Introduction

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Sixty years ago, R. R. Palmer published his two-volume *Age of the Democratic Revolution*, in which he described a "revolution of Western Civilization," that, he argued, had occurred in the years between 1760 and 1800. These decades, Palmer went on, saw numerous agitations, upheavals, and conspiracies on either side of the Atlantic, that arose out of specific or universal conditions, not simply as the result of the French Revolution. What Palmer outlined was what we now call the Age of (Atlantic) Revolutions, a theme that has been and continues to be the inspiration for high-quality publications, in part because this period in history supposedly laid the foundations for the countries shaped in the aftermath of these revolutions, and in part because of the need to explain the unusual political activity and social upheaval on display in this era. Virtually absent from the countless monographs, articles, and edited volumes is an overview of this important period in Atlantic history. Many specialists work within their own subfield, writing and conducting research on, for example, the American Revolution without closely following the newest trends in scholarship on the revolutions in France or Latin America. The aim of this book is to bring together current scholarship for the first reference work dedicated to the age of revolutions. Jointly, the chapters that make up this book will reveal the era in all its complexity. They will reflect the latest trends, discussing more than simply the causes, key events, and consequences of the revolutions by stressing political experimentation, contingency, and the survival of old regime practices and institutions. The time is ripe for analyzing these matters in a way that does justice to both the local nature of the revolts and their much wider Atlantic context.

Most scholars of the Age of Revolutions no longer share Palmer's geographic and temporal frameworks. They include the quarter-century (or more) after 1800 and look beyond western Europe and the United States to Haiti and Latin America. No general agreement exists, however, on the exact start and end dates, nor on its confinement to the Atlantic world. The

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periodization advocated by C. A. Bayly, who has made a case for the timeframe 1760–1840, is about the same as that adopted in this *Cambridge History of the Age of Atlantic Revolutions*.[1] Like any time limits, these are somewhat arbitrary. One could push the outer boundary to 1848. By that year of revolution, however, so many new factors and forces had emerged on the various national political scenes – including full-fledged liberalism and nationalism, and capitalism's working class – that there is more reason to see them as elements of a new era.

Although the geographic scope of these three volumes is vast, it has been my choice not to include all instances of rebellion, but to focus on coherence. What ties the numerous rebellious movements on either side of the Atlantic basin together in the half-century between the shots fired at Lexington and Concord (1775) and the Spanish loss at the siege of Callao, Peru in 1826 is more than just the, often violent, transitions from old to new regimes. The common glue is what marked these transitions: the questioning of time-honored institutions in the name of liberty; the invention and spread of a politics of contestation at local and national levels; the unprecedented experimentation with new forms of democracy; the abolition of numerous forms of legal inequality; and last but not least the aspiration to universal rights. These were processes in which plebeians, elites, and members of middling groups all participated. These phenomena were not experienced wherever in the world riots and rebellions broke out. They were largely absent, for example, from the Ottoman empire, although it was in great turmoil during the age of revolutions, especially in the years 1806–1808, when two sultans were deposed and thousands of people killed.[2]

What the age of revolutions brought was hope for fundamental change, a scarce good in the early modern world. Any criticism of authorities had previously been forbidden and heavily punished. It was only during periods of unrest that peasants in Europe could express their dissatisfaction without fear of reprisal. In such times, there are also glimpses of the hidden transcript of enslaved men and women throughout the Americas, which reflected the

[1] C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); C. A. Bayly, "The Age of Revolutions in Global Context: An Afterword," in David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, eds., *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760–1840* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 209–17: 217.

[2] Ali Yaycioglu, *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 158.

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awakening of their hopes.[3] A historian of the Russian Revolution has written that "revolutions disrupt assumptions that the future can only appear along the straight tracks where the present seems to be heading, and so challenge how we understand time and history . . . Utopia is this open disruption of the now, for the sake of possibility, not a closed map of the future. It is the leap not yet the landing."[4] This leap was made time and again by the oppressed. On the eve of the French and Haitian Revolutions, writes **John Garrigus** (Volume II, Chapter 23), many enslaved residents of Saint-Domingue "believed change was possible, whether that came through applying new laws or actively confronting the master class." For the 1790s, no fewer than forty-seven slave revolts and conspiracies have been documented for the Greater Caribbean, a number much larger than ever before or afterwards. Similarly, the years 1789–1802 saw 150 mutinies on single ships and half a dozen fleet-wide mutinies in the British, French, and Dutch navies, which meant that between 67,000 and 100,000 mobilized men were involved in at least one mutiny.[5]

Hope in the American Revolution often took the form of millennial expectations, which were so intense "during the early years of the revolutionary war that numerous patriots foresaw the final destruction of Antichrist and the establishment of the Kingdom of God within the immediate future." One revolutionary on Long Island saw the millennium as "the happy period when tyranny, oppression, and wretchedness shall be banished from the earth; when universal love and liberty, peace and righteousness, shall prevail."[6] The French Revolution aroused hope, both at home and abroad, that tended to be secular in nature. After arriving in France in 1792 as the United States' Minister Plenipotentiary, Gouverneur Morris wrote in a letter that he was delighted to find "on this Side of the Atlantic a strong resemblance to what I left on the other – a Nation which exists in Hopes, Prospects, and Expectations. The reverence for ancient Establishments gone, existing Forms shaken to the very Foundation, and a new Order of Things about

[3] Martin Merki-Vollenwyder, *Unruhige Untertanen: Die Rebellion der Luzerner Bauern im Zweiten Villmergerkrieg (1712)* (Luzern: Rex Verlag, 1995), 121–2; James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

[4] Mark D. Steinberg, *The Russian Revolution 1905–1921* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 292–3.

[5] David Geggus, "Slave Rebellion during the Age of Revolution," in Wim Klooster and Gert Oostindie, eds., *Curaçao in the Age of Revolutions, 1795–1800* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2011), 23–56: 41–3; Nyklas Frykman, *The Bloody Flag: Mutiny in the Age of Atlantic Revolution* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2020), 10.

[6] Ruth H. Bloch, *Visionary Republic: Millennial Themes in American Thought, 1756–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 79, 81.

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to take Place in which even to the very names, all former Institutions will be disregarded."[7] The imagined new order caused tremendous optimism on the part of enthusiasts for the French Revolution. Norwegian-born Henrik Steffens recalled in his memoirs that when he was sixteen and living with his family in Copenhagen, his father came home one day, deeply impressed by the French Revolution, and told his three sons: "Children, you are to be envied, what a happy time lies ahead of you! If you don't succeed in gaining a free independent position, you have yourselves to blame. All restrictive conditions of status, of poverty will disappear, the least will begin the same struggle with the most powerful, with the same weapons, on the same ground. If only I were young like you!"[8] Steffens experienced the time that followed as not simply a French but a European revolution that was planted in millions of hearts: "The first moment of excitement in history . . . has something pure, even sacred, that must never be forgotten. A boundless hope took hold of me, my whole future, it seemed to me, was planted in a fresh, new soil . . . From then on my whole existence had taken on a new direction . . ."[9]

Rights

If revolutionaries were guided by ideas emanating from the Enlightenment, did the Enlightenment produce the revolutions? No, answers **Johnson Kent Wright** (Volume 1, Chapter 2), at least not in the case of France. "Had 'enlightened' criticism of the Bourbon monarchy been sufficient to have launched the Revolution, it ought to have occurred some two decades earlier than it did." And yet, Wright adds, the French Enlightenment was essential to the way the revolution unfolded. Likewise, enlightened ideas helped steer the revolutions in the Ibero-American world, but, as **Brian Hamnett** argues (Volume 1, Chapter 3), the Enlightenment did not lead inevitably or automatically to support for revolution. In New Spain, for example, the outbreak of insurrection in 1810 divided its proponents into hostile camps.

Rights were an essential element of the sometimes baffling transformations that took place during the age of Atlantic revolutions. Rights used to

[7] Cited in Philipp Ziesche, "Exporting American Revolutions: Gouverneur Morris, Thomas Jefferson, and the National Struggle for Universal Rights in Revolutionary France," *Journal of the Early Republic* 26:3 (2006), 419–47: 426.

[8] Henrich Steffens, *Was ich erlebte: Aus der Erinnerung niedergeschrieben* (Breslau: Josef Mar und Kompanie, 1840), vol. 1, 362–3.

[9] Steffens, *Was ich erlebte*, 364–5.

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be privileges, granted to someone for the common good. Every male had rights commensurate with his station in life, which thereby confirmed the hierarchical organization of society. They were accompanied by obligations that forced the rights' holders to use their powers for the common good. The new notion that gradually took shape – and remained unfinished – was that humans' own moral power allowed them to stake their claims and relate their own rights to those of others. Rights transcended all structures of authority and were thus common to humankind. Human equality now trumped any differences in rank, nationality, or culture.[10] The US Declaration of Independence – the first revolutionary document to invoke rights – echoed this new idea by positing the existence of a supreme law against which positive law could be measured and, if needed, changed.[11] The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen served the same function, for which it was criticized by supporters of liberalism as metaphysical.

Once formulated, these catalogs of rights could inspire groups who had not been among the intended beneficiaries to claim parity. Just like Black people could argue that their humanity sufficed to negate their status as slaves, some women pressed for their equal rights. The authors of two Belgian pamphlets, who predicted that the current tide of revolutions would bring an end to "seventeen centuries of masculine abuse," called for a national assembly, half of whose members were to be women. If their demand was ignored by the nation's leaders, women would withdraw from society.[12] Adversaries of such rights, however, used the same language of natural rights to oppose these demands. Woman's nature, male French revolutionaries argued, made her unfit to exercise political power.[13]

The invocation of a higher law coexisted in the age of revolutions with the continued emphasis on ancient positive rights by men and women challenging the social order. In many places across the Atlantic world, as **Stephen**

[10] Knud Haakonssen, "From Natural Law to the Rights of Man: A European Perspective on American Debates," in Michael J. Lacy and Knud Haakonssen, eds., *A Culture of Rights: The Bill of Rights in Philosophy, Politics, and Law – 1791 and 1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 19–61: 21, 32, 35–6; Simon Middleton, *From Privileges to Rights: Work and Politics in Colonial New York* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 5–6.

[11] Andrew J. Reck, "Natural Law in American Revolutionary Thought," *The Review of Metaphysics* 30:4 (1977), 686–714: 712.

[12] Janet L. Polasky, "Women in Revolutionary Belgium: From Stone Throwers to Hearth Tenders," *History Workshop* 21 (1986), 87–104: 93.

[13] Annelien de Dijn, *Freedom: An Unruly History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020), 226.

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Conway argues in Volume I, Chapter 11, "the events associated with Palmer's 'democratic revolution' began as a conservative reaction to the reforming endeavors of rulers, not as a grassroots desire to extend popular participation." Ireland's Protestants, he shows, were looking backwards "in seeking to reclaim their autonomy." "Most of them were not interested in a democratic transformation of Ireland." **Janet Polasky** (Volume II, Chapter 14) writes that one of the groups challenging Austrian rule in Belgium "wanted to restore the medieval constitutions and reestablish the rule of the three Estates. Instead of natural rights, they referred to 'the eternal rights of man,' meaning something quite different from the enlightenment ideal. Instead of the 'rights of the People,' they referred to the privileges of the 'nation belge.'" In the (Swiss) Helvetic Republic, a document presented to the authorities of Zurich in 1794 that has been labeled the *Stäfner Memorial* demanded both the restoration of old privileges and a constitution that defended individual human rights.[14]

The introduction of rights was no straightforward process, as can be illustrated by the uncertain status of the right to profess one's religious belief. The tone was set by the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which stipulated that "all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience."[15] Although it has been argued that religious freedom was achievable in Protestant places such as Virginia where tolerance had already been practiced, its adoption was usually a matter of controversy. In Pennsylvania's constitutional debate of 1776, one side – made up of Protestants – opposed religious leniency, which they feared would put them at the mercy of the alien creeds of Islam, Catholicism, and Judaism. Likewise, although Massachusetts' constitution may have guaranteed the exercise of religion in private, it contained an injunction to the legislature to support Protestant teachers.[16] Nor was such intolerance the exclusive domain of elite politicians in the age of revolutions. A series of Catholic relief bills proposed

[14] Urte Weeber, "New Wine in Old Wineskins: Republicanism in the Helvetic Republic," in Joris Oddens, Mart Rutjes, and Erik Jacobs, eds., *The Political Culture of the Sister Republics, 1794–1806: France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), 57–64: 62.

[15] Daniel L. Dreisbach, "George Mason's Pursuit of Religious Liberty in Revolutionary Virginia," *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 108:1 (2000), 5–44: 16.

[16] Charles D. Russell, "Islam as a Danger to Republican Virtue: Broadening Religious Liberty in Revolutionary Pennsylvania," *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies* 76:3 (2009), 250–75: 251; Eduardo Posada-Carbó, "Spanish America and US constitutionalism in the Age of Revolution," in Gabriel Paquette and Gonzalo M. Quintero Saravia, eds., *Spain and the American Revolution: New Approaches and Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2020), 210–23: 217.

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by the British government threw into sharp relief the existence of a popular Protestantism that defined itself in opposition to French Catholicism and eventually led to the Gordon Riots (London, 1780).[17]

The antipluralist tendency was, however, stronger in the Catholic world, even in France, where the Catholic faith lost its status as state religion and where Protestants and Jews were emancipated. Political culture proved hard to change.[18] And so it could happen that a small town in Alsace decided in 1794 that the Jews had to shave their beards, and could no longer carry their Decalogues in public or show any other signs of their religion.[19] It was not different in the colonies. When the planters of Saint-Domingue sought protection from the British king in 1793, proposing some articles of government, they insisted on the exclusivity of the Catholic religion.[20] Soon, of course, French revolutionary intolerance went beyond the insistence on Catholicism, when the adoption of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy led to discrimination against the millions of people who clung to the old Church.

The influential constitution of Cádiz stated unambiguously that the religion of the Spanish nation was and would always be the only true Roman Catholic one. When the legislators gathered in Cádiz voted for press freedom in 1810, they followed it up by setting up boards of censorship that would make sure that published works did not threaten religion. Three years later, they went one step further by decreeing the death penalty for anyone suggesting the implementation of a policy of tolerance vis-à-vis non-Catholics.[21] At the same time, as **Roberto Breña** notes (Volume III, Chapter 3), the constitution "tried to control what up to that moment was an almost exclusive role of the Church in public education, publishing, and public discourse." Javier Fernández Sebastián has convincingly argued that "the overwhelming preponderance of Catholicism in the Hispanic world explains how difficult it was to conceive of religion and politics as separate spheres, and the correlative difficulty of regarding 'religion' as an abstract category of a general nature, capable of embracing several 'religions,' in the

[17] Brad A. Jones, "'In Favour of Popery': Patriotism, Protestantism, and the Gordon Riots in the Revolutionary British Atlantic," *Journal of British Studies* 52:1 (2013), 79–102.

