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After more than a decade of deliberations, ASEAN leaders agreed on 11 November 2022 in principle to admit Timor-Leste as the eleventh member of the regional organization and to grant Timor-Leste observer status to attend all ASEAN meetings. Timor-Leste has demonstrated positive developmental progress, and fact-finding missions across the three ASEAN Community pillars have returned generally optimistic results.
Timor-Leste has put in place institutional structures and implementing agencies for advancing cooperation with ASEAN. It is also moving towards harmonizing its laws with ASEAN instruments. However, its capacity remains in question due to a lack of substantive knowledge and technical expertise among government officials, as well as inadequate infrastructure, logistics and facilities for hosting ASEAN meetings.
Strengthening human capital will be a top priority for Timor-Leste. This includes not only enhancing its personnel's knowledge and technical expertise on ASEAN processes and procedures but also skills such as English language proficiency and negotiation. Coordinated capacity-building assistance from ASEAN and dialogue partners will be important. These efforts must also be met with economic diversification and growth of its nascent private sector.
Apart from bridging gaps, ASEAN needs to grapple with its reservations that Timor-Leste's economic limitations may slow down the realization of the ASEAN Economic Community. There are also concerns that Timor-Leste's membership may entrench differences within the bloc, particularly with regard to geopolitical issues, and dilute the organization's effectiveness or further complicate the consensus-based decision-making process.
The clean energy transition momentum is gathering pace globally, and in Southeast Asia as well. The transition is dependent on an uninterrupted supply of critical minerals and metals that are essential for the production of low-carbon technologies.
The supply of critical minerals is impeded by several constraints. First is the dominance of a handful of countries in both the upstream and downstream parts of the supply chain. Second is the current geopolitical race to secure supplies leading to greater protectionist behaviours, exhibited through export bans and trade impediments.
This study focuses on four selected critical minerals which are important to the region. Two criteria are used in determining a mineral having high significance: (1) There are significant deposits of it which can be tapped on to bolster Southeast Asia's strategic position in the supply chains; and (2) It is an essential input in industries and sectors of importance in Southeast Asia. The four critical minerals examined in this study are: copper, nickel, bauxite (alumina), and rare earth elements (REEs). ,br>The study makes three recommendations to enhance ASEAN's role in the critical minerals supply chains. The first addresses the insufficiency of investments in early-stage exploration and exploitation of critical minerals. The second appeals for investments at all stages, including in technology to tap into downstream activities beyond refining and purification, and in the manufacturing of component parts. The third calls for improvements in sustainability management in the mining sector, which is generally extremely environmentally and socially damaging to communities.
This paper discusses Chinese President Xi Jinping's flagship global initiatives' normative implications for the world order.
It argues that the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), which are key pillars of China's proposal to build a community of common destiny for mankind, are driven by Beijing's desire to cultivate authority in the international system.
Analysing the speeches by Chinese leaders, policy documents, media and analytical discourse in China, along with policy decisions, this study provides an assessment of the Chinese leadership's worldview. It places the launch of GDI, GSI and GCI within this context, before detailing the elements of each initiative and offering a critical analysis.
This study concludes that through GDI, GSI and GCI, the Chinese leadership hopes to shape an external environment that not only ensures regime security but is also favourable to China's development and security interests. In doing so, however, it is reshaping key norms of global governance towards a fundamentally illiberal direction.
The emphasis on cultural connectivity in China's growing presence and involvement in Southeast Asia highlights the importance China places on people-to-people exchanges as part of its global engagement strategy.
The remarkable ascension of China over the recent decades has precipitated a proliferation of anti-China sentiments, particularly galvanized within the crucible of a 'discourse war' with Western powers, as expressed in the latter's 'China threat' narrative.
In response to such challenges, China has made substantial investments in cultural diplomacy, to augment its soft power through orchestrated global outreach initiatives.
This article examines Chinese cultural diplomacy in the realm of entertainment, specifically 'The Melody of Spring: Transnational Spring Festival Gala' hosted in Nanning, Guangxi, and disseminated globally each Chinese New Year.
Against the legacy of China-Indonesia bilateral relations as well as Indonesia's treatment of its Chinese minority, this study explores China's cultural diplomacy and soft power in contemporary Indonesia.
