warner Brothers DVD, 2006).

⁶⁵Thomas Doherty, *Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and American Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 137.

⁶⁶Edgar C. Bundy, *Apostles of Deceit* (Wheaton, IL: Church League of America, 1966), xi, 12–21. See also Edgar C. Bundy, *Collectivism in the Churches: A Documented Account of the Political Activities of the Federal, National, and World Council of Churches* (Wheaton, IL: Church League of America, 1958), 135.

⁶⁷Arguably, no organization did more to encourage Americans to become amateur investigators than the John Birch Society (JBS). During the 1960s, the group's founder, Robert Welch, encouraged JBS members to begin a nationwide "research project" to "build up" "the most complete and most accurate files in America on the leading Comsymps, Socialists, and Liberals." "Bulletin for July 1961," in *The White Book of the John Birch Society for 1961* (Belmont, MA: John Birch Society), 14. Welch asked "each member" to document criticism of the JBS and to record any subversive activities they encountered in their local communities. Critics of Welch and the JBS identified the "research project" as a neo-McCarthyite program that "will inevitably turn into a little blacklist." "I've Got a Little List," *New York Times*, July 14, 1961, 22. For a more in-depth discussion of the JBS and amateur political surveillance, see D. J. Mulloy, *The World of the John Birch Society: Conspiracy, Conservatism, and the Cold War* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2014), 31–34; and Jonathan M. Schoenwald, "We Are an Action Group: The John Birch Society and the Conservative Movement in the 1960s," in *The Conservative Sixties*, ed. David R. Farber and Jeff Roche (New York: Peter Lang, 2003), 21–36.

⁶⁸*A Program for Community Anti-Communist Action* (Washington, DC: Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A. [c. 1948]), 17 (emphasis in the original); *Committee Handbook* (Washington, DC:

Institute for American Democracy), 28, *Internet Archive*, <https://archive.org/details/committeebook00inst>; “Filing Suggestions for Conservatives,” *THINK* 2, no. 7 (October 1962), 41, University of Iowa Right-Wing Collection (microfilm), reel 128, frame T-15.

Several important works have documented the voluntary surveillance activities of women during the early decades of the twentieth century. See, for example, Kirsten Marie Delegard, “Women Patriots: Female Activism and the Politics of American Anti-Radicalism, 1919–1935” (PhD diss., Duke University, 1999); Francesca Constance Morgan, “‘Home and Country’: Women, Nation, and the Daughters of the American Revolution, 1890–1939” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1998); and Kim E. Nielsen, *Un-American Womanhood: Antiradicalism, Antifeminism, and the First Red Scare* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2001).

⁷⁰Gary North, “It Usually Begins With Ayn Rand,” Blog, *LewRockwell.com*, December 16, 2002, <http://www.lewrockwell.com/north/north145.html>. For an obscure history of North’s equally obscure Christian Right activism, see Michael J. McVicar, *Christian Reconstruction: R. J. Rushdoony and American Religious Conservatism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015).

⁷¹Michelle M. Nickerson, “Domestic Threats: Women, Gender and Conservation in Cold War Los Angeles, 1945–1966” (PhD diss., Yale University, 2003), 170.

⁷²Nickerson, “Domestic Threats,” 171. See also Michelle M. Nickerson, *Mothers of Conservatism: Women and the Postwar Right* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).

⁷³Title 5 of the U.S. Code outlines exemptions to the federal Freedom of Information Act that allow the FBI (and all other federal agencies) to redact portions of requested files to protect against an “unwarranted invasion of privacy.” The most typical exemptions in these cases are (b)(6), which govern the redaction of general details such as the letter writer’s gender, occupation, class, or race and specific details such as names, addresses, and other contact information. Similarly, (b)(7) exemptions allow the FBI and other agencies to redact all “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes” that might, among other things, make prejudicial criminal or civil accusations against a person, expose someone’s identity, reveal confidential sources, or endanger someone through an irresponsible accusation. Because of these two classes of exemptions—coupled with sixteen others—the FBI retains wide latitude to redact information even in files that are over half a century old.

⁷⁴Federal Bureau of Investigation HQ file number 100-403529, Subject: Communist Infiltration of Religion; hereafter cited as

100-HQ-403529. The “Communist Infiltration of Religion” file was not even remotely the largest collection of its kind. Federal Bureau of Investigation file number 100-HQ-50869 also dealt with accusations of communist infiltration of the Federal and National Councils of Churches. This sprawling, 6,400-plus-page file spanned more than half a century (from the 1920s through the early 1970s) and included thousands of letters to the FBI and the Bureau’s accompanying internal memoranda and investigative documents. Numerous, smaller files also abounded, such as the previously cited nearly two-hundred-page domestic security file on accusations that Communists infested the translation team working on the Revised Standard Version of the Bible (100-HQ-413026).