[18] Bronislaw Baczko, *Politiques de la Révolution française* (Paris: Gallimard, 2008), 62–3.

[19] Claude Muller, "Religion et Révolution en Alsace," *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* 337 (2004), 63–83: 76.

[20] J. Marino Incháustegui, ed., *Documentos para estudio: Marco de la época y problemas del Tratado de Basilea de 1795, en la parte española de Santo Domingo* (Buenos Aires: Academia Dominicana de la Historia, 1957), 640.

[21] Juan Pablo Domínguez, "Intolerancia religiosa en las Cortes de Cádiz," *Hispania* 77:255 (2017), 155–83: 164, 178.

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plural." Since Catholicism was the foundation of the nation's identity, tolerance meant "disunion, illegitimacy, even civil war."[22] This sentiment was shared by the priests of central Switzerland when the constitution of the Helvetic Republic was promulgated, which meant that irreligiosity and heresy were no longer punishable.[23]

Residents of the Catholic world would not have viewed religious exclusivity as a form of inequality. As members of the Christian community, every individual enjoyed an equal status by virtue of their baptism. Their ties were governed by brotherly love. At least, that was the case in theory. In practice, it remained an ideal, pursued by Hidalgo and other priests involved in the Mexican uprising of 1810. The early Church fathers rather than Enlightenment *philosophes* were the inspiration for Hidalgo, who stated that his goal was to build a society in which all were recognized as equal children of God.[24] Likewise, the 1797 republican conspiracy in Venezuela, writes **Cristina Soriano** in Volume II, Chapter 28, "argued in favor of social harmony between whites, *pardos*, Indians, and blacks, because all these racial groups were seen as 'brothers in Christ.'"

Not all Catholic leaders were bent on continuing the exclusivity of their religion. Some sought to introduce a measure of tolerance. The difference between tolerance and religious freedom was expressed by the "Jews, settled in France" in a petition to the National Assembly a few months after the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen had been adopted. "The word tolerance," they wrote, "which after so many centuries and so many *intolerant acts* seemed to be a word of humanity and reason, no longer suits a country that wishes to establish its rights on the eternal basis of justice .... To tolerate, indeed, is to suffer what one would have the right to prohibit." Under the new conditions, the dominant religion had no right to prohibit another religion from humbly placing itself by its side.[25] But religious inequality was not to vanish, while tolerance – that typically early modern phenomenon – was still a viable option in Europe and the Americas. The

[22] Javier Fernández Sebastián, "Toleration and Freedom of Expression in the Hispanic World between Enlightenment and Liberalism," *Past & Present* no. 211 (May 2011), 159–97: 162–3, 186, 188.

[23] Eric Godel, "La Constitution scandaleuse. La population de Suisse centrale face à la République helvétique," in Andreas Würgler, ed., *Grenzen des Zumutbaren: Erfahrungen mit der französischen Okkupation und der Helvetischen Republik (1798–1803)* (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2011), 29–44: 32.

[24] Laura Ibarra García, "El concepto de igualdad en México (1810–1824)," *Relaciones* 145 (2016), 279–314: 287.

[25] "Pétition des juifs établis en France, adressée à l'Assemblée Nationale," 28 January 1790, in *Adresses, mémoires et pétitions des juifs 1789–1794* (Paris: EDHIS, 1968), 17–18.

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Polish constitution, writes **Richard Butterwick** (Volume II, Chapter 20), began "with a stirring preamble and an article maintaining the prohibition against 'apostasy' from the Roman Catholic 'dominant and national religion,' while assuring freedom of worship and the protection of government to all creeds." Similarly, the Organic Law that saw the light in Pernambuco, Brazil in 1817 said that the state religion was Roman Catholicism, while the other Christian sects of any denomination were tolerated.[26] In early independent Colombia, a campaign for religious toleration failed to achieve its goal. Foreigners could still not hold Protestant services in public in spite of sustained criticism of the Catholic clergy, which was held responsible for blocking new ideas.[27] The most radical constitution adopted in a Catholic country was that issued by Jean-Jacques Dessalines in 1805. While Toussaint Louverture's constitution of 1801 had declared Catholicism the official state religion, that of Dessalines (although short-lived) introduced religious tolerance.[28]

Sovereignty and Public Opinion

Many historians have assumed that a form of self-government was already in place in Britain's North American colonies. These are considered to have thrived in a long era of "salutary neglect." When that era ended in the aftermath of the Seven Years' War, a revolution became thinkable. In Volume I, Chapter 6, **Holly Brewer** shows that "salutary neglect" was largely a myth: "The political, legal and economic situations in the colonies were constantly negotiated in a struggle for power that was occurring not only on the level of empire but in England itself . . . To the degree that such 'salutary neglect' existed . . . it was part of this negotiation and struggle over the meaning and terms of power. While some could escape the power of empire in the short term, it was constantly tugging at their sleeves. One could take up land in the 'wilderness,' for example, . . . but the only way one owned it was by getting a legal title – and that demanded negotiation with all the ligaments of colonial authority, from surveyor and courts to secretary of

[26] Leonardo Morais de Araújo Pinheiro, "Análise da Lei Orgânica da Revolução pernambucana de 1817 à luz dos direitos fundamentais," *Revista Brasileira de História do Direito* 4:2 (2018), 114–34: 130.

[27] David Bushnell, *The Santander Regime in Gran Colombia* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1970 [1954]), 210, 215.

[28] Lorelle D. Semley, "To Live and Die, Free and French: Toussaint Louverture's 1801 Constitution and the Original Challenge of Black Citizenship," *Radical History Review* 115 (2013), 65–90: 78.

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the colony. How one could develop it, and what one could grow, how one could pass it on, were often regulated by laws that might emerge in the colonies but were subject to Royal veto. Other regulations were imposed directly by imperial authorities."

Revolutions are always a struggle for sovereignty. Despite the widely shared support for popular sovereignty, opinions were divided on the people's postrevolutionary political role. A prominent monarchist member of France's National Assembly opined that while all powers emanated from the people, their well-being depended on leaving the exercise of these powers to the king to prevent the chaos of anarchy.[29] In continental British America, **Max Edling** remarks (Volume 1, Chapter 17), the ideology of the American Revolution "introduced a nebulous concept of popular sovereignty, which somehow existed both at state and at national level." "Several of the new constitutions incorporated Congress's declaration of independence in whole or in part, thus illustrating how legitimate authority was based on popular sovereignty simultaneously expressed at national and local level." In Spanish America, it was unclear whether self-rule extended to a town's immediate vicinity or whether administrative centers could claim to govern vast areas. The assumption of sovereignty in Spanish America implied a return to nature. As Clément Thibaud has explained, that meant not a return to a Hobbesian world of lone individuals but *pueblos*, peoples in the sense of free communities. If indeed the *pueblo* was the repository of sovereignty, opinions differed on the *pueblo*'s identity, at least in New Granada. Was it the town, the province, or all of New Granada?[30] Federalists in many parts of the Atlantic world, often inspired by the United States and opposed to the horrors to which centralism had allegedly given rise in Jacobin Paris, usually found support outside traditional political centers. To legitimize the dispersion of political power, Dutch federalists used the climate argument – according to which each land had its own character and was therefore entitled to its own legislation – to plead for separate laws for each of the seven small provinces. Another argument was that the distance between the population and its rulers was much smaller on

[29] His name was Jean-Joseph Mounier. Nicolai von Eggers, "Popular Sovereignty, Republicanism, and the Political Logic of the Struggles of the French Revolution" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Aarhus, 2016), 216.

[30] Clément Thibaud, "Des républiques en armes à la République armée. Guerre révolutionnaire, fédéralisme et centralisme au Venezuela et en Nouvelle-Grenade, 1808–1830," *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* no. 348 (2011), 57–86: 63; Isabel Restrepo Mejía, "La soberanía del 'pueblo' durante la época de la independencia, 1810–1815," *Historia Crítica* 29 (2005), 101–23: 102–5.

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a provincial level. Such democratic reasoning had its limits, though, because the federalists' emphasis on the preservation of provincial laws and customs was at odds with the new egalitarian spirit.[31]

Penetrating everywhere, that new spirit changed the nature of political debates, which were no longer confined to elite venues. **Javier Fernández Sebastián** points out in Volume III, Chapter 12 that the "increase in the pace of publication of newspapers and readers' insatiable demand for news rapidly accelerated the circulation of new concepts and multiplied the uses, often contradictory, of basic political terminology." To succeed in achieving political goals, the mobilization of public opinion became indispensable, as in the Dutch Republic, where Patriot newspapers were not just sold widely but also carried many readers' letters, showcasing public opinion.[32] Public opinion, which rebels constantly invoked, came to be seen as an enlightened court with universal authority.[33] In order to expose the French king to this new "court" and remove him from the royal court in Versailles, plebeians forced Louis XVI to settle in Paris, where he would be surrounded by "the people." In Venezuela, conversely, several representatives proposed to move the seat of Congress away from Caracas and avoid the crushing weight of the capital's public opinion. Their adversaries opined that at least in Caracas, some Enlightenment may be found. One of them argued: "Public opinion is not power, but the sum of all opinions that cannot be formed without knowledge. And could it be that they exist among shepherds, farmers or peasants, who don't even know the name of those who govern them? Public opinion, in matters of government, resides only in the big cities and not in the villages and shacks, especially in America, where the previous government has always kept under a black veil even the inhabitants of the capital city."[34] And even in the big cities, only a small group of men were zealots for liberty, Genevan native Étienne Dumont noted when he arrived in Paris on the eve

[31] Peter A. J. van den Berg, *Codificatie en staatsvorming: De politieke en politiek-theoretische achtergronden van de codificatie van het privaatrecht in Pruisen, de Donaumonarchie, Frankrijk en Nederland, 1450–1811* (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1996), 306, 307, 314, 319.

[32] Nicolaas van Sas, "The Patriot Revolution: New Perspectives," in Margaret C. Jacob and Wijnand W. Mijnhardt, eds., *The Dutch Republic in the Eighteenth Century: Decline, Enlightenment, and Revolution* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 91–120: 102–3.

[33] Keith Michael Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 186, 193–6.

[34] Véronique Hébrard, "Opinion publique et représentation dans le Congrès Constituant Vénézuélien (1810–1812)," *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* no. 365 (2011), 153–75: 162 (quote), 167, 170–1.

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of the revolution: "There are in the immense population of this metropolis about fifteen or twenty thousand persons, who consider the meeting of the Estates-General as a matter of the utmost importance, and who anxiously watch all the measures of the court; these men, being to be found everywhere, in coffee-houses, at the theatres, in private companies, and in public places, may be said to form the public opinion."[35] That most delegates at the Estates-General and National Assembly would have agreed with Dumont is suggested by the highly centralized polity they set up. **David Andress** argues in Volume II, Chapter 1 that the revolutionaries expected only obedience from locally elected leaders, did not introduce intermediary bodies outside Paris, and opted not to set up institutional checks on the legislature.

To focus single-mindedly on the politically active members of a society would obscure the politicization on a vast scale – inside and outside France – of ordinary people, who appropriated the official rhetoric that was expressed in official documents and proclamations, and employed it when they thought it useful.[36] A new democratic culture emerged in the countries neighboring France, characterized by newspapers, pamphlets, societies, republican catechisms, and civic feasts which featured freedom trees and Phrygian hats.[37] In Italy, writes **John A. Davis** (Volume II, Chapter 17), "freedom of the press, official and unofficial newspapers, pamphlets and broadsheets offered unprecedented platforms for public debate, while the newly created consultative and executive committees, public assemblies, the drafting of constitutions, the debates on the procedures and formalities of government, the organization of plebiscites and formalized civic and public ceremonies gave opportunities to experience active citizenship, as did the political clubs and societies."

Essential to the process of cultivating peoples bound together by horizontal ties of citizenship and shared visions of revolutionary transformation, writes Michael Kwass, was material culture "as legislators, producers, and

[35] Richard Whatmore, "Étienne Dumont, the British Constitution, and the French Revolution," *The Historical Journal* 50:1 (2007), 23–47: 32.

[36] Jean-Luc Chappey, "Révolution, régénération, civilisation. Enjeux culturels des dynamiques politiques," in Jean-Luc Chappey, Bernard Gainot, Guillaume Mazeau, Frédéric Régent, and Pierre Serna, eds., *Pour quoi faire la Révolution* (Marseille: Agone, 2012), 115–48; Maxime Kaci, *Dans le tourbillon de la Révolution: Mots d'ordre et engagements collectifs aux frontières septentrionales (1791–1793)* (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2016), 288; Eugenia Molina, "Politización y relaciones sociales en Mendoza (Argentina) durante la década revolucionaria (1810–1820). Conflictos y consensos en la configuración de un nuevo orden," *Boletín Americanista* 58 (2008), 251–71: 253.

[37] Annie Jourdan, *La Révolution, une exception française?* (Paris: Flammarion, 2004), 271–2.

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consumers imbued everyday objects with revolutionary meaning. More than merely reflecting political ideas and aspirations, material objects mediated their very expression . . ."[38] In one rural part of the Dutch Republic in the 1780s, all sorts of everyday objects demonstrated one's allegiance on both sides of the political divide: crockery, pottery, drinking utensils, sugar-casters, cookie boards, scent bottles, and tobacco and snuff boxes.[39] Just as cultural objects were invested with a revolutionary meaning, cultural *practices* underwent a transformation. They served, argues **Nathan Perl-Rosenthal** (Volume I, Chapter 4), as vehicles for new political ideas and practices. These cultural practices, such as letter-writing, were not in themselves revolutionary, and could be used by the revolutions' opponents, but in the hands of revolutionaries they were given new forms.

Politicization was not by definition, or at least not exclusively, ideological. **Joris Oddens** contends in Volume II, Chapter 13 that "in some rural areas [of the Dutch Republic] passions ran high, but what was at stake seems to have been a long-running tribal conflict rather than an ideological divide dating to the revolutionary era itself: rival factions in a village sided with the Patriots or with the Orangists, but more particularly *against* each other, or the entire population of one village sympathized with one camp because the people of a neighboring town politically or economically dwarfing them supported the other." This phenomenon existed everywhere. Preexisting disputes or grievances often conditioned the choice for revolution or status quo. If a large town in Spanish America embraced revolution, nearby smaller towns seeking greater autonomy would remain faithful to the old regime. Similarly, the feuding Anglicans and Presbyterians ended up on opposing sides in the American Revolution in good part to avoid each other. Yet another example can be found in Africa. Shortly after Brazil declared its independence, the elite of Benguela (Angola) used the crisis of the Portuguese empire to try to break away from its subordination to Luanda, join Brazil, and become a province attached to Rio de Janeiro. **Roquinaldo Ferreira** reveals in Volume III, Chapter 22 that this was no surprise move. Benguela and Rio were linked through the transatlantic slave trade, the Benguela elite sent its sons to study in Brazil, and it had regularly imported foodstuffs from Brazil in time of need.

