The aim of this conceptual chapter is to define international secondary sanctions and to address the contemporary legal challenges they raise. It proposes to explain such complex legal mechanisms, to overcome the apparent definitional wanderings in their regard, and to identify concrete keys to tackle the legal problems encountered by public and private practitioners. To this end, the analysis begins with an explanation of the core concepts underlying secondary sanctions and focuses on the aim of (extraterritorial) secondary sanctions to extend their scope, what the author calls ‘the reach dilemma’. The unilateral and extraterritorial mechanics of secondary sanctions are then illustrated by three original figures, allowing the reader to grasp the complexity of the different levers involved. The study then addresses the additional difficulty arising from the apparent plurality of definitions of secondary sanctions and proposes an explanatory key enabling to retain only one working definition of secondary sanctions stricto sensu. Finally, the chapter goes on with the identification of the main difficulties currently facing public and private legal practices in this field and presents legal solutions that offer avenues for resolution, in the short, medium and long term.

This chapter presents a fleeting history of key changes in global trade and finance in the post-war period, organised around the themes of crisis and cooperation. The first section of the chapter discusses the key themes. The second section considers the emergence of the post-World War II Bretton Woods regime. The third section outlines the rise of private capital in the 1970s through to the debt crisis of the 1980s. The fourth section considers discussions of global financial architecture in the 1990s to the 2000s. The fifth section discusses changes in the last fifteen years, focusing on how the trade regime has stalled and the financial regime has been partially rolled back. Finally, the concluding section reflects on the ever-present need to foster cooperation in the global financial and trade architecture.

Since its accession to the WTO twenty years ago, China’s image has shifted from a good student aspiring to assimilate itself into the multilateral trading system to one that is increasingly alienated from key WTO principles. How has China’s perspective on WTO been evolving? What are the reasons behind China’s changing perspective? This chapter addresses these questions from the Chinese perspective with a comprehensive analysis of the key moments in China’s first two decades in the WTO, followed by practical suggestions on how to engage China more constructively in the WTO and beyond.

Chapter 8 summarises the main findings from the preceding chapters, and discusses the best way to deal with the China challenge. Contrary to those who prefer unilateral and plurilateral approaches, we argue that the potential of multilateralism has yet been fully explored. As we have documented, it was the desire to normalise its trade relations within the multilateral framework that prompted China’s initial decision to return to the multilateral trading system. While China did pursue unprecedented market-oriented reform, the potential of the multilateral rules in taming China’s state capitalism has not been fully unleashed since China’s accession. Of course, recognising the potential of multilateralism does not mean that multilateralism is perfect. Instead, we believe that multilateralism is the most promising compared with unilateral measures and bilateral and plurilateral negotiations outlined above. In addition to making fuller use of the existing rules under the WTO, this book has also put forward some approaches for the negotiation of new rules at the multilateral level where such rules are needed and suggested ways to engage China in a more constructive manner.

This chapter provides the necessary background as to why addressing the issue of the rights and obligations of States prior to delimitation is both pressing and topical. The main objective of the book is to lay out the rights and obligations of States (i.e. claimants and third States) under international law in disputed maritime areas. Particular emphasis in this regard is placed on those areas where States have not agreed upon delimitation (a), neither have been able to agree on cooperative arrangements (b), and for which a modus vivendi has not been developed to regulate activities in a disputed maritime area (c). Apart from that, States are obligated to take certain (unilateral) measures in disputed areas. This is because entitlements to maritime zones come with related obligations for the coastal State regarding certain issues. For instance, with regard to managing and conserving living marine resources, as well as protecting the marine environment, coastal States have significant obligations under the LOSC. Another issue that is discussed is how jurisdictional uncertainty, which is inherent to disputed maritime areas, affects claimant States, third States and their nationals.

