

STATE AND SOCIETY IN BRAZIL,
1822–1930

Richard Graham
University of Texas at Austin

- A CONSTRUÇÃO DA ORDEM: A ELITE POLITICA IMPERIAL.* By JOSE MURILO DE CARVALHO. (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campus, 1980. Pp. 202.)
- THE BRAZILIAN MONARCHY AND THE SOUTH AMERICAN REPUBLICS, 1822–1831: DIPLOMACY AND STATE BUILDING.* By RON SECKINGER. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984. Pp. 187. \$20.00.)
- O PARLAMENTO BRASILEIRO E AS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES (1826–1889).* By AMADO LUIZ CERVO. (Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1981. Pp. 254.)
- LE BRACCIA PER LA FAZENDA: IMMIGRATI E “CAIPIRAS” NELLA FORMAZIONE DEL MERCATO DEL LAVORO PAULISTA (1850–1930).* By CHIARA VANGELISTA. (Milan: Franco Angeli Editore, 1982. Pp. 272.)
- THE AMAZON RUBBER BOOM, 1850–1920.* By BARBARA WEINSTEIN. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983. Pp. 356. \$29.50.)

In 1972 Ron Seckinger coauthored an article that touched on the central problem of the relationship between the state and society in nineteenth-century Brazil. Drawing on parallels with Chinese mandarins, Seckinger and Eul-Soo Pang argued that a member of the political elite in Brazil during the Empire (1822–1889) typically acted as “a centrally controlled political agent” (Pang and Seckinger 1972, 216). Although drawn from a “ruling class or social elite” that depended on export agriculture for its wealth, these Brazilian “mandarins” faithfully served the interests of the central monarchy “rather than remain the captives of regional economic and family interests” (1972, 217). Despite several qualifications to the argument, the central thrust of Pang and Seckinger’s thesis remained that a common education in Brazil’s two law schools and a closely monitored career in which potential leaders received assignments in various parts of the country forged a cadre loyal to the emperor rather than to their class. The authors thus posited a sharp dichotomy between the state and the social class from which political leaders derived.

In doing so, Pang and Seckinger joined one of the two distinct traditions in Brazilian historiography that have long debated this issue.¹

Did the state exclusively serve the interests of a ruling class or did it possess a life and purpose entirely its own? Nestor Duarte (1939) and Cáo Prado Júnior (1945), for example, maintained that in the nineteenth century the Brazilian state was nothing more than the creature of the planter class, while Oliveira Vianna (1949) argued that elite family clans had always struggled, although ultimately in vain, against a state that responded to the larger interests of the nation. A highly influential work by Raymundo Faoro significantly titled *Os Donos do Poder* (1975), although authored by a leading liberal jurist, strengthened the case made by Oliveira Vianna, a protofascist. Faoro argued that all Luso-Brazilian history since 1385 could be understood as an effort by a "bureaucratic estate" to gain ascendancy over society. In a particularly surprising formulation regarding nineteenth-century Brazil, he identified this bureaucratic estate with the Conservative party, which he envisioned as battling the landowners represented by the Liberals. Faoro believed that the establishment of the republic in 1889 turned the tables and placed the planter elite in firm control until it was overthrown by Getúlio Vargas in 1930.

Pang and Seckinger viewed judges as the central figures in the state's effort to wrest authority from local potentates in the nineteenth century. They noted that a judgeship became an almost essential step in climbing into Brazil's political elite and depicted the judge as the archetypal "mandarin," responsive only to the will of the centralizing state. Indeed, after 1841 Brazil adopted a judicial system in which appointive judges depended on the imperial government not only for initial appointment but for all promotions, as well as for lateral moves into more or less desirable seats. Roderick and Jean Barman (1976) subsequently adopted this schema, depicting these *bacharéis* (law school graduates) as single-mindedly responsive only to the state, as loyal agents located throughout Brazil in order to impose public authority over private dominion.

