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Spinoza responds to the charge of atheism and the accompanying insinuation that his philosophy is irreligious by arguing that philosophy are theology distinct and autonomous practices. Each operates in accordance with its own epistemological standards and neither is the handmaid of the other. However, many of his readers have found his defense of this position unconvincing. Spinoza, they have claimed, awards priority to philosophy by endowing it with the authority to judge religion. In this chapter, I examine Spinoza’s response to their accusation. Religion, as he portrays it, can take various forms, of which the religion revealed in Scripture is one, and Spinozist philosophy is another. The shift from a theological to a philosophical mode of enquiry is not a move from a religious to a non-religious outlook, but a transition from one form of religious practice to another. This conclusion may disappoint critics who regard Spinoza as a predominantly secular philosopher, but I argue that they misidentify the nature of his radicalism. Spinoza undoubtedly aims to challenge the dominant religions of his time; but he also aspires to illuminate a form of religion that does justice to a philosophical understanding of God.
The empiricist legacy of John Locke developed in various directions in the British Romantic period, especially informing the movement known as theological utilitarianism, which taught ethics based on prudence and sought evidences for a benevolent, Christian God as designer of the world. This approach was challenged, however, above all by the idealism of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who drew on Platonic and recent German sources. Further, newly translated Hindu texts influenced both metaphysical speculation and practical recommendations of a life of moderation and self-denial, including in the work of several female novelists in the period.
Chapter 12 ties together the book’s central themes and highlights its main contributions. It argues that the Revolutionary Guards have endeavored to write the history of the Iran-Iraq War because of the way the Guards view the importance and meaning of the conflict in Iran today, the way they understand the nature and dynamism of history, and their commitment to what they view as the historical imperative of keeping the war alive.
This chapter examines contemporary responses to utilitarianism as a political tradition, and, contrary to accepted wisdom, argues that Bentham’s theory of utility was circumstantially and thus historically relative. It asks why Bentham has been perceived as both an ahistorical and an antihistorical thinker, despite his engagement with the ‘Enlightened’ historicisms of the eighteenth century: with Montesquieu, Barrington, Kames, and others. While he denied that history possessed an independent value that could determine or even effectively structure politics, we should not mistake these arguments for an unwillingness to contemplate politics historically, or to make occasionally significant concessions to time and place. Bentham’s point, rather, was that historical truths were categorically distinct from philosophical ones, and that sciences historiques observed the past while sciences philosophiques appraised it. The chapter also addresses Bentham’s overlooked work as a ‘historiographer’ who performed recognisably historical tasks, including the examination of evidence and the passing of historical judgements
This first comprehensive account of the utilitarians' historical thought intellectually resituates their conceptions of philosophy and politics, at a time when the past acquired new significances as both a means and object of study. Drawing on published and unpublished writings - and set against the intellectual backdrops of Scottish philosophical history, German and French historicism, romanticism, positivism, and the rise of social science and scientific history - Callum Barrell recovers the depth with which Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, George Grote, and John Stuart Mill thought about history as a site of philosophy and politics. He argues that the utilitarians, contrary to their reputations as ahistorical and even antihistorical thinkers, developed complex frameworks in which to learn from and negotiate the past, inviting us to rethink the foundations of their ideas, as well as their place in - and relationship to - nineteenth-century philosophy and political thought.
This introductory chapter examines the scope and range of wonder and the marvellous between Homer and the Hellenistic period, explores the significance of ancient conceptions of wonder in the modern literary critical tradition and outlines this book’s theoretical underpinnings and the scope and content of the subsequent chapters.
This concluding epilogue consists of three diverse case studies which both sum up many of the main continuities and differences in the treatment of wonder in Greek literature and culture from Homer to the early Hellenistic period and simultaneously point towards some further directions for the study of wonder in antiquity and beyond.
I begin by giving an outline sketch of the psychopathic personality and setting out the central problem of the book: how should we respond to such a person and their actions, either at an interpersonal or a societal level? Should we blame or praise them, or hold other reactive attitudes towards them such as resentment or indignation, or should we treat them ‘objectively’, as a problem to be solved? If psychopaths are to be punished by society, could this be on the basis of desert and retribution, or only of considerations such as deterrence or the prevention of harm? In short, are they morally responsible? I consider and then reject a suggestion that this question can be settled a priori, based on the idea that conclusions based on psychopaths’ behaviour cannot without circularity be used to explain that behaviour. I then sketch the central argument of the book: 1. A person cannot be held responsible for failing to act on reasons that she is unable to recognise as reasons. 2. Psychopaths are unable to recognise reasons for action stemming from the interests, needs and concerns of others. 3. Hence, they are not responsible for failing to act on them.