Through the case study of the 'Transnational Spring Festival Gala', this article posits that China's cultural dissemination as an instrument of soft power has yielded little influence on the Indonesian public and has limited impact on the formation of a transnational imagined community.
The concept of political fandom, the state of being fans of a politician or of a political party, played a crucial role during Thailand's General Election in 2023. Fandom contributed to the popularity on social media of politicians, such as Pita Limjaroenrat, the Move Forward Party's leader and prime ministerial candidate.
The strategies involved in achieving celebrity status for politicians are varied. This paper provides a case study of the factors behind the success of Pita and the Move Forward Party and contrasts these with reasons why Pita's key political opponents were less effective.
It argues that the digital age and the transcendence of politics into pop culture, where celebrity status and fandom can drive electoral outcomes, signify a profound shift in democratic participation, political engagement and the very fabric of Thai politics.
While fandom has become a stream in participatory democracy, it also highlights the polarized and temperamental nature of Thailand's contemporary hyper-partisan political scene.
A scholar from Nahdlatul Ulama by the name of Imaduddin Utsman has recently challenged the long-accepted claim that the Ba'Alawi - Muslims of Hadhrami descent also known in Indonesia as habaib - are descendants of Prophet Muhammad. The challenge arose out of his critical examination of available records on the Prophet's lineage from the fifth century to the tenth century of Islam.
His unprecedented challenge courted controversy in Indonesia. It was even more surprising that it came from a religious scholar with a traditionalist background.
The debate that ensued was inevitable as the habaib community had to defend their ancestry, and joining them in their defence were some Javanese Muslim scholars. However, Imaduddin actively rebutted their responses, alongside several other like-minded non-Arab scholars.
This article examines the debate where both sides presented documents and theories about the (dis)connection of the Ba'Alawi lineage to Prophet Muhammad. We argue that while Imaduddin's research does not fully invalidate the Ba'Alawi lineage, the habaib have not been entirely convincing - from Imaduddin's perspective - about their genealogy.
Nevertheless, the authority of the habaib remains intact despite the challenge to their lineage. This is because they can derive their authority from other factors apart from their lineage.
Malaysia is a signatory of the Global Methane Pledge, but the implications for national action on methane emissions remain unclear. A review of publicly available literature and data revealed that there is no clear national plan for methane action yet. Since signing the Pledge in 2021, there has been no demonstrable government initiative focusing on joined-up methane action at the national level. Malaysia does not have a methane strategy or policy, and sector-specific regulations focusing on methane emissions are either not present, vague, or publicly inaccessible.
There are indications emissions are falling due to positive corporate action. Effective methane reduction initiatives exist in Malaysia's top two methane-emitting sectors, oil and gas and palm oil, and key players have committed to net zero pathways with methane reductions central to progress to 2030.
Quantifying reductions with confidence remains challenging. Different reporting approaches and incomplete information on assumptions and uncertainties in quantification approaches, make independent analyses of reported emissions challenging.
Improvements in corporate Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) in the coming years are expected.
Methane reduction is a 'low-hanging fruit'. Methane is a major initial lever to reduce greenhouse gas emissions up to 2030 in the climate plans of leading Malaysian industry players. Action to improve methane-related processes in the key oil and gas and palm oil sectors thus presents a valuable opportunity for Malaysia to contribute to global climate mitigation within its long-term national interests.
During the fifteenth general election (GE15) in 2022 and the state elections in 2023, the clash between Anwar Ibrahim and PAS reached new heights. This can be viewed as a battle between political Islam and post-Islamism.
Political Islam as embodied by PAS pursues the establishment of an Islamic state, while post-Islamism as represented by Anwar Ibrahim is a way of balancing the ambitions of Islam with secular approaches.
While PAS has been consistent in espousing political Islam since its establishment, Anwar Ibrahim's approach to the role of Islam in politics has changed since his early days in UMNO. Evolving from an Islamist involved in state-led Islamization to a post-Islamist, he now espouses democratic values and multiculturalism.