In contrast, Thomas Flory's *Judge and Jury in Imperial Brazil* (1981) showed this understanding to be a much too hasty conclusion drawn from formal tables of organization.² To be sure, Flory was principally concerned with the system of elective justices of the peace that, before the law of 1841 stripped them of their earlier importance, had allowed the gentry to exert firm control within their bailiwicks. But Flory's study also included an insightful chapter on appointive career judges from 1841 to 1871. He began by dismissing the "ideal construct based on the supremacy of public power," insisting that in such a conceptualization, "important questions remained unanswered about the reconciliation of public and private interests in imperial Brazil" (p. 182). To begin with, "in order to make the magistrate an effective political deputy, the government was forced to invest the official with virtually all the powers of

the state" in the local setting. The effect was "to give judicial personnel ample currency for making . . . deals with the landed elite" (p. 187). The resulting "relationships between judges and local elites were distinctly transactional" (p. 189) because "Brazil's rural elites and these young magistrates had much to offer one another" (p. 191). As these ties solidified, "magistrates served as conduits between local and national interests" (p. 192). "Just as surely as these professionals kept strong their links with the locus of formal power in Rio de Janeiro, they also sought to establish informal and social links with the shifting loci of socioeconomic power" in the interior (p. 193). Marriage into elite families often proved the most effective means of solidifying the connection. The centrally appointed judge could then be "used by local elites who needed a voice in national politics" (p. 108). As time passed, it "became difficult to tell which source of power—public or private—was truly responsible for judicial dependence. This was the genius of the system and the source of its flexibility. Yet for the judge-intermediaries themselves there was a third possibility. . . . As brokers who dealt extensively in proxied powers, the magistrates derived independent leverage of their own" (p. 194).

Such a view directly contradicted both analyses, whether positing the steady expansion of state power over social elites or envisioning the state as only the executive committee of a ruling class. For this reason, Flory's book received lukewarm praise from both camps. In *A Construção da Ordem: A Elite Política Imperial*, José Murilo de Carvalho takes a similarly nuanced stand and is also alert to the need to respond to the reality of the past rather than the theoretical constructs of the present.³

Carvalho believes that Faoro is quite mistaken in suggesting that a bureaucratic "estate" existed that was cut off from and even hostile to the other sectors of society. Carvalho argues instead for what he calls the "dialectic of ambiguity":

The state could not sustain itself without export agriculture. . . . Therefore one cannot speak of the state separated from and dominating a nation, as the Liberals then described it (when they were out of power) and as Faoro reiterates today. . . . By the same token, the maintenance of order in the interior could not have been secured without the collaboration of the landlords. Like it or not—and many did not like it—the political elite, particularly the judges, had to covenant with the landowners in order to reach an arrangement, no matter how unsatisfactory, that would at least allow the appearance of order. (P. 179)

In short, the relationship between the state and society is a shifting one, constantly in flux.⁴

Carvalho does not consistently focus only on real men doing real things, however, as he often falls back upon ahistorical formulations. Here, I suppose, I am quarreling with his entire discipline for its ahis-

torical approach (compare Thompson 1963, 9). Having escaped one tendency toward abstraction, Carvalho still reifies the state rather than thinking of it as made up of individuals first of all, with their own goals, ambitions, loves, and frustrations. On the one hand, he argues that those involved in policy decisions cannot be seen merely as creatures of economically dominant groups. On the other, he understands them as enmeshed within a state with a will entirely its own. In effect, he fully accepts only one part of Flory's vision. Carvalho also envisions the course of history as unidirectional, moving always toward the expansion of the state and a "rational" bureaucracy. Thus he sees the Brazilian case as "truly pathological" (p. 122) and finds the United States the model against which Brazil should be judged. He explicitly invokes Weberian categories, although sometimes the weight of the evidence and Carvalho's own intelligent perceptivity lead him to acknowledge that the nineteenth-century Brazilian bureaucracy "attended to needs whose nature was political and social, not administrative. . . . It possessed its own rationality, related less to administration as such than to the political system as a whole" (pp. 129–30). I wish Carvalho had kept this idea clearly in mind throughout *A Construção da Ordem*.