The international legal framework that is applicable to disputed maritime areas consists of conventional law – predominantly found in the LOSC – and general rules of international law. Combined, these form a template of rules and obligations that must be observed by States in relation to their disputed area. Two questions arise in this regard: is the international law that is applicable in disputed maritime areas sufficiently defined? And does this international law actually contribute to prevent conflicts between claimant States, or between a third State, or its nationals, and a claimant States in respect of a disputed maritime area? Differences exist in terms of the amount of conflict that is engendered if one claimant decides to act on its rights in a disputed maritime area, without another coastal State’s prior approval. An important question is how does this aspect influence the issue of what the rights and obligations are of States in disputed maritime areas? Also, whether the scope for unilateralism can be defined conclusively is addressed. However, it becomes clear that determining this scope is made impossible by the variable of the circumstances surrounding a particular disputed maritime area.

Chapter 10 explores the foreign policy of Israel towards the Middle East in the wake of the collapse of the Israeli-Syrian peace process, focusing on its relations with Iran, Lebanon, and the Palestinians. The chapter provides the first account of Israel’s foreign policy towards Iran, arguing that, by 2000, it had matured around four principles - deterrence, defence, interception, and support for multilateral efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear program. In addition, it is the first analysis to demonstrate how and why the demise of Israel’s foreign policy of engagement gave rise to its unilateralism foreign policy posture. The analysis shows that, despite nine years of negotiations, rigid historical, national and religious narratives, political opposition, and hostile public opinion, were still preventing a land-for-peace exchange to end Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians. Israeli-Lebanon relations were free of these shackles, which is why Ehud Barak was able to order the IDF to withdraw unilaterally from Lebanon. Barak’s foreign policy style, which was based on untying Gordian knots swiftly and decisively, was a clear advantage in this context, as domestic political conditions were ripe and international legitimacy was forthcoming.

Chapter 14 is devoted to the resurgence of unilateralism during Ariel Sharon’s second government. It provides new information on the decision-making process leading to Israel’s unilateral disengagement from Gaza Strip in August 2005.The account exposes how Sharon and his circle of confidants secured the support of the USA and Egypt before informing the Israeli government, the security network, and the Israeli public of the plan to withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip.This prompted significant opposition within the security network and a fierce political response from within Sharon’s own party, Likud. The chapter examines how Sharon and his confidants overcame these domestic obstacles while liaising informally with Hamas and the Palestinian Authority on a successful unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. By way of a summary, the chapter outlines the consequences of disengagement, which included strengthening Israel’s grip on the West Bank, dividing the Palestinians and redrawing Israel’s southwest border.

The introduction outlines the main argument of the book, its key concepts, analytical framework, methodology, and contributions. It begins by presenting the argument that Israeli foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, has revolved around three stances: entrenchment, unilateralism, and engagement. These foreign policy postures, which are an original contribution of the book, are unpacked and explained. The introduction goes on to describe the analytical framework that informs the book and accounts for Israeli foreign policy, depicted as three concentric circles: the decision-makers, the security network, and the contours imposed on foreign policymaking by national identity. The approach in this book is positioned in relation to the existing literature on Israeli foreign policy. The introduction ends with a note on sources, which outlines the dataset comprising the book, its qualitative methodology, and the approach to debating Israel in academia.

Because of its transboundary effects and because states will be the primary actors, large-scale solar geoengineering and its governance are matters of international relations. The divergent problem structures among the responses to climate change help explain extant and likely action. Abatement and negative emissions technologies are aggregate effort global public goods and consequently undersupplied. Solar geoengineering would be a single best effort and a mutual restraint global public good, implying that it might be oversupplied. Uni- or minilateral deployment would be a problem if it were premature or contrary to the international community’s consensus. Solar geoengineering could pose other challenges to international relations such as legitimate decision-making, potential disagreements, cost-sharing, and security risks. Its sudden and sustained termination would have severe negative environmental impacts, but the probability of this is uncertain and may be low. Some economists have explicitly modeled states as rational actors to understand, explain, and predict their behavior in this domain. Given the approach’s limitations, these results should be interpreted with caution.