[38] Michael Kwass, *Consumer Revolution, 1650–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 198.

[39] Jouke Nijman, "Politieke cultuur en volkscultuur in de Patriottentijd," *Groniek* 30 (1997), 417–31: 425, 426.

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Rhetoric was, of course, also largely strategic. No fewer than 227 towns in France petitioning the National Assembly to reassign lawcourts and other institutions to them adopted egalitarian language.[40] Similarly, in German cities, writes **Michael Rowe** (Volume II, Chapter 18), "demands that had previously been couched in the familiar language of historic rights and privileges now included references to the universal liberties triumphant in France." Elsewhere, old and new regime values mixed, as in the case of a free merchant of color from Guayaquil who petitioned the Cortes of Cádiz in 1820 for both citizenship and recognition as an *hidalgo*.[41] And in the hinterland of the Swiss canton of Zurich, the language of reform was combined with an insistence on inalienable rights. This pragmatic republicanism, writes **Marc H. Lerner** (Volume II, Chapter 11), was typical of Switzerland in the age of revolutions.

The defenders of the status quo responded to revolutionary activity in various ways, appealing to the public themselves in person or in writing, or simply muzzling the press, as the viceroy of New Spain did in Mexico City, an act he defended by alleging that press freedom had led to an "extraordinary number of seditious and insulting publications."[42] Nor were the revolutionaries, once in the saddle themselves, content with an alternative opinion being expressed. During the American Revolutionary War, Patriots bullied printers into retracting contentious statements. In other instances, they seized and destroyed the entire print run of pamphlets they considered dangerous. In addition to book burnings, there were monetary rewards for the capture of certain pamphleteers. Amid such escalating levels of violence, Loyalists found it increasingly hard to make their voices heard.[43]

Not everyone engaged in political contestation. Many peasants and urban workers were indifferent to the revolutions as long as they could maintain such a stance. Farmers in Chile were only gradually drawn into the political conflict as they were mobilized on either side of the divide through ties of clientage. Indifference could also give way to outright opposition to the state,

[40] Wim Klooster, *Revolutions in the Atlantic World: A Comparative History*, new edition (New York: New York University Press, 2018), 173–4; Ted W. Margadant, *Urban Rivalries in the French Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 157.
[41] Federica Morelli, *Free People of Color in the Spanish Atlantic: Race and Citizenship, 1780–1850* (New York: Routledge, 2020), 127–8.
[42] Juan Ortiz Escamilla, *Calleja: Guerra, botín y fortuna* (Xalapa: Universidad Veracruzana; Zamora: El Colegio de Michoacán, 2017), 112.
[43] Holger Hoock, *Scars of Independence: America's Violent Birth* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2017), 38–9. See also Harry M. Ward, *The War for Independence and the Transformation of American Society* (London: Routledge, 1999), 59–65.

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as it did in the Dutch province of Friesland, where those who were largely interested in issues that were of their immediate concern such as food prices or high taxes ended up turning their back on the Batavian Republic when the electorate was forced to sign a declaration signaling their resistance to any form of rule by stadtholders, aristocrats, or autocrats.[44]

Democracy

Most thinkers and activists conceived of freedom as the ability to live under laws that the inhabitants of a country made themselves.[45] The revolutionaries agreed that the regimes they built had to be supported by some form of popular control over the government. Only a political system that reflected the people's voice – which was often, but certainly not always, called democracy – could supplant aristocratic or monarchical rule. That voice was to be expressed through representation, which was inseparable from suffrage.[46]

Who constituted the people? At least a section of the adult population, and usually – in line with classical republicanism – those who had taken up arms to defend the revolution. The 1826 constitution of Bolivia said that Bolivians included "those who fought for liberty in Junín or Ayacucho," the sites of two battles that had doomed the Spanish empire in South America.[47] Similarly, the French constitution of 1795 singled out "veterans of one or more campaigns for the establishment of the Republic" as citizens who did not have to qualify financially in order to cast their vote.[48] The earlier French constitution of 1791, which was never implemented, had even granted suffrage to every adult male, a decision replicated only in

[44] Igor Goicovic Donoso, "De la indiferencia a la resistencia: Los sectores populares y la Guerra de Independencia en el norte de Chile (1817–1823)," *Revista de Indias* 74:260 (2014), 129–60: 136; Jacques Kuiper, *Een revolutie ontrafeld: Politiek in Friesland 1795–1798* (Franeker: Van Wijnen, 2002), 517.

[45] De Dijn, *Freedom*, 177–8.

[46] Minchul Kim, "Pierre-Antoine Antonelle and Representative Democracy in the French Revolution," *History of European Ideas* 44:3 (2018), 344–69: 351. Earlier forms of representation were now abandoned. Cf. Joaquim Albareda and Manuel Herrero Sánchez, eds., *Political Representation in the Ancien Régime* (London: Routledge, 2019).

[47] Constitution of Bolivia, 22 November 1826, in J. R. Gutiérrez, ed., *Las constituciones políticas que ha tenido la República Boliviana (1826–1868)* (Santiago: Imprenta de "El Independiente," 1869), 4–5.

[48] Andrew Jainchill, "The Constitution of the Year III and the Persistence of Classical Republicanism," *French Historical Studies* 26:3 (2003), 399–435: 418.

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Paraguay (1813).[49] Some constitutions extended voting rights not to every male, but the vast majority of men. That of Cádiz (1812) enabled many inhabitants in the Spanish empire to cast their vote. In Mexico City, for example, 93 percent of the adult male population was enfranchised. Likewise, the Brazilian constitution of 1824 incorporated in the electorate vast numbers of small urban and rural proprietors as well as tenant farmers and sharecroppers, although it did not give the vote to journeymen and free men who lived from piecework or who were not regularly employed.[50] Formal exclusion did not necessarily mean the inability to take part in the election process. In both France and Spain, communities were represented by well-known individuals, who received the vote after days of deliberation, during which anybody could chime in. Commoners who could not vote were still believed to be *virtually* represented through their public demonstrations of support or rejection of elected candidates.[51] North American Patriots, of course, scoffed at the notion of virtual representation. During the crisis that preceded the American Revolution, Britain's insistence that Americans were represented in Parliament despite their inability to vote had alienated numerous Americans from the metropole.

In most parts of the Atlantic world, representative democracy was introduced sooner or later, but without citizens resigning themselves to the reduced role that would later become the norm, when their input became largely limited to the periodic casting of votes. Many North Americans left little leeway to the delegates, whom they saw as "mere agents or tools of the people" who could give binding directions "whenever they please to give them."[52] During the Cortes of Cádiz, Spanish newspapers as well as politicians invoked the demand that the people control their representatives very closely, reserving for themselves the last say in expressing the general will.[53]

[49] Richard Allan White, *Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, 1810–1840* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978), 56.

[50] Jaime E. Rodríguez O., *The Independence of Spanish America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 105; Cecília Helena de Salles Oliveira, "Contribuição ao estudo do Poder Moderador," in Cecília Helena de Salles Oliveira, Vera Lúcia Nagib Bittencourt, and Wilma Peres Costa, eds., *Soberania e conflito: Configurações do Estado Nacional no Brasil do século XIX* (São Paulo: Editora Hucitec, 2010), 185–235: 214.

[51] Jean-Clément Martin, *Nouvelle histoire de la Révolution française* (Paris: Perrin, 2012), 208; François-Xavier Guerra, "The Spanish-American Tradition of Representation and Its European Roots," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 26:1 (1994), 1–35: 7.

[52] Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (Charlotte: The University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 371.

[53] Javier Fernández Sebastián, "Democracia," in Javier Fernández Sebastián and Juan Francisco Fuentes, eds., *Diccionario político y social del siglo XIX español* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2002), 216–228: 218.

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Militant Parisians known as Enragés, who were wrongly portrayed at the time as forming a movement, considered direct democracy the only option for their city. They agreed with Rousseau that sovereignty could not be delegated. The people should have the right to sanction the laws and if there were to be delegates, they must be revocable at will.[54] A form of direct democracy was actually established in one city 400 kilometers to the north. In 1796, voters in Amsterdam received the right to send proposals to the municipal government. If two-thirds of the electorate backed a proposal, it would be binding.[55]

The man who crucially intervened in the French Revolution on more than one occasion, the Abbé Sieyès, disagreed with the view that delegates should be kept on a leash by the voters. He summarized the legislative process as follows: "The members of a representative assembly ... gather in order to balance their opinions, to modify them, to purify some through others, and to extract finally from the *lumières* of all, a majority opinion, that is to say, the common will which makes the law. The mixing of individual wills, the kind of fermentation that they undergo in this operation, are necessary to produce the result that is desired. It is therefore essential that opinions should be able to concert, to yield, in a word to modify one another, for without this there is no longer a deliberative assembly but simply a *rendez-vous of couriers*, ready to depart after having delivered their dispatches."[56]

Sieyès did not simply favor representative democracy; he also introduced the distinction between active and passive citizens that was adopted in France. Fulfilling income or property requirements, the first group was allowed more extensive participation in political life. Sieyès' distinction was soon copied in other new regimes. By virtue of Brazil's 1824 constitution, for example, citizens were all males of age at least twenty-five years who lived on their own and did not work as domestic servants. They also had "a yearly net income above a hundred thousand reis derived from real estate property, industry, trade, or employment." These men could vote in the parochial assemblies, which chose the provincial electors. Electors, however, could

[54] Albert Soboul, "Audience des Lumières. Classes populaires et Rousseauisme sous la Révolution," *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* 34:170 (1962), 421–38: 425.

[55] Thomas Poell, "The Democratic Paradox: Dutch Revolutionary Struggles over Democratisation and Centralisation (1780–1813)" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utrecht, 2007), 91.

[56] Murray Forsyth, *Reason and Revolution: The Political Thought of the Abbé Sieyes* (Leicester: Leicester University Press; New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1987), 134.

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only be members of the active citizenry, made up of all men with an income of at least 200,000 reis, who had not been freed from slavery.[57]

Underlying this division was a difference between the people as conceptualized by Enlightenment thinkers and the actual population. The abstract people were a source of legitimacy, whereas the real people were deemed ignorant and superstitious by the elites.[58] The natural representatives of the people, d'Holbach and Diderot had taught, were those who were the best informed and educated.[59] Where revolutionaries succeeded in toppling a regime, they commonly began the process of enlightening the vast mass of the population. Delegates presented themselves as moral guides in a society that allegedly had become corrupt, which meant that it would take time for civilization to become rooted. The moral decay that he accused Spain of bringing to its colonies at the same time made Simón Bolívar oppose the establishment of a genuine democracy. The people, he maintained, were simply not ready yet for a political role. He was not alone. Six days before the storming of the Bastille, one deputy of the Third Estate wrote that the revolution – a term he presciently used – should be postponed by ten years, allowing the people to educate themselves.[60] To the Italian intellectual Vincenzio Russo, representative democracy was a temporary stage that should last as long as popular education was needed. Once that goal had been achieved, direct democracy could be introduced.[61]

Thomas Paine asserted, on the other hand, that the educational effect of representative democracy would be immediate. "[T]he case is," he wrote, "that the representative system diffuses such a body of knowledge throughout a nation, on the subject of government, as to explode ignorance and preclude imposition . . . Those who are not in the representation, know as much of the nature of business as those who are. An affectation of

[57] Márcia Regina Berbel and Rafael de Bivar Marquese, "The Absence of Race: Slavery, Citizenship, and Pro-slavery Ideology in the Cortes of Lisbon and the Rio de Janeiro Constituent Assembly (1821–4)," *Social History* 32:4 (2007), 415–433: 416, 425.

[58] Valérie Sottocasa, *Les brigands et la Révolution: Violences politiques et criminalité dans le Midi (1789–1802)* (Ceyzérieu: Champ Vallon, 2016), 363.

[59] Jonathan Israel, *A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 66.

[60] Adrien Duquesnoy, *Un révolutionnaire malgré lui: Journal mai–octobre 1789*, ed. Guillaume Mazeau (Paris: Mercure de France, 2016), 137. See for the changing meaning of the term "revolution" in those days: Keith Michael Baker, "Enlightenment Idioms, Old Regime Discourses, and Revolutionary Improvisation," in Thomas E. Kaiser and Dale K. Van Kley, eds., *From Deficit to Deluge: The Origins of the French Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 165–97: 191–6.

[61] Luciano Guerci, *"Mente, cuore, coraggio, virtù repubblicane": Educare il popolo nell'Italia in rivoluzione (1796–1799)* (Turin: Tirrenia Stampatori, 1992), 112–13.

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mysterious importance would there be scouted. Nations can have no secrets; and the secrets of courts, like those of individuals, are always their defects. In the representative system, the reason for everything must publicly appear. Every man is a proprietor in government and considers it a necessary part of his business to understand."[62] Although Jacobins embraced it, this conviction was not widely shared. While they may have hoped for a rapid enlightenment of the masses, most revolutionary regimes adopted constitutions that included a literacy requirement. This was necessary, explained French lawmaker Boissy d'Anglas, because a man "is only truly independent when he does not need anyone to enlighten him about his duties and to convey his ideas."[63] The leaders of the new Spanish American republics shared the Enlightenment ideal of popular education, many of them embracing the system of mutual education invented by the Englishman Joseph Lancaster. In that way, writes **Karen Racine** (Volume III, Chapter 15), large numbers of people could become literate in a short amount of time. The goal of education, however, was to train not participatory citizens, but moral subjects who were economically useful.

Even so, urban crowds made up of literate and illiterate residents alike often performed an important legitimizing function for revolutionary elites. Leaders of Central American revolts, writes **Timothy Hawkins** (Volume III, Chapter 6), "relied on the energy of subaltern groups, in particular the urban masses, to advance their causes. In not a few cases, these uprisings arose from popular demands for redress of traditional grievances, which suggests a disconnect between the priorities of the leadership and the protesters." Some of the watershed moments in the age of revolutions saw the intervention of vociferous crowds that had been invited to show up. One such occasion was the popular response in Bogotá to the refusal of the viceroy of New Granada to form a junta that would be the local government. The crowd's anti-Spanish demonstrations on 20 July 1810 forced the viceroy to change his mind. Agents working for the rebel elite had used various methods to urge the plebeians to make their way to certain downtown sites, where they energized them. These agents were scribes and other middle-rank local officials who mingled with working men and were known to the elite because of their positions.[64]

[62] Thomas Paine, *The Rights of Man for the Benefit of All Mankind* (Philadelphia: D. Webster, 1797), 31.
[63] Jainchill, "The Constitution of the Year III," 421.
[64] Manuel Pareja Ortiz, "El 'pueblo' bogotano en la revolución del 20 de julio de 1810," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 71:1 (2014), 281–311: 283–4, 287, 291.