One finds instead a certain circularity in some parts of his argument. For instance, he alleges that although the centralizing purpose of the system of judges indeed coincided with the interests of the large export-oriented landowners and international merchants, that purpose derived not "from the fact that they were tied to these sectors socially" but rather from the judges' common education and place within the governmental system (p. 152). Such a conclusion derives entirely from theory: no empirical test is put forward to determine the motive of their action, and it may be impossible to devise one. What Carvalho intends to prove thus becomes the basis of his proof. Noting how military officers clashed much more often with the economic elite than did judges, he acknowledges that social origins probably did make a difference. Then he quickly adds, as if to suggest an exception, that the military belonged to a corporation that set them apart. Yet because Carvalho has stressed the education of judges as leading to the same kind of corporate unity, I would conclude that common formative experiences follow from social background. One could also argue that, given the ideological hegemony of the planter class, the power of judges remained utterly unthreatening to the larger interests of planters as indeed was true for the centralized state itself.

Seckinger and Pang wanted to determine why Brazilian experience differed from that of Spanish America. They argued that the "mandarins" constructed a national unity in Brazil, in marked contrast to the divisiveness that sundered the Spanish American colonial empire into so many little republics. This concern also forms a major theme in

Carvalho's book. Pang and Seckinger also maintained that the succeeding Republic came close to undoing the work of the earlier political elite. They even insisted that the elite's very success failed to allow sufficient room for regional economic and social interests, in other words, failed to respond to the multiple interests of the ruling class. One wishes that Carvalho had addressed the fall of the empire because if state power inevitably increases, one would assume that Carvalho believes the trend continued after 1889, despite conventional wisdom to the contrary.

Another author who has recently dealt with these issues is Fernando Uricoechea (1978).⁵ In *O Minotauro Imperial*, he also perceives Brazilian (and perhaps all) political history as oriented toward only one pole—the expansion of the state. Although he focuses on the Brazilian national guard rather than on judges, his basic premise is that private dominion yielded grudgingly but inevitably to public power. Officered by the well-to-do and manned by their free workers, the guard sprang originally from the planter class's desire to create a counterweight to the army. In 1850, however, the central government took over the right to appoint its officers, who previously were elected by the men. Uricoechea interprets this step as an attempt by the state to secure power at the expense of planters. The struggle was to be a long one. "What is at stake here is the problematic effect of private forces, if not representative and patrimonially coopted, in the development of a central state holding the legitimate monopoly of force. . . . It was this recognition of the private basis of political order that frequently led provincial presidents to a studied expression of prudence" in enforcing the law (1978, p. 270). Or again, "The state has power, yes; but it is not yet authoritative; . . . it coopts and bargains" (Uricoechea 1978, 270–71). Appointments as officers went to the already powerful as what he calls their "prebends." He bemoans the fact that

the bureaucratic state's need for foresight in developing a rationally planned scheme of administrative action was truly compromised by the permanent interference of private forces acting within the very structure of state bureaucracies. . . . The manner of the state's relationship with these forces contributed, first, toward retarding the development of the legitimacy of its authority and, second, toward strengthening the positions of power of the landowning groups. . . . The institutionalization of a legal bureaucratic order administered by the state was further hindered by the weak differentiation between public and private. (P. 274)

These conditions are all decried by Uricoechea as an obstacle toward an inexorable, albeit almost imperceptible, progress toward a rational bureaucratic system. Examining how they may have functioned very well for the persons involved is not part of Uricoechea's interest.

