SECTORAL CLASHES IN CUBAN POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT

Jorge I. Domínguez, Harvard University

I. INTRODUCTION*

THIS ESSAY DISCUSSES ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY CUBAN POLITICS AND ECONOMICS, up to but not including the 1969–1970 sugar harvest effort, from the point of view of a theory of sectoral clashes presented by Markos Mamalakis.[1] The essay will focus on those hypotheses, derived from Mamalakis' previous work, which attempt to explain social and political conflict and policy making.[2]

Mamalakis defines a clash or collision of sectors as the aggressive and administered struggle for privileges and advantages among an economy's sectors. The clash is administered or manipulated because the transfer of resources from one sector to another is brought about through governmental economic policy; it is aggressive because the transfer of resources goes beyond voluntary saving or nondiscriminatory fiscal policies to such an extent that the government is willing to risk the decay of one economic sector in order to promote another. The following hypotheses about political and social conflict can be derived from Mamalakis' theory:

H1a: changes in the dominance/suppression relation among economic sectors take place only after fundamental changes of government economic policy; government policy is a necessary cause of such changes;

H1b: changes in the dominance/suppression relation among economic sectors are highly related to the changing power positions of individuals and organizations within the government;

H1c: a dominance/suppression sectoral relation may begin with asymmetrical sectoral growth; but the test requires a finding of decay in one sector while there is either considerably less decay, or growth, in another sector;

H2: a sectoral clash causes considerable social conflict in the suppressed sector; the least organized group in this sector loses the most; however, the suppressed sector's social classes do not coalesce to struggle for sectoral interests;

* I am grateful to John Powell and to Markos Mamalakis for comments on an earlier version of this essay which was presented at the round table on sectoral clashes of the annual conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, held in Boston, December 26–31, 1969. They do not necessarily agree with this version. I am also grateful to the Society of Fellows and to the Center for International Affairs, both at Harvard University, for personal and research support.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

H3: there is no single governing group which shows an internal consistent agreement on major questions of economic policy through time; in fact, there is considerable conflict within the managerial groups across sectors;

H4: there is no social conflict among social classes in the dominant sector; its social classes coalesce to struggle for sectoral interests;

H5: there is no close correlation between patterns of support/opposition to the government and class structure; that is, a given income group is no more likely to support the government than to oppose it; the pattern of support/opposition, however, correlates highly with sectoral structure.

II. SOCIAL BASES

During the early years of revolutionary government in Cuba, the social bases of its political support were class based. This leads to questioning H5 for the early period.[3] In mid-June 1959, the magazine *Bohemia* released the results of a survey which showed that 90.29 per cent of the population supported the government and that only 1.30 per cent were firmly opposed to it and to its laws. In the spring of 1960, Lloyd Free[4] surveyed a cross-section of 500 residents of Havana and 500 residents of other urban and semi-urban centers; 86 per cent of those surveyed supported the government, 10 per cent opposed it, and 4 per cent had no opinion. Using a scale to classify socio-economic (SES) groups, support for the government was 90 per cent for lowest SES, 87 per cent for low-middle SES, and 71 per cent for upper and upper-middle SES. Free's survey did not include the rural areas. But he found that 72 per cent of the population of Havana supported the government, and that 93 per cent ofthe non-Havana population did so. Thus, even after government policies had become more radical, but before the most important shifts, support for the government was still overwhelming. Second, the surveys suggest a slippage of support for the government within one year, reflecting this shift to the left. Third, although support for the government was high in all social groups, and although age and sex helped also to explain it, the occupational factor which explained support best was class cleavage, not sectoral cleavage.

Slippage of support continued in the 1960s. Maurice Zeitlin randomly sampled 202 workers in large industrial centers in Cuba in 1962; 70.3 per cent were favorable to the revolution, 17.8 per cent were hostile, and the balance were undecided. Free's low-middle urban SES—the closest to Zeitlin's industrial workers—supported the government 17 per cent more than Zeitlin's workers. Second, Zeitlin found that support among those who had been unemployed or underemployed prior to 1959 was 87.1 per cent, while among those who had been regularly employed prior to 1959 it was 61.6 per cent. Therefore, the drop from Free's low-middle urban SES group to Zeitlin's regularly employed industrial workers is 25 per cent, while the drop from the former to Zeitlin's unemployed or underemployed workers was only 3 per cent.[5]

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

From the vast and controversial literature on Cuba from 1959 through 1962, it can be inferred that the farm and industrial worker populations supported the government more than the population as a whole. This inference can also be made by comparing the occupational characteristics of the exiles—recorded by the United States government—with occupational data from the last available Cuban census (1953). The exile flow was cut off in September 1962, and not resumed until December 1965. Data on exiles have a conservative bias, for only those Cubans who were registered with the Refugee Emergency Center are counted. Many wealthier Cubans, who did not need the Center's help, did not register. If all exiles were included, one would expect to find a larger proportion of upper class Cubans.

The usefulness of these data is also limited because: (1) the pattern of the mid-1960s may result from early upper and middle class departures which reduced their numbers for the second period; and (2) these groups had more resources to migrate (money, knowledge of English, transferable skills, etc.) so that the pattern may be a consequence of Cuban social structure and not simply of the distribution of political views. These are valid objections. Our purpose here is not to measure public opinion precisely, but to suggest three trends that can be inferred from the orders of magnitude shown in the data: (1) that the over-all level of support for the government has declined significantly since 1959; (2) that there was a large, trans-sectoral, class-based pattern of support/opposition; and (3) that the pattern has changed because the salience of the earlier class cleavage has declined and been partly supplemented by sectoral cleavage.

Table 1 gives the ratio of the per cent of the employable refugees in a given occupation during the periods of migration shown in the table to the per cent of the

TABLE 1[6]

Comparison of the Cuban Work Force and Employable Refugees

Categories	1959–62[a]	1962[b]	1966[c]	1967[d]
Professional, semi-professional, managerial and executive	3.9	3.3	2.2	1.9
Clerical and sales	2.2	2.4	2.3	2.5
Domestic service, military, and police	1.1	0.88	1.1	1.1
Skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labor	0.74	0.93	1.2	1.3
Agricultural and fishing	0.07	0.10	0.12	0.10

[a] Includes the data in column for 1962.
[b] Is included in column for 1959–62.
[c] Dec. 1, 1965, to Dec. 31, 1966.
[d] Jan. 1, 1967, to Dec. 1, 1967.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Cuban work force in a given occupation in 1953. A ratio of 1.0 indicates that an occupation's share of the employable refugee population is what would be expected from its share of the Cuban work force.

Up to 1962 inclusive, the exodus was a massive departure of the upper and middle classes. Workers and farmers left at a rate less than would be expected from their share of the work force. The extreme class characteristics of the first emigration are muted during the second, which parallels the distribution of the Cuban national work force—except for the farmers. The emigration findings up to 1962 are in general accord with the findings of Free and Zeitlin for the same period. There was a large lower class-based coalition supporting the government and a smaller upper and middle class coalition opposing it. The emigration data for the mid-1960s confirm a projection from the Free-Zeitlin comparison that industrial labor had defected from the government coalition. Reasons for this defection are given in section IV. Therefore, the class-based pattern of support/opposition for the government has eroded and been partly supplemented by a sectoral pattern. Thus, for the mid-1960s, H5 is supported.[7]

The government's early appeal to the population through concrete social programs had a strong class basic. One indicator is public educational policy. One can hypothesize that a class-based lower and lower middle class oriented public educational policy would support the expansion of primary and secondary education and restrict university education. The evidence supports it (Table 2). The table shows

TABLE 2[8]

Public School Enrollment (Thousand Students)

Year	Primary	Secondary	University
1958/59	717.4	88.1	25.6
1959/60	1092.3	90.2	19.5
1960/61	1136.3	120.8	19.9
1961/62	1166.3	158.8	17.6

that, during these years, primary school enrollment increased 62 per cent, secondary school enrollment increased 80 per cent, and university enrollment declined 31 per cent—a marked class-based pattern for early educational policy. With the consolidation of the revolution and the establishment of controls over the universities, university enrollment increased again.

