

thoroughness and inclusiveness. It will be very difficult for Soviet critics (or anyone else) to attack successfully the factual basis of his work.

The interpretation is something else again. But in order to dispute an author's interpretation, one must be at least as competent in the subject as he is. For example, though I would interpret the juridical position of the kolkhoznik somewhat differently than Wädekin (who speaks of "attachment to the soil" in a virtually feudal sense), a successful polemic against this position would once again require a considerable piece of research.

The strongest impression one receives from Wädekin's work is that Soviet society is still far from being classless or egalitarian. Social stratification seems to be, if anything, more complex in the Soviet Union, though less rigid, than in capitalist countries. This is something that has been discussed recently by Soviet social scientists—particularly Iu. V. Arutiunian. Incidentally, Wädekin seems to me to underestimate the candor, boldness, and originality of much current Soviet social science writing, and its value to the Western observer. In part, no doubt, the problem here is the familiar one: the field is moving so fast that a full-length book by a Western scholar on the subject will be out of date to a significant degree by the time it gets into broad circulation.

Wädekin is not an easy author to read or to use. This is particularly true of *Privatproduzenten*. The present work is an improvement in that respect, partly because there is less tabular data, and partly because the footnotes are at the bottom of each page rather than at the end of the book. Major sources are cited in abbreviated form in the footnotes and then listed in full in a bibliography at the end. I find this halfway use of the scientific style cumbersome and annoying. Citations should be either all one way or the other.

Wädekin's general conclusions (pp. 333–39) are sober and moderate and offer nothing startling. For example: "It is clear even today that in Moscow agrarian policy can no longer be made without regard to the reactions of the people concerned, as Stalin once did, and Khrushchev—in weakened form—once tried to do. It is also clear that these reactions must be studied concretely, instead of being deduced from the propositions of the ideology, but the question remains whether this insight has not come so late that it will make many of the recent investments futile, and will not be able to lift the rural economy out of its backwardness within a foreseeable time."

Given the extreme importance of the sociology of the Soviet countryside in terms of the theory of economic development, it is vital that the mass of data assembled by Wädekin be rapidly assimilated by scholars and interpreted from a variety of points of view. A speedy English translation of the present work would seem to be the first order of business.

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KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS. Introduction, commentary, and notes by *Edward Crankshaw*. Translated and edited by *Strobe Talbott*. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1970. xxviii, 639 pp. \$10.00.

Soon after the emergence of this best seller, a high official of the Soviet secret police wrote an article on psychological warfare and remarked that Western intelligence services "often resort to such methods as the fabrication of various 'memoirs'

and 'notes' of once-prominent party and state figures of the socialist countries." At first glance, the implicit charge of CIA authorship of *Khrushchev Remembers* for the sake of providing anti-Soviet propaganda is quite plausible. The forger at CIA would have been required to assemble a mere handful of basic sources, among which would be Khrushchev's Secret Speech of 1956, Svetlana Alliluyeva's *Twenty Letters to a Friend*, Milovan Djilas's *Conversations with Stalin*, Herbert Feis's *China Tangle*, N. Rutysh's *KPSS u vlasti*, Ilya Ehrenburg's *Memoirs*, and NBC's taped interviews with Khrushchev in retirement. These sources, respectively, provide raw material for the "disclosures" in *Khrushchev Remembers* about major crimes of the Stalin era, the circumstances surrounding Stalin's death, the sycophancy in Stalin's entourage, Stalin's view of Mao Tse-tung and his lieutenants as "margarine Communists," the extreme Russian nationalism of the Leningrad party faction purged in 1949, how Beria's agents staged a street accident to murder the Yiddish theater actor Mikhoels, and Kremlin decision-making processes in the Cuban missile crisis.

The CIA forger would add to the aforementioned handy ingredients a unique comment which equates Stalin's actions with Hitler's. He would not forget to point out the Soviet Union's violation of international law by armed attack on Finland in 1939, as well as its conspiracy with Pyongyang which sparked the Korean War in 1950. Of course, to leave an impression of an old man's failing memory, the craftsman would intentionally err about the year of Khrushchev's promotion to candidate member of the Politburo and the day on which the Hitler-Stalin pact was signed. The result is an insider's picture of the USSR as a onetime aggressor state which was long run by a criminal gang and presently acts out the will of "narrow-minded skunks" (p. 450).

