

Introduction

From Zero Bridge
a shadow chased by searchlights is running
away to find its body.
On the edge
of the Cantonment, where Gupkar Road ends,
it shrinks almost into nothing, is
nothing by interrogation gates, so it can slip, unseen, into the cells:
Drippings from a suspended burning tire
are falling on the back of a prisoner,
the naked boy screaming, "I know nothing."
The shadow slips out, beckons *Console Me*,
"Rizwan, it's you, Rizwan, it's you," I cry out
as he steps closer, the sleeves of his *phiren* torn.
"Each night put Kashmir in your dreams," he says,
then touches me, his hands crusted with snow,
whispers, "I have been cold a long, long time."
"Don't tell my father I have died," he says,
and I follow him through blood on the road
and hundreds of pairs of shoes the mourners
left behind, as they ran from the funeral,
victims of the firing. From windows we hear
grieving mothers, and snow begins to fall
on us, like ash. Black on the edges of flames,
it cannot extinguish the neighborhoods,
the homes set ablaze by midnight soldiers.
Kashmir is burning:
I won't tell your father you have died, Rizwan
but where has your shadow fallen, like cloth
on the tomb of which saint, or the body
of which unburied boy in the mountains,
bullet-torn, like you, his blood sheer rubies

on Himalayan snow?
 I've tied a knot
 with green thread at Shah Hamdan, to be
 untied only when the atrocities
 are stunned by your jeweled return.

—Agha Shahid Ali,
 “I See Kashmir from New Delhi at Midnight”¹

The prominent Kashmiri-American poet Agha Shahid Ali's poem “I See Kashmir from New Delhi at Midnight,” written in the 1990s, captures the violence and death embedded in Kashmiri bodies and minds as the Valley became embroiled in a full-fledged insurgency against the Indian state. Thousands of young Kashmiris, disillusioned with Indian democracy, found themselves enamored of the idea of *aazadi*, freedom. Because the mass upsurge took the form of a pro-independence movement, Indian security forces responded with aggression, failing to differentiate between insurgents and civilians as they protected their nation's territorial integrity. As pain, terror, and torture gripped almost every Kashmiri home, young Kashmiris were consumed with anger, resentment, and humiliation, and expressed frustration at their loss of human dignity. With teenage passions running high, some youth decided to trek the high mountain passes and cross into Pakistan-administered Kashmir to search for weapons and join the *tehbreek-i-aazadi*, the “movement for freedom,” unaware that death awaited them at the invisible, artificial border cutting through their ancient homeland.

Ali's poem is a eulogy for one such young Kashmiri. Rizwan, the eighteen-year-old son of the poet's family friend, had died, like thousands of other Kashmiris, while crossing the line of control. Deeply shaken, the poet imagines conversing with Rizwan's shadow, wandering through interrogation centers and sites of massacres in the Valley, searching for his body. The poet consoles Rizwan, referring to a green thread he has tied to the mesh of Shah Hamdan's shrine at Srinagar, an old Sufi practice for those seeking to have a specific wish granted: in this case, that atrocities in Kashmir end so that Rizwan's restless soul can find tranquility. But the green thread has not yet done its work. Twenty years have now passed since Rizwan's death, yet peace continues to elude the contested region of Kashmir, a contingent product of the postcolonial partition of the subcontinent that created the new states of India and Pakistan. The ongoing bloodbath in present-day Kashmir and Kashmiri Muslims' growing alienation from India stands in stark

contrast to the historic year of 1947, when the popular leader Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, hoping for a peaceful and prosperous Kashmir, tied its fate to India.

Since partition, Indian nationalists have obsessively viewed unrest in Kashmir through the lens of their fears about Pakistan, rather than as a result of the Indian state's abject failure to emotionally integrate Kashmiri Muslims into the rest of the nation. Because the Indian state views Kashmir from the perspective of "national security," individuals like Rizwan who challenge New Delhi's hegemony are consistently perceived as threats; the army feels justified in eliminating such citizens to protect its borders. In contrast, Kashmiri Muslim narratives portray young men like Rizwan as heroes, willing to sacrifice their lives to secure Kashmiri honor and dignity. What do these conflicting perceptions of Kashmiri resistance reveal about India's relationship with Kashmir? Why does the slogan "Freedom!" have such an appeal for Kashmiri Muslims? Why do thousands of Kashmiris turn up at the funerals of individuals the Indian state views as terrorists? The heart of this book is a search for the historical roots of this deepening estrangement between Kashmiris and the Indian state.²

The process of partition that created the states of India and Pakistan generated animosities as well. I argue that because, at the time of independence, India and Pakistan embraced the colonial construct of territorial nationalism, the retention of Kashmir—by any means necessary—came to seem indispensable to its national identity. In this context, "Kashmir" has been symbolically wedded to national pride, on both sides of the artificial border.³ As both new nation-states set about integrating Kashmir into their respective bodies, the retention of its territory took precedence over the needs of its people. Both India and Pakistan therefore employed coercive instruments—the police, the army, and intelligence networks—to secure centralized authority over the now-divided princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and to suppress popular resistance. The concepts of "territoriality," "state sovereignty," and "national security" have dominated the nationalist discourses on the Kashmir conflict, while the Kashmiris' thwarted aspirations, which had built over decades of oppression under multiple empires, have seemed of little importance in Indian political discourse. This book, by contrast, investigates a broad range of sources to illuminate a century of political players and social structures in contested Kashmir, and to reveal Kashmiris' myriad imaginings of "freedom," transcending the borders of the nation-states between which the region is partitioned.

But the devastating postcolonial experiences of the territory's inhabitants have also been strangely marginal not just to political discourse but to the scholarly understanding of Kashmiri resistance. Scholarship on Kashmir, to date, has largely emerged from three disciplines. Political scientists and students

of international relations, following the lead of Indian and Pakistani governing voices, have mainly seen the Kashmir question as an intractable territorial dispute or as a national security issue. In more recent times, political analysts have presented the Kashmir conflict as a manifestation of Islamist terrorism or jihad.⁴ Anthropologists, meanwhile, have addressed the impact of violence perpetrated by the state and insurgents on Kashmiri society.⁵ Finally, existing historical scholarship has primarily focused on the pre-1947 era of Kashmir.⁶ This book brings together ideas, institutions, and political players that have shaped the postcolonial history of fragmented Jammu and Kashmir since the drawing of the artificial ceasefire line that cuts arbitrarily across the state. Placing the events of the last few decades in deep historical context allows us to view post-partition Kashmir not as the Indian or Pakistani states have seen it, but from a Kashmiri perspective.

