

DETERRENT DIPLOMACY: JAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE USSR, 1935–1940. Edited by *James William Morley*. Selected translations from TAIHEIYŌ SENSŌ E NO MICHI: KAISEN GAIKŌ SHI. Japan's Road to Pacific War Series, vol. 1. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. xii, 363 pp.

Deterrent diplomacy is an acceptable norm in international relations. In the twentieth century, this type of diplomatic activity might be directed against an ideological system and take the form of hostile nonaggression pacts, or political agreements with military provisions attempting to establish huge spheres of predominance with warning signs for other states not to interfere. Between the invasion of Manchuria and the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan's foreign policy included both methods for resisting its adversaries, and the book under review seeks to explain the development of these trends.

Three essays by distinguished Japanese scholars—translated and introduced by established American specialists of Far Eastern history—are assembled in this study, the first volume in a series called "Japan's Road to the Pacific War." The essays, entitled "The Anti-Comintern Pact, 1935–1939," "The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation, 1935–1939," and "The Tripartite Pact, 1939–1940," are based predominantly on published and unpublished Japanese sources, and their translation thus makes valuable information available to Western students of this period. Between 1935 and 1939, Japan's foreign policy was buffeted by many currents: at home younger officers and civil servants sought to revitalize the country's policies on a more dynamic scale, and abroad the army clashed along the Manchurian-Mongolian frontier with Soviet forces and after 1937 became deeply engaged in an attempt to conquer China.

The first two essays explore Japan's efforts to obtain foreign support against her perceived adversary, the Soviet Union. Although the outline of the negotiations for the Anti-Comintern Pact and the subsequent efforts in 1938–39 to arrive at a military alliance have been known for some time, we learn a great deal about Japan's domestic forces (bureaucratic, ideological, and military) that promoted the ties with Nazi Germany. The author, Ōhata Tokushirō, details the incredibly complex method by which the various elements of the Japanese government needed to be consulted and reconciled before final agreement could be reached. The Japanese-Soviet military conflict, described by Hata Ikuhiko, exceeded 1600 armed clashes between 1935 and 1945, of which only the battles at Changkufeng and Nomonhan are familiar. The emphasis here is on military details, stressing the repeated insubordination of the local commanders versus the Imperial Japanese headquarters, the failure of Japanese intelligence in estimating Soviet military strength, and the Russian victories at the expense of huge Japanese casualties. The ability of Soviet diplomacy to take advantage of the shifting balance of power, especially in August 1939 when the battle of Nomonhan was raging, is also given careful attention. However, the maps for this article are inadequate.

The Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact left the Japanese angry and bewildered, but these emotions were forgotten in the wake of the German victories in May and June 1940. Opportunities for expansion (and the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere) beckoned wherever European colonies were left helpless because of the defeat of Holland and France and the expected collapse of England. But once again Japanese plans were threatened, this time by an increasingly bold American policy. The Japanese government also felt uncertain about Germany's attitude toward the disposition of the European colonies in the Far East. The catalyst that finally cemented the Berlin-Tokyo axis was the destroyer-for-bases arrangement of August 1940. America now became a clear antagonist in Hitler's mind, and he turned to the Japanese to divert Washington's attention to the Pacific. Within the first month of the destroyer-for-bases agreement, Germany, Italy, and Japan signed the Tripartite Pact which was designed to keep the United States out of the European and Pacific wars.

Professor Hosoya Chihiro is quite right when, in the third essay, he points to the differences between German and Japanese expectations about the alliance. Hitler wanted the Japanese to irritate the United States yet avoid an open conflict; the Tokyo government hoped that the Tripartite Pact would deter Washington from interfering with Japanese plans for southeast Asia. Both parties underestimated America's determination that was to wreck the tripartite treaty by December 1941.

ERNST L. PRESSEISEN
Temple University

THE MARSHALL PLAN SUMMER: AN EYEWITNESS REPORT ON EUROPE AND THE RUSSIANS IN 1947. By *Thomas A. Bailey*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1977. viii, 246 pp. \$10.95.

Thomas A. Bailey, whose *Diplomatic History of the American People* has been a basic college textbook for more than thirty years has added another volume to his twenty-odd books. *The Marshall Plan Summer* is based on the author's diary maintained while he surveyed conditions in war-torn Europe. Bailey traveled under the auspices of the National War College whose staff provided the initial briefings. In Europe most of his information also came from official or semiofficial American sources. In spite of this handicap, Bailey strives to maintain scholarly objectivity, but he succeeds only in part. Although many observations show his perspicience, he is not quite able to evade the clichés of a biased environment: thus the Soviet Union "did not want a reunited Germany"; "Stalin connived with Hitler to start the war"; and the Kremlin used the Western currency reform as "a pretext for inaugurating the Berlin blockade." In a similar vein, important details which could provide balance remain unreported. There is no reference to Truman's neglect when he relinquished the German assets in Austria as reparations; nor is the reader informed that a unanimous control council vote in Vienna was actually needed to reverse the decisions of Austria's independent government.

Bailey acknowledges that "the 'party line' at the War College was that the Soviet Union by its aggressive post-war designs and acts had forced the cold war on the Western democracies." And he admits that "I myself came to accept it, especially after numerous and extended talks with American officers in Europe who had experienced close contacts with the Russians."

Despite these limitations, *The Marshall Plan Summer* deserves a wide readership. It is well written, quite entertaining, and clearly reflects the spirit of the late 1940s, which tended to promote the confrontations of the Cold War.

JOHN H. BACKER
U.S. Senate

SOVIET IMAGES OF AMERICA. By *Stephen P. Gibert*, with contributions by *Arthur A. Zuehkle, Jr.*, *Richard Soll*, and *Michael J. Deane*. Stanford Research Institute, Strategic Studies Center. New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1977. xiv, 167 pp. \$12.50, cloth. \$5.95, paper.

In his opening sentence, the author declares: "Faulty perceptions of the policies of other nations or of the motives, beliefs and actions of their leaders and people can and do lead to disastrous mistakes." And his initial position, as well as that of his colleagues at the Strategic Studies Center of the Stanford Research Institute which published this volume, seems to be that Soviet perceptions of the United States have indeed been faulty, and dangerously so. Gibert appears to be convinced that Moscow now holds an