⁷⁵The admittedly fragmentary and impressionistic information in this paragraph is drawn primarily from partial categorization of inquiries sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1953 to 1961 and recorded in 100-HQ-403529, “Communist Infiltration of Religion.” Inquiries from Methodists dominated the letters retaining identifiable (that is, unredacted) information about the authors’ religious affiliation. In declining order, the identifiable denominations include Methodists (seventeen pieces of correspondence), Presbyterians (nine), Episcopalians (seven), Congregationalists (six), Baptists (five), Lutherans (four), and Pentecostals (two). Approximately eight letters contain identifiable information for parachurch agencies with some mainline affiliation, such as an inquiry for the Arizona Council of Churches (Presbyterian) and the Religious Emphasis Committee of Texarkana (Episcopal). The difficulty, of course, is that there are thousands of pages in the file set with redacted information that might conceal significant patterns in the inquiries for which this summary cannot accurately or fully account.

⁷⁶For example, file 100-HQ-403529 contains single letters from writers associated with an unspecified “Fundamental Baptist Church,” the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, and the Church of Christ, Scientist. Although a small number of the letters betray bigoted prejudices against Jews and Catholics, this file contains virtually no identifiable material from Jewish or Catholic writers. This is likely because the FBI filed anti-communist inquiries from Jews and Catholics separately in the Bureau’s vast files on the Catholic Church, the Anti-Defamation League, or individual figures associated with either religion.

⁷⁷Even with the widespread geographic origin of the inquiries, a few metropolitan areas dominate 100-HQ-403529: Los Angeles, California; Dallas, Texas; Pittsburg, Pennsylvania; and New York City.

⁷⁸[Redacted] to J. Edgar Hoover, February 11, 1965, 100-HQ-50869-[illegible].

⁷⁹[Redacted] to J. Edgar Hoover, March 14, 1962, 100-HQ-50869-875; [Redacted] to J. Edgar Hoover, January 27, 1969, 100-HQ-50869-1627; J. Edgar Hoover to [redacted], January 27, 1969, 100-HQ-50869-1627; John 18:38 RSV.

⁸⁰[Redacted] to J. Edgar Hoover, February 1, 1961, 100-HQ-403529-139. Unfortunately for congregants at St. Philip's Episcopal Church, the released file does not preserve their study course for posterity.

⁸¹[Redacted] to J. Edgar Hoover, July 13, 1961, 100-HQ-403529-221; J. Edgar Hoover to [redacted], July 20, 1961, 100-HQ-403529-221.

⁸²[Redacted] to J. Edgar Hoover, November 23, 1955, 100-HQ-50869-274; [Redacted] to J. Edgar Hoover, September 30, 1960, 100-HQ-403529-492.

⁸³Office Memorandum on [redacted] from M[ilton]. A. Jones to [Louis B.] Jones, May 16, 1956, 100-HQ-403529-62. All subsequent quotations in this paragraph are from Jones's memorandum. The subject of the memo, the Special Agent who interviewed her, and all other names are redacted.

⁸⁴Comments such as this one appeared in notes and memoranda throughout the 1950s and 1960s. See, among many other examples in the FBI's extensive files on the NCC, the note attached to a letter from J. Edgar Hoover to [redacted], May 17, 1955, 100-HQ-50869-275.

⁸⁵As Michael Paul Rogin notes, "Although liberals blamed McCarthyite attacks on responsible policymakers for the cold war Red scare, the rise of a security-oriented state bureaucracy was the most important factor in the modern history of countersubversion." Rogin, *Ronald Reagan*, 237. This essay affirms Rogin's central observation but qualifies it to argue that "security-oriented" state and corporate bureaucracies popularized countersubversion through many cultural and social channels, including America's churches and parachurch organizations. Without these complex circuits of institutional exchange, countersubversion might have remained an elite game of Beltway insiders, corporate board members, and law enforcement officials.

⁸⁶Gregory Krieg, "Newt Gingrich Wants New House Un-American Activities Committee," CNN, June 14, 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/14/politics/newt-gingrich-house-un-american-activities-committee/index.html>; and, Kenneth P. Vogel, "The Koch Intelligence Agency," *Politico*, November 18, 2015, <http://www.politico.com/story/2015/11/the-koch-brothers-intelligence-agency-215943>.

⁸⁷See, for example, the highly influential and controversial Center for Security Policy, *Shariah: The Threat to America: An Exercise in Competitive Analysis, Report of Team B II* (Washington, DC: Center for Security Policy Press, 2010).

ABSTRACT *This essay explores how some Americans came to view the Federal Council of Churches (FCC) and, more broadly, ecumenical mainline Protestantism as a threat to the national security interests of the United States. By focusing on the efforts of various elements in the federal bureaucracy—including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Chemical Warfare Service, and Military Intelligence—and the work of average Americans to investigate the FCC, the essay examines how techniques of surveillance and information management helped shape the way Americans came to understand religion in the twentieth century. The essay develops three interconnected themes: first, the rise of America’s national security surveillance establishment in the United States after World War I; second, the development of new methods of information management and visualization in corporate and state bureaucracies; and, third, the rise of voluntary, private surveillance in the wake of World War I. Through these three themes, the essay highlights how a network of federal bureaucrats, business leaders, and average citizens used graphs, indexes, and files to interpret mainline, ecumenical Christianity as a threat to domestic security in the United States. Ultimately, the project suggests that scholarly efforts to assess fissures in U.S. Protestantism have focused too much on controversies over belief and theology—especially those related to evolutionary theory, eschatology, and scriptural inerrancy—and paid far too little attention to the emerging bureaucratic systems of state and corporate surveillance that helped to document, visualize, and disseminate these accusations in the first place.*