Without ignoring the geopolitical currents which shape people's realities at any given moment, I take a bottom-up, people-centered approach that acknowledges the existence of conflicting and contradictory Kashmiri voices, braiding this history of internal diversity into the narrative of the Kashmir conflict. My hope is that this approach awakens readers to the larger historical currents within which real people today make decisions—and to the multiple moments in the past when those holding the levers of power at local, national, and international levels failed to prioritize Kashmiris' legitimate desires for what they later termed *aazadi*. My primary focus is on the Muslim community which includes the majority of the state residents, and whose thwarted aspirations have fueled Kashmiri resentment. However, since internal diversity is both a reality of Kashmiri life and an important theme of this work, I also investigate the views of the minority Buddhist and, especially, Hindu communities, which remain essential for understanding the seemingly intractable nature of the Kashmir conflict.

The core of this book is a close examination of the shifting postcolonial meanings of "freedom." The history of this multivalent concept reveals Kashmiris' changing worldviews as they negotiated the conflicting terrain of potential identities—Indian, Pakistani, and Kashmiri—each of which represented a different path to the freedom all claimed to seek. Instead of being passive spectators in the face of Indian and Pakistani power plays, I show that Kashmiris have consistently reinserted their own voices into local, national, and international narratives about the Kashmir conflict, and were and are active agents in the construction of their own sociopolitical identities. These identities have not always focused on gaining political freedom. Kashmiri political elites have often acted as mouthpieces for the nation-states, promoting their political agendas while

simultaneously heightening Kashmiri misery. When their political legitimacy was in question, the collaborators' governance focused not on improving the situation of the masses but on creating networks of patronage to gain administrative acceptability.

Although the measures puppet regimes took won over certain social groups, the inhabitants of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, the majority of whom suffered exclusion from structures of power and patronage, found themselves unrepresented by the political alliance between local elites and the nation-states. Conversely, the excluded Muslim majority (on both sides of divided Kashmir and within the wider British transnational community) employed the state's unique and disputed status to challenge the territorialization of state power and sovereignty by refusing to accept the ceasefire line as a permanent international border. They constructed a resistance discourse drawing inspiration from multiple international liberation movements to legitimize their own claims. The Kashmiri transnational activism enhanced feelings of political belonging, connecting even those who have never set foot in the physical territory to an imagined "homeland." In the process of charting these local, regional, and global Kashmiri connections, I map the contours of "Kashmiri-ness" in the postcolonial era.

■ Kashmir and Kashmiriyat: Identity, Freedom, and Self-determination

Contestations over "Kashmir" are not limited to cartographic representation and territorial boundaries; the debates extend into the validity of multiple definitions of "Kashmir," "Kashmiris," and "Kashmiri-ness." Does the term denote the occupants of the territory? Can the term "Kashmiri" be associated with only Koshur-speaking inhabitants of the state? Is it a legal term? What qualities, positive or negative, are associated with this identity? How have the answers to these questions changed with the political, economic, and social winds blowing through the province over the last century and a half?

According to a popular legend, the geographical entity of Kashmir emerged from a struggle for power between good and evil. The waters of a mighty lake covered the Kashmir Valley. It was a pleasure spot for gods and goddesses, until one day a demon came to inhabit it. The gods intervened and killed the demon; in the course of the battle water rushed out at the place where the Hindu god Vishnu struck the mountains with his trident, making the valley habitable.⁷ The Muslim version of the same legend credits the Prophet Solomon for ordering a genie, Kashif, to drain the lake.⁸ As Chitralkha Zutshi argues, this legend of

divine intervention made the Valley a “sacred space” in Kashmiri oral traditions, an idea later embraced by the Muslim mystics who presented Kashmir as a “blessed landscape of Islam.”⁹

As the inhabitants of the valley, called “Kashmiris” regardless of their religious affiliation, remained devoted to their sacred landscape dotted with shrines and temples, the valley and its surrounding areas were incorporated into various empires. Mughals, Afghans, and Sikhs in turn shaped and reshaped its geographical contours. While Kashmiris lamented the loss of their autonomy to these repressive foreign regimes, whose mismanagement reduced Kashmir to poverty, others’ narratives denigrated Kashmiris as “worshippers of tyranny” (*zulumparast*) who lacked the will and courage to alter their deplorable situation.¹⁰ These pejorative labels remained embedded in Kashmiri popular memory. Kashmiri discourses invoke such negative representations, dating from various stages of their turbulent history, creating a shared sense of lost dignity to mobilize the masses in a quest for *real* freedoms.

In the mid-nineteenth century, as British colonial domination spread to the frontiers of the South Asian subcontinent, the valley of Kashmir was mapped into the colonial landscape, and new borders and boundaries were created by outsiders once again. In 1846, the English East India Company assembled the diverse regions of the Kashmir Valley, Jammu, Ladakh, Gilgit, and Baltistan into the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Until partition the Dogra maharajas, based in Jammu, administered the state as one unit while accepting British paramountcy. The maharajas privileged their own Hindu community and excluded their majority Muslim subjects from power-sharing arrangements, a practice which generated deep resentment.¹¹ In the early twentieth century, however, a generation of Kashmiri Muslim community leaders, educated in new British and Muslim institutions and living both within and outside the princely state’s territorial boundaries, tapped into the Kashmiris’ feelings of injustice and oppression. These leaders contrasted these emotions with their supposed opposites, invoking “dignity” and “self-respect” to drive mass mobilization. As they gained momentum, the Muslim inhabitants of the princely state, although representing different sub-regional cultural and linguistic groups, claimed identification with “Kashmir” to legitimate their negotiations with the Dogra state. These trends underlay the Kashmiris’ postcolonial stance toward both India and Pakistan, as well as their shared sense of identification with their homeland.