Table 3 shows the improvement in Cuban labor's wages in 1959–60. The wage data suggest that by April 1959, wages to labor were much higher than they had been during the last year of the Batista government. By June 1959, at the time of the first serious political crisis, wages paid to labor were 22 per cent higher than at the

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 3[9]

Wages Paid to Labor (Million Pesos)

Year	Total	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
1958	723.0	58.5	67.6	69.2	64.3	63.8	58.7	55.9	56.8	56.2	54.6	52.5	64.9
1959	920.3	56.7	66.6	72.1	78.1	79.2	75.1	76.6	72.9	76.2	79.9	82.2	104.7
1960		82.0	101.0	100.0									

same time during the previous year. In October 1959, as the government battled for control of the Cuban Confederation of Labor, wages were 68 per cent higher than at the same time during the previous year.

Moreover, it has been shown that support for the government was much higher among those workers who had been unemployed or underemployed prior to 1959 than among those workers who had been regularly employed. This support is probably related to government performance. In 1957–58, unemployment declined seasonally from December to March by 4.8 per cent. Under the revolutionary government, the decline was 7.6 per cent in 1958–59. This higher drop is partly explained by the fact that unemployment soared at the end of the Batista government. To the unemployed in 1959, the decline showed the government's capacity to reduce unemployment.[10] The government also began a land reform, slashed low income housing rents by 50 per cent, and reduced public utility charges. These measures appealed to farmers and to urban lower strata. It is not surprising that the early political appeals and political supports reflected the existence of a trans-sectoral lower class coalition led by an elite offshoot which seized power. But the finding casts doubt on H5, and suggests that this coalition can be successful in redistributing a large number of economic and other values. It is not until the mid-1960s that class cleavages were supplemented partly by sectoral cleavages.

III. POLITICAL RESOURCES, CHOICES, AND COALITIONS

Available political resources during 1959–60 resembled those used in non-revolutionary countries, but with emerging differences. Because public opinion and interest groups remained sources of power, the competition for the control of communications resources was still politically significant. Politics in Cuba in 1959 were not within the revolution, but between its supporters and its opponents. The issue was not *how* to carry out the revolution but *whether* to do so. A good part of this battle was within the government. Fidel Castro and his supporters had immediate control of the labor and education ministries. This allowed them to appeal for popular support. They also controlled the army. After cabinet crises in the spring and fall of 1959, they controlled the government. Thirteen out of 21 cabinet ministers were replaced during 1959.[11]

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Fidel Castro acquired personal, autonomous, governing legitimacy, that is, a capacity for governing perceived to be legitimate by most people, derived from his own self and the totality of his personal activities—not from an election, an appointment, a specific act or program, or even from the revolutionary war. In 1960, the government monopolized communications through nationalization as it confronted its foreign and domestic enemies. The appeal to the people through mass rallies and the communications infrastructure became a significant political resource.[12] Politics within the revolution began then. Public opinion lost autonomy and became secondary. The scope of politics was restricted when the discussion of many issues became illegitimate (such as political incumbency, foreign policy, and non-socialist economic organization). The domain of politics was restricted when upper and middle income persons and those affiliated with previous Cuban governments were not allowed to participate in legitimate politics of opposition.

In a restricted political system, the paramount political resources are organizational resources. The politician-bureaucrat's main political resources for politics within the revolution are: (1) his distance from Fidel Castro; (2) his position within his organization; and (3) his access to organizations other than his own. The narrower the policy to be affected, the more important the second resource is; the broader the policy, the more important the first resource is. Every crisis could be ended and settled upon Fidel Castro's personal intervention.[13] Struggles over policy became closely related to struggles for organizational power. The issue became: who will implement whose policies?

There are identifiable issue clusters for politics within the revolution in the 1960s: (1) the role of the Communist Party of Cuba and the mass organizations; and the relation of the old Communist Party to the new one; (2) foreign policy; (3) personal and intellectual freedom, and policies toward the university and toward sexual deviance; (4) the role of labor, and material-moral incentives; (5) policy preferences between industry and agriculture; and (6) centralization, the organization of the economy, administration and controls. In this essay, we will be primarily concerned with the fifth and sixth issue clusters. The rest of this section will focus on resources, choices, and coalitions over clashes, and the next section on their effects.

Cuba's choice between agriculture and industry was also a choice between the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) and the Ministry of Industries, and ultimately between Fidel Castro and Guevara. Because Guevara was also the only aggressive would-be monopolist through his Ministry of Industries, the ensuing debate over centralization was a policy-power struggle which linked the fifth and sixth issue-areas. In these clashes among organizations which are largely co-extensive and closely identified with economic sectors, the actors are organizations and their leaders. The sectors define the stakes, the context, and the boundaries of the struggle. This analysis is compatible with H1b and H3, but not dependent on them. Sectoral theory has little to say about it and is not necessary to it. But to the extent that sectoral theory stresses aggregate sectoral behavior to the exclusion of analyses based on

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

organizazions and clientelism, then the Cuban case raises questions about the theory's applicability and points to gaps which it is unequipped to close.[14]

POLICIES

Cuba followed a policy of rapid industrialization during 1960–62. This policy was strongly emphasized during 1961, and had its effect during 1962 and 1963. Its chief sponsor was Ernesto (Che) Guevara, minister of industries. For example, Guevara declared in May 1961: "Cuba is a country of enormous wealth . . . [and] it has everything for industrialization. . . . In a few years we will have developed from an agricultural into an industrial state." Guevara was also unfavorable to sugar production, whose industrial aspects he supervised. In March 1960, asked about the dangers from the loss of the United States sugar quota, he replied: "I have not come just to speak about sugar. I wish that I did not have to speak about it. We would wish that sugar would be one among many Cuban products."

The commitment to rapid industrialization was not made by Guevara alone. Regino Boti, minister of economics, promised: "In the next decade Cuba's economy will be the most developed in Latin America . . ." from an industrial base. Prime Minister Castro added, as late as October 1962, that in the four-year plan inaugurated in 1962, "the bases were established for an industry capable of manufacturing machinery and assuring the development of the Cuban economy." The government's theoretical journal, *Cuba Socialista*, verified also that the growth of capital goods industries received high priority.[15]

This discussion, up to about the middle of 1962, was fairly free of consideration of fundamentally different policies and strategies. Therefore, the context of the discussion limited the range of probable choices (questions H3). Once the decision to proceed with a policy of accelerated industrialization was made by the government elite, policies which were incompatible with it were blocked out. Sugar, and agriculture in general, would be penalized. The elite and the bureaucracy created a climate of ideas and a decision-making methodology which precluded the operation of goal-changing feedbacks upon the effective making of policy. Evidence of this climate was Fidel Castro's scolding of his older brother, Ramón, on national television, because the elder Castro did not believe that sugar should be allowed to decay.

Two related events destabilized the economy to the extent that goal-changing feedbacks could break through gradually during late 1962 and early 1963. These were the deterioration of the balance of payments and the sharp decline of sugar production in 1962 and 1963. The consideration of alternatives began through an exploration of incremental change and marginal adjustments.[16] The Ministry of Foreign Trade argued in 1962 that the industrialization program should concentrate on import substitution in order to solve the balance of payments problem. Increasing sugar production was actively considered only *after* the 1962 harvest. When the strategy of increasing sugar production was first proposed, the economic managers—

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

even those in agriculture—refused to consider it for some time. Incrementalism could not operate as it does in bureaucracies in other countries because the style and method of decision making valued elite harmony and cohesion to such an extent that marginal changes (i.e., increasing sugar production *along with* industrialization and diversification) would be rejected. The policy changed only when Fidel Castro perceived the magnitude of the 1963 harvest failure, the worst since World War II. When the change came, it was sharp and total—not slow and incremental. Castro announced, on June 4, 1963, that sugar and agriculture would become Cuba's chosen instrument for development.[17] The magnitude of the required change, and the sorry state of the economy, were such that the system's mobilizational features were relaxed during 1963–64.

