

thinks that the main bone of contention between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland was the existence of the Polish Oder-Western Neisse frontier. The successive Christian Democratic governments stubbornly maintained the claim to the restoration of the 1939 frontiers. They never explained how those frontiers could be restored in the face of Soviet opposition.

The results of elections in 1969 allowed the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats to form their own government. This new government, headed by Chancellor Willy Brandt, was willing to sacrifice the unrealistic demand for a return to the 1939 frontiers. The author recounts the story of negotiations between Bonn and Moscow and Warsaw, which ended with the signature in 1970 of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties. The Federal Republic of Germany recognized in these treaties the Polish frontier on the Oder and Neisse, at least for the duration of the FRG's existence. This meant that a reunified Germany could reopen the territorial problem at some future time. This reservation did not evoke any uneasiness in Warsaw, however, because Poland knew that the USSR would not allow the German Democratic Republic to join the FRG. Thus, the FRG abandoned the former claim to the restoration of the 1939 frontiers, an action which the Weimar Republic would have considered unthinkable.

One must quarrel with the author when he espouses the view of the nationalistic organizations of German refugees and expellees from the territories east of the Oder-Neisse frontier, that from 800,000 to one million former German citizens continue to live in Poland (p. 52). If one would deduct from that figure only the ethnic Poles who had been German citizens prior to 1945, his estimate would still remain far-fetched. The probable estimate would be from 200,000 to 250,000 ethnic Germans still living in Poland. The author does not take into account the mass flight of Germans in 1944-45 in fear of the advancing Soviet troops, their mass expulsions in the following years, and finally, their emigration to both German states. He himself states that 450,839 ethnic Germans emigrated to the FRG from 1950 to 1972 (p. 75). This emigration continues to the present day.

The book is on the whole friendly to the Poles and is thus a bridge toward a better West German understanding of Poland's position on the Oder-Neisse frontier.

W. W. KULSKI  
*Durham, North Carolina*

DEUTSCHE MILITÄRVERWALTUNGEN 1938/39: DIE MILITÄRISCHE BESETZUNG DER TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI UND POLENS. By *Hans Umbreit*. Beiträge zur Militär- und Kriegsgeschichte, vol. 18. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1977. 296 pp. DM 48.

During the German occupation of both Czechoslovakia and Poland, the German military administration was supplanted almost immediately by a "civil" administration appointed by Hitler and dominated by Nazi party leaders and party organizations. Consequently, the army was never given the opportunity to exercise supreme administrative authority for any period of time adequate to demonstrate what kind of administration it might have established and how its rule would have differed from that of the Nazi authorities. Dr. Umbreit's book thus deals with an extremely limited subject.

In his first chapter, Dr. Umbreit describes plans which the army had drawn up before the war for administering conquered territories, but because these plans were never put into effect they are of no practical importance. His subsequent discussion of the military administration in the Sudetenland and the Czech provinces (as well as in Austria) is very brief, but covers adequately what there is to say on

the subject. The greater part of the book (pp. 65–273) is devoted to military preparations for the administration of Poland, the brief period of actual military administration, and the army's subsequent relationship and rivalry with Nazi party leaders and organizations in dealing with problems of security, the treatment of the conquered population, and the economic exploitation of the country. Army leaders, although themselves not particularly scrupulous in their treatment of the Poles, were nevertheless shocked by the policies pursued by the Nazi administrators. The generals could delay or evade the implementation of certain policies, but they lacked the authority and, for the most part, the will or desire to intervene effectively. On the whole they tried to avoid conflicts with the Nazi organizations and engaged in what can only be called a dishonorable retreat. The author admits that all these problems have been discussed in other works on the German occupation of Poland, but he maintains that all such studies contain so many misconceptions and outright errors about the nature of the German military administration that a special monograph on this subject is justified.

Dr. Umbreit's principal contribution, it seems to me, is the additional evidence he provides to undercut the theory (which is not widely accepted in any case) that the army tried to uphold standards of relative decency, while far behind the fighting lines the Nazi organizations carried out their bestial policies of genocide, terror, and economic exploitation. Dr. Umbreit makes clear that Nazi generals were quick to appreciate that opposition to Nazi policies might jeopardize or put an end to their careers; that they were positively eager to escape the responsibilities of administration; and that they competed ruthlessly for their share of the economic spoils. Because they were more pragmatic than the fanatic Nazi ideologues, they saw the danger of unrestricted terror and exploitation (as did numerous Nazi officials), but they failed—or rather, never seriously attempted—to challenge the Nazi administrators and establish a more practical, consistent, or humane administration.

NORMAN RICH  
Brown University

CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S INTERRUPTED REVOLUTION. By *H. Gordon Skilling*.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. xvi, 924 pp. \$45.00, cloth. \$15.00, paper.

Professor Skilling's valuable study of the Prague Spring will not disappoint those who have long awaited it. The author's extensive research, persuasive interpretations, and detailed biographical footnotes combine to make this the best volume available on the subject. It may well be the most comprehensive history of the Dubček era that we will have until new primary sources become available. Despite the study's formidable length, the format, which allows readers to find discussions of specific events and issues with ease, makes it useful as either a narrative or a reference work.

Although the bulk of Professor Skilling's volume deals with the January to August 1968 period, the author sets events into the broader historical context with which he is clearly very familiar. Some of his interpretations, such as the dual democratic and authoritarian traditions of Czechoslovak communism, are hardly original but are, nonetheless, well argued. His discussion of "the Czech question," that curiously persistent cultural quest of Czech intellectuals for a national identity and calling, finally gives this issue the importance it deserves in any analysis of domestic attitudes toward democratic socialism. And Professor Skilling's description of the pre-1968 years brings out well the character of Novotný as a politically inept bureaucrat who, wavering between tolerance and repression, went far to pave the way for reform but could never accept it in principle.