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When crowds were not manipulated but operated autonomously, they instilled fear in the elites. **Anthony McFarlane** writes in Volume I, Chapter 18 that elites in Quito and Arequipa (both in the viceroyalty of Peru) backed local revolts against Spanish policies until they "took fright at plebeian mobilization and rallied to defend the established order," terrified of a breakdown in social discipline.[65] John Adams feared that new claims would arise. "Women will demand a Vote. Lads from 12 to 21 will think their Rights not enough attended to, and every Man, who has not a Farthing, will demand an equal Voice with any other in all Acts of State. It tends to confound and destroy all Distinctions, and prostate all Ranks, to one common Levell."[66] Although such arguments were usually self-serving, they also expressed a sense of reality, as **Howard Brown** argues in Volume II, Chapter 7: "Actually implementing democratic ideals meant dismantling existing structures of authority and risked unleashing less appealing impulses across all social strata. Too often, notions of liberty, equality, reason, and progress acted as bellows on the glowing coals of resentment and jealousy."

Pursuing their own agendas, peasants and urban plebeians nonetheless achieved many of their loftier goals. In France, **Noelle Plack** (Volume II, Chapter 3) notes, "for four years the peasantry rose in waves of protest and insurrection which ultimately forced legislators in Paris to abolish once and for all the feudal regime. These actions should not be underestimated as it has been argued that without them, peasants in France would most likely have been responsible for feudal dues until at least the middle of the nineteenth century." She adds that "[t]ax revolt, in the form of petition, riot, resistance, and noncompliance was far more prevalent in the French Revolution than many historians realize. Popular refusal to pay taxes was as important an aspect to bringing down the *ancien régime* as subsistence riots and attacks on seigneurial chateaux." The balance sheet looked different in Brazil, where the struggles of the popular classes ended in defeat. A dozen years into the construction of the new independent polity, the goal of most legislators was to obtain more local autonomy and an increased federalization of the provinces instead of more social participation in politics. The social structure was consequently left largely untouched, which set off riots

[65] See, for Buenos Aires, Gabriel di Meglio, "Un nuevo actor para un nuevo escenario. La participación política de la plebe urbana de Buenos Aires en la década de la revolución (1810–1820)," *Boletín del Instituto Argentina y Americana "Dr. Emilio Ravignani,"* 3rd series, 24 (2001), 7–43: 32–3.

[66] Cited in Joan Hoff, *Law, Gender, and Injustice: A Legal History of U.S. Women* (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 62.

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and revolts of those whose demands did not find an expression on the parliamentary level.[67] Their defeat, however, writes **Hendrik Kraay** (Volume III, Chapter 20), does not mean "that these struggles were unimportant; rather, they were what made independence such an uncertain and contingent process and these years such a dynamic period in Brazilian history." **Gabriel Paquette** (Volume III, Chapter 16) adds that by contrast with preceding years, the decades after Brazilian independence "were characterized by tempestuous relations between the capital and the provinces, between urban and rural areas, between landed proprietors and their subalterns, between masters and slaves." At independence, "the destruction of the Old Regime was incomplete, perhaps not even yet under way."

Women

Women's contributions to revolutions and counterrevolutions have often gone unheralded. In France and Spanish America, more than a few examples have been found of women who actually took part in the armed struggles, sometimes disguised as men.[68] More frequently, their role was that of noncombatants, as **Ami Pflugrad-Jakisch** mentions in Volume I, Chapter 14. During the American Revolution, thousands of poor women "followed both the British and the continental armies as cooks, washerwomen, seamstresses, nurses, scavengers, and sexual partners." American women were also active on the political front, engaged in boycotts of British goods or in spinning bees, producing cloth to substitute for British manufactures. In numerous ways, women shared the plight of men. Loyalist women in South Carolina, for instance, were "verbally abused, imprisoned, and threatened with bodily harm even when they had not taken an active role in opposing the rebel cause." Those women who did help the British armies

67 Andréa Slemian, "Os canais de representação política nos primórdios do Império: Apontamentos para um estudo da relação entre Estado e sociedade no Brasil (c. 1822–1834)," *Locus: Revista de história* 13:1 (2007), 34–51: 49–51.

68 Claude Guillon, "Pauline Léon, une républicaine révolutionnaire," *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* 344 (2008), 147–59: 150–1; Christine Peyrard, *Les Jacobins de l'Ouest: Sociabilité révolutionnaire et formes de politisation dans le Maine et la Basse-Normandie (1789–1799)* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1996), 231; Evelyn Cherpak, "The Participation of Women in the Independence Movement in Gran Colombia, 1780–1830," in Asunción Lavrin, ed., *Latin American Women* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1978), 219–34: 221–2; Alberto Baena Zapatero, "Las mujeres ante la independencia de México," in Izaskun Álvarez Cuartero and Julio Sánchez Gómez, eds., *Visiones e revisiones de la Independencia Americana: Subalternidad e independencias* (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 2012), 115–35: 121.

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also suffered physical abuse.[69] When their husbands fled, Loyalist women often stayed behind and, as one historian has argued, "seized this moment to exert a new form of independence. War shook up the existing social order and provided women with a brief moment to act independently of existing gender restrictions."[70]

Shortly after the French commissioners put a de facto end to slavery in Saint-Domingue, women in the southern part of the colony who benefited from emancipation contested the new labor regime under which they had to toil. Along with their male counterparts, the women protested the regulations that the same commissioners introduced in an attempt to keep the plantation economy afloat. On more than a few occasions, only women expressed their displeasure by refusing to work or working less than was expected from them.[71]

The small group of revolutionaries who championed women's rights in Europe, writes **Jennifer Ngaire Heuer** in Volume II, Chapter 10, "were often politically marginal, or only intermittently engaged with the issue," adding that Olympe de Gouges and Mary Wollstonecraft are probably better known today than they were in their own time. Gerrit Paape, a rare male activist for women's rights, still remains virtually unknown to this day. This prolific Dutch writer sketched the outlines of a Batavian Republic 200 years in the future, in which women were educated and had the same rights as men. Their inborn intelligence and their ingenuity were no longer "smothered in kitchen smoke." As Batavian citizens, they helped build a better world.[72]

In France, the revolution did entail a number of new rights for women, which Heuer sums up as follows: "Women acquired a decree of legal autonomy, were able to sign contracts and enter in justice in their own names, marry without parental authorization once they reached the age of majority, divorce their husbands, and inherit equally with their brothers." Women actively campaigned for equal rights within the family, presenting equality in petitions as a natural right. But they also invoked a moral

[69] Jim Piecuch, *Three Peoples, One King: Loyalists, Indians, and Slaves in the American Revolutionary South, 1775–1782* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2008), 61.

[70] Kimberly Nath, "Left Behind: Loyalist Women in Philadelphia during the American Revolution," in Barbara B. Oberg, *Women in the American Revolution: Gender, Politics, and the Domestic World* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2019), 211–28: 223.

[71] Judith Kafka, "Action, Reaction and Interaction: Slave Women in Resistance in the South of Saint Domingue, 1793–94," *Slavery and Abolition* 18:2 (1997), 48–72.

[72] Gerrit Paape, *De Bataafsche Republiek, zo als zij behoord te zijn, en zo als zij weezen kan: Of revolutionaire droom in 1798: Wegens toekomstige gebeurtenissen tot 1998* (Nijmegen: Vantilt, 1998 [1798]), 77–9.

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language to question the traditional gender hierarchy in the family.[73] Bringing up changes in gender roles was still anathema around the Atlantic world. In the early American republic, both men and women saw women's discussion of their natural rights as dangerous because they feared that women would give up their domestic tasks.[74]

Politicians and intellectuals in the Iberian world took every effort to exclude women from public affairs. Those who thought otherwise were ignored. **Nuno Gonçalo Monteiro** (Volume III, Chapter 17) mentions that Portugal's parliament did not even vote on the proposal by one deputy to at least allow the mothers of six legitimate children to take part in elections. **Mónica Ricketts** contends in Volume III, Chapter 13 that in Spanish America "much like in France after the Revolution, women's participation in war and politics was seen as a sign of disorder and anarchy, for it was believed that their passions made them prone to corruption." If women were to remain aloof from politics, some politicians expressed their desire to see women educated. However, the goals of education did not differ from colonial days. Women were to be prepared for marriage, motherhood, and domestic skills.[75] One could argue that women in the Americas were not as a rule excluded from political rights due to sexual discrimination, but because, just like two other categories that were excluded – children and domestic servants – they belonged to the family as a political unit. As such, they were presumed to share the interests of the male members of their households.[76] In British North America, **Jessica Choppin Roney** explains (Volume I, Chapter 8), citizenship denoted the performance of duties for the benefit of the community, especially military protection. Since women were viewed as incapable of performing such duties, they could not be citizens and their "political personhood was subsumed under that of the male head of her household."

Economic Equality

If inequality of birth was a major target for revolutionaries, that cannot be said for inequality of property. **Lloyd Kramer** (Volume I, Chapter 20) cites

[73] Suzanne Desan, "'War between Brothers and Sisters': Inheritance Law and Gender Politics in Revolutionary France," *French Historical Studies* 20:4 (1997), 597–634: 624–6.
[74] Rosemarie Zagarri, "The Rights of Man and Woman in Post-Revolutionary America," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 55:2 (1998), 203–30: 217.
[75] Cherpak, "Participation of Women," 230.
[76] Anne Verjus, *Le cens de la famille: Les femmes et le vote, 1789–1848* (Paris: Bellin, 2002), 19–22.

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the French Marquis de Chastellux, who became concerned during his travels in the early American republic about the political consequences of unequal wealth. He "identified a socioeconomic threat that could soon weaken or even destroy the institutional structures of republican equality." Although economic considerations were conspicuously absent from most political debates and writings in the age of revolutions, there was no lack of thinkers who proposed considerable economic reforms. In his *Agrarian Justice*, Thomas Paine cried out: "The present state of civilization is as odious as it is unjust ... [I]t is necessary that a revolution should be made in it. The contrast of affluence and wretchedness continually meeting and offending the eye, is like dead and living bodies chained together."[77] Charity, which had been the traditional response to poverty, would no longer do. The French revolutionaries made a serious effort to provide poor relief, as shown by fifty-six decrees enacted within just a year by the Legislative Assembly that targeted this issue.[78] Besides, the Convention adopted a maximum limit on the prices of a wide array of staples.

In *Du contrat social*, Rousseau had already warned of the dangers of economic inequality. "As for wealth," he wrote, "no citizen should be so rich that he can buy another, and none so poor that he is compelled to sell himself." When that happens, those who are less advantaged may be forced to follow the will of someone else rather than their own. In other words, dependence will lead to a loss of freedom.[79] The idea that equality must extend to the economic realm was articulated by a special deputy to the French National Assembly from a town in Auvergne: "In the division of benefits, poverty alone has rights, and wealth must be repulsed; legislators must remove all the means that can produce extreme wealth and extreme poverty. Equality must be the goal of all their institutions and all their laws, because from equality alone is born happiness, which is the purpose of all societies."[80] Why was it, one French author asked, that one person received more land than his fellow men? Since their needs are the same, why would enjoyment be different? Such a law can only derive from force. Another one

[77] Thomas Paine, *The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine*, ed. Philip S. Foner (New York: Citadel Press, 1969), vol. 1, 617.

[78] Alan Forrest, *The French Revolution and the Poor* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 23.

[79] Frederick Neuhouser, "Rousseau's Critique of Economic Inequality," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 41:3 (2013), 193–225: 197.

[80] Margadant, *Urban Rivalries*, 164–5.

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agreed. The common good had become a source of pillage.[81] Such sentiments were not limited to France. Around the same time, a schoolteacher in Delaware named Robert Coram stressed economic equality by arguing that God had given the earth in common to all and for the benefit of everybody. Each person was therefore born with the natural right to enough land to survive.[82]

The question was how to achieve such equality. The naïve idea, adhered to by some North American politicians, that equal opportunity was the panacea did not find support among small farmers and marginal artisans in the early American republic.[83] Was a leveling of property a good idea? Jacob Green, a Presbyterian minister and advocate of the American Revolution, welcomed an equality of estate and property, but believed it could not be expected. Georg Forster, the prominent German revolutionary, admired the American constitution, which, he wrote, allowed for only one aristocracy, namely that of wealth. That, however, could not be removed without implementing an impracticable Spartan community. The French militant politician Jacques-Nicolas Billaud-Varenne agreed that, especially in a large country, the "balance of fortunes" could not be just and immobile.[84] The French Jacobins nonetheless did consider imposing a limit on the accumulation of property in response to a demand by the *sans-culottes*, but failed to take that step when push came to shove.[85]

Some authors living in parts of Germany unaffected by revolutionary turmoil, where practical changes were out of the question, proposed radical solutions. Since every person had the same right to the earth's goods, private property had to be abolished, argued Carl Wilhelm Frölich. It militates

[81] Antoine de Cournand, *De la propriété, ou la cause du pauvre: Plaidée au tribunal de la raison, de la justice et de la vérité* (Paris, 1791), 5; Pierre Dolivier, *Essai sur la justice primitive, pour servir de principe générateur au seul ordre social qui peut assurer à l'homme tous ses droits et tous ses moyens de bonheur* (Paris, 1793), 15.

[82] Seth Cotlar, "Radical Conceptions of Property Rights and Economic Equality in the Early American Republic: The Trans-Atlantic Dimension," *Explorations in Early American Culture* 4 (2000), 191–219: 193.

[83] Ruth Bogin, "Petitioning and the New Moral Economy of Post-Revolutionary America," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 45:3 (1988), 391–425: 392.

[84] S. Scott Rohrer, *Jacob Green's Revolution: Radical Religion and Reform in a Revolutionary Age* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2014), 203. Georg Forster to Therese Forster, Arras, 21 August 1793, in Klaus-Georg Popp, ed., *Georg Forsters Werke: Sämtliche Schriften, Tagebücher, Briefe: Briefe 1792 bis 1794 und Nachträge* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1989), 425. Citoyen Billaud-Varenne, *Les élémens du républicanisme: Première partie* (Paris, 1793), 57.

[85] Massimiliano Tomba, "1793: The Neglected Legacy of Insurgent Universality," *History of the Present: A Journal of Critical History* 5:2 (2015), 109–36: 120.

