Liberia’s declaration of independence in 1847 was motivated in part by the Liberian government’s dependence on revenue from trade. Previous histories of Liberia have argued that there was a dramatic shift from protectionist policies in the nineteenth century to a policy of "open door" from the interwar period onward. This conclusion was based on the restriction of foreign trade to specific ports through so-called ports of entry laws dating back to the 1830s, and not abolished until 1931. There were also active debates among the Liberian elite about how protectionist Liberia should be in contemporary political discourse. This chapter uses new data on Liberian tariff rates to compare its trade policy to that of countries in Latin America and Asia. It finds that Liberia’s tariffs were somewhere between the protectionism of Latin America and the free trade policies of Asia, but closer to the latter. Despite rhetoric about the "closed door," trade was too important to the incomes of Liberian elites to restrict it.

Born of confidence at the height of optimism for economic globalization, the WTO has failed so far to fulfill all the high hopes of its founders. WTO members have largely been unable to agree on new rules to meet new commercial needs, and global trade governance has been fragmented by a resulting proliferation of local and regional trade agreements. The rise of developing countries - and especially the rise of China - have transformed global trade negotiations. The return of economic nationalism in the United States and elsewhere has accelerated a retreat from multilateral trade liberalization and other global solutions in trade.

The pandemic has turned the world inward and toward such perennial false promises of self-sufficiency as localism and protectionism. The trade links made possible by global supply chains are being questioned along with all else that connects the global economy. Amid this questioning, in the ongoing battle to end the pandemic, tariffs and other barriers to trade in medicines and other medical goods must be eliminated; vaccine nationalism must be replaced by vaccine multilateralism; and trade restrictions on the global supply of food must be avoided.

New trade rules for the new pandemic world must begin with long needed rules that have yet to be agreed after decades of deadlocked multilateral trade negotiations. Trade must be freed in international trade in manufactured goods, agricultural goods, and services.

Chapter 2 discusses the notion of populism as approached in the political science, legal, and economic literature. It explains in detail how populism is understood in the book, what actions it is associated with, what its principal characteristics are, and what are the possible reasons behind the success of populist politicians. It analyzes the difficult relations between populism and liberal democracy and liberal markets. In particular, by studying the experiences of Hungary and Poland, the chapter provides the reader with two case studies which can be used in an analysis of how a populists’ government’s rule specifically affects liberal democracy and liberal economy. This discussion provides the reader with a concrete context within which the influence of populism on competition law systems can be studied. The chapter concludes with a finding that populism may work as a driver of illiberal change in democracy and the economy.

Unlike the industrial policies of other countries, which are mostly guidelines, China’s industrial policy is more like a corporate strategy that approves/disapproves projects and mobilizes the country’s resources to help its firms achieve dominance. Due to its size, the effects of China’s industrial policy have a powerful global impact. The general pattern of its industrial policy is that the state identifies certain industries and determines them to be high priorities. Once an industry is designated as strategically important, the state will mobilize all necessary resources from across the country to develop this industry. The state will pick some domestic firms as national champions, and erects barriers to foreign firms entering the industry. With a large, protected domestic market, the designated firms will be able to quickly realize the necessary scale and to lower unit production costs. Once the designated domestic firm becomes efficient, the state will support it as it goes out and dominates the world market. The cases of electronic vehicle batteries, solar panels, and high-speed rail are used to show how China’s industrial policy helps its firms to gain global dominance.

This chapter contributes to understanding the possible impacts of China’s Cyber Security Law once that law is fully implemented, as it concludes that Chinese authorities conduct an ongoing cost–benefit analysis in evaluating data localisation policies and practices, and that this partly explains China’s delay in implementing the data localisation provisions within the law. This is also consistent with the longstanding practice of the Chinese government to create fuzzy logic laws in areas of rapid change in order to allow for flexibility in implementation depending on the milieu. The costs and benefits of data localisation vary over time, requiring continual re-evaluation; hence, the laws can be implemented and reinterpreted in line with fuzzy logic. In particular, what is meant by ‘important data’ can be changed according to the policy considerations outlined in this chapter.

The key provisions of China’s Cyber Security Law relating to data localisation and data exits still allow for competing interpretations by regulators, which makes compliance difficult, even in 2021. The further attempt to include ‘backdoor’ keys to encryption in this law is also noted, although foreign companies have managed to exert some influence on this point and other implementation issues. The Cyber Security Law is an important and high-profile development in Chinese cyber policy history. It created much more controversy than the Anti-Terrorism Law explained in the previous chapter. In recent years, China has gradually adopted a series of laws, regulations and macro policies in the field of cyber security and data protection aimed at turning the country into a ‘cyber superpower’ and boosting its digital economy. The Cyber Security Law, which came into partial effect from 1 June 2017 (with an official 18-month phase-in period for the data localisation provisions), is a milestone in the development of China’s legal framework for cyber security and data protection. The law also provides further evidence of the inherent tensions underlying the innovation policies described in Chapter 3. However, vague regulations allow regulators leeway to adjust their aims in response to broader economic and political trends by means of implementing rules. Finally, clarifying the vaguest provisions in the Cyber Security Law through more transparent rules may provide an opportunity for the Chinese government to decide which way it is heading: towards further innovation or further restriction beyond the ongoing US–China trade war.

In 2017, the Chinese Communist Party began to pay close attention to the development of China’s artificial intelligence (AI) industry, likely motivated by rising tension between the USA and China. This chapter documents the suite of policies that followed and their impact on the evolution of the AI industry in China. First, the AI industry has become another policy tool for the ruling Chinese Communist Party, especially during national emergencies. Second, the AI push likely will further encourage vertical integration of the AI value chain, especially for lead firms. Third, rather than foster market or modular transactions along the AI value chain, Chinese government subsidies and preference for national champions will foster relational and even captive ties between actors along the AI value chain. Ironically, these policies may encourage fragmentation of data architecture in China instead of consolidation.

The Trump administration’s multi-front trade war dramatically escalated with the imposition of extraordinary tariffs on Chinese imports in 2018. Corporate America has responded with a concerted campaign of resistance. We document these efforts – through extensive participation in notice and comment and public coalition-building – and show that corporate opposition to the trade war is primarily a consequence of firms' sourcing and production linkages with China. In contrast, we find far weaker efforts by anti-trade firms to support the trade war, whether to insulate themselves from import competition or to confront Chinese trade practices. We therefore describe and empirically illustrate the politics of global production networks, and highlight that scholars of trade politics should not neglect opposition to the Trump trade agenda arising from globally integrated firms. Global order in the area of trade hangs in the balance in an ongoing fight between corporate globalism and populist nationalism.

It analyses the trade outcomes of the G20 Hangzhou Summit, by revealing its position on strengthening the multilateral trading system, advancing negotiations on Doha issues, ratifying the Trade Facilitation Agreement, opposing protectionism on trade and supporting plurilateral trade agreements like Environmental Goods Agreement. It points out that the G20 Hangzhou Summit will be beneficial to the development of both WTO and G20. It also discusses specifically the importance of including issues in regional trade arrangements, the possibility of establishing a World Investment and Trade Organization (WITO) and the role of China in this aspect.