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This chapter focuses mainly on the attempts by the British, Nigerians, and Zambians to set up the possibility of private negotiations between the Patriotic Front and Ian Smith in 1978. As the war grew increasingly costly and unwinnable from the Rhodesian perspective, Britain’s David Owen tried to work with the Zambians and Joe Garba of Nigeria to bring Ian Smith and Joshua Nkomo together for secret negotiations in Lusaka in August 1978. The diplomacy leading up to this meeting is explored, especially around Nkomo’s insistence and need to involve Mugabe as part of his promise not to break up the Patriotic Front. As numerous sources explain, Nkomo kept to his word not to negotiate a transfer of power from Smith without Mugabe, but Mugabe refused the pressures from the Nigerians to accept further negotiations, mostly because the offer would have required Mugabe to a take a secondary role to Nkomo. The fallout of the meeting is examined, as it led to the heightening of the war and increased accusations that Nkomo was ready to “sell-out” the Patriotic Front.
None of the rulers from the time of Abdur Rahman’s death until the communists seized power in 1978 had his reputation for violence, and the country enjoyed a long peace from the 1930s through the early 1970s. Our theory can explain why despite substantial political order, property rights did not develop much: the rulers who made minor progress in establishing legal property rights had very little state capacity and could not maintain political control, and there was never much progress in establishing political constraints. The communist governments faced even fewer constraints and were largely insulated from local institutions, which contributed to a massively unsuccessful effort to redistribute land, while the Taliban, despite providing some semblance of order and recognizing the importance of customary and traditional institutions, were largely unconstrained and without much administrative capacity to implement any sort of reform. Together, these developments illustrate a key implication of the theory: meaningful progress in establishing property rights requires a monopoly on coercion, high state capacity, strong political constraints on rulers, and inclusive political and legal institutions. Weakness of any of these elements can prevent the emergence of private property rights.
The thematics of the Cold War, including the daily ambient threat of nuclear annihilation, permeate much of Stoppard’s writing – implicitly in the absurdity and fatalism of early plays like Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead and explicitly in works dealing with interactions across the Iron Curtain like Squaring the Circle and Professional Foul.
After the armistice on the Western Front in 1918, the United States provided major food aid programs across Central and Eastern Europe. The American Relief Administration and the American Red Cross rushed into these fragile new nation-states where violence was ongoing with programs aimed largely at children. The JDC jumped aboard other American emergency relief efforts, which helped it reach Poland and later Russia, where Jews were in greatest need. Deployed around Europe, American Jews distributed emergency food relief, medicines, sanitary supplies, and clothing during harsh winters. Much like American postwar diplomacy carried out by the ARA and through private loans with tacit and direct support from the US government, Jewish “diplomacy” was carried out by the JDC, a private humanitarian association. American Jews led the way for American humanitarians of all kinds: as food remitters and as the first American organization in Soviet Russia. American Jewish relief paradoxically appeared as a peripheral humanitarian undertaking and as a central partner in the main humanitarian projects of the day.
The culmination of an ambitious and unique campaign to make humanitarianism self-sufficient, comprehensive reconstruction work became the focus of and heir to all previous international Jewish social welfare work. This chapter considers this humanitarian response to Jewish impoverishment as a result of war. Superimposing American wealth and Progressivism onto long-standing Jewish self-help ideology, prewar vocational training, housing construction, and agricultural colonization were revived and expanded, especially in the Soviet Union. Crucially, this involved the creation of two American-Western European foundations to foster Jewish microlending and cooperative systems in Eastern Europe and Palestine. Jewish reconstruction sat somewhere between state social welfare and international development. The crash of 1929 made economic relief the primary form of Jewish relief and serves as an endpoint to the narrative.
The Joint Distribution Committee failed to coordinate effectively among the reactive, incoherent international health campaigns undertaken to prevent the spread of typhus. Reactions to this failure to make public health more sensitive to Jewish needs resulted in the establishment of autonomous Jewish health programs. Jewish social medicine thus flourished, with American Jews, including Hadassah, acting as the bridge from the prewar years. Gradually, Jewish American workers left Europe and turned over work to European Jewish organizations and local Jews. These public health programs allowed Jews to reconstruct and even seek to improve their local status through incremental change, without state sanction. Furthermore, medicine was uncontroversial within Jewish communities and Jewish health professionals were relatively abundant. Unlike battling disease, which required governmental collaboration that was difficult to achieve, social medicine could work as a form of apolitical resistance to oppression.
