The Framers failed to anticipate universal suffrage and the American two-party system, let alone how these developments would change their system. Instead of letting Congress debate and decide policy, voters can now decide many issues directly. The chapter describes Americans grudging recognition that partisanship can lead to stable, responsible government. It then describes how 20th Century scholars developed rational voter models to formalize these ideas. It also asks how social voting, party leadership, identity politics, candidate charisma, and deep-pocketed donors change these results. Finally, it also argues that the existence of legislative deadlock lets comparatively small minorities take centrist compromises off the table. This forces the party system into presenting extreme choices that most voters oppose. The ensuing standoffs can last for years years and sometimes decades.

This chapter reviews and reconciles two theories of voting. Rational man models treat voters as actors seeking to maximize their material self-interest. Because their policy knowledge is limited, they often rely on ideology, trusted figures, and information picked up in the course of everyday activities to reach a decision. By comparison, survey evidence has shown that many voters are social, i.e. routinely adopt the opinions of those around them. The chapter concludes by describing various theoretical frameworks which unify these models. The combined models typically predict new behaviors in which initially small majorities are typically amplified; established opinions resist change for long periods; and very dramatic, once-in-a-generation events can abruptly reshuffle voters beliefs.

Like many nations, the United States is undergoing a revolution in economic and political geography. The shift from an industrial to a knowledge economy is feeding both political polarization and economic polarization. Scholars of American political development have long stressed that the United States’ diverse economic geography and strongly territorialized institutions encourage sectional policy conflict. Prominent scholars of contemporary politics have similarly argued that territorially based representation encourages policy responsiveness to local communities. We argue to the contrary that several key mediating factors – the increasing antiurban and status quo bias of American political institutions, the nationalization of US party coalitions, and the path-dependent character of inherited policy regimes – have greatly weakened the representation of place-based economic interests (PBEIs) in contemporary American politics. Indeed, because of these “filters,” each of the nation’s two major party coalitions manifests what we call a “PBEI paradox,” a set of policy commitments starkly at odds with the underlying economic needs of the areas that vote for it.

This chapter briefly reviews the books main arguments and offers limited reforms to improve the Framers design. The deepest challenges involve the characteristically 21st Century debates over COVID, global warming, and the Black Lives Matter movement. Given that even the experts disagree, neither side is likely to persuade the other any time soon. The challenge for the Constitution is to manage the debate for years and even decades. Here the best option is to promote a pragmatic politics that encourages politicians to try different solutions, and just as promptly discard them when they fail. Obvious reforms include safeguards to ensure that key research is never blocked to defend political arguments, and sunset laws that automatically eliminate statutes that fail to show results.

Chapter 9 is dedicated to three processes steering the cyclicity of protest, namely politicization, polarization, and radicalization. Simon and Klandermans elaborated on the dynamics of politicization of collective identity. A process of politicization implies support of third parties is sought and the environment becomes divided into allies and opponents. Polarization concerns distancing of the opposing camps. The more polarized the relationship becomes, the less deviation from the group’s opinions and actions is accepted and the more opposing opinions and acts are rejected. Eventually, this may result in radicalization. Also, in declining movements with many “exiters,” sustained participation can indicate radicalization. Take the violent Black Panthers, which played a short but important part in the civil rights movement, believing that Martin Luther King’s non-violent campaign had failed and any promised changes to their lifestyle via the “traditional” civil rights movement would take too long or simply would not be introduced at all. Hence, in light of the declining civil right movement, both disengagement and radical sustained participation were observed. To understand the social psychological correlates of the volatility of protest, politicization, polarization, and radicalization warrants elaborate investigation.

As scholars and activists seek to define and promote greater corporate political responsibility (CPR), they will benefit from understanding practitioner perspectives and how executives are responding to rising scrutiny of their political influences, reputational risk and pressure from employees, customers and investors to get involved in civic, political, and societal issues. This chapter draws on firsthand conversations with practitioners, including executives in government affairs; sustainability; senior leadership; and diversity, equity and inclusion, during the launch of a university-based CPR initiative. I summarize practitioner motivations, interests, barriers and challenges related to engaging in conversations about CPR, as well as committing or acting to improve CPR. Following the summary, I present implications for further research and several possible paths forward, including leveraging practitioners’ value on accountability, sustaining external calls for transparency, strengthening awareness of systems, and reframing CPR as part of a larger dialogue around society’s “social contract.”

