

as a revolutionary act unheard of in West European countries (p. 219), passing over in silence the new electoral law which introduced a network of "pre-electoral assemblies" entitled to affirm or veto the candidates, something which the electorate rightly took for an offense and responded accordingly. Similarly, he naïvely believes that since conquering space and developing speed in action have been essential in warfare, and since Poland could not afford a motorized army and columns of panzers, she had to have recourse to cavalry (p. 193). After the death of Piłsudski in 1935 Jędrzejewicz sided with Colonel Sławek, the closest personal friend of the defunct marshal, now spurned by President Mościcki and General (later Marshal) Rydz Smigły. Jędrzejewicz has been greatly mistaken in assuming that Sławek's idea of a General Political Organization (POP) would be more salutary to Poland than the elitist Camp of National Unity (OZN), launched in 1937 under the auspices of Rydz Smigły. It is a confession of a man who, having sinned and made the final reckoning, finds himself and his like righteous and sure of their correctness. However, if an insight is needed into the mentality of the Piłsudskists' wing which after the marshal's death used to pay their allegiance to Sławek, here it is. Needless to say, for different reasons, both wings failed.

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PEOPLE'S POLAND: GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS. By *Alexander J. Groth*. Chandler Publications in Political Science. San Francisco, Scranton, London, Toronto: Chandler Publishing Company, 1972. vii, 155 pp. \$3.95, paper.

This is a useful little book, with no pretension to a novel theoretical approach. Its main objective is to serve as an introduction to Poland's politics, and it contains a comprehensive survey of political, economic, and social developments in that country from the Communist takeover in 1944 until Gierek's ascendancy to power in 1970. A good balance is maintained in describing political institutions and processes—domestic as well as external.

The book is quite informative. The author obviously knows the subject well and has selected his material judiciously. The presentation is lucid and the argumentation persuasive. On the whole he maintains strict objectivity, but is not devoid of compassion. The discussion of the attitudes of the Polish people toward the Communist system is particularly well presented.

Nevertheless there are some factual errors, especially concerning recent events. For instance, in March 1971 Piasecki was not elevated to the Cabinet (p. 77) but to the Council of State; Switała was appointed minister of the interior in July 1968, not January 1971 (p. 76). Moczar was not head of the Security Police from 1945 until 1956 (p. 69); he did serve in the security apparatus in the postwar years, but in the early 1950s after Gomułka's fall he also went into eclipse and was transferred to other duties. He returned to the security apparatus only in 1956, as deputy minister; in 1964 he became minister. This last mistake is especially regrettable, since it colors the author's entire treatment of the political role of Moczar, which is presented in a distinctly one-sided way.

The bibliographical essay has some omissions. Important articles on Polish politics have appeared in *Survey*, *Foreign Affairs*, and *Canadian Slavonic Papers*—

all of which are missing from the list of English-language periodicals. *Polish Society* by Jan Szczepeński—which is certainly the most authoritative work in English on sociopolitical changes in postwar Poland—is also absent.

Yet, despite these occasional lapses, Professor Groth's book is a valuable addition to the literature in English on contemporary Poland. The author has accomplished his objective and produced a volume useful both to the beginner in any East European area program and to the general student of comparative politics.

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THE DOOMED DEMOCRACY: CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN A DISRUPTED EUROPE, 1914–38. By *Věra Olivová*. Translated by *George Theiner*. Introduction by *Sir Cecil Parrott*. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1972. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972. 276 pp. £4.50. \$12.50.

Professor Olivová's book is a remarkable piece of scholarship. It deserves to be studied carefully not for new information about interwar Czechoslovakia but for fresh, analytical insights which originate from a respectable scholar living in ideologically besieged Prague. Characteristic of the spirit of the "Czechoslovak Spring," the book was first published in Czech during that exhilarating though short-lived experience of freedom of expression.

Olivová's study of Czechoslovakia is firmly and correctly embodied in the framework of interwar Europe. The country's domestic developments reflected the changing social, economic, and political fortunes of the Continent. The author recognizes and appreciates the country's valiant commitment to political democracy, economic progress, and social justice. She treats T. G. Masaryk's program and his towering influence with respect, even admiration, and she has words of esteem even for Edvard Beneš. She sees the problem of Slovakia and the Sudeten Germans—the Achilles' heel of the solid state structure—as a challenge for which a solution would have been found, with time. Unhappily, international developments stripped Czechoslovakia of that needed time. First, the Locarno Pact gave a sense of security (a false one) to Western Europe and directed Germany's attention to Eastern Europe. As a consequence, conservative elements in Czechoslovakia questioned the country's foreign policy and gained influence in the government. Second, Hitler's arrival to power and his aggressive actions against the Rhineland and Austria were met with appeasement on the part of the West, and the reaction in Czechoslovakia was one of further political cleavage between progressive and right-wing elements. Third, and with tragic results for both Czechoslovakia and the rest of Europe, Munich opened the road—with the West's participation—to destruction. In all instances, the Soviet Union stood aside (though ready, according to Olivová, to defend the cause of democracy) because of a combination of factors: she was weak internally, and she was feared and not wanted by Europe.

The author had access to sources some of which are not available in the West or are not accessible to Western scholars. It is therefore regrettable that she gives no source references when she brings out some previously unknown facts. One can also question her analysis of social struggles in the years immediately following the end of World War I and during the Depression as well as the role of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. However, the book is remarkably free of boring