At root, the interpretations of both Carvalho and Uricoechea rest

on the assumption that individuals are important only as they play roles within a larger system. The framework of society insures that common educational experiences or occupational categories will make individuals act to preserve its general equilibrium. Institutions will always work to maintain behavioral patterns and adapt to changing environmental circumstances, defending societal boundaries. In its own way and by intellectual inheritance, this conceptualization is as decidedly anti-Marxist as was Oliveira Vianna's approbatory view of the state as expressing man's natural need for order. Carvalho's and Uricoechea's approach echoes North American social science, especially of the 1950s, even though their degrees are from the mid-1970s (compare Stepan 1978).

Before a state can wrestle with its ruling class, it must first establish itself as a separate entity and then assert the geographical extent of its attempted control. In *The Brazilian Monarchy and the South American Republics, 1822–1831: Diplomacy and State Building*, Ron Seckinger analyzes diplomacy among South American countries, concentrating on the second of these efforts.⁶ He asserts that "The idea of state or nation implies a specific territorial expanse—the space within which a people organize themselves politically" (p. 55). He defines *state-building* as "the process by which the people of a defined territory organize themselves politically through the creation and legitimation of a single, coherent politico-administrative system" (p. 4). Ignoring the question of which groups or classes from among these "people" may have had a greater or lesser interest in the emergence of the state, Seckinger nevertheless implies that the state and the ruling class can be lumped together, arguing that "the problems of state building and of finding a place in the international economy [together] necessarily influenced each nation's conduct of diplomacy" (p. ix). Economic interests and political goals are thus viewed as almost synonymous. He is therefore satisfied to concentrate his attention entirely on the work of South America's diplomats and political leaders. After considering the initial efforts of these leaders toward building an international community and forging alliances designed to defend republics versus monarchies or vice versa, Seckinger concludes that the primary impulse for state action lay in protecting the self-interest of each state. But he does not explore the process through which historical actors defined that self-interest.

A special virtue of Seckinger's study is its comparison of the experiences of various countries in Latin America. Unfortunately, however, he displays a curious reluctance to pursue implied causative explanations (see especially pp. 162–63). First, the lack of an "effective state apparatus" or of "elite consensus" is proffered as the cause of political instability. Perhaps sensing the tautology of such an argument, Seckinger then offers another, arguing that "incorporation into the

world economy" caused "progress toward consolidating political authority" in Chile and Brazil, presumably meaning that the rise of exports guaranteed stability (although he acknowledges that isolation worked well in Paraguay and that in many countries the "dominance of British merchants" limited the revenues new governments needed to consolidate their power). Then, in an apparent about-face, Seckinger uses the "inability of [some Spanish American] national elites to create viable nation states" as the reason why Britain "had no way of applying leverage to shape policies." So which comes first: international dependence or stability? The answer is unclear. Yet if one ignores the seeming contradictions and many exceptions, the thread of his argument begins to emerge, and it is a controversial one. Seckinger is saying that elite consensus and close ties to the world economy went together. Whether the ruling classes ran the state or the state dominated them, the firmer that union, the more likely would become control from abroad. Consensus and stability brought on economic dependence and political subservience to Britain or the United States—in short, incorporation within world capitalism. The units of analysis, he implies, must shift away from states to world economic systems. It is a provocative, even radical thesis that needs more precise elaboration.

Foreign policies are also the concern of Amado Luiz Cervo's *O Parlamento Brasileiro e as Relações Exteriores (1826–1889)*, which examines the debates in parliament on external affairs.⁷ Because the constitution restricted parliament to a limited role in foreign relations, this inquiry would appear at first sight to be somewhat peripheral. But Cervo establishes the importance of parliamentary debate on two grounds. First, in discussing foreign policy, members of the Chamber of Deputies identified the issues, set the parameters, explored the possibilities, and thus helped forge that policy. Cervo shows time and again how the questions raised in parliament eventually became governmental directives. This process operated particularly as parliament criticized the series of treaties signed by Pedro I (1822–1831), provoking subsequent governments to shun new treaties and refuse to renew old ones when they expired. As Cervo observes, "Sooner or later ideas may become facts" (p. 23). Second, and even more convincingly, Cervo shows how many areas within the legitimate purview of parliament had a direct impact on foreign policy. The significance of these areas is obvious, once mentioned—voting the war budget, tariff laws, navigation laws, the slave trade, and provisions for attracting immigrants from Europe. Their listing makes one surprised that the parliamentary role has been ignored heretofore.