Much of the existing historiography confines Kashmiri identity to those who speak the Kashmiri language. In analyzing the early twentieth-century history of Kashmiri Muslim mobilization, scholars have focused on Kashmiriyat, a composite identity built around an imagined history where religious communities lived

in peaceful coexistence, free from tensions and discord. Historian Chitralkha Zutshi has dismantled such definitions of Kashmiriyat, revealing that in the pre-colonial era regional political culture did not erase religious differences in favor of syncretism (the fusion of diverse religious beliefs and practices). Rather, Kashmiris defined their identity and sought to improve their society on the terms and via the practices of their distinctive religious belongings. In the early twentieth century, however, Kashmiri nationalists “denigrated religious affiliations in favor of an all-encompassing regional nationalism.”¹² Zutshi’s study shows how imbricated the links between regional and religious sensibilities were in Kashmiri political culture. Yet in the process of showing why and how Kashmiriyat was invented, she reduces its meaning to an instrumentalist political project that sought to emphasize religious syncretism in the Valley for nationalist purposes. A close study of the sociopolitical discourse of the early twentieth century reveals that the exponents of nationalism as a political strategy drew from indigenous traditions of regional and religious coexistence, in which the older mystical religious traditions of Kashmir built bridges across religiously defined communities. In other words, some Kashmiris had always held out the ideal of community coexistence, and religious affinities remained central to Kashmiriyat.

This book further contends that during the twentieth century the conception of Kashmiriyat was not monolithic. To begin with, “Kashmiri-ness,” crucially, was never restricted to inhabitants of the Valley but included expatriates who retained an emotional attachment to Kashmir and called themselves Kashmiris.¹³ The association of expatriate Kashmiris with their homeland in the colonial era, along with transnational interactions in the postcolonial period, complicate the category of Kashmiriyat. For expatriates the significance of belonging to Kashmir and being Kashmiri transcended prevalent cultural and territorial definitions of identity and referred primarily to an emotive attachment to a homeland. I emphasize that particularly in the postcolonial era, “Kashmir” has not been just a territorial space but a political imaginary, a vision that grounds Kashmiris in their negotiations for rights not only in India and Pakistan, but also in global cultural and political spaces.

I further differentiate between cultural and political identity in analyzing Kashmir’s postcolonial history. Cabeiri Robinson focuses on the political strand of Kashmiri identity to examine Kashmiri refugees’ identification with “Kashmir.” She argues that Kashmiri Muslim refugees in Pakistan identified with “Kashmir” rather than with the new nation-state because of a pre-existing concept of territorial citizenship—the “state-subject” criteria introduced by the Dogra maharaja in 1927.¹⁴ Postcolonial governments retained the policy, which allowed only residents of the state and recognized displaced Kashmiris to purchase

land and seek employment in Jammu and Kashmir.¹⁵ Many displaced Kashmiris hoped to return home and reclaim their lives and properties due to this state law. Patricia Ellis and Zafar Khan have asserted that “Kashmiri citizenship laws” even bind diasporic Kashmiris “psychologically and politically” with the homeland.¹⁶ I build on these insights, and draw from my investigation of diverse linguistic and cultural communities in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, along with several diasporic communities who called themselves Kashmiris and claimed a shared belonging with the undivided territory of Jammu and Kashmir, although none had much connection to the Valley’s culture or language. I agree with Robinson that the state-subject category not only reinforced Kashmir’s unique position in relation to the central Indian and Pakistani states, but also enabled Kashmiri Muslims on both sides of the ceasefire line to claim a relationship with the undivided whole. These definitions of Kashmiri political identity allowed those living in Indian and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, as well as in the wider transnational community, to build a common identity around their “occupied” homeland.

The state-subject category, the basis of the political identity of Kashmiri Muslims (the most contentious issue in present-day Kashmir), is vehemently rejected by non-Muslim minorities who consider Kashmiriyat an Indian subculture. Ironically, this present-day Kashmiri Hindu political position is in sharp contrast to the “Kashmir for Kashmiris” movement initiated by their early-twentieth-century predecessors in response to outsiders’ encroachment on their jobs. It was the Kashmiri Hindus’ tireless agitation that forced the Dogra maharaja to introduce the state-subject category in the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. However, the changing political dynamics of the postcolonial era, with much local power transferred to the Muslim majority, made state Hindus feel insecure about their minority status within the state. As early as the 1950s an organized agitation in Jammu supported by the Hindu nationalists demanded the abrogation of Kashmir’s special status. Yet several non-Muslims within Jammu and Kashmir rejected this Hindu nationalist stance and supported Kashmir’s autonomous position within the Indian union.

In the twenty-first century, however, as the Hindu right gained momentum in India, most, if not all, of the state’s minorities have also demanded revocation of the state-subject category, considering it a hindrance to Jammu and Kashmir’s complete merger with India. In the fall of 2019, as this book was being completed, the new Hindu-nationalist government’s unilateral abrogation of Kashmir’s special status, including Article 35A authorizing the state legislature to “make special provisions for permanent residents of the state,” legally erased this special category. However, as this book reveals, the state-subject category is an important part of

Kashmir's history and is now engraved in the Kashmiri Muslim psyche as the essence of their political identity. It supports the idea of an undivided homeland free from occupation, binding Kashmiris across ideological and territorial divides. Kashmiri Muslims, jealously insistent on the state-subject category's retention, have long feared that the discontinuation of this category would alter Kashmir's demography and transform their community into a minority. These clashing identities and different understandings of Kashmiri political identity complicate the notion of "self-determination" which has been and remains central to Kashmir's resistance discourse, producing an acerbic debate in the public arena and in the sphere of print.

At a global level, the concept of "self-determination" gained popularity after the First World War, based on Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points statement of principles for global peace. Self-determination broadly refers to the right of people to shape their own political destiny, and this is how it is employed in the Kashmiri vernacular. But it is worth noting that at its contemporary geopolitical origins self-determination was understood to be for the "weaker sections of Europe"—Belgians, Poles, Czechs—rather than the peoples of the colonial world.¹⁷ Mark Mazower contends that imperialists pushed for the "limited applicability" of self-determination to non-European nations. For them, mandates or international trusteeships remained essential to train certain races to become "democratic civilized nations."¹⁸ As Timothy Mitchell argues, these structures allowed imperial powers to maintain indirect control by creating a new class of "native rulers," who presented themselves as nationalists but exercised only partial sovereignty. These puppet rulers lacked popular support, but the imperial powers interpreted their participation in governance as an expression of self-determination.¹⁹ "Self-determination," then, was systematically utilized as an "instrument for domination and consent"—as indeed happened in postcolonial India, which appropriated such imperial understandings of the term to exercise its hegemony in Jammu and Kashmir. The support of local elites allowed India to claim legitimacy, delay the United Nations–mandated plebiscite, and interpret a series of farcical and rigged elections as Kashmiri expressions of "self-determination." Despite this ambiguous history, however, the language of self-determination captured the imagination of Kashmiris, who embraced it to seek rights initially from the Dogra monarchy, and later from the postcolonial states of India and Pakistan.