Without desiring to raise this matter to the plane of key detective story of Russian history, one cannot help but take a second glance and wonder if the origins of *Khrushchev Remembers* are not somewhat different. After all, Western journalists in Moscow tell us that "persons well-connected with Soviet officialdom" are certain that Khrushchev at his place of house arrest had dictated reminiscences into a tape recorder. The informants claim that when party bosses learned of this, a decision was taken to leak the memoirs to the West, where they would be discredited once experts found the many errors likely to be made by someone working without the benefit of access to archives. Besides, the public statement which Khrushchev was forced to sign on November 10, 1970, is notably evasive, saying that he never sent memoirs to any publishers, but not explicitly denying their existence. While the informants made it clear that the leak and the statement were designed to cast doubt on the authenticity of the memoirs, they did not explain why the authorities had not destroyed the tapes to suppress them.

Apparently the KGB and its controllers in the party Secretariat would have been unable to resist the temptation to rig Khrushchev's memoirs so that the final product would serve their immediate policy interests. In 1970 those interests included hampering the development of any far-reaching trend toward an improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations, and insuring the continuation of the American military presence in Vietnam as a thorn in the side of mainland China. *Khrushchev Remembers* accordingly insinuates to our opinion-leaders that in view of the sordid record of Kremlin behavior it is best to move cautiously into President Nixon's new "era of negotiation," always watchful to prevent arms-control diplomacy from going too far and too fast. The same unauthorized compilation grossly exaggerates

the influence of Peking in Hanoi, confirming the belief of those who argue that the United States wisely fights in Vietnam to contain the revolutionary expansionism of Communist China.

In any event, this book has no value to the historian. Its version of Soviet military tactics used on the Karelian isthmus in 1939–40, for example, is flatly contradicted by the classic study of the British scholar John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command*. The author(s) further allege that “Stalin had never gone out of his way to take other people’s advice into account, but this was especially true after the war” (p. 361). More trustworthy is the word of party literature that in 1948–53 there was a permanent commission of the Politburo for handling questions of foreign policy. Although the claim is made, “We have been sincere and unsparing in our efforts to assist Vietnam” (p. 485), the USSR in fact virtually cut off its aid to Hanoi during the 1962–64 period. Mr. Crankshaw, aside from trumpeting the dubious “insights” offered by this corrupted text, might at least have correctly dated the Third Partition of Poland—1795 not 1863.

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#### THE SOVIET POLITY: GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE U.S.S.R.

By *John S. Reshetar, Jr.* New York and Toronto: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1971  
ix, 412 pp. \$4.50, paper.

*The Soviet Polity* is an exploration of Soviet politics from an approach that emphasizes “institutional structures, functional analysis, the nature of the Soviet leadership, the principal components of Soviet political life, and the definition of the major problems confronting the Soviet polity” (p. v). The author has set himself an impressive task, and the result is a well-conceived and thorough investigation of Soviet politics. First among Professor Reshetar’s achievements is his lucidity. He is able to follow the tortuous route of administrative developments and illuminate both the fundamental continuity and the innovating change. His treatment of the secret police, for example, is a model of balance and clarity, showing how this structure maintains its cohesiveness through reorganization after reorganization. A second strength of this study is the author’s skill in providing the historical context for each structure or function he discusses. Thus the Soviet political system is seen to rest on a much older tradition than the fifty-odd years so often taken for granted. Such areas as ethnic heritage, law, and administration are examined in the light of their distinctively Soviet elements and also in the context of Russian tradition. Similarly, the author’s discussion of the structure and organization of the Communist Party and the governmental hierarchy is clear and precise. As a third strength, I would put forth Reshetar’s analysis of problems recognized generally as important but rarely analyzed satisfactorily. The distinctions he draws are original and persuasive, such as the ones he makes between mass and elite political culture (he devotes a chapter to each), between the socialism and communism of the Marxist tradition on the one hand and non-Marxist forms of socialism on the other, and between the ideological core and the pragmatic periphery of the perceptions of Soviet leaders.

In a study as broad as this, there are bound to be some areas that receive less emphasis than others. This reviewer finds, for example, that the chronological method of explanation tends to promote a sense of determinism that masks the political process. For example, the author says: “Lavrentii Beria, a deputy premier,