The shift was the result of a perceived failure of the chosen economic policy, not of a perceived failure of the decision-making process. The government decided that the former could be changed, while the latter could be preserved. The decision led again to government oversteering, which favors new sugar and agriculture over industry. Since about 1965, policies which are incompatible with pro-sugar and pro-agricultural decisions have been blocked out, just as the same process with the reverse effects had operated earlier. This style of decision making, characteristic of a mobilization system, leads to questioning H3.

A mobilization system is a hierarchical system of authority in which the goals of the state—including modernization—become sacred. The postponement of immediate gratification in consumption is identified as social discipline and required of the individual in his orientation to the community. A mobilization system has a future-oriented ideology. It stresses the urgency of action, the need for direct planning, and drastic re-stratification of society. Its atmosphere is one of crisis and attack. Passivity is illegitimate. All social and economic life is politicized. There is a heavy reliance on social and political coercion. Policies incompatible with stated, pre-ordained goals of the system are rejected. Refusal to accept goal-changing feedback is costly.[18] The mobilization features of the system are relaxed only in the wake of a catastrophe, as in Cuba in 1963–64. Cuba's mobilization system includes a charismatic leader whose decisions cause policy changes where incrementalism is stymied. In 1968, the mobilization system was accelerated with the punishment of a Communist Party group called the "microfaction." Among the many charges brought against the group, one was its critique of current economic policy. This rejection of incompatible policy *and* information may bode ill for the responsiveness of top decision makers to feedback.

Fidel Castro's commitment to sugar became unwavering. On June 27, 1963, he repeated his statement that, "sugar is the base of our economy and our development." The statement may be true, since sugar exports accounted for 85 per cent of all Cuban exports, which amount to about 25–28 per cent of the country's national income in the 1950s. But these facts had been so neglected that Castro's new commitment was startling. On November 26, 1963, he outlined his expectation that industry would be planned to depend on agriculture:

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Industry will be born from agriculture. And what kind of industry? . . . Are we going to build cars, airplanes? Why should we build those things which other countries have already? . . . We have to develop chemistry as it relates to sugar. . . . We are going to develop sugar derivatives. . . . We will develop an industry which starts from agriculture and through the international division of labor.[19]

Guevara fought the downgrading of industry. He made a small tactical concession: agriculture would have a continuing role even if it was industry that guaranteed development. For example, in March 1964, Guevara declared: "Remember, comrades, that although in the years to come agriculture is Cuba's fundamental resource, there can be no vanguard country which does not develop its industry. Industry is the future." He defended this view even after he had lost his position in the government. On February 26, 1965, at the Second Economic Seminar of the Organization of Afro-Asian Solidarity, held in Algiers, he stated that "industrial development is what determines the growth of modern society."[20]

CENTRALIZATION

The other controverted aspect of the economic policy was the extent of centralization. Much of this was cast as a debate about budgetary policies, and it is quite intricate. The main arguments can be barely outlined here. The centralizing or budgetary control coalition argued that the state sector of the Cuban economy was a single economic unit. Transfers from one locale to another were not buy-sell relationships. Money, prices, and credits operated only when dealing with consumers at home or with foreign countries. Enterprises lacked funds for investment. The system depended on a high level of administrative centralization for its operation.

The economic autonomy coalition argued that the state sector of the Cuban economy was not a single economic unit but that various enterprises were independently owned and controlled by the state. Transfers from one enterprise to another were buy-sell relationships. Money and credits were necessary to maintain economic controls over production and to provide objective means to evaluate economic performances. Enterprises had to meet their own production costs. They were responsible for new maintenance and innovation. The system depended on a high level of economic autonomy for the component units of the economy.[21]

Guevara, minister of industries, Alvarez Rom, minister of the treasury, and their respective ministries, defended centralization and the budgetary control methods. On the other hand, Alberto Mora, the minister of foreign trade, Marcelo Fernández, the president of the National Bank, and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, president of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) supported economic autonomy methods and decentralization. Because there were other debates, proceeding simultaneously in other issue areas, these men and these organizations were involved in issues other than this one. Although there were interlocking interest groups from these and other issue areas, conflicts were resolved fairly independently from each other. For example, the defeat of the old communists—who also favored curtailing the extreme emphasis

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

on industry, economic autonomy, and material incentives—does not seem to have seriously affected the resolution of conflicts in the economic issue areas. But being on the losing side of several issues was troublesome. Regino Boti, minister of economics, favored both industrialization *and* material incentives. Out of favor with Castro for the first reason, and with Guevara at least for the second, he left the cabinet in 1964.[22]

A "coalition" requires economic cohesion within each organization and among the organizations on the same side, and concerted action by each side. One indicator of economic cohesion is the distribution of enterprises within the Cuban economy according to methods of controls. There were two systems in operation in 1964: budgetary controls and economic autonomy (the private sector is a variant of economic autonomy here). Both these systems were coordinated by the National Bank and by the Central Planning Board (JUCEPLAN). Under the budgetary system, one could only find the Ministry of Industries with 152 enterprises (*empresas*) and 22.282 units. Table 4 shows what one finds under economic autonomy.

All but 6.1 per cent of the enterprises and 0.91 per cent of the units of the Ministry of Industries were under the budgetary controls system. All of the units of the other state organizations in this table were under economic autonomy. Economic autonomy did not work as the theoretical model required. Enterprises were rarely profitable and depended heavily on credits from the National Bank, which were infrequently repaid. However, certainly in ideology and to some extent in practice, the experiences of most people in the Ministry of Industries were different from those in the other economic organizations. Two different socialist economic Cubas were coexisting. These data also indicate the power of the Ministry of Industries: of a total of 221 state enterprises, Industries controlled 73.7 per cent.

A second indicator suggests concerted political action. The Ministry of Industries and the Ministry of Foreign Trade each had a journal under their supervision (*Nuestra Industria* and *Comercio Exterior*, respectively). Though presumably committted to the discussion of all socialist economic points of view, in fact they were organs for their ministries. Journal control is an example of how resources are made available by organizational power. Table 5 summarizes the number of articles favoring the two

TABLE 4[23]

Economic Autonomy Enterprises

	No. of enterprises	No. of units
INRA	25	1124
Min. Industries	11	205
Min. Foreign Trade	14	----
Min. Internal Trade	9	135
Other state sectors	10	28

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 5[24]

Number of Opposing Political Positions in Economic Journals

Journal		1963	1964	1965	Total
Comercio Exterior	budgetary	0	0	2	2
	autonomy	8	8	12	28
Nuestra Industria	budgetary	7	10	5	22
	autonomy	1	3	4	8

main positions which appeared in the two journals. The foreign trade journal supported economic autonomy and was more politically cohesive, as would be expected from its greater economic cohesion (Table 4). The industrial journal supported budgetary controls and was very cohesive during 1963–64. It was relatively impartial during 1965, after Guevara had lost effective control. Ministers and staffs of all members of a given coalition supported each other through journal articles. The dissenting articles in each publication were either reprints from the rival publication or articles from foreign writers.

Guevara's aggressive competition for resources contributed to the formation of an opposing coalition. He argued that all activities connected with the processing of sugar, including many still under INRA's supervision, should be transferred to his ministry. He argued further that the role and functions of the National Bank should be limited so that its activities would be consistent with the budgetary controls system. Finally, he argued that his ministry should have a measure of control over the domestic and foreign distribution of the goods which its units produced.

The coalescing of his opponents shows the importance of access to organizations other than one's own in restricted politics. Although the National Bank serviced enterprises under both budgetary controls and economic autonomy, its role was more important under the latter system. When Guevara attacked the bank precisely for these reasons, the bank and its president, Marcelo Fernández, were enlisted in the anti-Industries coalition. The agricultural and trade organizations had little in common other than their reliance on economic autonomy methods through the bank. The bank thus provided a stake to be defended and a channel for communication. The ministers and the bank gained access to each other's organizations through their opposition to Industries. Though no single minister could have beaten Guevara, he was vulnerable to their pooled organizational resources.

