We study the effect of an immigration ban on the self-selection of immigrants along cultural traits, and the transmission of these traits to the second generation. We show theoretically that restricting immigration incentivizes to settle abroad individuals with higher attachment to their origin culture, who, under free mobility, would rather choose circular migration. Once abroad, these individuals tend to convey their cultural traits to their children. As a consequence, restrictive immigration policies can foster the diffusion of cultural traits across boundaries and generations. We focus on religiosity, which is one of the most persistent and distinctive cultural traits, and exploit the 1973 immigration ban in West Germany (Anwerbestopp) as a natural experiment. Through a diff-in-diff analysis, we find that second generations born to parents treated by the Anwerbestopp show higher religiosity.

Economic studies of religion tend to focus on religious affiliation and attendance at religious services to the exclusion of other dimensions of religion, including religious belief. We address this lacuna, using data from the World Values Survey to construct an index of religious beliefs based on whether an individual believes in God, heaven, hell, an immortal soul, and the afterlife. Following the approach in a seminal article, we compare the roles of religious beliefs and attendance in determining economic values related to cooperation, patriarchy, institutional trust, lawfulness, thrift, markets, and market fairness. Controlling for denominational, country and period fixed effects and a set of individual-level characteristics, we find that religious beliefs matter for six of these seven values, relative to five for attendance. In addition, beliefs are more important than attendance for promarket and patriarchal values and less important for thrift, market fairness, lawfulness, and institutional trust. We also consider the relationships between beliefs, attendance, and economic values for eight religious’ affiliations: Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, other religions, and non-religious. Taken together, beliefs and attendance are most important for patriarchal values, promarket attitudes, lawfulness, and institutional trust. Relative to attendance, beliefs matter most for patriarchal attitudes and least for institutional trust. Our results suggest that religious beliefs constitute an important dimension of religious life. An exclusive focus on attendance may understate the role of religion in economic values.

Some cultural evolutionary models predict that under stressful reductions of well-being, individuals will be more attracted and fastidiously adhere to traditional systems of norms that promote solidarity and cooperation. As religious systems can bolster human relationships with a variety of mechanisms, the material insecurity hypothesis of religion posits that individual religiosity will increase under conditions of material insecurity. The bulk of the literature up to this point has been correlational and cross-national. Here, across 14 field sites, we examine the causal role that educational attainment and food insecurity play in religiosity. We find that years of formal education and food insecurity do not consistently contribute to individual religiosity cross-culturally. We conclude with a discussion of some theoretical and methodological implications. As a general workflow for cross-cultural causal research in the quantitative social sciences, the present work is a modest but necessary first step in reliably estimating causation in the material insecurity hypothesis of religiosity.

This paper analyzes relationships between Islamic religious behaviors and civic engagement in Europe and North America. Using data from an original survey of Muslims in Canada, France, Germany, the UK, and the United States, it finds that Muslim religious behaviors relate to civic behaviors in varied ways. The conventional distinction between public and private religious behaviors does not graft perfectly on to Islamic religious behaviors, but the way Islamic religious behaviors straddle the public-private divide help explain their relationships with civic behaviors. Mosque attendance, an example of public religious behavior, is positively associated with secular organizational membership and mainstream political behaviors, and negatively associated with protest activity. Private, or quasi-private, religious behaviors are more commonly associated with protest activities. There are some national-level differences in patterns of civic engagement after controlling for other determinants, but not many, suggesting similar mechanisms mobilize and facilitate Muslim civic incorporation across national contexts. The results suggest that Islamic religious behaviors create diverse opportunities for Muslims to engage as civic citizens.

This study examines the intricate relationship between religion and attitudes towards terrorist violence, with a specific focus on individual sympathy for al-Qaeda and justification for suicide bombings. While religion has the capacity to promote both harmony and social cohesion, as well as division and conflict, it is crucial to explore the complex and contradictory nature of religious beliefs in relation to individuals’ attitudes towards terrorism. To address this paradox, the study differentiates between religion as a belief and religion as an ideology. Drawing from a subset of the 2011 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, encompassing countries with substantial Muslim populations (Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey), the research investigates how religiosity and political Islam influence public attitudes towards terrorism, considering political and economic grievances in these contexts. Multivariate statistical analysis suggests that religiosity and political Islam exhibit distinct associations with the justification of suicide bombings and support for al-Qaeda, and these dynamics vary across countries. Ultimately, the study underscores the importance of perceiving religiosity not as a threat but as a potential remedy to prevent extremism by fostering an educated and deeper understanding of religious principles.