A formidable body of scholarship on Kashmir debates the 1949 United Nations resolution, which promised Kashmiris "democratic method of a free and an impartial plebiscite" to decide "the question of accession of Jammu and Kashmir state to India or Pakistan."²⁰ Some of this work foregrounds the pluralism

of the state and highlights the contested allegiances that have complicated the long-promised granting of self-determination.²¹ Others have suggested that the concepts of democracy and self-determination converge as the focal points of Kashmiri Muslim political aspirations.²² Although these works correctly draw attention to the intractable fault lines that make self-determination more complex than it might seem, their limited political and territorial definition of self-determination does not address the emotional appeal this concept has had for Kashmiri Muslims across more than half a century. This book historicizes the meaning of “self-determination” to emphasize that Kashmiri imaginings of emancipation in different temporal frames were not confined to political freedom but also included concepts like human dignity, economic equity, and social justice.

These terms, contextualized in the regional environment of the Valley, reveal that Kashmiris’ history of exploitative relations between social groups and of subjugation at the hands of ruling colonial dynasties shaped their visions of freedom. Kashmiris equated freedom with the concept of *insaaf*, or justice, the equitable distribution of resources for material development so that the disadvantaged were not mired in poverty; *haq*, or rights, meaning that rulers should practice political ethics and be accountable to the people; and *izzat*, human dignity. Throughout the twentieth century these terms dominated popular discourses on freedom as Kashmiris envisioned a society where they would not have to undergo humiliations at the hands of the ruling power. This study shows that these ideas gained significance in the postcolonial era as self-determination moved from fantasy to real possibility with the United Nations–mandated plebiscite, and informed popular resistance in the region. As the Indian state remained focused on retaining Kashmir’s territory and denied Kashmiris freedom to shape their political future, Kashmiri imaginings of emancipation became intertwined with, but have never been confined to the limited territorial definition of self-determination (accession to either India or Pakistan). These developments politicized the meaning of “freedom,” and revealed deep schisms between majority and minority communities’ aspirations for “self-determination.”

■ Territorialization, Borders, and Transnational Networks

The emergence of territorial nationalism in India during British colonial rule developed, after decolonization, into a “territory of sovereignty.” Sumathi Ramaswamy traces the concept of territorialization to the sacredness associated with the anthropomorphic form of Mother India. As the colonial state fixed, measured, and mathematized the map of India with latitudes and longitudes,

it became a “powerful emblem of anti-colonial nationalisms” and “penetrated deep into the popular imagination.” Indian nationalists supplemented the map with the divine form of a Hindu mother goddess who “reaches for the map form in order to transform the geo body into a homeland and motherland to live and die for.”²³ If India embodies a mother goddess, every inch of Indian territory is sacred, reinforcing territorialism but also excluding diverse religious and regional communities, especially peripheral ones like Kashmiri Muslims, who find it difficult to relate to the image of Mother India as the representative body of the Indian nation. However, such representations embed “Kashmir” in the nationalist imagination as an integral part of the nation-state’s representation, the core of their identity and hence a non-negotiable issue.

The new South Asian nation-states produced territorial sovereignty in their peripheries through the coercive instruments of surveillance, mapping, and armed force, bringing together physical and cultural spaces with financial and social inequities that reinforced their marginality as compared to the “nation.”²⁴ As India embarked on the territorialization of its peripheries, it provided Jammu and Kashmir with preferential treatment, primarily due to Kashmir’s disputed nature as India, Pakistan, and China all laid claims to its territory. The ceasefire line, later renamed the line of control, is technically not a border, even though both India and Pakistan consider the territory of Jammu and Kashmir within their respective control as an integral part of their nation. In fact, the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir is a different, more complicated entity than other Indian states in the sense that it is the only state that negotiated its relationship with India at the time of decolonization and partition. Article 370 of the Indian constitution guaranteed Kashmir’s autonomy and allowed the state to have its own constitution, flag, and constituent assembly. It was agreed that any central power in Jammu and Kashmir state could only be implemented with the approval of the state’s constituent assembly.²⁵

Furthermore, India also provided special privileges and rights to the inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir. Article 35A of the Indian constitution authorized state legislature to retain the state-subject category that only allows Kashmir’s longtime inhabitants to purchase land or seek employment in the state. The Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru included this article in the Indian constitution in 1954 to appease Kashmiri fears that “rich outsiders” might pay exorbitant prices to buy “delectable places,” and reduce poor Kashmiris to a landless position. Such unique arrangements are not uncommon in federations.²⁶ India has also worked out different relations with states in the northeast. Articles 371 and 371A of the Indian constitution provide special rights and privileges to the residents

of Sikkim, Nagaland, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh, and prohibit non-state residents from owning property in these states.²⁷

While Kashmiri political elites collaborated with India to implement its development and centralization policies, Pakistan's bureaucracy established its complete hegemony in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, while theoretically accepting Kashmir's disputed status.²⁸ Pakistan's official policy of not integrating Azad Kashmir allowed the retention of its territorial claims over India-administered Kashmir, the source of the rivers Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab that flow from Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan and sustain its economy.²⁹ As both nation-states, contrary to initial hopes, practiced overt and covert authoritarianism in their sides of Kashmir, Kashmiris' disappointment amplified. This book asserts that Kashmiri voices of resistance, aware of their unique and disputed status, have long challenged the territorialization of state power and state sovereignty by refusing to accept the ceasefire line as a permanent border. The inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir have struggled to adapt to this artificial divide separating families, disrupting the environment, and destroying economic structures. In Kashmiri imagination, the new "border" is an aberration; exercising self-determination means in part erasing this line and roaming freely in their homeland without the constraints of its militarized landscape. In fact, the line of control remains fluid and porous, allowing a continuous flow of goods, peoples, and ideas.³⁰

The internal diversity of Jammu and Kashmir adds significant complexity to Kashmiri resistance discourse. There are schisms and divisions within the Kashmiri resistance; individuals, groups, and sub-regions differ in their political visions. At different moments, both rival nations have manipulated the emotions of disenchanted Kashmiris and utilized some as pawns to promote nationalist agendas. Despite these challenges, dissenting Kashmiris have consistently attempted to find their own agency in shaping their resistance. Kashmiri voices of resistance forged regional connections across the two divided parts of Kashmir as they imagined and re-imagined Kashmir's political future. Studying this network broadens the contours of both postcolonial and resistance history, differentiates Kashmir's unique "border" experience from that of other states in South Asia, and reveals that many of those who traversed this arbitrary line did not always perceive their state as the periphery of a sovereign nation; instead, some contested the national territorialism of both India and Pakistan by creating their own notions of territorial integrity.