IV. EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL-SECTORAL CLASHES

A. Industry dominant, agricultural suppressed

The first organizational-sectoral clash took place in the early 1960s. From the theory of sectoral clashes and the preceding discussion, one may expect a dominant

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 6[25]

Production of Selected Agricultural Products (Thousand Tons)

Year	Rice	Maize	Potatoes	Sugar	Tobacco	Sweet Potatoes
1950	127	278	90	5528	42	295
1958	207	148	100	5784	38	186
1960	307	214	109	5862	52.2	272
1962	230	152	100	4815	51.5	201

industrial sector and a suppressed agricultural sector. However, the available evidence is that there was a suppressed agricultural sector but that the dominance of industry must be qualified. Let us first look at agriculture (Table 6). This table shows the mixed performance of the 1950s up to Batista's last year: three advances and three declines. It shows how agricultural production increased in every single category from 1958 to 1960. These data are important because the first Cuban land reform policy—based primarily on small property ownership and cooperatives—was carried out then. Its short-term result was a production increase relative to pre-revolutionary performance. The table shows also a production decline in every category from 1960 to 1962, as the policies of rapid industrialization and the second land reform went into effect. The disastrous fall of sugar production to 3.8 million tons in 1963 triggered the reversal of economic policy.

There was an actual direct penalty to agriculture which caused the decay of agricultural production. For the sake of agricultural diversification, the government ordered the destruction of 134,200 hectares of sugar cane to give way to other economic activities.[26] Yet Table 6 shows that there was no such diversification between 1960 and 1962. There was also an over-slaughtering of cattle. Before 1959, per capita beef consumption was between 65 and 70 pounds. The corresponding ration in 1962, applying to Havana only, was 39 pounds of beef per person.[27] The 1962 state budget specified that $208 million pesos would be invested in industry and only $112 million in agriculture.[28]

TABLE 7[29]

*Selected Cuban Import Categories (million dollars)**

Category	1955	1957	1960	1961	1962
Non-durable consumer goods	196.2	242.1	184.2	154.0	163.0
Agricultural machinery and equipment	10.9	16.2	23.6	32.1	18.0
Transportation machinery and equipment	16.7	24.3	26.7	71.0	75.1
Industrial machinery and equipment	66.8	127.8	57.8	59.3	115.7

* Other import categories did not change much during this period.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Fourth, the government's import policy changed (as shown in Table 7). Imports of agricultural machinery and equipment expanded until 1961, then were almost cut in half. Imports of industrial machinery and equipment declined in 1960–61, when private industrial investment declined as a result of nationalization. But they rose by 1962 as a result of the policy of accelerated industrialization. In 1961, the gap between imports for industry and for agriculture was not quite 2-to-1. It was 6.4-to-1 in 1962. Non-durable consumption and agriculture paid for industrialization then. As a result of government policy, agricultural decay set in and led to food supply crises.

Unstable land ownership policies may also have contributed to agricultural decline. The 1959 land reform law (first policy) set a maximum ownership limit of approximately 400 hectares per person; 29 per cent of the land went to the state, 12 per cent to sugar cooperatives, 39 per cent to private farmers who owned less than 67 hectares and were organized into the National Small Farmers Association (ANAP), and 20 per cent to private "bourgeois farmers" who owned more than 67 hectares and were not organized. The second land reform policy was the result of a radicalization of the revolution during the second half of 1960, through nationalization of foreign and domestic property. One result was the end of cooperatives in 1961. By December 1961, the state sector included 41 per cent of the land, ANAP farmers 39 per cent, and bourgeois farmers 20 per cent.

The third land reform policy (or second law) issued in October 1963, has remained in force. Prior to the 1963 shift, the condition of the agricultural sector was dismal: production had declined, food rationing had set in, farmers in cooperatives became state employees, private medium-sized farmers had lost their land, and the private small farmers were still insecure under ANAP's tutelage. The new policy led to the nationalization of the property of the bourgeois farmers, setting a maximum of 67 hectares for private land owning. It increased the state's share of agricultural land to 60 per cent. The entire private sector was represented by ANAP's 40 per cent. In terms of total land, however, the state controls over 70 per cent of the land, and ANAP controls the balance. A key feature of the 1963 law is that the state guaranteed that the land of the small farmers in ANAP would be respected—a commitment to defend and protect the agricultural private sector.[30] Cuba underwent three different land ownership policies in four and one-half years. Production rose after the first and the third, and fell after the second. In short, production results are not explained either by the fact of land reform or by its radicalism but by accompanying government policies.[31]

The conflict within the agricultural sector, between INRA's managers and the peasants, was also serious. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, who became INRA's president in 1962, criticized INRA officials for their indiscriminate political repression of farmers in 1961–62, whether bourgeois or not. The result was that the small peasants "collaborated with the enemies to one or another extent." The conflict had economic roots. The peasants wanted to sell their product in the open market to take advantage of the food shortage in the cities. INRA then "sought to compel the peasants to sell

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

their products only to the state and in some cases resorted to confiscation of agricultural products intended for the market." These conflicts led to "fear or lack of faith in the future." The least organized group within the suppressed sector (the peasants) lost the most, and the groups within the suppressed sector failed to act in concert to help each other. This supports H2. However, interest group and organizational theory, among others, would also explain this outcome.

The entire agricultural sector, including the managers, suffered. The Ministry of Agriculture was dissolved in 1961, and its functions transferred to INRA. Many former employees in the ministry lost their jobs and organizational positions. In early 1962, Antonio Núñez Jiménez, who had led INRA since the first land reform, and approximately four-fifths of the administrators of the state-owned People's Farms, were also dismissed.

Industrial managers, on the other hand, did well. INRA's Department of Industrialization blossomed into the Ministry of Industries in February 1961, headed by Guevara. The trade sector benefitted also from an increase in jobs and power when the Ministry of Trade was split into Ministries for Internal Trade and for External Trade. The Ministries of Transport, Communications, and Construction, which could have been consolidated with some of the new ministries had the goal been the reduction of bureaucracy rather than the expression of policy preferences, were untouched. Therefore, bureaucratic restriction and growth followed a sectoral pattern.[32]

Industry's economic performance was disappointing (as shown in Table 8). A balance of four advances and three declines is hardly encouraging. More accurate data on cement and electric power is now available for these years through both Cuban and United Nations sources.[34] They indicate that there had been a significant investment in cement and electric power production just prior to the revolution. The data show also that cement and electric power production actually declined between 1961 and 1962. Moreover, with the exception of sugar, the shifts between 1958 and 1962 followed the same direction as those between 1957 and 1958. These data suggest that the trend for the early revolutionary years was a result of events in the late 1950s

TABLE 8[33]

Indexes of Industrial Production, Selected Products (1957 = 100)

Product	1958	1962	Shift 1958–62
Sugar refining	101.2	84.9	−16.3
Beer	95.4	69.9	−25.5
Textiles	60.0	51.9	− 8.1
Cigarettes	104.0	148.9	+44.9
Petroleum refining	131.9	181.7	+49.8
Cement	108.3	133.6	+25.3
Electric power	108.1	166.9	+58.8

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

which lasted until the 1960s. It seems, then, that the policy of accelerated industrialization did not go far. Its failure is another reason why it could be scrapped in 1963.

Despite industrial sector dominance, industrial workers benefitted little. At the time of the eleventh congress of the Cuban Confederation of Labor, in early 1962, the workers gave up the *aguinaldo*, thirteen-months payment for twelve-months work, received at the year's end. They gave up the nine-day sickness leave with automatic pay, too. They called for the eight-hour day for everyone. This meant that those who had gained the seven-hour day would have to work eight hours. Strikes and collective bargaining were declared obsolete. Guevara stated that if "the labor movement does not respond to the reality of the times . . . its future is to disappear." This meant: "The labor union must learn to play its new role: that of the ally of the manager in production and of spokesman for the workers." Guevara's emphasis was on the former task. There is also much evidence that industrial workers protested these and similar policies, as reported ably by Carmelo Mesa-Lago.[35] The defection of industrial labor from the government coalition thus began.