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against the fulfillment of the needs of everyone. For his part, the philanthropist Heinrich Ziegenhagen proposed the organization of small-scale agricultural colonies based on communal property in which children of the poor and the rich would be raised together to become sociable beings.[86] These plans had in common with contemporary radical French proposals that they did not reflect the rapidly changing economies of western Europe. Far from taking into account the reality of industrialization, they revered subsistence agriculture and idealized peasant simplicity.[87] If these were lone voices, a popular belief in genuine economic equality did take root in Italy. Various authors took up their pens to address the population and convince them that their ideas were mistaken and that they had to content themselves with equality before the law. Economic differences were the logical consequence of differences in natural abilities.[88]

Nor were the rural dwellers insisting on economic change in New York and Virginia looking for equalization of property. Confronted with unfair taxes and economic constraints, they simply tried to end their status as tenants and become part of a reformed society based on landownership. Revolutionary elites did not meet such demands but they made land available in the western parts of their states, thereby easing tensions.[89] In the Río de la Plata, José Artigas organized an agrarian reform, as **Gabriel di Meglio** writes (Volume III, Chapter 9). He distributed vast rural properties from the enemies of the revolution among free blacks, free *zambos*, Indians, and poor creoles. The independence war in northern Spanish America had no comparable outcome. Simón Bolívar's land policy was more concerned with preserving the support of the *caudillos* – the warlords who controlled regional supplies and soldiers – than with offering hope to the rural poor. The caudillos could thus form a new landowning elite who benefited from confiscated property and public land.[90]

86 Helmut Reinalter, *Die Französische Revolution und Mitteleuropa: Erscheinungsformen und Wirkungen des Jakobinismus. Seine Gesellschaftstheorien und politischen Vorstellungen* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), 126–8.

87 R. B. Rose, "The 'Red Scare' of the 1790s: The French Revolution and the 'Agrarian Law,'" *Past & Present* no. 103 (1984), 113–30: 125. Inside and outside France, these values retained their strength into the nineteenth century. Cf. Giorgio La Rosa, "La représentation dans la pensée politique d'un jacobin italien. Luigi Angeloni (1759–1842)," in *Le concept de représentation dans la pensée politique* (Aix-en-Provence: Presses universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, 2003), 313–20.

88 Guerci, *Mente, cuore, coraggio, virtù repubblicane*, 131–9.

89 Thomas J. Humphrey, "Conflicting Independence: Land Tenancy and the American Revolution," *Journal of the Early Republic* 28:2 (2008), 159–82: 174, 182.

90 John Lynch, "Bolívar and the Caudillos," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 63:1 (1983), 3–35: 25.

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If equalizing property may have ultimately been unachievable anywhere, the French Revolution did accomplish a comprehensive transformation of property. In Volume II, Chapter 2, **Rafe Blaufarb** explains what the famous abolition of feudalism entailed. In 1789–1790, the French revolutionaries did away with the old system of property and replaced it with an entirely new one. "Feudalism," Blaufarb writes, was "not a special form of property-holding specific to the nobility, but rather *the system* of real estate itself, a system whose essence was to produce a hierarchy of multiple claims to single parcels of land." By blurring public power and private property, feudalism blocked the establishment of national sovereignty. Feudalism was replaced by the national domain, which became the repository of confiscated ecclesiastical properties and properties that had belonged to the royal domain. The sale of these *biens nationaux* was a long, drawn-out process that benefited numerous groups in French society, including, as **Philippe Bourdin** mentions in Volume II, Chapter 9, "the *petite bourgeoisie* (innkeepers, butchers, and merchants, whose numbers were increasing), the stockjobbers who sometimes acted as intermediaries for families of the old nobility, and the state creditors." However, a law of 1796 that forbade the sale of *biens nationaux* in small lots shut the door to the small and medium-sized peasantry, which had fervently hoped to acquire more land since the start of the revolution.[91]

Violence

Revolutions are not straightforward affairs. The search for freedom never leads directly to emancipation, but brings about a crisis in which the revolutionaries are presented with different solutions.[92] The initial claims to autonomy in Spanish America following the king's resignation in Bayonne, writes **Stefan Rinke** (Volume III, Chapter 1), "were not hard revolutionary ruptures, but rather events in which the elites cautiously groped their way into unknown territory and gradually expanded their own ideas and demands." Independence was not yet on the horizon. Revolutions could gain momentum when many plebeians suddenly stopped resigning themselves to the old hierarchical civic order and became aware of the potential power of the joint

[91] Bernard Bodinier and Éric Teyssier, *L'événement le plus important de la Révolution: La vente des biens nationaux (1789–1867) en France et dans les territoires annexés* (Paris: Société des Études Robespierristes, 2000), 383–98.

[92] Federica Morelli, "Guerras, libertad y ciudadanía. Los afro-descendientes de Esmeraldas en la independencia," *Revista de Indias* 76 (2016), 83–108: 84.

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efforts of like-minded people. That was a nightmare scenario for the champions of the status quo. When the Haitian revolution broke out, one planter believed his class might need to kill half of the enslaved workforce to stop the "epidemic" and replace those killed with new imports from Africa.[93]

While polarization was deadly in Saint-Domingue, the middle ground was also lost sooner or later in other revolutionary theaters. In Mexico, any reluctance to support one side was seen as a sign of sympathy for the other.[94] Similarly, Patriot authorities in North America summoned, secured, or confined anyone suspected of being "unfriendly to the rights of America."[95] After the end of the revolutionary war, John Jay explained to Peter Van Schaack that the latter had been mistaken to try to maintain his neutrality: "No man can serve two masters: either Britain was right and America was wrong; or America was right and Britain was wrong. They who thought Britain right were bound to support her; and America had a just claim to the services of those who approved her cause. Hence it became our duty to take one side or the other."[96] **Liam Riordan** (Volume I, Chapter 13) cites Massachusetts Governor Thomas Hutchinson, who wrote in 1776 that "under the present free government in America, no man may, by writing or speaking, contradict any part of this Declaration, without being deemed an enemy to his country, and exposed to the rage and fury of the populace."

One of the features of the revolutions was the amount of violence that accompanied them. In Ireland, **Thomas Bartlett** writes (Volume II, Chapter 16), "the extreme violence witnessed during the 1798 rebellion, and during the run-up to it, bears comparison to that perpetrated in the Vendée, and later in Spain during the Peninsular War. As in these theaters, irregular combatants were simply not recognized as legitimate fighters and therefore the normal ethical constraints on soldiers' conduct could be ignored." In Mexico, another historian has suggested, the rebellion created "a political space for the emergence of violent men of little principle and

[93] Philippe Girard, *Toussaint Louverture: A Revolutionary Life* (New York: Basic Books, 2016), 125.

[94] Timo Schaefer, "Soldiers and Civilians: The War of Independence in Oaxaca, 1814–1815," *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos*, 29:1 (2013), 149–74: 168. As exemplary punishment, at least in Oaxaca, both sides also tended to set fire to villages. Ibid., 172.

[95] Christopher F. Minty, "'Of One Hart and One Mind': Local Institutions and Allegiance during the American Revolution," *Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 15:1 (2017), 99–132: 115.

[96] T. H. Breen, *The Will of the People: The Revolutionary Birth of America* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019), 146.

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large ambition."[97] During Hidalgo's revolt and the following counterinsurgency, thousands of people were executed. **Juan Ortiz Escamilla** writes in Volume III, Chapter 5 that the military dictatorship set up by the royalists in Mexico, which lasted six years, "was a period characterized by assassinations, plundering, arbitrary executions, exemplary punishments, the burning of villages, and the raping of women." In other parts of Spanish America, the death toll was initially relatively small, but as **Ernesto Bassi** tells us (Volume III, Chapter 8), northern South America was where the low-intensity confrontation first mutated into violent warfare under the banner of "war to the death." Bassi adds that in the same region, the Spanish recapture of most of South America was launched and took its most violent form. Chile and Upper Peru also registered a large mortality. A census held in La Paz in 1824 after hostilities had ceased revealed a very small number of men between ages fifteen and twenty-five.[98] Even by then, the end to violence was not in sight in Spanish America. **Juan Luis Ossa Santa Cruz** argues in Volume III, Chapter 7 that "the following decades witnessed countless armed conflicts, transforming violence into a daily and legitimate political practice that, with ups and downs, lasted for the rest of the century."

Was the French Revolution notoriously violent or has the violence unleashed in France been exaggerated? **Marisa Linton** writes (Volume II, Chapter 8): "The received opinion is that the French Revolution was unique in its time in its recourse to political violence. Yet comparisons with the death toll in the English Civil Wars (that stretched throughout the British Isles) and 'revolutions' of the seventeenth century, with the American Revolution, and with the suppression of the revolt in Ireland in 1798, suggest that it would be more accurate to see revolutionary violence in the context of wider factors such as fear, repression, and the degree of retaliation, rather than as the consequence of a specific ideology unique to the French Revolution." Revolutionary Saint-Domingue offers another example of widespread violence, and certainly not only on the part of enslaved insurgents. White residents, as **Bernard Gainot** shows (Volume II, Chapter 24), engaged in lynching and mutiny. These so-called "patriots" were driven by a violent rejection of equal rights.

[97] Eric Van Young, *The Other Rebellion: Popular Violence, Ideology, and the Mexican Struggle for Independence, 1810–1821* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 196.

[98] Karen Racine, "Death, Destiny, and the Daily Chores: Everyday Life in Spanish America during the Wars of Independence, 1808–1826," in Pedro Santoni, ed., *Civilians in Wartime Latin America: From the Wars of Independence to the Central American Civil Wars* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 2008), 31–53: 36.

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The American Revolution was indeed remarkably violent as well. The British Army left in its wake landscapes that were so affected that it seemed they had been hit by a tornado or earthquake. "Rape," writes one historian, "was endemic within the British Army."[99] Areas that could not be held by either side were pillaged relentlessly, such as, for example, Westchester County, just north of New York: "From 1775 through 1782, the county became a no man's land whose four thousand families enjoyed neither personal security nor freedom from plunder. Contending armies, militias, and partisan bands took farm surpluses and left families with too little to last through winter. They raided friend and foe alike to pilfer personal property, steal livestock, burn barns and houses, and cut trees and fences for firewood. Soldiers and criminal gangs looted what armies and militias left behind."[100] Violence was also of central importance on the Patriot side, studied by **Wayne Lee** in Volume 1, Chapter 12. He notes that "the American revolution and the accompanying war included a wide set of categories of political violence, all of which occurred within the same overall clash of wills." And in most cases, those categories were also *stages*. Lee distinguishes between violence that was "intimidative and catalytic," "regular and logistical," and "retaliatory."

Violence was not the monopoly of warring armies. In revolutionary Pennsylvania, acts of violence were often committed by those frustrated about the lack of decisive action on the part of politicians whose rhetoric they shared. Such violence required the revolutionary elites to take the rebels' grievances seriously.[101] The peasant revolts across early revolutionary France were part of a similar dynamics with massive consequences, since they helped bring about the end of "feudalism." In France, violence away from the battlefield continued in the years to come. Howard Brown has explained that "the Revolution not only destroyed the institutional constraints on popular violence, it eroded many of the cultural ones as well. This included the diminished role of the clergy in community life, the decline in deference accorded social status, the disruption in patronage patterns, and the reduced primacy of the local community."[102] There was a transatlantic continuity in

[99] Hoock, *Scars of Independence: America's Violent Birth*, 131, 170 (quote).

[100] Allan Kulikoff, "Revolutionary Violence and the Origins of American Democracy," *The Journal of the Historical Society* II:2 (Spring 2002), 229–60: 236.

[101] Kenneth Owen, "Violence and the Limits of the Political Community in Revolutionary Pennsylvania," in Patrick Griffin, Robert G. Ingram, Peter S. Onuf, and Brian Schoen, eds., *Between Sovereignty and Anarchy* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2015), 165–86: 180–1.

[102] Howard G. Brown, *Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice, and Repression from the Terror to Napoleon* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006), 50.

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French violence, as one historian has argued. It was no coincidence that the French campaign in Saint-Domingue of 1802–1803 resembled that in the Vendée in its goal to exterminate the enemy. Contemporaries already referred to the "colonial Vendée" as they laid (at least partial) blame for both on the British enemy. As if to confirm this connection, the Directory appointed as its agent in Saint-Domingue one of the generals who had "pacified" the Vendée.[103]

Royalism

The Vendée's opposition to the revolution was symbolized from the start by white cockades worn in public, which gave expression to the rebels' adherence to royalism. Yet royalism did not necessarily denote a progressive or conservative ideology. Neither the revolutionaries in the Americas nor those in France started out as republicans. Only when King George did not live up to the expectation of orators and writers to reclaim the royal privileges that his predecessors had lost did a republican solution become a possibility in North America. It was at that juncture that Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* came out, condemning the "royal brute of Britain."[104] Monarchist members of the French Assembly favored the revolution, but more as a set of early achievements than as a seemingly endless movement. They hoped to entrust the king with sovereign powers, assisted by a bicameral parliament that would provide counsel. After this constitutional project was rejected, they tried to maintain a centrist position between revolution and counterrevolution.[105] **Caroline Winterer** (Volume I, Chapter 1) stresses that during their revolution, North Americans were impressed by Europe's enlightened despots, who mixed monarchical rule with Enlightenment. And **Matthew Rainbow Hale** (Volume II, Chapter 5) notes that there was an intimate relationship between monarchy and democracy that proved to be resilient. What exerted a particularly powerful force in the 1790s on both sides of the North Atlantic was the allure, derived from monarchies, of indivisible sovereignty.

[103] Malick Ghachem, "The Colonial Vendée," in David Patrick Geggus and Norman Fiering, eds., *The World of the Haitian Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 156–76.

[104] Eric Nelson, *The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 33, 57–8, 63.

[105] Pascal Simonetti, "Les monarchiens. La Révolution à contretemps," in Jean Tulard, ed., *La contre-révolution: Origines, histoire, postérité* (Paris: Perrin, 1990), 62–84.

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Nor were the political elites of Spanish America who assumed sovereignty after the forced abdication of Fernando VII in Bayonne natural republicans. Their intention was not to repudiate the monarchy, but to redefine it in a constitutional framework that was dictated locally and not in Cádiz. Before they embarked on independentist projects, the elites aimed to consolidate governmental rule and maintain the basic laws in a Hispanic structure.[106] Individuals and groups across the Atlantic world, then, continued to display allegiance to their hereditary rulers, from whom they sought protection and the concession of privileges.[107] Slaves in New Granada often understood the republican fight for independence as an attempt of their owners to limit the authority of the king. At the same time, they tried to have their defense of the king's power expressed in the form of individual or collective advantages.[108] Many enslaved freedom fighters in Saint-Domingue also supported a distant European king, carrying royalist banners and proclaiming that they wanted to restore Louis XVI to his throne after they had heard about his arrest.[109] Other rebels sided with Spain, in part because, as **Robert D. Taber** writes in Volume II, Chapter 22, "Spain also offered a king, a potent symbol of good government." Monarchism survived the revolution in Saint-Domingue and was alive and well in independent Haiti. Dessalines was crowned Emperor Jean-Jacques I, while Henry Christophe later led the kingdom of Haiti as King Henry I. And even the republic that Alexandre Pétion established, in which universal male suffrage was introduced, was "an oligarchy with a democratic veneer," writes **Erin Zavitz** (Volume II, Chapter 26).