The Joint Distribution Committee cooperated with other American organizations to feed Jewish children after the armistice, more successfully than what was achieved in public health. But Jews were always concerned about the Jewish future, and these worries manifested in heated Eastern European Jewish debates over the right way to bring up Jewish children in the postwar economy. Jewish organizations could only achieve so much in terms of exporting Progressive child welfare schemes to Poland. Their vision of child welfare and self-help depended on an improving economy and the related ability of local Jews to absorb the initiatives begun by American Jews. When such improvements failed to materialize outside Palestine, the JDC felt morally obliged to continue its work, constructing a collective welfare system that in many ways aspired to that of a social welfare state.
Where does the Russian case or, rather, the two distinct periods of terrorism in Russia, stand vis-à-vis the world’s historical waves of terrorism, from the late nineteenth century to the early twenty-first century? What are the key aspects specific to the main types of terrorism in post-Soviet Russia (i.e. terrorism by separatist-Islamist rebels in Chechnya and the broader North Caucasian region in the course of the first post-Soviet decades, and the more recent phenomenon of transnationalised, but home-grown, Islamist terrorism inspired by ‘global jihad’)? How specific are they, compared to typologically similar varieties of terrorism elsewhere? How does the rise and fall of terrorism in post-Soviet Russia relate to the factors of sociopolitical and socio-economic transition, regime type, functionality and legitimacy of state power, public perceptions and transnationalisation, in general and as compared to terrorism in the Russian Empire? How can very low levels of domestic terrorism during the Soviet period be explained? Finally, does history teach us anything? Can any lessons be gleaned from almost three decades of the more recent, contemporary history of terrorism in post-Soviet Russia? Have they been? If so, do they apply to Russia alone or more generally? These are just some of the questions that the angle taken in this volume raises in relation to Russia and that require both its main historical periods of terrorist activity to be addressed.
This chapter examines the politically charged meanings and contested readings of repatriation and screening in the French zone, challenging historical presumptions about French insensitivity and ‘pro-Soviet’ policies, supposedly exemplified by the handing over of Baltic and Ukrainian DPs in the autumn of 1945. It demonstrates that French positions changed in Paris (and in the zone) before the adoption of the UN landmark resolution of 12 February 1946, which officially recognized all DPs’ right to asylum. In doing so, it illuminates the vicissitudes of repatriation, repatriation incentives being highly contingent on changing international circumstances, institutional rivalries and local realities. While the chapter recognises the importance of diplomats and national politicians in formulating repatriation policies, it also reveals how repatriation and screening crucially depended on how French administrators re-interpreted and implemented these instructions in the zone.
In this article, I draw from organizational imprinting theory to illuminate the impact of the Soviet legacy on contemporary Russian economic geography and regional policy. I argue that central coordination in the creation and regulation of Russian urban agglomerations is connected to a socialist imprinted paradigm associated with the Soviet economic regionalization model and territorial-production complexes (TPCs). I conduct a qualitative historical study to analyze the role of the foundational environment and the dynamics in the development of this imprint. I propose that this imprint effect is prone to reproduction in contemporary regional development strategies and community-based paradigms due to exaptation and cultural-cognitive persistence. The article extends the literature of socialist imprinting by demonstrating how imprints may emerge, transform, and affect localized organizational communities in transition economies and highlights the role of imprinted paradigms in policymaking and regional development.
Thousands of Roma were killed in Ukraine by the Nazis and auxiliary police on the spot. There are more than 50,000 Roma in today’s Ukraine, represented by second and third generation decendants of the genocide survivors. The discussion on Roma identity cannot be isolated from the memory of the genocide, which makes the struggle over the past a reflexive landmark that mobilizes the Roma movement. About twenty Roma genocide memorials have been erected in Ukraine during last decade, and in 2016 the national memorial of the Roma genocide was opened in Babi Yar. However, scholars do not have a clear picture of memory narratives and memory practices of the Roma genocide in Ukraine. A comprehensive analysis of the contemporary situation is not possible without an examination of the history and memory of the Roma genocide before 1991.