The results of GE15 and the 2023 state elections between PAS and Anwar Ibrahim, who is now prime minister, show that there will certainly be sequels to come. The elections illustrate that political Islam is growing in strength. This is most evident in the fact that PAS currently has a whopping forty-three seats in the Malaysian parliament, and controls four states. The only way Anwar Ibrahim can remain in power is through assistance from PAS' old nemesis, UMNO, a party heavily tainted by corruption.
Over the past decade, app-based driving services like ride-hailing and delivery have become an integral part of business, employment and daily life in Vietnam. This growth, however, has been accompanied by tensions and conflicts between ride-hailing platforms and traditional taxi companies, xe ôm (motorbike taxi drivers), the authorities and the drivers working for these platforms.
Most drivers on these services are male and work long hours for low wages. Their working conditions are precarious because platforms classify them as partners rather than employees, denying them basic rights and benefits. Although platforms offer bonuses, organize events to celebrate drivers' contributions, and provide training courses, these do not address the fundamental exploitation in the employment relationship.
The Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) has not taken sufficient action to protect drivers or taken a stance on whether they should be classified as contractors or employees. The Vietnam General Confederation of Labour (VGCL) is working towards securing social protection for drivers and increasing their representation in labour associations. While some members of the VGCL have argued that app-based drivers are actually workers and should be afforded the same rights and benefits as all workers, this is as yet not the formal position of the confederation.
Drivers have taken to organizing strikes and protests to demand better treatment from the platforms. Policymakers and practitioners are called upon to ensure that platform work contributes to improved livelihoods and decent lifestyles for all.
Amid China-US geopolitical competition in the Asia-Pacific, it is imperative for both China and Singapore to adapt and respond to evolving circumstances for mutual benefit.
The enduring trust and solid foundation between China and Singapore in economic and trade cooperation are validated through their active involvement in each other's initiatives. This proved true even when the recent COVID-19 pandemic strained political interactions.
The political-security dimensions of the relationship between China and Singapore are complex and constantly evolving, influenced as they are by factors such as Singapore's military training in Taiwan, the contentious South China Sea disputes, and US foreign policy in the region.
However, Singapore's longstanding hedging strategy between the two superpowers may face increasingly severe tests as China-US rivalry escalates.
If carefully managed, Singapore's successful track record of facilitating dialogue between conflicting parties can continue to make it a valuable player in easing tensions between China and the US.
It is worrying that, in many cases in Indonesia, exposure to the Internet, especially social media, increases knowledge seekers' religious radicalism. This exposure has not only resulted in increased radicalism but also compelled some individuals to turn to violence in the name of Islam.
Moderate online media institutions have not been effective in counteracting the online dissemination of extremist religious content. The content disseminated by radical websites is still being popularly consumed, albeit those moderate Muslim websites have put in considerable effort to counteract radical narratives.
This report argues that this ineffectiveness is due to structural and cultural challenges. The structural challenges include limited funding and sensitivity towards the policy of umbrella organizations. Cultural challenges include passiveness in corporate culture, alongside the 'ivory tower' traditions among journalists which leaves them out of touch with Muslim communities.
The government of Indonesia can assist moderate Muslim media websites in fighting radical narratives, for example, through better funding to them.
Besides being one of the countries most severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, Indonesia also experienced a severe 'infodemic': an overabundance of contradictory information - including misinformation and disinformation - on COVID-19. This infodemic hampered pandemic mitigation efforts, resulting in non-compliance with public health measures and delays to the national vaccination programme in the first six months of the pandemic due to widespread vaccine hesitancy or vaccine refusal. Furthermore, it fomented public distrust of the government and other institutions.
The government also contributed to the spiral of distrust through its inconsistent policies, lack of transparency, and mixed messages. Especially in the pandemic's early phases, government officials themselves were found spreading misleading information, first to downplay the severity and risk of COVID-19 in order to avoid social unrest, and subsequently to push for a quick reopening of the economy. In prioritizing the economy over public health, considerable resources were spent on influence campaigns to persuade the public to continue business as normal.
The influence campaigns appeared to succeed in persuading people to return to work and to get vaccinated eventually. However, public distrust remained and was easily reactivated on social media in response to inconsistencies and double standards in the government's enforcement of COVID-19 restrictions.