In Latin America, too, monarchism remained a viable option after independence. One reason, as **Gabriel di Meglio** contends in Volume III, Chapter 9, was the Congress of Vienna's condemnation of governments created by revolution. That influenced the debate in Buenos Aires about postrevolutionary rule, in which some fancied a constitutional king, who could maintain order and put an end to local turmoil. In Brazil, the outcome of the independence process was an imperial state. Besides, writes **Jurandir**

[106] José M. Portillo Valdés, *Crisis atlántica: Autonomía e independencia en la crisis de la monarquía hispana* (Madrid: Fundación Carolina, Marcial Pons, 2006), 147–53.

[107] Hannah Weiss Muller, "Bonds of Belonging: Subjecthood and the British Empire," *Journal of British Studies* 53:1 (2014), 29–58: 57–8.

[108] Marcela Echeverri, *Indian and Slave Royalists in the Age of Revolution: Reform, Revolution, and Royalism in the Northern Andes, 1780–1825* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 60.

[109] Jeremy D. Popkin, *You Are All Free: The Haitian Revolution and the Abolition of Slavery* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 94, 104, 129–30.

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Malerba in Volume III, Chapter 18, regent prince Dom João, who had moved the Portuguese court to Rio de Janeiro, played an important role in the independence process: "willingly or not, by coopting the Brazilian upper classes through his patriarchal and enticing policy, the sovereign helped decisively define the profile of the new elite that was formed in Brazil during the thirteen years he spent in Rio de Janeiro." When the unpopular first emperor, Dom Pedro, suddenly abdicated in 1831, a fresh opportunity was presented to radical leaders of the liberal opposition, writes **Jeffrey Needell** in Volume III, Chapter 19. The parliamentary leadership, however, "interwoven with the families and interests of the elite," balked. Instead, they chose, again, to support the vision of a constitutional monarchy that they had been trying to force upon Dom Pedro since 1823. Faced with radical republicanism, with its associated, clear threat of socioeconomic and national destabilization, they chose, again, the hope of constitutional, balanced partnership with a "unifying, charismatic national leader." Dom Pedro II thus started his reign as the new emperor.

Monarchical leadership also marked the start of Mexican independence. Cultivating close ties with the local elites, Agustín de Iturbide worked out the Plan of Iguala, which declared "the absolute independence of this kingdom," but also extended an invitation to Fernando VII or one of his family members to govern New Spain.[110] After the Spanish government declined, Iturbide assumed command and, supported by the Mexican elite, was enthroned as Emperor Agustín I. José de San Martín also strongly favored organizing independent states as monarchies, while even the committed republican Simón Bolívar had begun to flirt with monarchism by 1825. A British diplomat quoted him as saying in a private conversation: "Of all Countries South America is perhaps the least fitted for Republican Governments. What does its population consist of but Indians and Negros who are more ignorant than the vile race of Spaniards we are just emancipated from. A country represented and governed by such people must go to ruin." It would, however, take a while, he believed, for the inhabitants of the former Spanish colonies to embrace the notion of a new king.[111] Bolívar was not the only one during his presidency of Colombia to advocate a constitutional monarchy. A French agent wrote that the clergy, the army, and the common

[110] Jaime E. Rodríguez O., *"We Are Now the True Spaniards": Sovereignty, Revolution, Independence, and the Emergence of the Federal Republic of Mexico, 1808–1824* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 253–63.

[111] Harold Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822–1827: England, the Neo-Holy Alliance, and the New World*, 2nd edition (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1966), 557–8.

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people all favored that option. Some wanted Bolívar himself to be crowned, while others debated his possible succession, if he died, by a foreign prince.[112]

On the whole, royalists belonged to the counterrevolutionary camp, those desirous to maintain the status quo or pursue their goals without overthrowing the government. In Central America, people across the social spectrum steadfastly clung to Spain during the 1810s, when in all other parts of Spanish America people began to aspire to independence. **Timothy Hawkins** (Volume III, Chapter 6) notes that this was "despite exposure to the widespread political ideas of this revolutionary age and the kind of persistent internal grievances that united to spark and fuel independence movements in other colonies. Combined with a colonial administration single-minded in its dedication to root out dissent, this broad consensus helped marginalize and suffocate the few substantive challenges to the colonial order that did arise during this decade." More generally, writes **Marcela Echeverri** in Volume III, Chapter 10, "even within a position of loyalty, all subjects in the Atlantic empires embraced and produced radical lasting change."

In British America, royalists did not automatically adopt certain views. The only matter on which Loyalists agreed was the need to defend royal rule.[113] Royalist disunion in Spain during that country's constitutional triennium (1820–1823) even led to confrontations between different royalist factions, as **Juan Luis Simal** tells us in Volume III, Chapter 4. The constitutional monarchy was challenged by ultraroyalists, who engaged in guerrilla activities with the support of a rural population that resented taxes, conscription, and recent socioeconomic changes.

Loyalists in North America included members of ethnic and religious minorities who perceived the Crown as "a buffer against the tyranny of the majority."[114] Likewise, Indians in Spanish and Portuguese America sought to uphold the time-honored colonial pact, on account of which they paid royal tribute, and thus contributed to Crown income, in exchange for assuring themselves of the possession of their lands and the preservation of their way

[112] C. Parra-Pérez, *La monarquía en la Gran Colombia* (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1957), 95, 105, 129, 323.

[113] Maya Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World* (New York: Vintage Books, 2012), 189.

[114] David J. Fowler, "'Loyalty Is Now Bleeding in New Jersey': Motivations and Mentalities of the Disaffected," in Joseph S. Tiedemann, Eugene R. Fingerhut, and Robert W. Venables, eds., *The Other Loyalists: Ordinary People, Royalism, and the Revolution in the Middle Colonies, 1763–1787* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009), 45–77: 50.

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of organizing their community.[115] Indian tributaries in the Spanish colonies had different demands than their caciques, who were exempt from tribute payments, and enjoyed the privilege to ride horseback and use arms. One feature of Túpac Amaru's revolt in Peru was the rift in many communities between caciques, who remained loyal to the Spanish Crown, and their tributaries, who supported the uprising.[116] The end of the colonial pact could be devastating. In Argentina, **Gabriel di Meglio** explains in Volume III, Chapter 9, "the end of tribute and juridical inequality meant that those villages no longer had rights to their common land, which they had used to pay the tribute, nor to maintain their ethnic leaders, who were in charge of the tribute. Thus, many villages lost their lands, which were sold out." Even the term "Indian" was being erased. The liberal Mexican politician José María Luis Mora proposed to the Congress of his country to do away with that term, since "the Indians should not continue existing" as a social group subject to special legislation. Nonetheless, the term was used throughout the 1820s, although at times the indigenous population was labeled "the so-called Indians."[117]

To the degree that the age of revolutions challenged royal authority, contemporary movements in Africa have been described by some historians as parallel. John Thornton has advanced the argument that Kongo's political system contained an absolutist concept that bestowed all power on the king. In the eighteenth century, absolutism was challenged by a movement (mis-labeled "republican" by Thornton) that stressed the need for popular consent to royal rule.[118] Even more forcefully, Paul Lovejoy has made a case for the great significance of jihad in west Africa, especially in the central Bilād al-

[115] María Luisa Soux, "Rebelión, guerrilla y tributo: Los indios en Charcas durante el proceso de independencia," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 68:2 (2011), 455–82: 458; Mariana Albuquerque Dantas, "Os indios 'fanáticos realistas absolutos' e a figura do monarca português: Disputas políticas, recrutamento e defesa de terras na Confederação do Equador," *Clio* 33:2 (2015), 49–73: 50, 56.

[116] Alexandra Sevilla Naranjo, "'Al mejor servicio del rey.' Indígenas realistas en la contrarrevolución quiteña, 1809–1814," *Procesos. Revista ecuatoriana de historia* no. 43 (2016), 93–118: 111; David T. Garrett, "'His Majesty's Most Loyal Vassals': The Indian Nobility and Túpac Amaru," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 84:4 (2004), 575–617: 597. Caciques in New Spain did not collect tribute, nor did they enjoy the same social standing as their counterparts in the viceroyalty of Peru: Aaron Pollack, "Hacia una historia social del tributo de indios y castas en Hispanoamérica. Notas en torno a su creación, desarrollo y abolición," *Historia Mexicana* 66:1 (2016), 65–160: 71.

[117] Laura Ibarra García, "El concepto de igualdad en México (1810–1824)," *Relaciones* 145 (2016), 279–314: 306.

[118] John K. Thornton, "'I Am the Subject of the King of Congo': African Political Ideology and the Haitian Revolution," *Journal of World History* 4:2 (1993), 181–214: 187.

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Sūdān (south of the Sahara) between 1804–1808 and 1817. In response to the despotic rule of warlords, Islamic governments "based on religious leadership and consensus among Muslim officials" were established. How revolutionary west African jihad actually was remains to be seen. What is clear is that the universalist strain of the revolutions in Europe and the Americas was absent. Debates about slavery focused on the illegitimacy of enslaving Muslims, while ending slavery for non-Muslims never came up.[119] In other words, Islamic west Africans had arrived at the point that Christian Europeans had reached in the late Middle Ages, when they ended slavery, but only among their own.

Counterrevolution and Banditry

Ideologies that challenged the revolutions were not exhausted by royalism. Revolts that were directed against revolutions, such as that in the Vendée, had in common their communal character; rural dominance; the importance of religious sentiments; their spontaneous nature; and the opposition to the politics of progress defended by the state that jeopardized the beliefs, structures, and functioning of traditional rural societies.[120] Across Europe and even in Spanish America, the fear of French influence and its ability to dramatically change traditional societies was enormous. Typical is the judgment of the Spanish Inquisition in late 1789 when it forbade the printing of materials that referred to the events in France: these works were produced by a new race of philosophers, who were men with a corrupted spirit. By posing as defenders of liberty, they actually plotted against it and destroyed the political and social order.[121] Spain's Secretary of State, the count of Floridablanca, did all he could stop the flow of information arriving from France. In Volume III, Chapter 2, **Emily Berquist Soule** writes that he "placed more Spanish troops on the border with France in order to deter unsanctioned crossings of people and goods. He implemented a policy of strict censorship designed to keep out all news of the events in France;

[119] Paul E. Lovejoy, *Jihād in West Africa during the Age of Revolutions* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2016), 90, 245–6.

[120] Jean-Pierre Poussou, "Les autres 'Vendées,' jalons pour une thématique des 'Vendées,'" in Yves-Marie Bercé, ed., *Les autres Vendées: Actes du colloque international sur les contre-révolutions paysannes au XIXe siècle* (La Roche-sur-Yon: Éditions du Centre vendéen de recherches historiques, 2013), 299, 304.

[121] Gonzalo Añes Álvarez de Castrillón, "España y la Revolución francesa," in Almudena Cavestany, ed., *Revolución, contrarrevolución e Independencia: La Revolución francesa, España y América* (Madrid: Turner Publicaciones, 1989), 17–39: 20.

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forbidding French newspapers, and even employing Inquisition officials to inspect mail coming across the Pyrenees."

British American Loyalists, writes **Trevor Burnard** (Volume I, Chapter 9), "especially those of higher social status, feared that the wild ideas of liberty thrown about by revolutionaries would have a leveling tendency and by promoting lawless anarchy" were harming the empire. Anarchy was projected onto the new republican regimes because of their commitment to democracy. Revolutionaries tended to believe that only republics, ruled as they were by laws and not the royal will, could resist the tendency of men to pursue only their own, personal interest.[122] Counterrevolutionaries rejected the way in which these laws took effect. The large mass of people, asserted a priest from Guayaquil in the viceroyalty of Peru, cannot judge for themselves their own interests unless they put themselves in the hands of a single individual. A Dutch thinker who supported the antirevolutionary Orangists wrote in the same vein that the "people" was incapable of acting by itself. Since they were dependent on a few among them, democracy was in practice always a struggle between various groups of demagogues.[123] The quest of revolutionaries to erect a new society was chimerical in the eyes of their opponents, who rejected the fictitious state of nature. The natural, transcendent order established by God could not be changed.[124]

While prominent rebels and conservatives created the script for each revolution, the vast mass of people involved in the revolutions were motivated by their own individual or group goals, as the abovementioned motives of peasants, slaves, and Indians make clear. In northern South America, **Ernesto Bassi** argues in Volume III, Chapter 8, "support from the *pardos* [the light-skinned free people of color] was highly contingent and depended on the fact that they tended to see political independence or continued allegiance to Spain not as an end in itself but as a means to achieving a more

[122] Anthony Pagden, *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish-American Social and Political Theory 1513–1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 136.

[123] Victor Samuel Rivera, "José Ignacio Moreno. Un teólogo peruano. Entre Montesquieu y Joseph de Maistre," *Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades* 15:29 (2013), 223–41: 238. Wyger R. E. Velema, "Elie Luzac and Two Dutch Revolutions: The Evolution of Orangist Political Thought," in Margaret C. Jacob and Wijnand W. Mijnhardt, eds., *The Dutch Republic in the Eighteenth Century: Decline, Enlightenment, and Revolution* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 123–46: 138.

[124] Serge Bianchi, *Des révoltes aux révolutions: Europe, Russie, Amérique (1770–1802). Essai d'interprétation* (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2004), 447.

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important aim: legal equality. The same assertion is valid for slaves, although in their case the goal was to secure freedom."

Principle often combined with opportunism to persuade people to join or oppose the revolution. **Liam Riordan** writes in Volume 1, Chapter 13: "The complex web of circumstance and opportunity that informs allegiance in times of uncertain change and military mobilization is necessarily shaped by perceptions of self-interest." In Mexico, Hidalgo's rebellion "encouraged certain marginalized and semi-marginalized Mexicans to employ violence in order to adjust deeply held grievances against the regime, provincial administrators, and members of the propertied classes who had long enjoyed the benefits of power, and it presented to many others an opportunity to get rich-quick, or at least to stake out for themselves a place in any new society."[125] These men engaged in guerrilla warfare, as **Juan Ortiz Escamilla** explains. Violent raids on towns and habitual looting of haciendas were their trademarks. Their leaders, often locally born, saw to the distribution of booty and captured livestock among their supporters. Italy's bandits engaged in robbery and armed revolt as a form of revenge against a society that had marginalized them. They found common cause in attacking the privileged classes, fighting government bureaucracy, as well as the French invaders. Those invaders' insults of personal or family honor convinced many a peasant to take up arms.[126] Besides, peer pressure and a search for adventure must have played a role as well.[127]

The distinction between rebellion/counterrebellion and banditry was often blurred, either because ordinary bandits sided with the royalists or the patriots, or – particularly in countries in which Napoleon's armies lived off the land and introduced mass conscription – because banditry doubled as resistance, but also because guerrillas on both sides often engaged in crimes that had no political dimension. At the same time, authorities were eager to label counterrevolutionary attacks as brigandage since that served to discredit the enemy's political demands. In France, the term "brigand," which had initially both caused aversion and won admiration among the members of the National Assembly, was increasingly defined negatively in the course of the Revolution, especially after the start of the war in the Vendée. In their

[125] Christon I. Archer, "Banditry and Revolution in New Spain, 1790–1821," *Bibliotheca Americana* 1:2 (1982), 58–89: 59, 88.
[126] Massimo Viglione, *Le insorgenze: Rivoluzione & Controrivoluzione in Italia, 1792–1815* (Milan: Edizioni Ares, 1999), 96–7; Michael Broers, *Napoleon's Other War: Bandits, Rebels, and Their Pursuers in the Age of Revolutions* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010), 110.
[127] Van Young, *The Other Rebellion*, 105–6.