The Kashmiri challenge to "territorialization" has not only been posed within the confines of the subcontinent's political contestations but has also occurred in transnational space. The global dimension of the Kashmiri resistance shows the limitations of territorially bounded nationalist frameworks by addressing the

ideological and political connections forged by Kashmiri transnational activists in the diasporic space.³¹ Placing a marginalized region in a broader global history, my research investigates how transnational actors and the long-distance nationalism of Kashmiri emigrant groups made Kashmiris visible in the international arena and displaced perceptions of Kashmir as a peripheral region to be controlled and conquered.

Kashmiri imaginings of freedom in global arenas, especially during the eventful decades of the 1960s and 1970s, drew inspiration from anticolonial struggles across Africa, Asia, and Latin America that created transnational solidarity and conjured up new imaginaries of social justice, economic equity, and political freedom. These powerful ideas inspired transnational activists from Pakistan-administered Kashmir in Britain as they attempted to redefine the Kashmiri conflict while navigating the pressures of living on the margins of their host society. The British Kashmiri transnational community constructed its political claims in the image of the twentieth century's worldwide political movements for self-determination, placing the debate over Kashmir's freedom within an "anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist framework."³² Reading transnational connections in this way gives new insight into postcolonial history, the meaning of Kashmiri identity, and the ways the transnational actors both challenged and replicated territorial nationalism with its claim that Kashmiris should have the right to choose independence.

■ Religion, Politics, and State Security

The role of Islam in Kashmiri resistance has fascinated politicians, journalists, and policymakers alike. As India tightened the noose of its centralization policy in the 1950s and attempted to fully integrate the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, Kashmiri Muslims invoked "self-determination" in protest. Many protestors calling for self-determination used religious slogans or expressed extra-territorial affiliations to convey dissent; the Indian government dismissed these as illegitimate demonstrations by a group of "separatist" Muslims. Indian nationalists today continue to interpret Kashmiri Muslim protests as a rejection of Indian secularism and an acceptance of Islamist ideology. Others depict Kashmiris' struggle for self-determination as a "long jihad" initiated by Pakistani intelligence agencies within weeks of the creation of India and Pakistan, with the end game of creating a larger Islamic state.³³ Such portrayals of Kashmiri resistance gained momentum in the aftermath of the armed insurgency of the 1990s, and a more recent trend delegitimizes Kashmiri protests as a "subset of the global Islamic terror game" in pursuit of an "Islamic Caliphate."³⁴

However, analyzing Kashmiri resistance only through a religious lens is simply insufficient to explain the deeper roots of Kashmiri Muslims' sense of the political injustice and violation of individual liberties they have experienced as part of democratic India. Such arguments conveniently ignore the fact that in 1947 Kashmiri nationalists opted for India, going against their religious affinity with Pakistan. Presenting Kashmiri resistance as an "Islamist movement" is perhaps India's way of absolving itself of more than seven decades of actions that have alienated Kashmiris to the extent that they want nothing to do with New Delhi.

Religion and religious affiliation have been key components of Kashmiri Muslim identity throughout the twentieth century. "Religion" in this context, while not excluding matters of belief and ritual practice, has significant economic and social dimensions; for well over a century, community belonging has defined access to political, educational, financial, and social power. As Mridu Rai puts it, "the protest of Kashmiri Muslims" against the Hindu Dogra state, prior to Kashmir's accession to India, "represents not so much a defense of Islam but of the rights of a community defined as Muslims by ruling hierarchies minded to dole out patronage along religious lines." This religion-based neglect, in Rai's interpretation, became pivotal in mobilizing Kashmiri Muslims to fight for the material and cultural rights denied to them by the ruling regime.³⁵ In the postcolonial period, religious identity remained an important identification marker for Kashmiri Muslims, especially as independent India embraced "secular nationalism" both to define itself and to manage diversity and difference within the country. As Ayesha Jalal argues, India's conflation of secularism with nationalism misconstrued concern for one's religious community as disloyalty to the nation, delegitimizing minorities' fears and any aspirations that conflicted with the state's version of secular nationalism.³⁶ In Kashmir, when India's centralization policy created feelings of political injustice, Kashmiris appealed to religious differences as part of their resistance to complete integration.

I argue that Kashmiri Muslim assertions of religious identity to express political dissent do not lead directly to a fraught relationship with secularism, nor is it their religious identity as such that makes them oppose secular India. In the context of South Asia, "secularism" refers primarily to a political ideology, rather than alluding to "secularization," an open-ended historical process in which human beings "abandon otherworldly concerns and focus on the here and now."³⁷ Kashmiri political elites, in collaboration with India, spread the "doctrine of secularism" in the hope of bringing Kashmiris culturally closer to India through accelerated political and financial integration. Thus in Kashmir the secularism of the modern nation-state is a closed ideology imposed from above to bring

Kashmiris into the national mainstream whether they want to be there or not. Furthermore, the presence in Jammu of the Hindu right, clamoring for Kashmir's complete integration with or without popular support, bred insecurity among Kashmiri Muslims. Disaffected Kashmiris endangered by India's integrationist moves, constrained by economic resources, and excluded from political power have clung more tightly to their religious identity.

Most Kashmiri Muslims' expressions of attachment to religious identity are different from the articulations of an Islamist ideology by groups like the *Jamaat-i-Islami* of Jammu and Kashmir, a party that rejects Western-style democracy and secularism while claiming that absolute sovereignty resides with God.³⁸ In explaining the relatively recent appeal of such groups, who operated for a long time on the political fringes of the Valley before becoming more prominent, I trace the internal and external causes that gave the *Jamaat* political and social visibility. Indeed, the global resurgence of political Islam assisted such groups in establishing a ubiquitous presence in the 1980s. However, I also illuminate the economic transformations unleashed by India's development policies and the political blunders of Kashmiri nationalist leaders—developments that provided Islamist groups the space to develop their support base among middle-class Kashmiris and attempt to redefine self-determination.