As the other studies under review have established, members of parliament sprang from elections controlled by judges, national guard officers, or centrally appointed provincial *presidentes*. The question im-

mediately arises, then, as to how parliamentary views may have conformed to or diverged from the interests of the planter class or other economic elites. Once again, was the state the creature of a class? Cervo usually does not ask what groups or interests benefited from the policies adopted. He takes it for granted that there was a "public opinion" (in a country where only 21 percent of the adult population could read and write in 1872) and that parliament reflected it (see pp. 9, 60). Only occasionally does Cervo qualify this view, as when he speaks of "public opinion, that of the social elites" (p. 138) or of "the public opinion of dominant classes" (p. 142). At one point, he even admits that parliament acted counter to public opinion (p. 166). By raising only limited theoretical questions, Cervo restricts his study's potential for stimulating critical thought. He argues, moreover, that foreign policy was an area of consensus in Brazil, "above" party and beyond regional or sectoral loyalty. Although noting the divergent interests of planters and would-be industrialists regarding tariffs, his account of the debate remains basically an intellectual history, in which ideas seem to have enjoyed a life of their own independent of the individuals who thought them. Only rarely does Cervo acknowledge class interests, as when he states that liberal doctrines regarding free trade "served the interests of the European bourgeoisie and the Brazilian landowning and commercial classes" (p. 17). On this issue, he posits a conflict between agrarian and commercial interests on one side and "national interest" on the other, by which he implies that industrialization served all Brazilians rather than just certain classes (p. 246, n. 493).

Cervo almost inadvertently refers at times to the relationship between the state and society. He defends the economic liberals by saying that "in a certain way they had their feet firmly planted: they benefited the dominant classes of the social structure, the landowning class, interested in maintaining agricultural predominance in the internal economy" (pp. 18, 229). Thus he understands parliament as distinct from the social structure and sees within it one segment serving a class, although evidently parliament itself (the state) did not form part of the social structure and parliamentarians could have freely chosen to serve another class. At one point, he alleges that only the state stood to benefit from an immigration policy focused on self-sufficient settlements, in contrast to the effort to provide laborers for the landowners (p. 175). Thus Cervo acknowledges the issue even when not addressing it head-on, but he leaves to the reader the task of deducing the theory behind his views.

The state's role in fostering immigration and expanding the supply of workers for the plantations occupies much of the attention of Chiara Vangelista in *Le braccia per la fazenda: immigrati e "caipiras" nella formazione del mercato del lavoro paulista (1850-1930)*.⁸ During the last

years of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth, millions of Italians arrived in Brazil, most destined to work (at least for a short time) on the coffee plantations in São Paulo. Vangelista demonstrates the central role played by the government in developing Brazil's labor market and argues that it served the interest of the "dominant class" (p. 20). Moreover, she asserts that the dominant class itself assumed both economic and political power and represented its own interest directly, thus dispensing with any autonomous political class to mediate between the political and the economic spheres. The plantation formed the basis for all economic, political, cultural, and social relationships and profoundly influenced the entire country: "Economic and political power have their foundation in the ownership of land" (p. 199). The plantation was the state: the *fazendeiro* not only ruled internally but his decrees and his style applied outside the *fazenda* (p. 212). The state—again reified—took on the mentality of the landowners (p. 58). Also, the dominant class monopolized legal force to suppress any possible rebelliousness manifested by workers (p. 195). No wonder the nation's immigration policy soon pointed steadily toward the plantation (p. 252).