Secularism—i.e., the separation between the state and religious institutions—is a fundamental characteristic of liberal democracies, yet support for secular arrangements varies significantly across Western countries. In Canada, such attitudinal divergences are observable at the regional level, with citizens from Quebec displaying higher levels of support for secularism than other Canadians. In this paper, we test three hypotheses to account for this regional discrepancy: religiosity, liberal values, and out-group prejudice. Using data from an online panel survey (n = 2,000), our findings suggest that support for secularism in Quebec is mostly explained by the province's lower baseline levels of religiosity, anticlerical feelings, and by its distinctive understanding of liberalism. These factors are likely to result from Quebec's unique religious and sociohistorical history. Results also suggest that while negative feelings toward religious minorities are positively correlated with support for secularism across the entire country, negative feelings toward ethnic minorities are associated with lower support for secularism in Quebec. These findings disprove the commonly held assumption according to which support for secularism is driven by ethnic prejudice in Quebec.

While grain farming has seen a major shift toward organic production in recent years, the USA continues to lag behind with domestic demand continuing to outpace domestic supply, making the USA an all-around net importer. The Midwestern USA is poised to help remedy this imbalance; however, farmers continue to slowly transition to organic production systems. Existing literature has identified three prevalent narratives that farmers use to frame their organic transition: environmentalism, farm-family legacy and economic factors, in addition to a four and untested religiosity narrative. This study sought to better understand how these different narratives frame grain farmers’ thought processes for transitioning from conventional production systems to certified organic production systems. We co-created narratives around organic production with farmers, which resulted in four passages aligned with the literature: farm-family legacy, economic values, environmental values and Christianity and stewarding Eden. Then, we mailed a paper survey to conventional, in transition and certified organic Indiana grain farmers in order to test how these different narratives motivated organic production. We found that the most prevalent narrative around organic production is the farm-family legacy, which specifically resonated with midsize farmers. We also found that the religious stewardship narrative resonated with a substantial number of organic and mixed practice farmers, which is likely due to Amish farmers within the sample. These results shed light on the role that narratives and associated values play in organic practice use and can inform the organic efforts of agricultural professionals.

Existing research proves the connection between religion and social attitudes toward biopolitical topics. The purpose of our analyses was to deepen reflection on these connections. We explored the internal pluralization of religiosity and ideological self-placement and their significance for orientations toward abortion, in vitro fertilization, and homosexuality, subjects of intensive political debate engaging the Catholic Church. Our analysis, based on a nationally representative sample of Catholics in Poland, leads to the conclusion that, despite high indicators of religiosity, the capacity of the Roman Catholic Church to form a consistent cognitive perspective among its followers is limited. Even among Catholics who present fully institutionalized religiosity (~25%), only half agree with the Church's teaching on biopolitical themes. These findings are discussed in the context of the importance of intra-religious pluralism for understanding the ideological role of religion in countries with high levels of belonging to one, dominant form of it.

Same-sex marriage has risen to the top of political agendas across Latin America, but it is still illegal in many countries. Public support about the issue varies greatly, and the roles of the courts, presidents, and legislatures have also differed. This article focuses on legislators because they are charged with representing the public and converting demands into policy. Although many legislatures have now voted on the issue, the literature has not intensively examined the policy makers’ attitudes toward same-sex marriage. This study applies a theoretical framework that extends theories considering context and social contact and uses a survey of the region’s legislators to study the correlates of support for same-sex marriage. Although the study also tests for individual-level variables (e.g., gender and ideology), the models focus on the contextual role of religiosity. The results show that having more secular colleagues encourages even pious legislators to support same-sex marriage.