Interim comments can be made on the theory of sectoral clashes. There was a strong clash in Cuba in the early 1960s. It led to dominant organizations in the industrial sector and to suppressed organizations in the agricultural sector. The evidence of governmental intervention to shape the dominance/suppression relationship can be found in budgetary policy, imports policy, acreage cutbacks, and through the shifting positions of power of politician-bureaucrats (supports H1a, H1b). While industry was actively benefitted, the entire agricultural sector, regardless of social position, was suppressed and decayed (supports H1c). Active resistance against the government by peasants suggests that there was a struggle within the agricultural sector while the entire sector was being suppressed, with the peasants losing the most (supports H2). Evidence has also been presented concerning the struggle among sectoral subgroups of the same organizational and status position (supports H3).

However, the overt policy challenge against industrial dominance came only after the Prime Minister had legitimized it. Prior to this point, support for industrialization within the elite, including the defeated agricultural bureaucrats, was nearly unanimous (questions H3). This is a consequence of mobilization. Sectoral theory also predicts the absence of serious conflict within the dominant sector. This was *not* the case in 1962 (questions H4). There was conflict in both sectors, dominant and suppressed. The failure of industry to increase production indicates also that sectoral dominance need not lead to sectoral growth. Through declines in agricultural production, it may lead to a net decline or stagnation in economic growth. There is no evidence of trans-sectoral, class-based coalitions in 1960–62 among the losing groups against the winning groups (supports H5), unlike in 1959–60 (questions H5).

B. Agriculture dominant, industry suppressed

We proceed to the period after the shift of emphasis from industry to agriculture. The most complete summary of Cuban production is the *Compendio estadístico*

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

de Cuba, a small statistical yearbook published by the Central Planning Board (JUCEPLAN). The combined editions for *1966, 1967* and *1968* have indexes (1963 baseline) on 124 different branches of agriculture, fishing, and industry. Because 1963 was probably the worst year in Cuban production, most indicators since then have pointed up. We select 1964 and 1966 for comparison because (1) they are sufficiently removed from the 1962–63 low ebb and from the push for the 1970 harvest to give us a more "normal" economic performance; (2) sugar production for both years is about the same; therefore we control for its impact on the rest of the economy; and (3) these are the years prior to the shift to reliance on moral over material incentives for labor: therefore we control for change in incentives policy. These comparisons are shown in Table 9.

Advances outweighs declines in agriculture by 2.9-to-1; advances outweigh declines in industry by only 1.9-to-1; 56 per cent of all reported declines are in the industrial sector. Such a favorable performance is probably too optimistic for the economy of the mid-1960s. But the table is important because, by the Cuban government's chosen standards of measurements, agricultural production was much better off than industrial production—a reversal of the earlier 1960s.

Asymmetrical sectoral preference for sugar, however, did not lead to great production increases. Although production reached 6 million tons in 1965 and 1967, it did not reach 5 million tons in 1964, 1966, and 1969. It was barely above that level in 1968. Sectoral dominance did not lead to growth in the dominant sector or in the economy.

To increase agricultural production, the government had to halt the flight of farm labor to the urban areas. Given a labor policy which still favored material incentives, agricultural wages would be expected to increase more than industrial wages. Table 10 shows that this was the case. Actual wage data show also sectoral differences in growth. From 1962 to 1964, annual median wages jumped from $869 to $1,027 pesos in agriculture, but only from $1,908 to $1,944 pesos in industry. Agricultural wages rose $158 for the period, or 9.1 per cent per year. Industrial wages rose $36 for the period, or 0.95 per cent per year. Allowing for a moderate price increase, real industrial wages probably fell during this period, while real agricultural wages probably rose. Thus, agricultural workers were doing well, while industrial

TABLE 9[36]

Distribution of Reported Production Advances/Declines 1964–66

	Advances	Declines	Total
Agriculture and cattle	20	7	27
Fishing	20	11	31
Industry	43	23	66
Total	83	41	124

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 10[37]

Distribution of Wage Advances/Declines 1962–64

	Advances	Declines	Total
Agriculture, cattle, fishing	6	0	6
Industry	6	4	10
Total	12	4	16

workers probably paid for their advance. Because the wage data are for the period preceding the expansion of agriculture, cattle, and fishing production, it is likely that primary sector wages continued to rise faster than secondary sector wages.

Agricultural policy makers also did better than industrial ones. During 1964, Guevara left effective control of the Ministry of Industries. In 1964, a Ministry of Sugar Industry was established, in 1965 a Ministry of the Food Industry, and in 1967 what remained of the Ministry of Industries was split into three Ministries for Basic Industries, Light Industries, and Mining and Metallurgy. Guevara's centralized realm was split into five units in three years. The dismantling of the Ministry of Industries in 1967 coincided with the acceleration of the anti-bureaucratic campaign. The ministries which were most closely associated with the industrial sector suffered the most. Three times as many persons were dismissed from Industries as from INRA (see Table 11).

Another supporter of industrialization, Regino Boti, minister of economics, was dismissed and his ministry absorbed by the Office of the President of the Republic. Guevara's ally in the centralization battle, Luis Alvarez Rom, minister of the treasury, was dismissed in 1965, and his ministry was absorbed by the National Bank. On the side of the anti-industrial, decentralizing coalition, only Alberto Mora, minister of foreign trade, was dismissed because of his mishandling of import policy. The National Bank was organizationally strengthened by the elimination of its competitors—Economics and Treasury. Marcelo Fernández, the bank's president, received the lead-

TABLE 11[38]

Anti-Bureaucratic Campaign, March–October 1967: No. of Persons Dismissed

Ministry of Industries	5820
Ministry of Transport	5320
Ministry of Internal Trade	3180
INRA	1970
National Bank	1960
Ministry of Construction	1570
Total	21750

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

ership's confidence when he was shifted to the Foreign Trade Ministry to rescue the balance of payments. In 1965, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez was replaced as president of INRA by Fidel Castro himself. Agriculture's strength could no longer be matched. Rodríguez remained as Minister without Portfolio, and subsequently as Party Secretary, assigned to crucial economic supervision, research, and ambassadorial tasks.

The connection between debates on sectoral preference and centralization can be clarified. Despite some variations by sector, there was never much economic autonomy anywhere. By 1965, budgetary controls prevailed even in those enterprises that were theoretically under economic autonomy.[39] Centralization actually increased in the financial sector to benefit the National Bank, and held its own in agriculture. Therefore, it was never abandoned as a general policy. Debate over these issues was an effective way to attack Guevara's monopolistic Ministry of Industries. The goal was to decentralize Industries, not the economy. The asymmetrical implementation of decentralization shows that the substantive debates were over industry versus agriculture *and* the monopolistic power of the Ministry of Industries—not over economic theory.

Within the industrial sector, now suppressed, labor's conditions remained bad. According to the Minister of Labor, the replacement of material by moral incentives in 1966–67 means that "workers will be paid according to their skills and the number of hours worked. Wages will be affected by neither over- nor under-fulfillment of production goals." Bonuses and overtime pay were abolished. Labor leaders did no better. At the twelfth congress of the Cuban Confederation of Labor in 1966, the Secretary General of the Confederation, Lazaro Peña, an old Cuban communist labor leader, was replaced by Miguel Martín, the President of the Union of Young Communists, who had not risen through the confederation's ranks. Martín became the Central Committee's man in the confederation. But he was transferred in November 1968, to become the Central Committee's delegate in the Ciego de Avila-Jatibonico area of Camagüey province. Thereafter, the Confederation was run by its Second Secretary and by the Minister of Labor. Loss of leadership extended to labor's lower ranks. In 1966, only 26 per cent of the delegates to the labor congress had also been delegates to the previous congress.[40]

Peasants had political power. At the third national Congress of ANAP in 1967, the prime minister reiterated the guarantee of small private farm property. This policy choice reflected the primacy of politics over economics:

> We have never made any attempt to establish socialist production among the small farmers (applause from the audience). We especially recommended not fostering cooperatives. Why? Because you begin to form cooperatives and those rumors gain force . . . the lie that we want to socialize the farmer's land. . . . We believe that the small parcel of land, both from the standpoint of the land and from the standpoint of labor, is not the most rational, the most productive form. Nevertheless, our policy was to maintain these parcels . . . respecting the farmer's desire to produce in the way to which he was accustomed, in the way he chose.

