

the *Ausgleich*. It enabled the Dalmatian Nationalists to begin implementing changes in the administration, schools, and language regulations that allowed the South Slavic majority to reassert itself in Dalmatia after centuries of Italian domination. This rather traditional interpretation pervades most of the articles included in the volume.

Only one selection deals directly with the election of 1870. The others discuss the economic, social, cultural, and political conditions in Dalmatia in the nineteenth century. The papers vary considerably in quality—including a keen analysis of the Croatian ideology of Mihovil Pavlinović as well as elaborations of well-known events of Croatian political history. In one essay, Foretić carefully examines the census statistics for the Italian minority (which never exceeded 28,000), although he probably goes too far in characterizing it as “an artificial creation, the result of definite political events.” Foretić points out elsewhere that the proper focus of this volume is on the *Croatian* national revival, because the Serbs of southern Dalmatia never had to face the same problems of cultural identity as the Croats. They also supported wholeheartedly the Nationalists’ goals of union with Croatia and the replacement of Italian with the Serbo-Croatian language in public life. As the contents of this volume demonstrate, however, more research is needed on the awakening of Serb national consciousness in Dalmatia.

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RATNI CILJEVI SRBIJE 1914. By *Milorad Ekmečić*. Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1973. 550 pp.

SRBIJA I JUGOSLOVENSKO PITANJE 1914–1915. GODINE. By *Dragoslav Janković*. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju i “Eksport-pres,” 1973. 574 pp.

Milorad Ekmečić, professor of history at Sarajevo University, has written an important book on how Serbia developed her war aims in World War I. To persons not specifically interested in Serbia and the Yugoslav question, the most intriguing portion of his book will be those few pages where he uses suspected but previously unknown telegrams to the Serbian government from its ambassador in St. Petersburg, Miroslav Spaljković, in the critical days preceding the Austrian declaration of war in July 1914. Spaljković’s report of his discussion with Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov on July 24, and his telegram of the next day forwarding the results of the meeting of the Russian Council of Ministers, add substance to Albertini’s argument that Sazonov was trying to hint that the Serbs should not accept the Austrian ultimatum. The Russians did not give Serbia unconditional support, but Spaljković’s enthusiastic and positive assessment of the mood in Russian military and court circles, evident in the telegrams Ekmečić reveals, was an important ingredient in both the Serbian answer to the Austrian ultimatum and in her intransigent attitude in the days that immediately followed.

But Ekmečić’s study is more than an exposé of these details. It is a superbly researched book, written in a rich style appropriate to the complexity and passion of Serbia’s dark but glorious year of 1914. Dragoslav Janković’s excellent book on almost the same question, although it is complete and able, is pale by comparison. Janković, professor of legal history at Belgrade University, pre-

sents a discussion of the views held by every important South Slavic political group on the Yugoslav question in 1914. Ekmečić is not so systematic, but he is more analytical. For example, Janković discusses the step-by-step evolution of Nikola Pašić's policy on Macedonia more clearly than Ekmečić. But Ekmečić offers an explanation of why Serbia resolutely refused to give up any part of Macedonia—almost no matter what concessions were offered her—that goes beyond the obvious ingredients of blood, victory, and chauvinism. A good part of the reason, Ekmečić suggests, stems from the notions of geopolitics widely held throughout central Europe, and specifically in Russia and Serbia. Just as Sazonov felt that Constantinople and the Straits were the geopolitical key to control of the Orthodox Balkans, so did Pašić believe that Macedonia was the heartland of the Balkans without which Serbia could never be a viable state. Perhaps the Allies had such difficulty understanding Serbia's inflexibility over Macedonia because this way of thinking about what constituted greatness was so akin to their own.

Both Janković and Ekmečić point out that Serbia entered World War I under the mistaken impression that Russia went to war to aid Serbia, when in fact she did so to save herself as a Great Power. Ekmečić believes this realization of Russia's motives, coupled with the necessarily increased exposure to England and France during the war, was a turning point in the long-range view of Russia held by South Slavs. The hopes that many Serbs had placed in Russia in the nineteenth century started to dissipate.

Many other comparisons could be made between these two studies, but the basic point of both is that from very early in the war the Serbian government, under Pašić's relatively moderate leadership (compared to the army clique under Apis, for example, or the National Party), followed a policy of creating a unitary Yugoslav state that would include Croats and Slovenians. Pašić was pressured by Russia over the Macedonian question and Bulgarian entry into the war, and by Great Britain over Adriatic issues and Italy's entry into the war. He had to face invasion, economic collapse, and a typhus epidemic. But he kept the "great solution" of a Yugoslav state before him.

Many factors shaped this solution and gave rise to the well-known problems of organization and loyalty that crippled the postwar Yugoslav state. Both authors discuss these factors, but Ekmečić is particularly cogent on the following: the failure of any popular uprising to materialize in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the differences in political style between the Croatian and Slovenian politicians in the Habsburg tradition and the Serbs; the tendency of the Great Powers to think of the postwar Balkans in terms of compensations to Serbia rather than in terms of creating a new state; and the successful efforts by the Austrians and the Turks to mobilize the peasantry on the basis of religion.

The differences in these two books are not so much a matter of the skill of the two historians—both of whom are well known in Yugoslavia as masters of their craft—as they are differences in style, temperament, and richness. Ekmečić is erudite, witty, analytical, and complex. Janković is thorough, systematic, and clear, but a bit obvious.

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