Chapter 8 examines the Cold War during 1984, a presidential election year. It featured a dramatic shift in US foreign policy, as the need to avert a major crisis conjoined with domestic imperatives. The pragmatists grasped the symbiosis. If his ambition of reducing nuclear arms was to be realized, Reagan would need to win a second term. His immediate political interests would be served by forging a more flexible, constructive approach with Moscow. Reagan would now emphasize the peaceful side of “peace through strength” – a candidate who could be peacemaker and statesman. The chapter provides in-depth analysis of Reagan’s move toward the center. A string of new US initiatives were undertaken without any Soviet movement: Reagan’s conciliatory address on US–Soviet relations; the pursuit of new agreements with Moscow (diplomatic and military); the reversal of Carter’s 1980 sanctions; and a White House invitation to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Although these events did not yield a major diplomatic breakthrough, 1984 witnessed a thaw in US–Soviet relations, in which the sense of fear, paranoia, and distrust were eased. Orwellian scenarios did not come to pass.
The epilogue provides an overview of the end of the Cold War. It discusses the Reagan–Gorbachev relationship, their efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons at a remarkable summit in Reykjavik (1986), and the INF Treaty of 1987. The chapter analyzes the reasons for the end of the Cold War and the change in Soviet policy. I argue that although SDI was an important part in Soviet thinking, the key changes effected from 1989 were primarily the result of factors originating in the USSR and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. These were factors largely (but not entirely) independent of the policies pursued by US administrations. They include Gorbachev’s own evolving predilections (reinforced by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster); Soviet high politics; long-term structural problems besetting the Soviet economy; the role of non-state actors; and the courageous efforts of citizens and peace groups across Eastern Europe. The epilogue concludes by highlighting the foreign policy turns of Carter and Reagan, and their significance for the Cold War. I argue that only by examining the full landscape – international and domestic – can we truly understand how US foreign policy is crafted.
Chapter 6 covers the first three months of 1983, which featured several important developments. By the mid-point of his first term, Reagan was facing a political crisis: an economic recession, a nationwide nuclear freeze movement, sagging approval ratings, heavy defeats in the midterm elections, and waning support for his military program. To counter the freeze movement and revive domestic support, Reagan would unveil a dramatic proposal for a space-based missile defense system, to protect the United States from nuclear attack. The Strategic Defense Initiative (or, to its critics, “Star Wars”) emerged as a major development in the story of the end of the Cold War. I explain the origins of SDI, arguing that the proposal stemmed from a domestic political crisis as much as strategic one. The chapter analyzes the Soviet response to SDI and the ramifications for the Cold War, as well as discussing Reagan’s famous “Evil Empire” speech of March 1983.
Chapter 4 covers the first year of Reagan’s presidency. Living up to conservative expectations, his administration embarked upon the most hardline, anti-communist agenda in at least two decades. To compel the Soviets to negotiate on arms control, Reagan would oversee the largest peacetime military buildup in American history. But there was little evidence of any strategy to complement the buildup. The Reagan administration engaged in anti-Soviet rhetoric, rejected the idea of a summit with Brezhnev, and refused to offer any serious arms control proposals. The confrontational approach raised US–Soviet tensions during 1981. This chapter also discusses Reagan’s support for the Contras in Nicaragua, which prompted resistance from Democrats in Congress, culminating in the Boland Amendment of late 1982. Finally, the chapter analyzes the crisis in Poland, which saw the imposition of martial law amid the movement led by Solidarity (a non-communist trade union). I discuss the complex factors behind Reagan’s response: his ideological beliefs, European–Soviet trade relations, the influence of the AFL-CIO, and conservative criticism.
Chapter 5 covers the second year of the Reagan administration, and the growing public concern over nuclear war. It discusses the rise of a major grassroots movement, which called for a freeze in the production, deployment, and testing of nuclear weapons by the US and the Soviet Union. The nuclear freeze campaign soon morphed into the largest peacetime peace movement in American history. The force of the movement would make foreign policy the political liability of the Reagan administration. Public demands for a “freeze” on nuclear weapons began to elicit support from within the Democratic Party. The freeze campaign, and a broader “peace movement,” became the Democrats’ most potent political weapon against Reagan’s conservative revolution. The chapter analyzes the administration’s struggle to combat the movement, and persuade the public of the benefits of its own strategy for reducing nuclear weapons. Among other aspects, it discusses Reagan unveiling of a START initiative. By late 1982, Reagan’s policies had raised tensions with Moscow, upset NATO allies, weakened support for his arms buildup, and generated antinuclear movements across America and Western Europe.