Farmers gained other benefits: sugar cane growers were exempt from taxes on their production, the National Bank established a policy of interest-free loans to small

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

farmers and agricultural societies, and the Agricultural Purchasing Department temporarily raised the prices paid to farmers for seasonal crops.[41] The government's favorable treatment for the private sector arose from its contribution to production. Recalling that the farmers owned only 40 per cent of the agricultural land, Table 12 shops ANAP's share of the national production.

This discussion of benefits to the agricultural sector and to the peasants—wages, production, land tenure, tax, credit, and price policies—is somewhat unusual in comparative social research in Latin America, where the industrial sector is typically favored. Cuba's development strategy pursues simultaneously goals of national income growth and redistribution of social, political, and economic values to the benefit of the heretofore most oppressed sector in Cuban society, and of the poor within that sector. We can tentatively conclude that Cuba is already achieving the latter goal but that it is less likely to achieve sustained economic growth. The theory of sectoral clashes can be useful here. A sectoral clash, though economically inefficient, is inherently redistributive. What makes sectoral clashes oppressive is that their effects usually favor those groups which already have a high share of social, political, and economic values, as in 1961–62 Cuba. If the redistributive force of the mobilization system and of the sectoral clashes is turned to help those who have benefitted the least in the past, the social effects of sectoral clashes can be progressive, as in 1963 Cuba, even if the level of economic inefficiency is not curtailed.

Returning to the specific hypotheses of sectoral clashes, we find again a strong sectoral clash in the mid-1960s, following the policy change (supports H1a). This led to a faster growing, dominant agricultural sector and to a slower growing, suppressed industrial sector (supports H1c). In turn, this shaped the redistribution of personal and organizational power in the system (supports H1b). Within the suppressed sector, industrial managers and workers alike suffered from the decline of their sector, although the nature of the loss varied according to one's position. Conflcts continued in the industrial sector. These conflicts were probably the continuation of earlier conflicts which existed under sectoral dominance. Therefore, it is unlikely that the suppression of industry caused social conflict within that sector (questions H2). In support of the theory of sectoral clashes, we found a continuing policy-power conflict within the managerial group (supports H3), an absence of trans-sectoral class coalitions (support H5), and a reduction of conflict in the dominant agricultural sector (supports H4).

TABLE 12[42]

ANAP's % Share of National Production

Tomatoes	96	Other fruits	68
Beets, carrots, radishes	84	Starchy vegetables	46
Coffee	83	Other vegetables	71
Papaya	80	Cattle ownership	42

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

V. CONCLUSIONS

The theory of sectoral clashes points to sectoral dominance/suppression problems. It points to the crucial role of government in shaping economic relationship (H1a) and calls attention to the relation between shifts in economic power and shifts in political power (H1b). It also points to the unlikelihood of economic growth under extreme sectoral clashes (H1c), that is, those clashes that lead to decay in one sector. The data which have been presented are in accord with these hypotheses. But there are already existing alternative political and economic theories which explain these phenomena adequately and with more sublety, because they take variables other than economic sectors into full account. In this essay we have gone to these other approaches whenever the need arose.[43]

The data cast some doubt on four hypotheses of sectoral theory, which are precisely those which are more peculiar to it. First, serious conflict can occur within the dominant sector between managers and workers, as in the industrial sector in the early 1960s (question H4). Second, the causes of conflict in the suppressed sector may be unrelated to sectoral suppression, as in the industrial sector of the mid-1960's, where labor conditions had to be traced to the period of dominance prior to sectoral suppression (questions H2). Third, class-based trans-sectoral coalitions are possible, as in 1959–60 (questions H5). And fourth, a mobilization system, which existed between 1960–62 and since abaut 1966, reduced conflict and increased cohesion within the managerial elite (questions H3).

In support of sectoral theory we found, first, serious conflict within the suppressed sector at all times (support H2). Second, a reduction of conflict in the dominant sector (agriculture) took place in the mid-1960s (supports H4). Third, there was an erosion of the class-based coalitions and a rise of sectoral coalitions (supports H5). And fourth, there was serious breakdown of managerial elite cohesion leading to organizational power-policy clashes with serious sectoral effects during 1963–66 (supports H3).

The perspective of sectoral theory on Cuban data on social conflict can be preserved providing one is willing to take a more modest view of it. It heightens our sensitivity to sectors in interest group theory. Social conflicts can be explained by analyzing the divergent social, economic, and political perspectives, expectations, and actions of managers and workers within different social groups. They may take place in any sector of the economy, whether dominant or not. Theory predicts that the conflicts of the industrial revolution may be reduced as economic growth leads to a high level of wealth.[44] Sectoral theory would propose that such a reduction is likely to take place *first* in the dominant sector. Yet sectoral dominance, by itself, does not reduce conflicts in the absence of national and sectoral economic growth (dominant, stagnant, and conflict ridden industrial sector in 1962). But it may reduce conflict in the dominant sector, even in the absence of national economic growth, provided there is some dominant sector growth (agricultural sector in the mid-1960s). Sectoral dominance, moreover, need not lead to economic growth either in the dominant

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

sector or in the economy as a whole. Such growth occurs, or fails to occur, for other reasons which are explained by existing economc theory.[45]

Second, existing social theory suggests that class-based trans-sectoral coalitions are possible as in Cuba in 1959–60. Sectoral theory reminds us that there are strains to such coalitions, but it is insufficient to explain the reasons for their transformation. To explain labor's defection, we note that the government worried less about survival once the political system became restricted. It was, therefore, less necessary to appeal to and benefit industrial labor. The government's goal shifted from survival to development, and the path chosen was the mobilization of the workers into self-discipline and self-sacrifice. The suppression of industrial labor—and its defection from the government coalition—was a consequence of the government's chosen route to development. Therefore, sectoral theory is not an adequate explanation here, for the suppression of industrial labor is unrelated to whether the industrial sector is dominant or suppressed. Labor was suppressed under sectoral dominance *and* suppression. Existing theories are also adequate to explain Cuba's choice.

Cuba's choice follows from a modification of the experiences of the countries which served as its "models" for change, that is, the Soviet Union and China. At least three elements of that experience are relevant. The first is the role of government in planning and managing the economy. The second is the use of labor as a source of wealth and growth. The third is the emphasis on industrialization as the general strategy for growth. Cuba accepted these elements at first, and then rejected the third after 1963. The role of government can be explained in terms of the ideology of the revolution. In another sense, it is an acceleration of the consequences of a secular trend in the rise of the economic importance of government which has taken place over the long run in non-communist, industrialized countries. The developmental role of labor also has an ideological source in the Marxist theory of labor surplus value, which is turned around to put labor to work to produce growth. It also parallels the historical experience of non-communist industrialized countries where labor's efforts contributed mightily to economic growth.

The early choice of industrialization as a growth strategy comes also from the particular experiences of the Soviet Union and China and from the general long-term experiences of the non-communist industrialized countries. But, as we have shown, the damage done to the Cuban economy in the early years led to a change in emphasis toward agriculture. The fact that this emphasis has become a "sacred" commitment where the "honor" of the country is at stake can be explained by the mobilization model which has been sketched. Cuba's choice, therefore, has both class and sectoral components.