In the concluding chapter, I summarise again the central argument of the book and the evidence I have offered at various stages in support of it. I take care to set out the limitations of this argument as well as its conclusions: the limited set of reasons, to which psychopaths are not responsible for responding, and the limited class of people to whom my conclusions apply, namely those who have a severe lack of empathy stemming from birth or childhood. Finally, I point to some issues which would require additional argument: whether society would be justified in pre-emptively incarcerating psychopaths, and whether people who exhibit psychopathic traits to a lesser degree might as a result have diminished responsibility.
This article aims at proposing a solution to one of the well-known textual cruces in Lucretius’ De rerum natura. After a brief survey of the suggested emendations, the author will shed some fresh light on Manning's gratus, which recent editors have curiously neglected. The idea that the old man should retire from life with thanks is not uncommon among classical writers. In addition, parallel expressions are also found in Epicurus’ own words. This article concludes that gratus is what we would expect in the last line of Nature's admonition in De rerum natura and, therefore, the most probable emendation.
Having found a way to justify a world of state-machines, German lawyers thought about how to manage those machines so as to produce "happiness", which would eventually be understood to include the freedom of the nation and its members. At the University of Göttingen from 1734 onwards ius naturae et gentium eventually produced four specialised idioms: empirical state-science, economics, philosophy and modern law of nations, each opening a distinct way to address an increasingly international world. Among legal professionals, the view of the law of nations as the formalisation of European diplomacy became generally accepted. But the most influential aspect of the German debates concerned the role of the state in realising freedom in conditions of political modernity. Individual rights were to be reconciled with the flourishing of the nation; the state was to adopt its historically appropriate position in relationship to expanding bourgeois civil society. The search for a new vocabulary to address such features of modernity persuaded international lawyers finally to settle on “civilisation”, as will be briefly noted in the Epilogue.
A communication gap exists between psychiatry and indigenous people about views of mind and mental health, which often becomes an obstacle to optimal care and a source of distrust.
We aimed to explore the utility of the concept of two-eyed seeing for facilitating communication among traditional cultural practitioners (TCP) and conventional mental health practitioners (CMHP).
“Two-eyed seeing” is spreading across North America as a metaphor for explanatory pluralism. Albert Marshall, a M’iqmaq from Nova, Scotia, Canada, developed this traditional concept (eptuamptamuk in M’iqmaq) to speak to the idea that indigenous knowledge is as valid as contemporary science for conceptualizing phenomena. We taught the concept to 100 practitioners, equally balanced between CMHP’s and TCP’s, and obtained ongoing feedback about the results of their applying these ideas to their ongoing collaborations. Qualitative research methods were used to evaluate this feedback.
Using the two-eyed seeing concept allowed CMHP’s to better listen to TCP’s descriptions of their concepts of mind and of mental suffering. TCP’s felt more respected by CMHP’s. While concepts such as spirit visitation, the breaking of taboos, and intergenerational curses are inherently foreign to CMHP’s, the two-eyed seeing concept allowed them to bracket these ideas as interesting and to interact with the TCP in a more productive way, while allowing them to observe the effects of the TCP’s interventions in a less judgmental way.
Two-eyed seeing allowed a rich dialogue between CMHP’s and TCP’s that enabled each to appreciate the other’s perspectives, leading to greater cooperation and collaborative treatment. Outcomes improved.
Usually, Plato is not considered a philosopher that comprehensively treated the matter of suicide. By studying Plato’s work (especially Crito, Phaedo, the Republic and the Laws), we observe that Plato was concerned with the problem of suicide and that he gave an elaborate answer regarding the problem of suicide, laws against its practice as well as exceptions from them, customs and punishments.
This paper, in the light of a trial to overcome the monistic approaches of the matter of suicide, proposes the modest but fundamental goal to point out the resemblance between Plato’s position (especially from the Laws and the Republic) regarding the matter of suicide and the nowadays reasons invoked by the patients requesting assisted suicide.
Looking at the patients from the United States of America which requested assisted suicide, by analyzing the available annual reports (at the time of writing this abstract, only 6 out of 9 states that have a legal status that permits assisted suicide are publishing annual reports regarding the patients and their assisted suicide requests), we compare them with Plato’s attitude towards suicide.