Chapter 9 covers 1985, beginning with the election of Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet leader. It discusses the Soviet “new thinking,” Gorbachev’s desire to implement reform, and his decision to remove Gromyko as foreign minister. For the newly re-elected US president, Gorbachev’s arrival was perfectly timed. Riding a wave of popularity and political strength, Reagan stood by the policy of engagement and moderation. He rejected the advice of hard-liners who persisted in opposing realistic negotiation. Despite his early misgivings, Reagan realized that Gorbachev was a “somewhat different breed” of Soviet leader. The Geneva summit of November 1985 – the first meeting of a US and Soviet leader in six and a half years – marked the end of the Second Cold War. Although no agreement on arms control emerged, the meeting set a new tone for US–Soviet relations. It provided a base for trust between two men with different backgrounds and philosophies. Reagan and Gorbachev viewed the summit as a personal breakthrough. There were many issues to resolve, and Gorbachev’s policies would evolve gradually. But the events of 1985 did much to allay the tension and mutual suspicion between the two nations.
Chapter 3 covers the period from November 1979 through to the end of Carter’s presidency. On December 24, 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought détente to a final, shuddering halt. Together with the US response (the force of which would surprise Moscow), it marked the beginning of a “second” Cold War. It was a conflict that grew more tense, dangerous, and unpredictable over the next four years. Afghanistan followed on the heels of one of the most humiliating episodes in modern US history. The Iran hostage crisis became headline news and struck an emotional chord with the American public. As election season began, Iran and Afghanistan played into the hands of Carter’s critics, who accused him of “weakness.” The world’s number one power, so they argued, could neither stem the tide of Soviet expansion nor bring home the captive Americans. The setbacks allowed political opponents such as Ronald Reagan to declare that the pursuit of SALT had been misguided all along. With criticism mounting, Carter would stake his credibility on a vigorous, alarmist response to the Soviet invasion. It was, he claimed, “the most serious threat to world peace since the Second World War.”
Chapter 2 examines the period from January to October 1979. Domestic troubles spiralled during Carter’s third year at the White House. An economic recession, mounting inflation (resulting from a new oil crisis), and intraparty disagreements all undermined support for the president. Together they conjured images of an administration in turmoil. As the year progressed, the idea of “national weakness” gained traction – invoked by opponents of Carter’s foreign and defense policies. In 1979 Carter came under further pressure to align foreign policy with his political needs. His decision to approve the production of the MX program appeared perverse in light of everything that had preceded it. Here was a notable policy departure, veering well beyond the sort of compromise or rhetorical device that Carter had been forced to deploy earlier in his presidency. Soon after, the bungled US response to the “discovery” of a Soviet brigade in Cuba undermined relations with Moscow, just weeks after the Vienna summit. The political maneuvering, and the administration’s mishandling of the episode, damaged the prospects for ratification of the SALT II Treaty.
Chapter 7 covers the remainder of 1983, widely regarded as the most dangerous year of the second half of the Cold War. A series of events raised US–Soviet tensions and public fears of nuclear war: Reagan’s SDI announcement; the Soviet destruction of a Korean airliner, which cost the lives of 62 Americans; the US invasion of Grenada; antinuclear protests across Western Europe and America; the US deployment of INF missiles in Europe; and the Able Archer “war scare.” But these events obscure a development quite as significant: Reagan’s growing awareness of the political context (at home and abroad), and signs of a readiness to depart from the hard-liners’ position. With Shultz’s prompting, the president sought to initiate a dialogue with Moscow and became receptive to the idea of modifying the US approach to arms control. He reacted with restraint to the KAL disaster, and toned down the anti-Soviet rhetoric. Even before the Able Archer crisis there had been a change in Reagan’s attitude. It reflected his own moderate views, a desire to improve relations, and an increased sense of his domestic imperatives. As his election campaign began, Reagan was pragmatist was emerging.