There are, then, explanations for Cuba's choice. They include an analysis of preferential sectoral policy. But theories of social, political, and economic change—some of which have been used in this essay—have long discussed the role of economic sectors in the process of change. What may be *new* about Mamalakis' theory is that it calls attention not just to sectoral clashes (which other have done) but to some extreme forms of preferential sectoral policies which may lead to decay in a sup-

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

pressed sector. Mamalakis' distinctive contribution, therefore, is not a theory of sectoral clashes but a theory of sectoral pre-eminence. It contributes to an understanding of the Cuban experience because it is a special case and a subset of theories of groups and social, economic, and political change, provided it is modified through the use of these other theories to fit the Cuban case.[46]

To explain the failure to form successfully a trans-sectoral class-based coalition in the mid-1960's, we consider the lower income groups in the industrial and agricultural sectors as social and politcal peripheries. They can be linked to each other only if they have access to elite communications power holders who can use such power to link them up into a trans-sectoral coalition. In 1959–60, the revolutionary leaders were such communications power holders and did link up the lower class sectoral peripheries. In the mid-1960s, the government monopolized communications power. No one else was available to link the peripheries. Such monopoly permits conflict within the sectoral peripheries precisely because it can be expected that these resisting groups will not be linked up. In short, coalitions of sectoral peripheries are improbable except through the "center" or a part therof. When no center is available, coalitions fail. Sectors may not only be in conflict. They may also be isolated from each other by the government.[47]

Third, the economic inefficiencies which result from the government's sectoral preferences can be best explained as a consequence of the mobilization system. The early policy of industrialization, unmodified by goal-changing feedbacks, led to the economic collapse of 1962–63. Sharp changes in policy during a period of non-mobilizational exception following this catastrophe, and the renewal of mobilization and government oversteering since 1965, have had direct costs for the industrial sector and opportunity costs for the entire economy. Consequently, real per capita GNP may have declined at an annual rate of 0.5 per cent from 1962 to 1966.[48] Although the Cuban government wants to follow a development model whereby one leading sector pulls up the rest of the economy,[49] what has happened is that support for the leading sector is of such magnitude that remaining resources for other sectors are too scarce, leading to decay.[50] There appears to be nothing inherent in government preference for sectors that would necessarily lead to decay. Such extreme sectoral preferential policies are probably explained by the economic consequences of a political mobilization system.

Fourth, sectoral theory adds little to our understanding of available political resources in a restricted political system during non-mobilization periods. A leader of the defeated sector's organization does not work against the dominant sector at the polls or in the streets and hills. He waits for a system opening through Fidel Castro and then forges a coalition of compatible organizations around common stakes to oppose the dominant sector's organization. In short, although the distribution of political support is correlated with government performance, this has a limited impact on determining "who governs."

Real clashes take place directly not between economic sectors through mass political parties or mass movements but between individuals in organizations which are

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

largely coextensive and closely identified with their sectoral bases. In Cuba, the sectors provide the stakes over which to fight, the context and boundaries within which organizations operate, their probable power, and the coalitions which they are likely to join. In other contexts, and in other countries, social classes and/or sectors may do this. But an organization's usable political power in Cuba comes not from its sectoral base or its economic success but from its organizational resources. Sectoral theory, therefore, does not identify the actors in the Cuban political system with precision. This suggests that sectoral theory is a special case of interest group theory which must be supplemented by other approaches.[51]

Mamalakis' theory of sectoral pre-eminence raises interesting issues in defining research problems. The approach contributes to the study of Cuba because Cuban economic organizations have been largely coextensive with economic sectors. By itself, however, this theory is *not* sufficient for the analysis of social and political questions. A theory of sectoral pre-eminence, in contrast to theories of sectoral conflicts, is necessary as a special case of interest group theory only when a case warrants its use, and provided other theories are brought to supplement it.

NOTES

1. References are from Markos Mamalakis, "The Theory of Sectoral Clashes," *Latin American Research Review*, 4: 3: 10–11, 27–29. See also Markos Mamalakis, "Public Policy and Sectoral Development: A Case Study of Chile, 1940–1958," in Markos Mamalakis and Clark Reynolds, *Essays on the Chilean Economy* (Homewood, Ill., 1965), and Markos Mamalakis, "La teoría de los choques entre sectores," *El Trimestre Económico*, 33: 2 (1966).
2. An effort is made to use as much reliable, quantitative data as possible. We use the data of the academic or governmental sources most opposed to the conclusions based on those data which are presented here. We seek to reduce the possible biases of some of the sources. For a discussion see Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "Availability and Reliability of Statistics in Socialist Cuba," *Latin American Research Review*, 4: 1, 2.
3. A form of H5 is also presented by Andrés Suárez, *Cuba: Castroism and Communism*, 1959–1966, xiii–xiv (Cambridge, Mass., 1967).
4. Lloyd Free, *Attitudes of the Cuban People toward the Castro Regime* (Princeton, N. J., 1960); for the *Bohemia* survey, see *Revolución*, June 20, 1959, 18.
5. Maurice Zeitlin, *Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class,* 13–44, 57–58 (Princeton, 1967).
6. Compiled from data in Richard R. Fagen, Richard A. Brody, and Thomas J. O'Leary, *Cubans in Exile: Disaffection and the Revolution*, 19, 115 (Stanford, 1968).
7. There is variation in exile views toward the revolution prior to its victory and during the first months of its government. Those with least education were also less initially favorable to the revolution. This is in opposition to Free's survey. There are two probable explanations. (1) Among the least educated exiles one finds military, police, and early displaced farmers whose attitudes are atypical of the Cuban lower class. (2) Among the most educated exiles, over-all the most favorable to the revolution at the outset, there is the sharpest generational cleavage. Young university educated persons were the most favorable, while old university

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

educated persons were the least favorable education-age groups to the revolution. Allowing for this variation, exile attitudes toward the revolution at its outset are consistent with other available data. *Ibid.*, pp. 39–43.

8. Junta Central de Planificación, *Compendio estadístico de Cuba, 1966*, 20–21 (La Habana, 1967).
9. Cuban Economic Research Project, *Labor Conditions in Communist Cuba*, 71 (Miami, Fla., 1963).
10. International Labor Office, *Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1959*, 186 (Geneva, 1959).
11. The Cabinet is defined to include the President of the Republic, the President of the National Bank, the chief executive officer of INRA, and all the ministers. Shifts from one post to another are not counted.
12. For discussion, see Richard R. Fagen's work: "The Cuban Revolution: Enemies and Friends," in David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen, *Enemies in Politics* (Chicago, 1967); "Mass Mobilization in Cuba: The Symbolism of Struggle," *Journal of International Affairs*, 20: 2 (1966); and *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba*, 1–32 (Stanford, 1969).
13. Lee Lockwood, *Castro's Cuba, Cuba's Fidel* (New York, 1969), is a sensitive presentation of Fidel Castro's relation to the Cuban people.
14. For comparative theory and data, see Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR*, 129–232 (New York, 1967); Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Politics in the USSR*, 213–257 (Boston, 1966); Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case," and Carl Beck, "Bureaucracy and Political Development in Eastern Europe," in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, 1963); John D. Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 64: 2 (1970).
15. Ernesto Guevara, *Economic Planning in Cuba*, 4 (New York, 1961); *Revolución*, March 3, 1960, 12; for Boti and Fidel Castro, see Cuban Economic Research Project, *A Study on Cuba*, 766 (Coral Gables, Fla., 1965); Francisco García and Juan Noyola, "Principales objetivos de nuestro plan económico hasta 1965," *Cuba Socialista*, 2: 13: 11–16 (1962).
16. On incrementalism and planning, see Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare*, 82–85 (New York, 1963).
17. Edward Boorstein, *The Economic Transformation of Cuba*, 184–204 (New York, 1968).
18. On politics and communications theory, see Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York, 1967); on the mobilization system, see David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*, 359–360 (Chicago, 1965).
19. *Obra revolucionaria, 1963*, 15: 33–38, 18: 7, 32: 12.
20. Speech of March 1964, in *Obra revolucionaria, 1964*, 10: 14; and speech of February 1965, in *Che Guevara Speaks*, 115 (New York, 1967).
21. This discussion parallels others in socialist countries. In Cuba, it is found in the following articles: for budgetary controls, Ernest (Che) Guevara, "Sobre la concepción del valor," *Nuestra Industria: Revista Económica* (hereinafter NI:RE), 3 (1963); Luis Alvarez Rom, "Las finanzas como un método de desarrollo político," *NI:RE*, 1 (1963); Miguel Cossío, "Contribución al debate sobre la ley del valor," *NI:RE*, 4 (1963); Ernesto Guevara, "El socialismo y el hombre," *NI:RE*, 14 (1965). For economic autonomy, Alberto Mora, "En torno a la cuestión del funcionamiento de la ley del valor en la economía cubana en los actuales momentos," *Comercio Exterior*, 1: 3 (1963); Alberto Mora, "Sobre algunas prob-

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

lemas actuales de la construcción del socialismo," *NI:RE*, 14 (1965); see also articles by Marcelo Fernández in *Cuba Socialista*, February and May issues, 1964. For summaries of the issues, Salvador Vilaseca, "El Banco Nacional de Cuba y los sistemas de financiamiento," *NI:RE*, February, 1 (1965), and Alban Lataste Hoffer, *Cuba: Hacia una nueva economía política del socialismo*, 33–41 (Santiago, 1968).

