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The Churchill Lectures in Economics was inaugurated in 1993 to provide a series of annual public lectures on topics of current interest to students and researchers in the discipline. The lecturers are selected from the top echelon of leading scholars in the profession. Although always acknowledged specialists in their field, they are encouraged to take a broad look at their chosen subject and to reflect in a way that will be accessible to the senior undergraduate student.

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4 results in Churchill Lectures in Economics

Putting Auction Theory to Work
  • Paul Milgrom
  • Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    12 January 2004
  • This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

Economics and Language
  • Five Essays
  • Ariel Rubinstein
  • Published online:
    22 September 2009
    Print publication:
    14 September 2000
  • Arising out of the author's lifetime fascination with the links between the formal language of mathematical models and natural language, this short book comprises five essays investigating both the economics of language and the language of economics. Ariel Rubinstein touches the structure imposed on binary relations in daily language, the evolutionary development of the meaning of words, game-theoretical considerations of pragmatics, the language of economic agents and the rhetoric of game theory. These short essays are full of challenging ideas for social scientists that should help to encourage a fundamental rethinking of many of the underlying assumptions in economic theory and game theory. As a postscript two economists, Tilman Borgers (University College London) and Bart Lipman (University of Wisconsin, Madison), and a logician, Johan van Benthem (University of Amsterdam, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation and Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Information) offer comments.

Strategic Foundations of General Equilibrium
  • Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games
  • Douglas Gale
  • Published online:
    22 September 2009
    Print publication:
    15 August 2000
  • The theory of competition has held a central place in economic analysis since Adam Smith. This book, written by one of the most distinguished of contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of perfect competition. Beginning with a concise survey of how the theory of competition has evolved, Gale makes extensive and rigorous use of dynamic matching and bargaining models to provide a more complete description of how a competitive equlibrium is achieved. Whereas economists have made use of a macroscopic description of markets in which certain behavioral characteristics, such as price-taking behavior, are taken for granted, Gale uses game theory to re-evaluate this assumption, beginning with individual agents and modelling their strategic interaction. A strategic foundation for competitive equilibrium shows how such interaction leads to competitive, price-taking behavior. Essential reading for graduate courses in game theory and general equilibrium.

On Time
  • Lectures on Models of Equilibrium
  • Peter A. Diamond
  • Published online:
    31 December 2009
    Print publication:
    06 October 1994
  • In these two lectures, first published in 1994, Peter Diamond explores how time is modelled in theoretical analyses of individual industries and of an entire economy. In the first lecture he considers equilibrium in a single market by examining the distinction between the short run and the long run in Marshallian analysis. He proposes an explicit modelling of time in place of Marshall's use of different atemporal models for different time frames. In the second lecture he turns to models of an entire economy, and begins by considering how and why models of an entire economy should differ from models of a single industry. Both cyclical and seasonal data on the behaviour of macro-economies are examined.