This chapter examines the legislative powers of the States. The chapter explains that the legislative powers of the States pre-date the Australian Constitution, were made subject to the Australian Constitution but otherwise continued in force at Federation, and were confirmed by the Australia Act 1986. In general terms, the States possess plenary legislative power that allows them to make and unmake any laws they want. That power extends to amending State Constitution Acts by ordinary legislation. The plenary power of the States is subject to the possibility of restrictive procedures that regulate the way in which certain types of laws must be passed, but which do not prohibit the passing of those laws. The States also have power under the Australian Constitution to refer power to make laws to the Commonwealth Parliament and thereby expand the practical scope of federal legislative power.

This volume, part of the Feminist Judgment Series, shows how feminist legal theory along with critical race theory and intersectional modes of critique might transform immigration law. Here, a diverse collection of scholars and lawyers bring critical feminist, race and intersectional insights to Supreme Court opinions that deal with the source of the power to regulate immigration, state and local regulation of immigration, citizenship law, racial discrimination, employment law, access to public education, the rights of criminal defendants, the detention of noncitizens, and more. Feminist reasoning values the perspectives of outsiders, exposes the deep-rooted bias in the legal opinions of courts, and illuminates the effects of ostensibly neutral policies that create and maintain oppression and hierarchy. One by one, the chapters in this book reimagine the norms that drive immigration policies and practices. In place of discrimination and subordination, the authors here demand welcome and equality. Where current law omits the voice and stories of noncitizens, the authors here center their lives and experiences. Collectively, they reveal how a feminist vision of immigration law could center a commitment to equality and justice and foster a country where diverse newcomers readily flourish with dignity.

This volume, part of the Feminist Judgment Series, shows how feminist legal theory along with critical race theory and intersectional modes of critique might transform immigration law. Here, a diverse collection of scholars and lawyers bring critical feminist, race and intersectional insights to Supreme Court opinions that deal with the source of the power to regulate immigration, state and local regulation of immigration, citizenship law, racial discrimination, employment law, access to public education, the rights of criminal defendants, the detention of noncitizens, and more. Feminist reasoning values the perspectives of outsiders, exposes the deep-rooted bias in the legal opinions of courts, and illuminates the effects of ostensibly neutral policies that create and maintain oppression and hierarchy. One by one, the chapters in this book reimagine the norms that drive immigration policies and practices. In place of discrimination and subordination, the authors here demand welcome and equality. Where current law omits the voice and stories of noncitizens, the authors here center their lives and experiences. Collectively, they reveal how a feminist vision of immigration law could center a commitment to equality and justice and foster a country where diverse newcomers readily flourish with dignity.

This volume, part of the Feminist Judgment Series, shows how feminist legal theory along with critical race theory and intersectional modes of critique might transform immigration law. Here, a diverse collection of scholars and lawyers bring critical feminist, race and intersectional insights to Supreme Court opinions that deal with the source of the power to regulate immigration, state and local regulation of immigration, citizenship law, racial discrimination, employment law, access to public education, the rights of criminal defendants, the detention of noncitizens, and more. Feminist reasoning values the perspectives of outsiders, exposes the deep-rooted bias in the legal opinions of courts, and illuminates the effects of ostensibly neutral policies that create and maintain oppression and hierarchy. One by one, the chapters in this book reimagine the norms that drive immigration policies and practices. In place of discrimination and subordination, the authors here demand welcome and equality. Where current law omits the voice and stories of noncitizens, the authors here center their lives and experiences. Collectively, they reveal how a feminist vision of immigration law could center a commitment to equality and justice and foster a country where diverse newcomers readily flourish with dignity.

This volume, part of the Feminist Judgment Series, shows how feminist legal theory along with critical race theory and intersectional modes of critique might transform immigration law. Here, a diverse collection of scholars and lawyers bring critical feminist, race and intersectional insights to Supreme Court opinions that deal with the source of the power to regulate immigration, state and local regulation of immigration, citizenship law, racial discrimination, employment law, access to public education, the rights of criminal defendants, the detention of noncitizens, and more. Feminist reasoning values the perspectives of outsiders, exposes the deep-rooted bias in the legal opinions of courts, and illuminates the effects of ostensibly neutral policies that create and maintain oppression and hierarchy. One by one, the chapters in this book reimagine the norms that drive immigration policies and practices. In place of discrimination and subordination, the authors here demand welcome and equality. Where current law omits the voice and stories of noncitizens, the authors here center their lives and experiences. Collectively, they reveal how a feminist vision of immigration law could center a commitment to equality and justice and foster a country where diverse newcomers readily flourish with dignity.

Beyond Indian Law: documents the Rehnquist Court’s shift away from jurisprudence that permitted a sovereign people to control their own territory, and the people within it, and toward a ‘subjectivist approach’ that allows the Supreme Court to determine what Indian law ought to be. It places this shift within a broader narrative of the Court deviating from well-established interpretive principles. Getches ultimately critiques the signals the Rehnquist Court has sent in its existing jurisprudence and warns that future cases will see state interests prevail in their control of the reservation, attempts to protect Indians as sovereigns will fail, and that mainstream values will be protected.

There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause: illustrates how the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence has recognized the rights of states and placed new limits on the powers of the federal government, even while the courts have steadfastly deferred to the ‘plenary power’ of Congress in the area of Indian affairs. Clinton suggests that the plenary power doctrine is no longer consistent with a textualist reading of the Constitution, and urges instead an interpretation where there is no federal power over Indian tribes at all without their consent manifested through treaty.

Sovereignty and Illiberalism: introduces the reader to the different set of rights that are controlling upon tribal governments. The Constitution does not apply in Indian country. This means that tribes may use their inherent sovereignty to do things that appear to intrude on the legal protections of their members. Riley’s piece confronts this tension directly by exploring competing sympathies: tribal sovereignty and civil rights.

Marshalling Past and Present: provides an introduction to the Marshall Trilogy, the foundational set of Indian law Supreme Court opinions. These cases announced a presumption that while Congress has plenary power in the area of Indian affairs, that which it has never taken away remains among the inherent power of tribes. Frickey questions whether the modern court is remaining faithful to these principles and explores the implications for Indian country should the presumption of inherent tribal power be eroded.

A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: documents instances in which modern US Supreme Court decisions depart from historic first principles. The article demonstrates that many of these changes have come in cases involving individuals who are not members of the tribe in question. Frickey documents that the result has been a profound encroachment upon the Indian canons, thus eliminating the foundational interpretational principles that made federal Indian law unique.