We observe that the most invoked reasons (concerns and underlying illnesses), by the patients wich request assisted suicide, are also the cases in which Plato permitted suicide.
This comparison and insight into Plato’s philosophy does not resolve any particular issues of the medical praxis but is binging out the utility of a multidisciplinary, especially philosophical and ethical, approach to the practice of assisted suicide.
Since Ancient Times, Man has tried to analyze the passage of time, looking for repetitions, relating them to space to build a notion of a mechanical and chronological time. The idea and problem of time play a central role in both modern philosophy and psychiatry. Many authors contributed to the notion of “lived time” and placed the focus on how time is lived and perceived by the individual. Even though the notion of “time assimilated in space” has an important role in psychiatric nosology, the “lived time” has a psychopathological impact and is a field of study and debate.
This work aims to acknowledge the relevance of the experience of temporal structures (past, present and future) and how they relate to psychopathology.
We did a non-systematic literature revision in the main databases.
Phenomenological psychopathology has been profoundly interested in the philosophical discussions on the nature of time and its relation with the subject’s experience and condition. For instance, the melancholic experience, the maniac experience and the schizophrenic experience constitute changes in how time structures are perceived and lived by the individual.
Temporality has drawn attention to researchers from many different areas of study, having as of this day many approaches possible. It is important to know those contributions and conceptualizations in order to improve as a clinician.
The Introduction to Morality as Legislation: Rules and Consequences explains the difference between a situated perspective where a person asks which act should be performed in a particular instance and a legislative perspective where one asks what rule should apply to a whole class of people in given circumstances. The legislative perspective seems to have advantages in terms of coming to more plausible moral conclusions but does not fit neatly into either consequentialist or Kantian categories as it uses consequentialist considerations to select among possible rules while being unable to explain why the question “which rule?” is the relevant question on purely consequentialist grounds. The Introduction describes four different dimensions along which conceptions of the legislative perspective can vary and two contextual dimensions as to where it is employed: political and nonpolitical contexts and legislative and nonlegislative contexts. The Introduction clarifies the goals of the book and provides summaries of the following chapters.
Chapter 4 is an English translation of an interview (geidan) with Kamigata storyteller Hayashiya Somemaru IV (b. 1949), with whom the author informally apprenticed from 2010 to 2012. This chapter offers readers an inside look at Kamigata rakugo and invaluable insight from one of the art’s respected masters.
In the twentieth century, secular philosophers explicitly defended rule-utilitarian theories as alternatives to act-utilitarian theories that, they believed, led to implausible moral conclusions. This approach was powerfully criticized by people like David Lyons and J. J. C. Smart who thought rule-consequentialism was paradoxical because it awarded rules a weight that could not be justified on consequentialist grounds. In the mid- to late twentieth century there were philosophers who attempted to challenge the boundaries of utilitarian orthodoxy by expressly using nonconsequentialist moral premises to justify the shift to a legislative rather than situated perspective. The focus on the failure of rule-utilitarianism in terms of strict utilitarian orthodoxy has obscured the importance of hybrid theories that draw on both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist premises. A number of thinkers who are classified as rule-utilitarians (and sometimes criticized for betraying utilitarian orthodoxy) in fact expressly acknowledged nonutilitarian aspects to their theories (including R. M. Hare and John Harsanyi). The chapter ends with a summary of the main historical claims of Part I.
This chapter uncovers the meaning of altruism. First, an understanding of the essence of altruism is garnered from the consideration of a wide range of scholarship from different disciplines. Certain common themes of the concept are identified. Second, the connection between altruism and cosmopolitanism is revealed in an effort to show how altruistic behaviour between people from different countries can develop. Third, the influence of altruism in legal systems at the domestic level is considered by having reference to major studies that have analysed manifestations of altruism in European and US private law regimes. Other references to altruism or related concepts in international legal scholarship are also explored.
Interest in the concept of moral injury among researchers, clinicians and policy makers can have undesirable consequences that are rarely considered. It can lead to misunderstanding of post-traumatic stress disorder, risks of primary and secondary gains for affected individuals and tertiary gains for third parties. This editorial calls for critical assessment of this sensitive matter.
Strands of thought in the philosophy of mind offer another way of looking at the nature of mental illness and how it arises from intense emotional states. Analysing the phenomenon of wonder is suggested as a novel approach to explaining delusions and variations in insight.