Kashmiri Muslims' association with religious identity increased in intensity after India adopted a tough approach in the wake of the armed insurgency, arming its military with special powers to crush resistance. India's policies in Kashmir are largely in tune with its treatment of insurgencies in Assam and the northeast, yet there are some underlying differences. Kashmir's disputed nature and its Muslim-majority character add another layer of complexity in unraveling the severe responses of Indian soldiers to Kashmiri Muslim protestors. The involvement of Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute and its assistance to Kashmiri insurgents mean that the Indian army perceives Kashmiri resistance as a Muslim uprising in union with their archenemy, Pakistan, seeking to destroy India's territorial integrity.³⁹ But repression and terror have backfired, leading even apolitical Kashmiri Muslims more fully embrace their religious identity.

The present-day militarization of Kashmir has led to extensive human rights violations in the Valley. The treatment of Kashmir as an occupied territory turns the spotlight on the larger debate about the relationship between popular sovereignty and state legitimacy. Does the state have a responsibility to protect the human rights of its citizens to gain domestic legitimacy? To what extent have human rights abuses in Kashmir diluted India's legitimacy in the region? As Hallie Ludsin argues, the "concept of internal legitimacy flows from sovereignty in the people" and "sovereign rights can be lost" when governments, including

democracies, commit “egregious human rights abuses.”⁴⁰ However, India invokes the concept of state sovereignty that gives the state a monopoly on violence to protect its territorial integrity. Framing the Kashmir issue through a national security lens gives India flexibility on its constitutional commitment to protect the fundamental rights of its Kashmiri citizens, while also warding off moral condemnation from international organizations like the United Nations and Amnesty International, who draw global attention to extensive human rights violations in India-administered Kashmir. India dismisses such reports as a “selective compilation of largely unverified information” and a “violation of the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”⁴¹ Instead, India has sought international legitimacy for its actions by packaging Kashmiri civilian resistance as “Islamist terrorism.” In a world threatened by radical Islamist groups and wary of any kind of resistance (whether civilian, military, or political) if it stems from Muslim communities or from Muslim-majority areas of the world, branding Kashmiri resistance as “Islamist” is a powerful tool for fending off international criticism of India’s response.

■ Sources

Even though more than seventy years have passed since the partition of the South Asian subcontinent, most official documents in the Indian national archives regarding postcolonial Kashmir remain restricted, as Kashmir continues, from the point of view of the Indian state, to be a major national security issue. Furthermore, the ongoing conflict has taken a toll on the Jammu and Kashmir state archives, with administrators’ attention being on “security” rather than on preserving the state’s heritage. A substantial number of the state archive’s relevant records have been left unprocessed; its dilapidated buildings leave rare documents and manuscripts immersed in dust and pigeon droppings, making access almost impossible.

To overcome the challenges posed by government archives in the subcontinent, I analyze a variety of vernacular sources in Urdu and Kashmiri to comprehend the political and social positioning of contemporary Kashmiri voices on both sides of the India–Pakistan divide as well as in the larger Kashmiri transnational community. Visiting Kashmiri community leaders and literati, I collected their unpublished memoirs, letters, and diaries, an alternative archive for reconstructing Kashmiri consciousness. I travelled to villages in India-administered Kashmir to meet with families that have been victims of the conflict and visited civil society groups to comprehend the impact of militarization on Kashmiri society.

Interactions with the Kashmiri transnational community in Britain made me re-examine the relationship between Kashmiri cultural identity and Kashmiri political identity. The extensive interviews I conducted with Kashmiris of various political orientations contributed significantly to my understanding of the issues of belonging, citizenship, and identity formation in one of the most contested regions of South Asia. Kashmiri literature, vernacular newspapers, and pamphlets capture the complexity of popular discourses and nationalist rhetoric, and bring together elite expression and excluded voices, while oral histories, social media posts, and political blogs illuminate the digital flavor of Kashmiri protest in the twenty-first century.

Complementing these diverse sources, archival repositories in India and England did yield some of the official sources necessary for a holistic understanding of the Kashmir conflict. I examined the legislative assembly debates of Jammu and Kashmir state to comprehend how Kashmiri political elites negotiated with India. Declassified Ministry of State files contain memos and legislation about the official Indian policy in the aftermath of partition and local police records document Kashmiri Muslim grievances against India in the early 1950s. The private papers of prominent Indian leaders and political parties provide insight into Indian policy debates about Kashmir, while the Dominion Office Files at Kew Archives in London contain files unavailable at the National Archives of India which illuminate Kashmir's internal dynamics in the 1960s and 1970s. I read these sources not only to get the state version of events, but also as a repository of popular voices: intercepted letters written by families or friends separated by the ceasefire line; petitions for repatriation sent to Indian and Pakistani officials by stranded Kashmiris desiring to return "home;" and letters written by ordinary Indian citizens requesting their political leaders to adopt a tough approach on Kashmir in the aftermath of partition. These people's voices within the official archives reveal how "Kashmir" is constructed and imagined in the nationalist imagination, while also uncovering the baggage of partition as contested postcolonial boundaries continue to disrupt peace in the South Asian subcontinent.

■ Organization and Layout

This book has six chapters, organized both chronologically and thematically. The first chapter examines Kashmiri understandings of freedom in an historical context, highlighting how Kashmiris engaged with pre-existing ideas of freedom for political mobilization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

It teases out the tensions between secularly oriented nationalism and religiously informed universalism in the 1930s and 1940s to understand how Kashmiris defined and negotiated multiple meanings of religion and secularism prevalent in Kashmir. By focusing on the dissonance among Kashmiri voices, this chapter demonstrates the myriad visions the people of the princely state had for their state's future, visions that never found expression as both India and Pakistan laid claims to Kashmir's territory immediately after partition.

The second chapter addresses the themes of identity, belonging, and loyalty in the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir in the aftermath of the sovereignty feud between India and Pakistan, which artificially divided Kashmir and dragged its people into an international dispute. Drawing on Kashmiri popular discourses, the chapter addresses resentment about how the promises of freedom actually unfolded in the region. It highlights the impact of decolonization on the divided state of Jammu and Kashmir and argues that the creation of the ceasefire line, which disrupted the natural environment and dismantled entire economic structures that had sustained the state prior to 1947, also shaped the question of Kashmiri Muslims' belonging to and their perceptions of India, Pakistan, and Kashmir. Ultimately, the sociopolitical processes and transformations set in motion at decolonization precipitated tensions between communities and sub-regions of Jammu and Kashmir, and with India on a larger scale.

