an interesting passage in the 1965 volume which concluded that during the battle for Tsaritsyn in 1918 Stalin "ignored the Leninist line of the party on using military specialists," thereby earning Lenin's personal criticism; in 1972 he simply omitted the passage. Citing statistics on the political opinions of 230 Moscow engineers in 1922, Fediukin concluded in 1965 that they demonstrated the "departure [*otkhod*] of the intelligentsia from the bourgeoisie"; in 1972 he found that the identical statistics showed the "tremendous success of the Communist Party, which sought to separate [*otryvat'*] the intelligentsia from the bourgeoisie." The party has replaced the intelligentsia as the main actor, "separating" those who might not otherwise "depart" from their class origins and loyalties. Sections on trade-union opposition to Stalin in 1929 are absent now. New critical comments on Molotov and Vyshinsky have been added, perhaps to replace the missing criticisms of the *vozhd*. A letter written by Lunacharsky to Stalin in 1929 attacking the purges (*chistki*) of educational institutions has disappeared, along with Fediukin's 1965 remark about the "destruction of legality connected with the sick suspicions of I. V. Stalin toward the intelligentsia."

In sum, this book is as illustrative of neo-Stalinism in current Soviet historiography as it is instructive about the technical intelligentsia in the 1920s. For Fediukin, at least, that group was independent and even recalcitrant in 1965, but responsive to party directives in 1972.

ROBERT C. WILLIAMS
*Washington University*

KLASSOVAIA BOR'BA V DEREVNE I LIKVIDATSIIA KULACHESTVA KAK KLASSA (1929–1932 GG.). By *N. A. Ivnitsky*. Moscow: "Nauka," 1972. 357 pp. 1.37 rubles.

N. A. Ivnitsky, a Soviet researcher noted for his work on the history of the Soviet peasantry and collectivization, offers here what probably is a product of years of patient investigation. The amount of new material published for the first time makes the book a valuable contribution to the study of the dramatic but still insufficiently understood events during which the kolkhoz system was created. The central strategic device the Soviet state applied to help collectivize the peasants—the so-called liquidation of the kulaks as a class—is Ivnitsky's theme, and he offers new figures, data, and, especially, hitherto unknown facts about the uprooted families and their subsequent fate in the Siberian and Kazakhstan wilderness, where they were forced to build a new life for themselves (those who survived, of course; but this problem is not treated by our author). Thanks to this work, the years 1930–32, during which the dekulakization operations took place, emerge much sharper and clearer. We learn much more about the opposition of peasants to kolkhozes—the different forms of "disorders," riots (*vystupleniia*), or "uprisings," which were very widespread. Scores of clandestine organizations, especially in the Northern Caucasus, are said to have existed and were engaged in preparing, in liaison with foreign intelligence services, uprisings against the regime; but not much came of it, for the plotters were arrested by the thousands. No proof is offered about those connections with foreign intelligence, and large extracts of "confessions" are sufficiently discredited for us to remain skeptical even if foreign participation is not in itself implausible.

The "kulak terror," about which a lot is said in the book, cannot be fully

documented, according to the author, because complete data on this important matter are missing. Thus all those organizations and the kulak terroristic actions remain still curiously problematic, although they are the main argument used in justification of Soviet policies. But Ivnitsky tells enough for us to agree with him that the situation in the countryside in those years was "strained to the limit" (*do predela nakalennaia*).

One regrettable omission is the lack of a social analysis of the "rural bourgeoisie," which is, after all, the book's central theme. This omission may have something to do with the attitude which takes for granted both their character as avowed class enemies and the need to destroy them in order to build Soviet socialism. It may well be that such a social analysis could endanger the orthodox Soviet interpretation of their rural policies, to which Ivnitsky seems fully committed. It is amazing, though not totally unexpected, to see these crucial events of the early thirties presented in 1972 as if they were taken directly from Stalin's *Short Course*: collectivization was well prepared in advance, dekulakization was launched only when the time was ripe for it, and once the kulaks were destroyed as a class, a real socialist stage could begin. Whatever difficulties arose in the course of events, they are laid at the doorstep of the kulaks. Their stubborn opposition, or their contacts with foreign agents, "imposed on us" whatever was done; they are even accused of having trapped the local cadres into committing all those well-known "excesses."

The top leadership is exempt from any responsibility; Stalin's "general line" comes out of it in almost virgin innocence. If the peasant masses were so genuinely interested in the kolkhozes and flocked into them with enthusiasm—that much is claimed in the book—why did they listen to the "kulak agitation" and slaughter their cattle, dealing a terrific blow to themselves and the country's economy? Why did the party have to engage in the well-known orgy of coercive action (*peregiby*) in order to force people to join who so dearly wanted to join the kolkhozes anyway?

Asking such questions is already sufficient to show that orthodoxy is no substitute for history. The whole story still remains to be written, but Ivnitsky's contribution toward the advancement of our knowledge is considerable.

M. Lewin
*University of Birmingham (England)*

WITNESS TO HISTORY, 1929–1969. By *Charles E. Bohlen*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1973. xiv, 562 pp. $12.50.

Charles Bohlen's death removed from the American scene not only one of the leading diplomats of his time but also an outstanding connoisseur of Russian history and culture. Instructive and delightful as this autobiographical account of his career is, one who has known him is bound to feel that it still does not do full justice to his charming personality or his great services to his country. Part of the explanation must be sought in the requirements of today's publishing: the book, we are told, represents about one-third of the original notes. Yet it is precisely for details that a scholar looks in his search for an explanation of historical events; it is through a wealth of incidents and observations—even if some or most are in themselves inconsequential—that the general reader is brought to the threshold of understanding a subject as complex and as susceptible to distortion by passion and mythology as the story of American-Soviet relations. There is also another