Various motivations underlying terrorism uncovered by recent scholarship include the radicals' desire for Muslim unity, political interest, yearning to correct social and economic deprivation in the Muslim world, and simply anti-Westernism.
This article focuses on the radicals' call for Muslim solidarity and how this tends towards becoming their primary motivation for perpetrating terrorism. It discusses how radical groups and individuals exaggerate the perceived oppression of Muslims worldwide and how this encourages their sympathizers in planning, fundraising and/or executing terrorist attacks.
The so-called ummah solidarity discourse is coupled with the prevalence of the dogma that Muslims are targets of Western or foreign oppression. This has legitimized jihadist terrorists' use of violence and facilitated the recruitment of new terrorists.
Besides regular crackdowns on terrorists and putting limitations on access to radical websites and other Internet sources, this article contends that the Indonesian security apparatuses and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must work with the embassies from India, China and Myanmar based in Jakarta to nullify any likelihood of terror attacks on their embassy compounds or their citizens.
In 1995, then Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim introduced 'Masyarakat Madani' as his proposed economic framework for Malaysia. The term was heavily debated among scholars and politicians across all parties and ideologies. It was often argued that Madani was an effort to limit the rise of political Islam.
Following Anwar Ibrahim's dismissal from government in 1998, Madani came to be more narrowly redefined as 'civil society' However, Anwar's supporters, known as the 'Anwarinas', strove to keep the spirit of Madani alive and continued to promote its ideals of social justice, democratic values and inclusivity. They were encouraged further by the fall of Barisan Nasional from federal power in the fourteenth General Election in 2018.
After Anwar Ibrahim became Malaysia's tenth Prime Minister in 2022, he reintroduced Madani as a framework for the country, to be implemented in various sectors. Anwar Ibrahim likely received help from scholars such as Ziauddin Sardar, as reflected in his election manifesto, Script for a Better Malaysia. This time around, the core component of Madani is Maqasid Al-Shariah, or the higher objectives of sharia.
In that sense, Madani is now arguably more an expression of what may be called post-Islamism. For it to succeed, however, it will have to counteract the growing power of the conservatives and Islamists. This may be an uphill battle, given that a key component party of the unity government - UMNO - is facing several allegations of corruption.
Many current counter-disinformation initiatives focus on addressing the production or 'supply side' of digital disinformation. Less attention tends to be paid to the consumption or the intended audiences of disinformation campaigns.
A central concept in understanding people's consumption of and vulnerability to digital disinformation is its imaginative dimension as a communication act. Key to the power of disinformation campaigns is their ability to connect to people's shared imaginaries. Consequently, counter-disinformation initiatives also need to attend to these imaginaries.
This report examines why the precarious middle class in the Philippines has been particularly susceptible to digital disinformation. It focuses on two key imaginaries that disinformation producers weaponized in the year leading up to the 2022 national elections. The first was a long-simmering anti-Chinese resentment, which racist social media campaigns about Philippines-China relations targeted. The other was a yearning for a 'strong leader', which history-distorting campaigns about the country's Martial Law era amplified. Ironically, some practices adopted by members of the public to protect themselves from the toxicity and vitriol of online spaces increased their vulnerability to digital disinformation. The cumulative impact of these was for people to dig deeper into their existing imaginaries, something that disinformation producers targeted and exploited.
To establish a similarly robust common ground of reality, counter-disinformation initiatives should themselves be programmatic, not ad hoc.
Approximately 110,000-130,000 new Chinese migrants reside in Thailand in 2022. They are comprised of five categories: entrepreneurs, employees, students, accompanying family members and lifestyle migrants. These migrants contribute to the Thai economy but also precipitate negative impacts as well. Some stay and work in Thailand illegally, and some engage in unlawful business practices. Five positive impacts include business cooperation, economic circulation, sources of Chinese-speaking manpower, technological transfers and a cross-cultural environment. Five perceived negative impacts are bad public mannerisms, occupying of local jobs, competition in business, control of businesses and tarnishing of Thailand's reputation.