22. Evidence of Guevara's strained personal relations with some of his antagonists may be found in his *Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War*, Victoria Ortiz, tr., 271, 280, 282 (New York, 1968).
23. Data from Vilaseca, 8.
24. Compiled by examining every issue of these two journals for this period.
25. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), *Statistical Bulletin for Latin America* (New York), 3: 1: 22–24, 27, 31 (1966); 4: 2: 34, 37, 40, 42, 66 (1967); 6: 1: 36, 39, 42, 44, 68 (1969).
26. Severo Aguirre, "El primer aniversario de las cooperativas cañeras," *Cuba Socialista*, 1: 3: 24 (1961).
27. Dudley Seers, ed., *Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution*, 133 (Durham, N.C., 1964).
28. *Ibid.*, 42.
29. ECLA (1966), 101–109.
30. On land reform, Antonio Núñez Jiménez, "Revolución agraria en Cuba," *INRA*, 2: 6: 7 (1961); Blas Roca, "Nueva etapa de la revolución cubana," *Cuba Socialista*, 2: 5: 45 (1962); Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, "The Cuban Revolution and the Peasantry," *World Marxist Review*, 8: 10: 62–71; and Comisión Económica para América Latina, *El dessarrollo industrial de Cuba*, ST/ECLA/Conf. 23/L. 63 (1966). For an interpretative essay, see James O'Connor, *The Origins of Socialism in Cuba*, 90–134, 214–239, 319–327 (Ithaca, 1970).
31. For further discussion of the problems leading to agricultural decay, Seers, ed., 137–140.
32. For Cuban data, Rodríguez, 66–67; Theodore Draper, *Castroism: Theory and Practice*, 135–165 (New York, 1965). For an alternative explanation to sectoral theory, Dahl and Lindblom, 340–341.
33. Seers, ed., 323.
34. Cuban cement statistics in *Panorama económico latinoamericano*, 5: 283 (1966); Cuban electric power statistics, *Granma Weekly Review*, January 7, 1968, 2; United Nations statistics, ECLA (1966), 69–83.
35. Carlos Fernández R., "El XI congreso nacional de la CTC-R," *Cuba Socialista*, 2: 6 (1962); *Revolución*, February 2, 1963, 3; and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *The Labor Sector and Socialist Distribution in Cuba*, 40–44, 69–73, 112–115, 145–150, 178–180 (New York, 1968).
36. Junta Central de Planificación, *Compendio estadístico de Cuba* (La Habana) *1966*, 15–17 (1967); *1967*, 18, 22–24, (1968); *1968*, 12, 16, 18, 19 (1969).
37. Data compiled from Junta Central de Planificación, *Boletín estadístico de Cuba, 1964*, 25, 46, 47 (La Habana, 1966).
38. *Granma Weekly Review*, October 8, 1967, 4.
39. Lataste, 36, 49.
40. *Granma Weekly Review*, July 16, 1967, 3; Miguel Martín, "Informe al congreso," *Cuba Socialista*, 62 (1966).
41. *Gramma Weekly Review*, May 28, 1967, 3, for Fidel Castro's speech of May 18; and June 18, 1967, 4, 12, for data on financial benefits.
42. *Ibid.*, June 18, 1967, 12.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

43. For alternative and more subtle explanations of the relation between politics, economics, organizations, interest groups, and changes therein, Dahl and Lindholm; Seymour M. Lipset, *The First New Nation,* 52–68 (Garden City, N.Y., 1967); and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, 1968). Sectoral theory's prediction that economic growth is unlikely under "extreme sectoral clashes" has been discussed from the perspective of "balanced growth" and the role of agriculture by Ragnar Nurkse, *Equilibrium and Growth in the World Economy,* Gottfried Haberler and Robert Stern, eds., 241–259 (Cambridge, Mass., 1962); Hla Myint, *The Economics of the Developing Countries,* 128–146 (New York, 1965); and Simon Kuznets, *Economic Growth and Structure,* 236–256 (New York, 1965). A symposium on these issues is in Gerald Meier, *Leading Issues in Development Economics,* 229–337 (New York, 1964).
44. The literature on the effects of economic growth on social conflict is vast. Among the studies, Seymour M. Lipset's *Political Man,* 27–86 (New York, 1963), relates economic growth to democratic stability. Huntington, however, suggests that the stabilizing effect is only likely at fairly high levels of economic prosperity; countries in the midst of the process are likely to face acute social conflict. For a quantitative analysis, Bruce M. Russett *et. al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators,* 261–340 (New Haven, 1967).
45. Simon Kuznets, *Modern Economic Growth,* 1–160 (New York, 1966); Kuznets, 1–81 (1965). For a description and critique of existing economic growth theory and further bibliographical references, Charles Kindleberger, *Economic Development,* 40–60 (New York, 1965).
46. For the role of labor and government in the non-communist industrialized countries, see Kuznets, 168–170, 217–219, 234–243; for an example of the analysis of sectoral shifts and preferences in existing economic growth theory, see 86–159 (1966). For comparative information on China and the Soviet Union, see Alexander Eckstein, Walter Galenson, and Ta-Chung Liu, *Economic Trends in Communist China* (Chicago, 1968), 19–28, 379–383, 459–460, 503–505, and Abram Bergson, *The Real National Income of Soviet Russia since 1928,* 250–257 (Cambridge, Mass.: 1961).
47. Concepts of center-periphery from S. N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change* (Englewood-Cliffs, N. J., 1966), and E. Shils, *Political Development in the New States* (New York, 1964). On communications power holders, Frederick Frey, "Political Development, Power and Communications in Turkey," *Communications and Political Development,* Lucien Pye, ed. (Princeton, 1963).
48. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, footnote 2.
49. Albert O. Hirschman's *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven, 1958) precedes Mamalakis' work by several years. Hirschman provides an insightful analysis, and suggests a strategy of change, which is highly sensitive to intersectoral relations and their social and political implications. But Hirschman does not fall into two pitfalls of stressing the pre-eminence of economic sectors or economic sectoral determinism of all social and political life. Mamalakis may be pushing himself, regrettably, into these pitfalls in the essay in LARR, which follows.
50. Two comments. First, the United States economic embargo is also part of the explanation for Cuba's slow rate of economic growth. Cuban leaders have also insisted that major explanations for slow growth are government economic policies and the management of the economy. However, this essay is not concerned primarily with national economic growth but with differential sectoral performance. In the early 1960s, the embargo affected industry more than agriculture, because of the former's dependence on foreign repair parts. There-

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press

fore, the lower performance of agriculture in the early 1960s cannot be explained by external factors. Likewise, an unaltered embargo could not explain the shifts of the mid-1960s. Second, the early policy of industrialization was an attempt to diversify the Cuban economy. The shift back to sugar was a recognition that sugar production was essential for long-term growth. Both policies could be rationally defended in their contexts. But it was this essay's concern to go beyond such considerations to explore decision making and policy implementation, and their effects on Cuban politics and economics.

51. For a modern perspective on interest group theory, David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1961); for a comparative perspective, Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston, 1966).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041066 Published online by Cambridge University Press