Most critics of direct election of the president assume that it would require a runoff provision. Although it is possible that such a rule would encourage third-party candidacies, there is no need to institute a runoff under direct election of the president. Advocates of the electoral college are correct that America is better off without a second-ballot runoff election. They are incorrect, however, that the electoral college is the only way to avoid such a runoff. Although there is no voting system that guarantees that the most preferred candidate will win, both plurality election and ranked choice voting are more likely to produce the Condorcet winner than the electoral college. Neither system requires a second ballot. The electoral college is not essential for a two-party system and actually encourages third parties to run presidential candidates and discourages party competition in many states. There is no evidence that direct election of the president would polarize political parties. Similarly, there would be little incentive for secret deals under direct election and severe constraints on the bargains third parties could make. Moreover, there is much less chance of such deals under direct election than under the contingent election provision of the electoral college.

Voters are the MVP of any coalition if they are engaged with the coalitions Agenda. How should a business publicly articulate its agenda in order to maximize voter engagement? Or, alternatively, how can messaging reduce the publics engagement with the opposing coalitions agenda? This chapter deals with these questions.

Chapter 7 examines the detrimental effects that polarization between different groups can have on individuals, groups, communities, and societies. The book thereby contrasts itself with positive perspectives on polarization and conflict in society. One important aspect that may start important instances of group polarization is how to respond to dissenting opinions, and the affective and defensive responses dissenters may trigger. Fairness concerns come with an important dark side. For example, people may go to great lengths to protect their views that they live in fair and just societies and that their group and culture are involved in what is morally right. Indeed, desperately wanting to be involved in what is morally pure can strengthen important aspects of group polarization in our modern society. This is especially the case when groups have clear group boundaries, involve some form of (authoritative or moral) direct leadership, and when group members think their tribe is fighting for a worthy moral cause. Thinking of individuals as members of other groups in abstract terms facilitates enemy thinking between different groups. People tend to adhere more to fairness principles when they act out of their own individual responsibilities than when they feel responsible to defend their group interests.

This chapter argues that two Congresses coexist in Washington, DC. The partisan Congress, which receives the bulk of public and media attention, is characterized by polarization, gridlock, and partisan conflict. But there is also the collaborative Congress, in which members work together to find common ground. Chapter 1 draws on examples from media accounts, interviews with congressional staff, and a new dataset of congressional communications to illustrate what the collaborative Congress looks like in practice and introduce the central question of the book: Why do members of Congress collaborate? The discussion of collaboration is situated in the broader literature on Congress to explain why we know so little about it and why it matters. Conflict draws attention, and Congress is rife with highly visible disagreements, leaving little room for awareness of the members who are crafting policy through negotiation, compromise, and bipartisanship. But if the partisan Congress explains why Congress is broken, the collaborative Congress can help us understand why it works, improving Congress's capacity to legislate and address pressing societal problems.

Chapter 3 describes how the Constitution created a system for control of factions. But when those factions more and more polarized around the issue of slavery, the Northern and Western national majority was unable to rule and eventually had suppress the Southern minority in the Civil War. In recent decades, much Black migration out of the South and some White migration into the Republican Party have again polarized voter sentiment into red and blue states, or two tribes. This gridlock in the national government has again created a national majority which cannot rule (see the Senate cloture procedure), in which case a new political crisis plagues the country.

This chapter examines the prospects of moderation in America today. Conceived as a form of lively dialogue with the two imaginary interlocutors, it examines concrete solutions for empowering moderates’ voice in contemporary America. Special attention is paid to organizations like Braver Angels and More in Common that seek to build civic bridges to narrow ideological divides.

This chapter analyzes the dangers posed by the politics of warfare by drawing on concrete examples from contemporary politics. It focuses on the controversial “Flight 93” essay by Michael J. Anton and shows how the rhetoric of warfare politics informed its theses and recommendations. It warns that this type of destructive politics, fueled by an apocalyptic rhetoric and Manichaean view, has become all too common in American society, and suggests a few way to fight against it.