So the dominant class consisted of large landowners who controlled the state. Yet strangely, Vangelista also argues that the ambition of this class was to end earlier public programs aimed at populating the country through state-sponsored settlements in nonplantation areas (p. 42). Quite so, but had not the state earlier been under the control of a dominant class as well? Had not that class also been formed by a planter oligarchy? The problem lies partly in defining the territory of the state. In Vangelista's study, "the state" quickly becomes limited to the State of São Paulo. She easily convinced this reader that this region's government indeed responded directly to the interests of a small economic elite. Officials maintained a hostel where arriving immigrants could stay while awaiting placement, subsidized overseas transport for many of them, organized a placement service, arranged for concessionary railways to grant discounted fares to immigrants bound for the plantations, helped maintain order on the estates when it was threatened and backed the planters' interests in countless ways large and small. But is that governmental unit the state?

The State of São Paulo did not have any of the responsibilities of the state discussed by Seckinger. Only when one looks at that larger state does the nuanced complexity of the problem of state-class relationships become clear. For instance, ending the slave trade in 1850 ran counter to the interests of a significant segment of the slave-owning class; yet it also insured the integrity of national territory and thus the preservation of the state. Because slaveowners had much to gain from the existence of the state, it is not surprising to find that they acqui-

esced, however gracelessly, in ending that nefarious trade. By the same token, fostering immigration surely served only one part of Brazil's dominant class, and it is the unraveling of the potential conflict within that class that presents the conceptual difficulty facing historians of the subject. Subsidies for immigration provided by the central government varied surprisingly between 1880 and 1900 (see Graham 1977), while the interests of the dominant class presumably remained unaltered. Vangelista does not devote the attention to this problem that it deserves.

Defining the "dominant class" has also puzzled historians. For most of the nineteenth century, the term implies planters or more broadly, landowners and slaveowners (only Faoro claimed much power for merchants, but the alliance he envisioned between them and the "bureaucratic estate" is not convincing). Between 1870 and 1930, Brazil's class structure evidently became more complex. The rise of cities, the beginnings of industrialization, and the end of slavery introduced new social groups or transformed old ones. The relationship of the state to the new contours of society may be presumed to have altered as well. First, however, the nature of that change must be understood.

Vangelista is particularly concerned to examine whether the end of slavery and the shift to free laborers implied the rise of capitalism, almost by definition. If workers were separated from the means of production and had only their labor to sell, then the cash nexus between employer and employee would have substituted for relationships of dependence. At the same time, wages would have provided cash for acquiring manufactured goods. The accumulation of capital in the hands of planters could have found an outlet in industrial investments. Brazil then would have repeated a trajectory first elaborated in Europe, and the state might have become the instrument of a capitalist, industrialist class rather than a planter one. Yet, Vangelista argues, none of these things happened in Brazil, or at least few of them occurred and much more slowly than could be expected from the sudden transition to free labor. Why was this the case?

Vangelista believes that the answer is to be found in the post-emancipationist labor relations of Brazil. She begins with the perspicacious remark that structurally, the flow of immigrants merely replaced the slave trade, still supplying from abroad the labor ingredient so essential to the plantation economy while keeping the free Brazilian-born worker on the margin of the labor market, as had been true for the *agregado* in the days of slavery. Although free, these Brazilians did not form a classic proletariat. Nor did the arrival of immigrating free workers result from the primitive accumulation of capital in Brazil (which would have led to the separation of the worker from the means of production) but from that very process occurring outside Brazil, namely in Italy. The immigrant, moreover, lacked any bargaining power and

could not effectively choose among employers. In short, it was not a perfect labor market and therefore not really “free” labor (p. 63).