In Indonesia, Thailand and Myanmar, democratic regression and the reconsolidation of authoritarian regimes have triggered the rise of social media-driven protest movements. These are pioneered by a new generation of activist youth, distinguishing themselves from previous student and youth movements by the digitally mediated, decentralized and diverse nature of their protest.
While experimenting with digitally mediated repertoires of action adopted and adapted from similar struggles elsewhere, these protesters forge transnational links that give rise to new protest assemblages across and beyond the region. This is exemplified by the social media-based #MilkTeaAlliance, in which the distinct protests in Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar and other countries are conjoined through extended solidarity and affinity ties in a common 'generational' struggle against entrenched authoritarianism. The youth resistance in Hong Kong was instrumental in driving this trend.
Like a 'rhizome', these movements are characterized by connectivity, heterogeneity, multiplicity and 'unbreakable' expansion. This allows for a fluid participation of various activist and non-activist groups (such as K-poppers) and the inclusion of various issues and demands in the protest, which merge into the cause of fighting systemic injustice. It also heightens the movements' viability and resilience to repression.
Meanwhile, as long as authorities remain repressive and tone-deaf to this generation's criticism and concerns, the gulf between them looks set to widen. The longer-term implication is that this generation will remain alienated and continue to express their struggle in novel and unpredictable ways.
The fifteenth general election (GE15) in Malaysia produced surprising results. The conservative coalition of PN emerged as the dark horse of the election, overtaking the longest-ruling coalition, BN, by a significant margin. The two largest coalitions post-GE15, PH and PN, represent ideological opposites, which may spell a polarized future for Malaysian youths. This paper intends to understand what happened to the youth votes and provide possible hypotheses for future trends.
In West Malaysia, constituencies with a larger share of young voters registered a higher voter turnout rate. A majority of seats with 30 percent or more of voters under 30 years old were won by PN, followed by PH, and thirdly BN. This demonstrated PN's relatively stronger hold on young seats in GE15. Discrepancies between pre-GE15 survey findings and actual results could be explained by the Shy PN factor' or PN-leaning voters' reticence towards revealing their preference - and a swing from BN to PN.
Of all voter groups, PN voters have shown the highest loyalty and affinity to their coalition of choice, largely led by PAS voters. This is followed by PH and then BN, where the latter has shown the lowest support durability and the highest likelihood of swing. Unsurprisingly, voters from the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum of PN and PH share a high degree of coldness towards each other, implying that a middle ground will be hard to reach between the two voter groups.
In the past five years, Brunei Darussalam's socio-cultural landscape has witnessed a significant transformation, creating social and economic opportunities for Bruneians. Social media sites such as Instagram, Twitter and TikTok have become spaces and sites for racial, political and religious engagements in Bruneian society.
Digitally connected young people and their engagements on various social media platforms are major catalysts in this transformation. They actively share their social and religious practices and, in the process, create new discourses that are effectively reshaping the nation's socio-cultural, religious and political landscape.
This article examines three trends in Bruneian youths' social media engagements: digital civic engagement and social justice; self-expression and influencing culture; and new religious expressions and lived religiosities. Based on these trends, we can expect further evolution of youth culture carrying significance for the nation's development. The social consciousness and mobility of these young people are effectively measured through a study of the fluidity of their identity, ideas and practices.
This paper examines the impact of globalization and a rising China, among other factors, on the political orientation of Chinese-language newspapers in Indonesia. Chinese newspapers in Indonesia have had a long trajectory, moving from a China-oriented focus to an Indonesia-oriented one over the course of Indonesian history. Their content has grown beyond the local to become regional in its outlook. The recent rise of China has been having a profound impact on Chinese newspapers in Indonesia. Many of their articles are pro-China while attempting to maintain the delicate balance and being Indonesia-oriented at the same time.
With the community of Chinese-speaking Indonesian Chinese shrinking due to age, the Chinese-language dailies face challenges in circulation. The older generation that frequents them possesses significantly strong economic power, however, and while new migrants from China and ethnic Chinese from other Southeast Asian countries also read these dailies, their numbers are relatively small. As more and more newspaper editors, journalists and writers are now foreigners instead of being local-born, the Chinese-language newspapers in Indonesia may become newspapers for the overseas Chinese.