THE SOVIET NAVAL OFFENSIVE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE STRA-TEGIC ROLE OF SOVIET NAVAL FORCES IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT. By Edward Wegener. Translated from the German by Henning Wegener. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975 [1972, 1974]. x, 135 pp.

Wegener, a retired German naval officer who served both during World War II and in a NATO command, has written an important book not only for strategists but for all persons seriously concerned with Soviet foreign policy. Modifying Admiral Mahan's position, Wegener provides a plausible strategic doctrine for evaluating Soviet and Western naval postures.

His analysis is at all times thoughtful, informing the reader of the latest technological developments as well as quantitative trends. Wegener distinguishes the prerequisites for psychological warfare in peacetime and for actual wartime operations. His crowning achievement, however, is to base his entire analysis on the geographical conditions which, on balance, favor the West and severely limit the USSR, for example, the triple obstacle course Soviet ships must run to pass from the Black Sea to the Indian Ocean. Contrary to Admiral Zumwalt and Jane's Fighting Ships, Wegener suggests that the United States masters all the oceans and the critical eastern Mediterranean, and can retain this mastery if past performance is continued.

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COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE: THE COMINTERN AND THE POLITICAL UNREST IN THE 1920'S. By Jacob Hen-Tov. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1974. viii, 184 pp.

Professor Hen-Tov's study of the Palestinian Communist movement during the twenties is narrowly focused and apparently directed at the specialist. The author has the necessary linguistic credentials to delve into this complicated subject, as he utilizes numerous sources in Russian, Hebrew, and Arabic, and he also provides a fascinating array of information and a thorough bibliography. His research is excellent but, unfortunately, his presentation is marred by pbor writing and organization and the lack of any comprehensive analytical framework. In addition, his book is not edited very carefully—there are at least forty-five typographical, spelling, and grammatical errors, as well as an inconsistent system of transliteration.

Hen-Tov discusses the Comintern's opposition to Zionism and the linkage of this issue to the problem of Jewish nationalism in the Soviet Union. He also points out the incongruous position of Palestinian Jewish Communists, many of whom emigrated from the Soviet Union to Palestine only to adopt an anti-Zionist line. Jews predominated in the Palestine Communist Party since few Arabs could be attracted as members but, beginning in 1928, the Comintern came to view the Arabs as the main revolutionary force in Palestine while the Jews were perceived as allies of British imperialism. This led to an accelerated drive to recruit Arabs but the turning point did not come until the 1929 Arab riots which led to the Arabization of the P.C.P. and the purging of many Jewish members. The Jewish leaders of the party had at first condemned the Arab rioters and had called for cooperation with Jewish defense forces in order to oppose what they labeled an "anti-Jewish pogrom," but the Comintern then successfully pressured the P.C.P. to reverse its stand.

Certain aspects of Hen-Tov's study could use some further elucidation. His comments on Jewish and Arab membership in the P.C.P. are not backed up with