Even more significantly, the immigrants themselves did not truly enter a wage-labor force. A complex set of cultural and psychological characteristics inherited from slavery implied continuation of the personal ties between workers and planters. Planters never abandoned their role as absolute *padroni* recognizing no authority above their own (p. 197). Immigrant workers remained clients and retainers, receiving protection from their patrons. Remuneration of immigrant settlers, established through complex and changeable formulae, was partly monetary, partly in kind, with some paid in advance and some only after the work was done (p. 140). Moreover, as workers gained the right to work a plot of land and were dealt with as family units, capitalist labor relations clearly did not develop. Surely workers could have had no notion of the specific value of their work and that of their children and wives. No one then or since could determine the surplus value produced by workers and appropriated by employers (p. 157). Finally, these immigrant workers hoped to acquire land someday and thus identified with landowners, not with wage workers.

Just as earlier theorists have argued that a slave economy could not be a capitalistic economy—despite its ties to world capitalism—because of the nature of slave labor (Lapa 1980), Vangelista here maintains that even free workers do not capitalism make. She takes issue with those who speak of a “slave mode of production,” emphasizing that in an export economy, changes at the level of production lose much of their theoretical importance. “Free labor in the case of São Paulo does not signify in substance a modification of the mode of production. . . . The modification is not necessary because the mercantile exchange with the exterior does not change qualitatively. . . . Free . . . labor does not mean a capitalistic mode of production” (p. 61). The reason is that this kind of free labor merely strengthened export commerce and not a real capitalism of industry based on wage labor (p. 65).

If capitalism did not arise out of the ending of slavery, then the dominant class of São Paulo remained a latifundary one. Its relationships to the state insured official support for the export trade but not for industrialization. The rise of capitalism in Brazil occurred only later. The politics of patrimonialism were to continue unabated, and Uricoechea’s dream of a rational bureaucracy would be further postponed.

Barbara Weinstein has examined much the same set of problems in *The Amazon Rubber Boom, 1850–1920*.⁹ She centers a large part of her study on the labor system and the ties between the dominant class and the state. In the Amazon, too, migrants (in this case from Brazil’s own Northeast) flooded the region to supply workers for a booming export trade. Ironically, Weinstein uses São Paulo as a comparative foil, asking

why the transition to a capitalist economy failed to succeed in the Amazon as it did in São Paulo.

Like Vangelista, Weinstein seeks the answer first of all in the relations of production: rubber tappers did not become wage workers. Tappers received their supplies on credit, in effect being paid in advance rather than at the conclusion of their labor. Although dependent on their suppliers to buy their product and to offer the traditional protection expected of patrons, tappers could change patrons, use their labor instead to produce foodstuffs on land that “belonged” to no one, or take leisure rather than participate in the money economy. In this way, although Weinstein was unaware of the similarity, tappers resembled the immigrants as described by Vangelista—independent entrepreneurs who contracted to care for so many coffee trees in exchange for part of the crop and cash advances. Even when prices fell, suppliers continued to advance goods to rubber tappers for fear that they would otherwise cease to produce altogether. It is this lack of control over workers, this mercantile approach to production, that Weinstein considers the source of Amazonian failure to duplicate São Paulo’s record. As she observes, “The evolution of a wage-labor economy in São Paulo, by increasing the internal market and the circulation of goods and expanding opportunities for investments in urban industries and transport, eventually allowed that state to emerge as the leading center of industrial and agricultural activity in Brazil. The expansion of the rubber trade, by contrast, did not lead to such qualitative changes in the organization of the Amazon’s economic life” (p. 71).

Weinstein also finds significance in the weak control exerted by the Amazonian economic elite over the state in comparison with the planters of São Paulo. It is a somewhat confusing point. She refers especially to the price-support programs for coffee undertaken by three southern states in 1906 and by the federal government in 1921. Price supports would surely have been ineffective for rubber, however, because the problem of falling prices did not lie in overproduction within Brazil but in Southeast Asia. Because São Paulo carried out such a program without federal help before 1921, one could conclude that Weinstein is referring to weak elite control over the local state government. But her own evidence shows that the “potentates in the rubber districts” successfully dominated state government on other issues and even opposed proposals for government support of immigration (p. 126). She even argues at one point that the local bosses exerted more influence on the state government of Pará than was true in São Paulo. The problem lies, perhaps, in a normative approach: the state ought to have played a developmental role, and she considers its failure to do so an unfortunate aberration from proper behavior.