In the third chapter, I examine the political economy of the Kashmiri resistance from 1953 to the 1980s, probing how India's development policies created a class of collaborators who transformed Kashmir's political processes and social structures. The chapter shows how integration with India ushered in cultural transformation in urban Kashmir, generating insecurities among Kashmiri Muslims while precipitating class differences and rural–urban tensions. It highlights social and economic discontent in postcolonial Kashmir, which initially fringe Islamist groups deployed to condemn the secularist and socialist ideologies propagated by the ruling elites, advocating an Islamic state as a solution to Kashmir's problems. As political elites monopolized all economic benefits in the decades following decolonization and partition, the excluded Kashmiri Muslim majority reacted and responded to their exclusion from networks of patronage, further alienating them from India.

The fourth chapter examines the resistance discourse fashioned by activists from diverse political leanings, especially that of the Plebiscite Front, which sought to mobilize the excluded majority and challenge Indian nationalist narratives' tacit assumption of Indian control over Kashmir. On a political level, the idea of a plebiscite and the conversations it inspired in the wider public arena brought

competing definitions of self-determination into the dialogue. This chapter reveals that despite a fractured Kashmiri discourse, the plebiscite movement became popular in public arenas and in the sphere of print as activists connected self-determination with the concepts of *haq* (rights), *insaaf* (justice) and *izzat* (dignity) inherent in earlier Kashmiri discourses on freedom. It explores how the 1960s student activism pitted communities against each other and politicized the concept of self-determination, further driving a wedge between the majority Muslim and minority Hindu and Buddhist communities. The debates between plebiscite and autonomy shaped the post-1975 period; the Indian state met regional dissidence by undermining state governments to ensure that only parties or leaders who complied with New Delhi held power. This meddling intensified anti-India sentiments in the Valley and deepened regional divisions within the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

In the fifth chapter, I shift my attention to Pakistan-administered Kashmir and examine inter-regional connections across the ceasefire line as well as the transnational relationship between the expatriates and the homeland, both critical to Kashmiri understandings of sovereignty and territoriality. The hegemonic relationship of Pakistan with its part of Kashmir bred resentment and alienated large numbers of Azad Kashmiris. The chapter focuses on Kashmiri voices suspicious of both India and Pakistan, but inspired by a worldwide belt of twentieth-century insurgencies. Drawing inspiration from revolutionary movements in Vietnam, Algeria, and Palestine, these Kashmiris surreptitiously crossed the ceasefire line and advocated an armed struggle to liberate Kashmir. The second section of this chapter addresses the transnational dimension of postcolonial Kashmiri resistance to show how globally dispersed Kashmiris, pushed out by oppression, lack of economic opportunities, or physical displacement, engaged with the concepts of imperialism, socialism, and communism in shaping their myriad visions for Kashmir's freedom. It also examines diasporic tactics aimed at generating global support for Kashmiris physically trapped in the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan.

The last chapter unravels the role of Islam in Kashmiri resistance. It explores the significance of religious identity and symbolism in Kashmiri Muslim protests, while placing the articulation of an Islamist ideology by certain political groups in the context of Kashmiri disillusionment with their political elites, the rising power of the Hindu right, and the globalization of Islam. I draw upon novels, poetry, and short stories to reveal how state suppression made Kashmiri Muslims more aware of their religious identity in the post-insurgency era, while the power politics of India and Pakistan played a key role in shifting the image of Kashmiri

resistance from a national freedom movement to Islamic jihad. As the insurgency crystallized religious identities, it created an impenetrable gap between Kashmir's Hindu and Muslim communities, revealing once more how the contested nature of "freedom" has helped to make the Kashmir dispute intractable. While Kashmiri Hindus lament the loss of their homeland, a new generation of Kashmiri Muslims use creative modes of protest including social media, music, paintings, and animation to challenge the militarization of Kashmir. The story of Kashmir in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century sheds light on the differentiation between popular and state sovereignty and the relationship between human rights and state legitimacy.

Notes

1. Extract from Agha Shahid Ali's poem "I See Kashmir from New Delhi at Midnight," in *The Country without a Post Office* (Delhi: Orient Longman, 2000), 10–12.
2. Brief sections of this manuscript have been published as the chapter "Kashmiri Visions of Freedom: The Past and the Present," in Chitralkha Zutshi (ed.), *Kashmir: History, Politics, Representation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 89–112.
3. Ananya Jahanara Kabir's *The Territory of Desire* argues that the "roots of Indian desire" for the Kashmir Valley are in its "symbolic capital." In the colonial period, the British photographers focused their lens on Kashmir's beautiful landscape, which enhanced its value. After decolonization, the Indian nation-state replicated this visual image of Kashmir in films and artworks, thus, embedding "Kashmir" in the national imagination. For details, see Ananya Jahanara Kabir, *The Territory of Desire: Representing the Valley of Kashmir* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).
4. Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846–1990* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992); Sumit Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Robert Wirsing, *Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age* (London: Routledge, 2003); Praveen Swami, *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004* (London: Routledge, 2006).
5. Haley Duschinski, "Destiny Effects: Militarization, State Power, and Punitive Containment in the Kashmir Valley," *Anthropological Quarterly* 82, no. 3 (2009): 619–717; Cabeiri Robinson, *Body of Victim, Body of Warrior: Refugee Families and the Making of Kashmiri Jihadists* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013).
6. Mohammad Ishaq Khan, *Kashmir's Transition to Islam: The Role of Muslim Rishis* (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1994); Chitralkha Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity and the Making of Kashmir* (New York: Oxford University