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subsequent fight against insurgents in countries occupied by France, lawyers and gendarmes ceased to distinguish between bandits and guerrilla fighters.[128]

Bandits – with or without a political agenda – used the breakdown of law and order that was the result of revolution. Chilean banditry, for example, was encouraged by the anarchy of the civil war between republicans and royalists, as many poor people were displaced or otherwise affected.[129] In northern South America, the disruption of the colonial state and colonial institutions opened the door to the caudillos, military leaders who drew to them the *llaneros*. These plainsmen lived by plunder and lacked any political objectives. They followed "the first caudillo who offers them booty taken from anyone with property. This is how Boves and other bandits of the same kind have been able to recruit hordes of these people, who live by vagrancy, robbery, and assassination."[130] Such bandits may have been able to fill the political vacuum left by the disappearance of the old government, but in turn they prevented a new civilian government from taking hold. The Thirteen Colonies in North America fell prey to banditry – which included the stealing of slaves – that was hardly political in nature. As historian Holger Hoock observes, by 1780, "large swaths of the American lower South presented a scary scene – a virtually permanent little war of raiding and plundering between Patriot and Loyalist militias, prisoner abuse, even outright murder. In addition, armed gangs unaffiliated with any real military units operated in the semi-lawless wasteland between the lines."[131] Many of the smaller bands "operated independently, though often in the guise of serving one side or the other."[132] Nor can the Maroons who refused to remain on their plantations during the Haitian Revolution and retreated into the interior be categorized as counterrevolutionaries. As **Philippe Girard** writes (Volume II, Chapter 25), the Maroons distrusted all elite actions vying for control of Saint-Domingue, opposing "whichever side was dominant to preserve their freedom and autonomy."

[128] Sottocasa, *Les brigands et la Révolution*, 60, 146, 289; Broers, *Napoleon's Other War*, 55, 102–3.

[129] Leonardo León, "Montoneras Populares durante la gestación de la República, Chile: 1810–1820," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 68:2 (2011), 483–510: 487–8, 492.

[130] John Lynch, "Bolívar and the Caudillos," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 63:1 (1983), 3–35: 5.

[131] Hoock, *Scars of Independence*, 309.

[132] Matthew P. Spooner, "Origins of the Old South: Revolution, Slavery, and Changes in Southern Society, 1776–1800" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 2015), 62.

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Ideology, then, was just one of many factors motivating individuals. On both sides of the American Revolution, desertion was rampant. One historian has written, "A steady stream of Loyalists deserted, as they were converted to the American cause, discouraged because of limitations placed on looting, disheartened by the ever-lengthening conflict, enticed by the colonial life-style, or simply out of boredom." Patriots also deserted, "many of them for the same reasons as the Loyalists, because of uncertainty of the rightness of their cause, because the changing seasons meant they were needed for work on their farms, or because the war was not the adventure or sure meal ticket they had thought it would be."[133] If many men changed their minds, others avoided choosing sides as long as possible. Their lack of affiliation did not mean indifference. Instead, their personal or group goals might or might not align with the two main adversaries. Tenants in the northern Hudson Valley whose goal was to own the land on which they worked put off a choice for either side in the war until they could no longer avoid it. For their part, indigenous groups in Upper Peru often withdrew to their communities and only did the absolute minimum to satisfy patriots and royalists, waiting to see which side was gaining the upper hand.[134]

Nor did enslaved men and women in the Thirteen Colonies automatically take side with one of the two main sides. **James Sidbury** contends (Volume 1, Chapter 15) that "the Revolutionary War offered Blacks in North America many potential opportunities, but none that were reliable, so it is unsurprising that different people living in different places pursued different strategies." Still, 20,000 of them actually ran to the British armies during the course of the war, attracted by vague promises of freedom; 8,000 to 10,000 of them survived and managed to leave the United States, as Sidbury writes, "to live the rest of their lives as free people."

International Dimensions

Textbook accounts of revolutions tend to obscure their strong international dimension. The American Revolution, for example, cannot be understood without acknowledging the role of the French colonies of Martinique and

[133] Anne Pfaelzer de Ortiz, "German Redemptioners of the Lower Sort: Apolitical Soldiers in the American Revolution?," *Journal of American Studies* 33:2 (1999), 267–306: 290.

[134] Thomas J. Humphrey, *Land and Liberty: Hudson Valley Riots in the Age of Revolution* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004), 93; Soux, "Rebelión, guerrilla y tributo," 458.

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Saint-Domingue and the Dutch island of St. Eustatius, as **Wim Klooster** stresses in Volume I, Chapter 19. As for Spain's role, **Gonzalo M. Quintero Saravia** argues in Volume I, Chapter 10, that when its government joined the French war effort against Britain in 1778, it "not only tipped the balance of the conflict, giving France and Spain numerical superiority both at land and at sea, but also profoundly changed the general strategy of the war . . . This clear superiority opened up new theaters in this now truly global war, spreading British resources thin. Britain would be forced to abandon a purely American perspective of the conflict and adopt a more global view of the war . . ." France's support for the American Revolution was accompanied in the same years by its defeat, alongside Bern and Savoy, of Geneva, where an insurrection had taken place against the magistrates. Geneva was unfortunate, writes **Richard Whatmore** (Volume II, Chapter 12), that in 1782 the strength of France was at a peak unparalleled since the 1680s. French invasions of foreign countries may have stopped during the early stages of the French Revolution, but the fear of an international conspiracy aimed at defeating the revolution helped forge a parliamentary majority in Paris in favor of war in 1792. From then on, warfare was a permanent feature of French life until the Battle of Waterloo, conquest of neighboring territories doubling or masquerading as liberation.[135]

The Spanish American independence movements were even more borderless than those in Europe. Troops from Buenos Aires were deployed not only in battles against Spanish forces in Chile and Upper Peru, but also outside the viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata in Peru. Similarly, natives of New Granada were instrumental in ending the Spanish regime in Peru. In addition, the independence movement in Spanish America was entangled with that in Brazil, as **João Paulo Pimenta** shows in Volume III, Chapter 21. One element of this braided history was the repeated Portuguese and later Brazilian interventions in the Banda Oriental, starting in 1811, which were predicated on fear of the successive revolutionary governments in Buenos Aires. These military incursions ended only with the creation of Uruguay in 1828.

International connections were not just military in nature. What gave the revolutionary age coherence was the spread of ideas and ideals, inspiring both enthusiasm and aversion. Pimenta notes that through "newspapers, as well as diplomatic reports, official and private correspondence, and the

[135] T. C. W. Blanning, *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars* (London: Longman, 1986).

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circulation of people, rumors, and news, Spanish America became increasingly familiar in Brazil, arousing interest, fears, and expectations, and provoking reactions." All around the Atlantic world, the North American Declaration of Independence and the constitutions spawned by the new nation and its component states became powerful documents in the hands of rebels in other locales.[136] The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and the French constitutions of the first revolutionary years served the same purpose. In Hungary, **Orsolya Szakály** writes in Volume II, Chapter 19, the radical Society of Liberty and Equality "called for a democratic republic of equal citizens in Hungary with references to the French Revolution." Political awareness in several Spanish colonies was also stimulated by the French Revolution. In Volume II, Chapter 6, **Clément Thibaud** shows that members of Spanish American elites could derive inspiration from the French Declaration as much as slaves and free people of color, as they both did during the French revolutionary decade and the Spanish imperial crisis after 1808. No explicit reference could be made to the French example, but, writes Thibaud, "between 1811 and 1813, all constitutional projects in Spanish America included a section on the Rights of Man and of the Citizen." The French model did not arrive alone, mingling with that of the Haitian Revolution to form a potent mixture of revolutionary ideas, slogans, and practices. In the 1790s, **Cristina Soriano** writes (Volume II, Chapter 28), the new revolutionary language "that arrived on the coast of the Spanish Main challenged the already tense relations that existed among different socioracial groups. The majority of the white population interpreted this revolutionary narrative as a violent torrent that sought to destroy their political system and social order, while many free and enslaved people of African descent saw this as their opportunity to achieve social justice and emancipation from the system of slavery, or to at least renegotiate their labor conditions and political roles." One free man of color in Spanish Louisiana expressed his admiration for French rule in Saint-Domingue, where, he said, men like himself enjoyed civil equality. "We can speak openly, like any white person and hold the same rank as they." It is unjust that we don't enjoy equality in Louisiana. Anticipating a line from Martin Luther King's famous speech, he added: "Only their method of thinking – not color – should differentiate men."[137]

[136] George Athan Billias, *American Constitutionalism Heard Round the World, 1776–1789: A Global Perspective* (New York: New York University Press, 2009).
[137] Kimberly Hanger, "Conflicting Loyalties: The French Revolution and Free People of Color in Spanish New Orleans," *Louisiana History* 34:1 (1993), 5–33: 26.

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Among German radicals, debates revolved around the French catalog of rights, which they saw as the foundation for social order. The French example still resonated internationally when, in France itself, Thermidor set in and principles of natural law were no longer considered the foundation of liberty but denounced as an arsenal for anarchists and levelers which had produced the Terror.[138] The international impact of the ideas spawned by both the French Revolution and the American Revolution, as well as those associated with the Enlightenment, has often been presented as ideological absorption. It was, however, not the force of these ideas themselves that enabled them to spread to certain locales. As one historian has argued, ideas can make history only when they successfully process reality and offer ways out of a social impasse. Crises make those seeking solutions look for appropriate intellectual and political instruments.[139] And once a revolutionary situation is unfolding, creative energies are unleashed that produce new ideas and ideals.[140]

As had happened under the influence of the Revolution in France, a surge of politicization also occurred under the influence of the constitution of Cádiz of 1812, at least in the Iberian world. **Jane Landers** writes in Volume III, Chapter 11 that this constitution "reversed long-promulgated racial prohibitions and decreed that 'Spaniards of African origin' should be helped to study sciences and have access to an ecclesiastical career." The new constitution, Landers continues, was read in plazas across the Atlantic, to enthusiastic crowds that included free and enslaved Blacks. After the constitution reached Cuba, a series of slave revolts swept through the island, as hope born of debates in the Cortes and British Parliament helped launch rumors about abolition decrees authored by authorities as diverse as the king of Spain, the Spanish Cortes, the king of England, the king of Haiti, and the king of Kongo. Those debates did not create such beliefs but activated the often deep-felt conviction of Black men and women of the illegality of their enslavement. News from afar was not necessary to trigger such ideas, as suggested by the impact of the constitution of Antioquia (New Granada), which was saturated with the metaphor of liberty, on a group of slaves who

[138] Yannick Bosc, *La terreur des droits de l'homme: Le républicanisme de Thomas Paine et le moment thermidorien* (Paris: Éditions Kimé, 2016); Günther Birtsch, "Naturrecht und Menschenrechte. Zur vernunftrechtlichen Argumentation deutscher Jakobiner," in Otto Dann and Diethelm Klippel, eds., *Naturrecht – Spätaufklärung – Revolution* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1995), 111–20: 119–20.

[139] Peter Blickle, *Von der Leibeigenschaft zu den Menschenrechten: Eine Geschichte der Freiheit in Deutschland* (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2006), 15.

[140] Kristin Ross, *Communal Luxury: The Political Imaginary of the Paris Commune* (London: Verso, 2015), 6–7.

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claimed to represent more than 10,000 fellow bondspeople. Convinced of the existence of a liberating decree, they approached the tribunal of justice in Medellín, only to be arrested.[141]

The movement to abolish slavery was one that transgressed boundaries. In Volume II, Chapter 4, **Erica Johnson Edwards** shows that the French Society of the Friends of the Blacks and its successor organization, the Society of the Friends of the Blacks and the Colonies, enjoyed membership from both sides of the Channel and both sides of the Atlantic. In another sense, abolitionism also extended across international borders. As **Seymour Drescher** details in Volume II, Chapter 15, Great Britain sent a large fleet to Algiers, which succeeded in liberating many enslaved Europeans, victims of the Barbary corsairs, took great pains to stimulate international condemnation of the transatlantic slave trade, and made recognition of the new Latin American countries dependent on a commitment to abolish the slave trade. News about the termination of slavery in foreign lands was not always a welcome boon for abolitionists. Abolition in Saint-Domingue in 1793, sanctioned by the French Convention the following year, made antislavery activists both in Great Britain and in the United States lose ground in their struggle. **Ashli White** demonstrates in Volume II, Chapter 29 that those bent on upholding slavery in the United States spread the fiction that Black people in Saint-Domingue were fighting a war of revenge against their former masters after they had been set free thanks to false philanthropists.

The Haitian Revolution also proved to be a major source of inspiration among those living in bondage in the New World's many slave societies, while the French Revolution found resonance among both whites and nonwhites. That was in part due to the initiatives of Victor Hugues, France's most senior representative in the years 1794–1798, whose revolutionary troops were composed largely of former slaves. This massive force, **Jessica Pierre-Louis** tells us in Volume II, Chapter 27, "forced the British to recruit and emancipate more enslaved conscripted soldiers to cope with the increase in French troops. Thus, general French freedom also generated, albeit to a lesser extent, emancipation in the British colonies."

Separating the reception of the closely intertwined French and Haitian revolutions is not easy. In Brazil, **Alejandro Gómez** asserts (Volume III, Chapter 14),

[141] María Eugenia Chaves, "Esclavos, libertades y república: Tesis sobre la polisemia de la libertad en la primera república antioqueña," *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina* 22:1 (2011), 81–104: 87–9. Cf. Wim Klooster, "Slave Revolts, Royal Justice, and a Ubiquitous Rumor in the Age of Revolutions," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 71:3 (2014), 401–24.