The degree to which individuals prefer smaller sooner versus larger delayed rewards serves as a powerful predictor of their impulsivity towards a number of different kinds of rewards. Here we test the limits of its predictive ability within a variety of cognitive and social domains. Across several large samples of subjects, individuals who prefer smaller more immediate rewards (steeper discounters) are less reflective (or more impulsive) in their choices, preferences, and beliefs. First, steeper discounters used more automatic, less controlled choice strategies, giving more intuitive but incorrect responses on the Cognitive Reflection Test (replicating previous findings); employing a suboptimal probability matching heuristic for a one-shot gamble (rather than maximizing their probability of reward); and relying less on optimal planning in a two-stage reinforcement learning task. Second, steeper discounters preferred to consume information that was less complex and multi-faceted, as suggested by their self-reported Need for Cognitive Closure, their use of short-form social media (i.e., Twitter), and their preferred news sources (in particular, whether or not they preferred National Public Radio over other news sources). Third, steeper discounters had interpersonal and religious beliefs that are associated with reduced epistemic complexity: they were more likely to believe that the behavior of others could be explained by fixed rather than dynamic factors, and they believed more strongly in God and in the afterlife. Together these findings provide evidence for a link between individual differences in temporal discounting for monetary rewards and preferences for the path of least resistance (less reflective and/or more automatic modes of processing) across a variety of domains.

Recent research has shown that religious individuals are much more resistant to utilitarian modes of thinking than their less religious counterparts, but the reason for this is not clear. We propose that a meta-ethical belief that morality is rooted in inviolable divine commands (i.e., endorsement of Divine Command Theory) may help explain this finding. We present a novel 20-item scale measuring a belief that morality is founded on divine authority. The scale shows good internal reliability and convergent and discriminant validity. Study 1 found that this scale fully mediated the relationship that various religiosity measures had with a deontological thinking style in our sample of American adults. It also accounted for the link between religiosity and social conservative values. Furthermore, the relationship between the scale and these outcome variables held after statistically controlling for variables related to actively open-minded thinking and the Big Five. Study 2 replicated the results using naturalistic moral dilemmas that placed deontological and utilitarian concerns in conflict, and showed that the results of Study 1 cannot be explained by differences in moral foundations (e.g., concern for authority more generally) or differences in the perceived function of rules. Quite the contrary, endorsement of the divine origins of morality fully mediated the relationship religiosity had with the so-called “binding” foundations (i.e., Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity). Our findings highlight the importance of meta-ethical beliefs for understanding individual differences in moral judgment.

Although bullshit is common in everyday life and has attracted attention from philosophers, its reception (critical or ingenuous) has not, to our knowledge, been subject to empirical investigation. Here we focus on pseudo-profound bullshit, which consists of seemingly impressive assertions that are presented as true and meaningful but are actually vacuous. We presented participants with bullshit statements consisting of buzzwords randomly organized into statements with syntactic structure but no discernible meaning (e.g., “Wholeness quiets infinite phenomena”). Across multiple studies, the propensity to judge bullshit statements as profound was associated with a variety of conceptually relevant variables (e.g., intuitive cognitive style, supernatural belief). Parallel associations were less evident among profundity judgments for more conventionally profound (e.g., “A wet person does not fear the rain”) or mundane (e.g., “Newborn babies require constant attention”) statements. These results support the idea that some people are more receptive to this type of bullshit and that detecting it is not merely a matter of indiscriminate skepticism but rather a discernment of deceptive vagueness in otherwise impressive sounding claims. Our results also suggest that a bias toward accepting statements as true may be an important component of pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity.

Sacred or protected values have important influences on decision making, particularly in the context of intergroup disputes. Thus far, we know little about the process of a value becoming sacred or why one person may be more likely than another to hold a sacred value. We present evidence that participation in religious ritual and perceived threat to the group lead people to be more likely to consider preferences as protected or sacred values. Specifically, three studies carried out with Americans and Palestinians show: (a) that the more people participate in religious ritual the more likely they are to report a preference to be a sacred value (Studies 1–3); (b) that people claim more sacred values when they are reminded of religious ritual (Study 2); and (c) that the effect of religious ritual on the likelihood of holding a sacred value is amplified by the perception of high threat to the in-group (Study 3). We discuss implications of these findings for understanding intergroup conflicts, and suggest avenues for future research into the emergence and spread of sacred values.