One can only conclude that the ruling class in the Amazon—as

in São Paulo—exerted the control it wished. Why it was not a different ruling class seems a fruitless inquiry. Better to ask how it used its power to advance its interests. One might find that the ruling class's interest lay in continuing its dominion rather than in advancing capitalism, just as it may have had little to gain from a rational bureaucracy. Truly, political action does not always conform to theoretical schemes, even those laid down by Marx or Weber.

NOTES

1. These traditions are not only Brazilian. A useful summary of conceptual alternatives can be found in Stepan (1978, 3–45); see also Hamilton (1982) and Spalding (1982, vii–xx).
2. Because Flory's book was based on a dissertation written under my direction (at the University of Texas at Austin in 1975), I could not properly include it in this review essay. Yet some mention is required because it so squarely addresses at one point the present issue.
3. Carvalho turned his valuable dissertation (completed at Stanford in 1975) into an even better book. He not only revised many chapters, adding a comparative dimension to each discussion, but eliminated many others (reserved for a subsequent work) and provided a new chapter on the bureaucracy as well as a conclusion. Surprisingly, while the new chapter sharply differentiates between the "political bureaucracy" (judges, for instance) and administrative civil servants, that distinction is not made in other chapters, leading to much confusion. As in the dissertation, Carvalho confuses the reader of his tables by the way he handles cases about which he has no information. For instance, in judging what proportion of cabinet members had ties to the land (p. 87), the real thrust of the data is lost by including cases for which he lacks data.
4. On pp. 156–57, Carvalho presents a succinct historiographical survey of the debate as it related to party divisions.
5. Uricoechea's book also resulted from his dissertation (completed at Berkeley in 1976). The English version of his book, *The Patrimonial Foundations of the Brazilian Bureaucratic State*, has already been reviewed in this journal (see Stephen G. Bunker, "Debt and Democratization: Changing Perspectives on the Brazilian State," *LARR* 21, no. 3:206–23). I will therefore not pay it the attention deserved by its extensive research in primary records, intelligent marshalling of evidence, and keen sensitivity to the major issues of nineteenth-century Brazilian history. I do find the work marred by an exotic Weberian vocabulary more suitable to European than to Brazilian history.
6. This gracefully written narrative turns out to be primarily a diplomatic history of Brazil due to Brazil's importance and common borders with most of the countries of the continent. Seckinger thoroughly mined archival and printed materials from a large number of countries and uses a straightforward approach in presenting his findings.
7. Cervo, who received his doctorate at the University of Strasbourg, is a professor at the Universidade de Brasília. Detailed indices of the parliamentary debates have been compiled there, which he uses as guides to research. He also provides useful summaries of key debates. Cervo's bibliography is reasonably comprehensive but reveals several surprising omissions, such as Warren Dean (1971), Paula Beiguelman (1967), Emília Viotti da Costa (1966), and Robert Conrad (1975).
8. In this rewritten Italian dissertation, Vangelista bravely tackles many statistical puzzles posed by the data on migration. She expends much effort in establishing correlations regarding the various sources of immigrants (foreign or Brazilian), their style of employment (day workers or families hired by the number of coffee bushes

tended), and remuneration. The issue fits into a larger literature on labor markets that is not addressed in this discussion.

9. I have reviewed this book elsewhere from a different perspective. See my review in *International Labor and Working Class History* 27 (Spring 1985):135–38. *The Amazon Rubber Boom* makes an impressive contribution to understanding the regional politics of Brazil, which Weinstein ties closely to social and economic realities.

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