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both the revolution in Saint-Domingue and the support of revolutionary activity by the French colonial regime in Guadeloupe affected the city of Salvador, where conspirators in 1798 criticized the "monarchical yoke" and praised the "freedom, equality, and fraternity" of the French.[142] The impact of these two revolutions on the Americas was dissimilar, David Geggus has argued: "If the French Revolution proclaimed the ideals of liberty and equality, the Haitian Revolution demonstrated to colonized peoples that they could be won by force of arms. Plantation societies built on bondage, prejudice, and inequality were peculiarly vulnerable to the ideology of revolutionary France, but the dramatic example of self-liberation offered by Saint-Domingue's transformation into Haiti brought the message much closer to home."[143]

In Spanish America, writes **Clément Thibaud** (Volume II, Chapter 6), the legacy of the French or Haitian revolutions was not explicitly invoked, but hiding in plain sight. Revolutionaries had a thorough grasp of what the French assemblies had accomplished and adopted several institutions that had originated in France. It would also be impossible to imagine the revolutionaries' acceptance of racial equality without the shadow of the Haitian Revolution.[144] And then there was the Haitian republic, a vivid reminder of the successful revolution, which officially maintained its neutrality, but provided crucial support to rebels in Caribbean South America. **Ernesto Bassi** writes (Volume III, Chapter 8) that the obvious sympathies for the Spanish American revolutions of Alexandre Pétion (the president of one of Haiti's two polities at the time) led to the characterization of his republic by Spanish officials as "the receptacle of all the adventurers."

Like the Haitian Revolution, that of France was particularly influential in its own hemisphere. In nearby Switzerland, for example, both intellectuals and peasants who had suffered under the remnants of feudalism responded enthusiastically in the first months after the storming of the Bastille, while in rural areas in western Germany peasants refused to pay tithes or perform the *corvée*, the unpaid labor owed to their lords.[145] Usually, however, the

[142] See also Luiz Geraldo Silva, "El impacto de la revolución de Saint-Domingue y los afrodescendientes libres de Brasil. Esclavitud, libertad, configuración social y perspectiva atlántica (1780–1825)," *Historia* 49:1 (2016), 209–33.

[143] Geggus, "Slave Rebellion," 27–8.

[144] David Geggus, "The Sounds and Echoes of Freedom: The Impact of the Haitian Revolution on Latin America," in Darién J. Davis, ed., *Beyond Slavery: The Multilayered Legacy of Africans in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 19–36: 25.

[145] Marc H. Lerner, *A Laboratory of Liberty: The Transformation of Political Culture in Republican Switzerland, 1750–1848* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 79; T. C. W. Blanning,

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revolution's supporters were small in number and to be found among radical city-dwellers, who often pinned all their hopes on a French invasion. Joseph Schlemmer, a German lawyer, wrote in 1792: "The happiness of half the world depends on the luck or misfortune of French arms. For if they win, the subject can hope for equity and justice, for better laws to protect him. If they lose, the most terrible slavery in monarchical states is inevitable."[146] The French, indeed, brought freedom, introducing various degrees of rural emancipation in Belgium, the Helvetic Republic, several parts of northern and western Germany, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. These French policies also led to preemptive emancipation in German states that were not invaded.[147]

Despite the changes wrought, bitterness and opposition eventually prevailed in the areas subdued by French arms. In Volume II, Chapter 21, **Annie Jourdan** writes: "In view of the political, economic, and social consequences, the so-called sister republics were a flagrant failure. Their alliance with the French republic brought them continuous disorder, increased taxation, military violence and depredations, and infinite abuses of power." Italian territories were particularly badly affected. In Milan, the French provoked outrage by billeting soldiers in private homes, establishing a National Guard for which all able-bodied men between sixteen and fifty-five were recruited, and eliminating religious festivals and sacred wall paintings on public buildings.[148] Apart from strong local cultural and religious traditions, the French invaders were confronted with deep-rooted judicial cultures which challenged their uniformist impulse.[149] Sooner or later, although not universally, the French presence descended into boundless military violence, which inspired counterviolence.[150] **John A. Davis** (Volume II, Chapter 17) nuances this picture. Even brutal features of the French presence, he writes,

Reform and Revolution in Mainz 1743–1803 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 306.

[146] Jörg Schweigard, *Aufklärung und Revolutionsbegeisterung: Die katholischen Universitäten in Mainz, Heidelberg und Würzburg im Zeitalter der Französischen Revolution (1789–1792/3–1803)* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2000), 155.

[147] John Markoff, "Violence, Emancipation, and Democracy: The Countryside and the French Revolution," *The American Historical Review* 100:2 (1995), 360–86: 383.

[148] Laura Gagliardi, "Il volto della Rivoluzione: Milano di fronte all'invasione francese (1796–1799)," in Cecilia Nubola and Andreas Würgler, eds., *Ballare con nemico? Reazioni all'espansione francese in Europa tra entusiasmo e resistenza (1792–1815)* (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino; Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010), 23–34.

[149] Luigi Lacchè, "L'Europe et la révolution du droit: Brèves réflexions," *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* no. 328 (2002), 153–69: 162.

[150] Jean-Clément Martin, *Violence et révolution: Essai sur la naissance d'un mythe national* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2006), 289–91.

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"were not sufficient to reduce the republican experiments of 1796–1799 to a mere narrative of military oppression. The attraction of the promised new republican order had been evident when in April 1796 Bonaparte was greeted enthusiastically in Milan as a liberator. Republican sympathizers and political exiles from Naples, Rome, and Piedmont flocked to the city where political clubs and associations were founded, and newspapers and journals were launched." The response was similar in other parts of the Italian peninsula. Besides, Davis argues, the popular anger that did erupt in 1799 – on a scale vaster than the insurrection in the Vendée – "was in many respects a continuation of insurrections and unrest that had been evident throughout the peninsula from much earlier, but existing discontents had been exacerbated by the impact of the revolution, the military occupation, and the new republics."

In some countries, the fear of a French invasion caused officials to stoke fear about the baneful presence of imaginary Frenchmen. In Saxony and Austria, French agents were accused of stirring up the population or preparing a coup d'état.[151] Nowhere, though, was the fear of French emissaries so great as in Spanish America in the first years after Fernando VII and Carlos IV surrendered to Napoleon in 1808. A tremendous amount of bureaucratic energy was spent on detecting unknown travelers and checking the countless reports about their alleged activities.[152] In reality, Napoleon did send some agents to Spanish American shores, but they remained harmless.

By the time Napoleon seized power, France rarely served as a beacon of hope anymore, at least in Europe.[153] In the eyes of numerous commentators, who now looked to Great Britain for inspiration, the French Revolution had failed, and its supporters were simply terrorists and anarchists.[154] If books by

[151] Jirko Krauß, *Ländlicher Alltag und Konflikt in der späten Frühen Neuzeit: Lebenswelt erzgebirgischer Rittergutsdörfer im Spiegel der kursächsischen Bauernunruhen 1790* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012), 411; Helmut Reinalter, "Gegen die 'Tollwuth der Aufklärungsbarbarei': Leopold Alois Hoffmann und der frühe Konservatismus in Österreich," in Christoph Weiß, ed., *Von "Obscuranten" und "Eudämonisten": Gegenaufklärerische, konservative und antirevolutionäre Publizisten im späten 18. Jahrhundert* (St. Ingbert: Röhrig Universitätsverlag, 1997), 221–44: 227–8.

[152] Timothy Hawkins, *A Great Fear: Luís de Onís and the Shadow War against Napoleon in Spanish America, 1808–1812* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2019).

[153] By contrast, liberals and conservatives at the Cortes of Cádiz tried to learn lessons from the early stages of the French Revolution. José M. Portillo, "El poder constituyente en el primer constitucionalismo hispano," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas* 55 (2018), 1–26. In addition, as seen above, radicals in the Spanish colonies continued to be inspired by French revolutionary thought and practice.

[154] Richard Whatmore, *Terrorists, Anarchists, and Republicans: The Genevans and the Irish in Time of Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 349–50.

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Voltaire, Rousseau, and Raynal had always been banned in the Catholic world, publications associated with the revolution in France were seen by moral guardians of monarchical regimes as equally impious, seditious, or obscene. It was not even necessarily a book's content that was judged – authorship by a disreputable person sufficed for a work to be condemned. Censors in Brazil in the 1810s prohibited the sale of the innocent-sounding *Liberty of the Seas* because its author, the former Jacobin Bertrand Barère, had been "one of the most bloodthirsty associates of the monster Robespierre." And although the *philosophe* Gabriel Bonnot de Mably had died in 1785, his works were blacklisted because his doctrines of equality and liberty were found to have contributed much to the French Revolution.[155]

Whereas anti-French feelings abated, anti-Spanish sentiment in Spanish America grew after 1808, as the fight between patriots and royalists intensified. In Buenos Aires, a series of repressive measures against the *peninsulares* commenced with the May revolution of 1810, although persecution was limited to those who openly rejected the new regime. It became much more comprehensive after the discovery of an antigovernment conspiracy with Spanish ringleaders.[156] At the tail end of the independence process, there was also a reckoning for Spanish natives in both Peru and Mexico. Their massive expulsion caused so much ill-will on the part of the Spanish government that it embarked on an unsuccessful reconquest of Mexico in 1829–1830.[157] Like in other former colonies, Brazil also initiated measures against natives of the former metropole. **Hendrik Kraay** (Volume III, Chapter 20) asserts that these policies were not simply aimed at eliminating an enemy ethnicity. Anti-Portuguese rhetoric and violence were also about political choices and local power struggles. Besides, "expelling Portuguese-born office holders also conveniently opened up spaces in the civil and military bureaucracy for Brazilian patriots."

The French themselves, meanwhile, were not above excluding foreigners, who were seen by the Jacobins as treacherous enemies of the revolution. Months after the outbreak of war with Britain, all British nationals were arrested, and their property was confiscated. Englishmen soon stood accused

[155] Lúcia Maria B. P. das Neves and Tânia Maria T. B. da C. Ferreira, "O medo dos 'abomináveis princípios franceses': A censura dos livros nos inícios do século XIX no Brasil," *Acervo* 4:1 (1989), 113–19: 116.

[156] Mariana Alicia Pérez, "¡Viva España y Mueran los Patricios! La conspiración de Álzaga de 1812," *Americanía. Revista de Estudios Latinoamericanos* special issue (May 2015), 21–55.

[157] Harold Dana Sims, *The Expulsion of Mexico's Spaniards, 1821–1836* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990).

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of "lese humanity." War to the death was consequently declared on them.[158] Such policies stood in stark contrast to the universalism the revolutionaries had professed in the first years of the revolution. As late as January 1793, *Le Moniteur Universel*, the government's official newspaper, had invoked "the bonds of universal fraternity which the French have extended to all peoples and on which they stake their lives."[159] Universalism did not disappear once France's armies began to cross the country's boundaries, although its adherents were now usually to be found elsewhere. In his *A Letter to the People of Ireland* (1796), Irishman Thomas Russell connected the plight of those countrymen of his who had been impressed by the Royal Navy not only to the oppression of Catholics in Ireland but also to that of enslaved Africans. Impressment, after all, enabled Britain to wage wars that aimed at continuing the Atlantic slave trade.[160] Russell thus tapped into the remarkable popular success of Britain's abolitionist movement. **Seymour Drescher** writes (Volume II, Chapter 15): "Unlike its counterparts in France and America it endured for half a century as a national social movement. Its participants were initially aroused by what they deemed violations of the 'principle of humanity.' Their intended beneficiaries were not their own fellow Britons nor even residents of their own colonies. They differed from the enslaved in race, color, religion, or culture."

If imperialism did not raise its head in France until a few years into the revolution, the American Revolution was more blatantly imperialist from the very start. In Volume I, Chapter 16, **Colin Calloway** contends that "the Revolution was also, quite simply, a war over Indian land. Speculators like George Washington had worked long and hard to get their hands on the best western lands; western settlers sought to rid lands of Indian neighbors, and Congress and the individual states needed land to fulfill the bounties and warrants they issued in lieu of pay during the war." Those Indian neighbors paid the price for westward expansion. Calloway relates that the Cherokees sued for peace after a genocidal campaign had been waged against them. At the peace treaties they signed, they lost more than 5 million acres. The indigenous plight throws into relief the apparent contradiction discerned by **Patrick Griffin**

[158] The rebels in the Vendée, who were officially excluded from the nation – not humanity – were treated the same way: Sophie Wahnich, *L'impossible citoyen: L'étranger dans le discours de la Révolution française* (Paris: Éditions Albin Michel, 2010), 11, 359.

[159] Rachel Rogers, "The Society of the Friends of the Rights of Man, 1792–94: British and Irish Radical Conjunctions in Republican Paris," *La Révolution française* (2016), 1–26: 6, http://lrf.revues.org/1629.

[160] Anthony Di Lorenzo and John Donoghue, "Abolition and Republicanism over the Transatlantic Long Term, 1640–1800," *La Révolution française* (2016), 14, 48–9, http://lrf.revues.org/1690.

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(Volume 1, Chapter 7). The creoles of British North America, he writes, were "a people of paradox: anti-imperial when it came to the metropole and imperial when it came to dominance at home." Westward expansion continued after the peace treaty with Britain was signed in 1783, but, as **Mark Peterson** notes (Volume 1, Chapter 5), the Confederation Congress (the body that initially governed the new republic) was ill-equipped to manage claims on western lands. It was in part to solve this problem that a constitutional convention was convened that ended up creating a new form of national government.

The Realm of Freedom

Some revolutionaries, even those who stood to benefit more than others, had always doubted the possibility of introducing a new order.[161] The German "Jacobin" Joseph Görres believed in a four-stage development that had begun with the transition from barbarism to society, which was followed by that from a despotic to a representative regime. Next, a pure democracy would arise that would eventually give way to the period of "anarchy," during which people no longer needed a government. This progression took time, however. To move from the second stage to the third, as the French revolutionaries had tried to accomplish by introducing the constitution of 1791, did not make sense. That constitution came thousands of years too early. A long process of popular education was first required.[162]

Still, the upheaval of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries created new regimes that often bore no resemblance to the old ones. These regimes made a start, however incomplete and reversible, and more in some places than others, with the emancipation of the many men and women who previously had been voiceless. And yet the belief, generated by the revolutions around the Atlantic world, in an imminent entry into the realm of freedom was proven to be misplaced. In the course of the revolutions, goals that had been embraced in the early stages mutated into ideological phrases that lacked urgency.[163] What gained currency was, once again, the idea that change would come only gradually. For most residents of the Atlantic world, true liberty would have to wait until a distant future.

[161] Domenico Losurdo, "Vincenzo Cuoco, la révolution napolitaine de 1799 et l'étude comparée des révolutions," *Revue Historique* 281:1 (1989), 133–57: 151.

[162] Joseph Görres, "Mein Glaubensbekenntnis (Juni/Juli 1798)," in Axel Kuhn, ed., *Linksrheinische deutsche Jakobiner: Aufrufe, Reden, Protokolle. Briefe und Schriften 1794–1801* (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1978), 240–50: 242–3.

[163] Stefan Greif, "Das Diskontinuierliche als Kontinuum. Aufklärung und Aufklärungskritik im Werk Georg Forsters," *Georg-Forster-Studien* 15 (2010), 77–93: 87.

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