- Press, 2004); Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights and History of Kashmir* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
7. Walter R. Lawrence, *Provincial Gazetteer of Kashmir* (repr., Delhi: Rima Publishing House, 1985), 21–2.
 8. G. M. Mir, *Geographical Realities of Jammu and Kashmir* (Yorkshire: United Kashmir Publishers, 2000), 10.
 9. Chitralkha Zutshi (ed.), *Kashmir: History, Politics, Representation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 5.
 10. G. M. D. Sufi, *Kashmir: Being a History of Kashmir*, Vol. 2 (New Delhi: Light and Life Publishers, 1974), 816; Walter R. Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir* (Srinagar: Kesar Publishers, 1967), 2–3.
 11. Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects*, 80–127.
 12. Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging*.
 13. Nasreen Ali in “Kashmiri Nationalism: Beyond the Nation State” has argued that the discourse of Kashmiriyat emerges from the displacement and resettlement of Kashmiris in the diasporic space. Nasreen Ali, “Kashmiri Nationalism: Beyond the Nation State,” *South Asia Research* 22, no. 2 (September 2002): 145–60.
 14. In 1911 the maharaja initiated a State Subject Definition Committee to probe complaints of Kashmiri Hindus against Punjabi Hindu domination in government services. They expressed concern that state policies have prevented Kashmiris from holding important positions in the government. To placate the disgruntled Pandit community, in 1927 Maharaja Hari Singh passed the Hereditary State Subject Act. According to this act, “all persons born or residing in the state before the commencement of the reign of Maharaja Gulab Singh and all persons who settled therein before the commencement of 1885 and have since been permanently residing in the country” were now considered state subjects. The law restricted state service to individuals who could produce a state-subject certificate. Additionally, non-state subjects could not purchase land in Jammu and Kashmir. Report of the Committee to Define the Term “State Subject,” Political Department, 1935, File.No.199/RR-18, Jammu Kashmir Archives; Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects*, 249–53. Robinson, *Body of Victim, Body of Warrior*, 37–9.
 15. Robinson, *Body of Victim, Body of Warrior*.
 16. Patricia Ellis and Zafar Khan, “The Kashmiri Diaspora: Influences in Kashmir,” in Nadjie Al-Ali and Khalid Koser (eds.), *New Approaches to Migration? Transnational Communities and Transformations of Home* (London: Routledge, 2002), 169–85.
 17. Erez Manela, *Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and International origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 17.
 18. Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 44–5.
 19. Timothy Mitchell, *Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil* (London: Verso, 2011), 92–9.

20. P. L. Lakhanpal, *Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute* (Delhi: International Books, 1968), 158–9.
21. Navnita Chadha Behera, *Demystifying Kashmir* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2006).
22. Sumantra Bose, *The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-Determination and a Just Peace* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997).
23. For details, see Sumathi Ramaswamy, *The Goddess and the Nation: Mapping Mother India* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Sumathi Ramaswamy, “Maps and Mother Goddesses in Modern India,” *Imago Mundi* 53 (2001): 97–114.
24. David Ludden, “Spatial Inequity and National Territory: Remapping 1905 in Bengal and Assam,” *Modern Asian Studies* 46, no. 3 (May 2012): 483–525; Willem Van Schendel, *The Bengal Borderland* (London: Anthem, 2005).
25. For details, see A. G. Noorani, *Article 370: A Constitutional History of Jammu and Kashmir* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011).
26. Examples include Quebec’s special status within Canada; the concessions to the east after German reunification in 1990; and the USA’s Reconstruction after its Civil War. Dilip D’Souza, “India’s Government Has Undermined the Very Essence of Federalism and Democracy,” *The Nation*, August 15, 2019, <https://www.thenation.com/article/india-kashmir-modi-bjp-federalism-and-democracy/>, accessed November 15, 2019.
27. Article 371A prohibits non-residents from buying land in Nagaland. Article 371F grants special provisions to Sikkim which prohibit sale and purchase of land or property to outsiders. States under the Sixth Schedule of the constitution that include Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram, and the areas under the Gorkha Hill Council, Darjeeling, in West Bengal, impose restrictions on outsiders to buy land. Subash Rajta, “Who Can and Cannot Buy Land in Himachal,” *The Tribune*, October 30, 2019, <https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/sunday-special/kaleidoscope/who-can-cannot-buy-land-in-himachal/819058.html>, accessed October 30, 2019.
28. Christopher Snedden, *The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
29. Anam Zakaria, *Between the Great Divide: A Journey into Pakistan-Administered Kashmir* (Delhi: Harper Collins, 2018, Kindle Edition). Zakaria draws from oral histories to explore the impact of the conflict on Azad Kashmiris from the tribal raid of 1947 to the rise of the armed insurgency in the 1980s.
30. Willem van Schendel’s *The Bengal Borderland* examines how the political culture of borderlands is marked by continual struggles between the powers of territorial control and those of cross-border networking. Taking Bengal as an example, he presents borderland insurgencies as the machinations of rival nation-states in South Asia who aid and abet the insurgents to destabilize and dismember their neighbors. Instead of only seeing insurgencies as strategies of neighboring states, I also acknowledge the agency of “borderlanders” who resist marginalization and make themselves visible in the national arena.

31. Scholarship on South Asian historiography has studied the extraterritorial dimension of Indian nationalism. In *A Hundred Horizons* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), Sugata Bose argues that nationalist identity and imagination cannot be limited within a territorially delimited nation-state, while “oceanic dimensions of anti-colonialism may go some way in freeing the study of nationalism from its landlocked state.” His study shows how the Indian Ocean served as an “inter-regional arena,” carrying waves of laborers serving in mines and plantations outside India, soldiers serving overseas, and even expatriates who imagined and perceived an Indian homeland. Maia Ramnath’s *Haj to Utopia: How the Ghadar Movement Charted Global Radicalism and Attempted to Overthrow the British Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011) argues against viewing the anticolonial Ghadar movement in a nationalist framework; instead, she suggests that the Ghadar revolutionaries mediated local and transnational concerns across America, Europe, the Middle East, and East Africa.
32. Martin Sökefeld, “The Kashmiri Diaspora in Britain and the Limits of Political Mobilization,” in Astrid Wonneberger, Mijal Gandelsman-Trier, and Hauke Dorsch (eds.), *Migration Networks Skills* (Hamburg: Transcript-Verlag, 2016), 23–46.
33. Jagmohan, *My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1991); Praveen Swami, *India, Pakistan, and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004* (London: Routledge, 2007), 2–3.
34. Vivek Sinha, “Yes, Kashmir Struggle Is a Subset of Global Islamic Terror Game,” *Times of India*, June 6, 2017, <https://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/between-the-lines/yes-kashmir-struggle-is-a-subset-of-global-islamic-terror-game/>, accessed June 2017; Vivek Sinha, “Kashmir Struggle Is All about Establishing Islamic Caliphate and Sharia,” *Indiafacts.org*, May 27, 2017, <http://indiafacts.org/kashmir-struggle-is-all-about-establishing-islamic-caliphate-and-sharia/>, accessed June 2018.
35. Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects*.
36. Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 161–83.
37. Ayesha Jalal, *Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 12.
38. For details about the rise of Islamic revivalism in South Asia, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
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40. Hallie Ludsin, “Returning Sovereignty to the People,” *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 46, no. 1 (January 2013): 97–169, <https://www.vanderbilt.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/78/Ludsin.pdf>, accessed January 2019.
41. Indrani Bagchi, “India Slams UN Report,” *Times of India*, June 14, 2018, <http://theindiaobserver.com/india-slams-un-report-on-kashmir-calls-it-selective-compilation-of-largely-unverified-information/>, accessed August 23, 2018.